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 Th is is not your usual run-of-the-mill entrepreneurial business book. 
 Th e authors are going after nothing short of a transformation in the 
African business environment, specifi cally in Kenya. Th ere are scores of 
books on innovation and entrepreneurship, but this one is clearly focus-
ing on what could make Kenya tick in an age of innovation and rapidly 
evolving technology. 
 Kenyans, along with many of their fellow Africans, have leapfrogged 
into the modern, smartphone world without passing through the his-
torical wire-line telephone stage. Th e economics of mobile telephony are 
diff erent from those of older forms of telephony—and, of course, a smart-
phone is  much more than a telephone. It is a general-purpose computer 
that can access the Internet, run local programs, serve as a remote con-
troller, and tell users where they are with the Global Positioning System, 
among myriad other tasks—and, by the way, make telephone calls. 
 But this book is not just about mobiles. In fact, it is mostly  not about 
mobile technology. It is primarily about fostering innovation, harness-
ing talent, gathering capital, fi nding or defi ning markets, and asking the 
right questions. It is also about the for-profi t and nonprofi t world and the 
roles each can play in an economy. Th e authors do not duck the challenge 
of government policy when it comes to competition. Th e book wrestles 
with the relative merits of domestic and international market making—
for every country, participation in the global market has a larger potential 
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than any domestic market, but for entrepreneurs just starting out, local 
sales may at fi rst be much easier to close than global ones. 
 What I particularly like about the book are the dialogues with prom-
inent entrepreneurs, investors, and thinkers in Africa. Th ese give very 
concrete examples of what has been done and how it was done. Th eir 
pragmatic examples provide essential guideposts for fulfi lling the promise 
of African innovation. Adapting to the unique and varied strengths and 
characteristics of the continent is a vital ingredient to business success. 
Th is book has set my mind buzzing with possibilities—and I hope yours 
will react the same way. 
 Vinton   G.   Cerf 
 Vincent “Vint” Cerf is an American Internet pioneer, celebrated as one 
of the “fathers of the Internet” and active today in many organizations 
that are working to help the Internet deliver humanitarian value. 
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 “ Digital Kenya is a candid look at the backstory of Kenya’s celebrated 
entrepreneurial revolution. It combines insightful analysis with hon-
est conversations in the unique voices of the nation’s tech leaders. A 
sober look at Kenya’s dream of becoming the ‘Silicon Savannah’ — 
and an essential guide to the new African narrative.” 
 — Bob Collymore, CEO, Safaricom, Kenya 
 “Insightful, thorough, and revealing.  Digital Kenya thrusts the 
nation’s tech entrepreneurs, policymakers, fi nanciers, and thought 
leaders into the limelight. How is Kenya transforming itself into an 
unprecedented world tech leader? What historical, cultural, and 
other barriers is it facing? Will it succeed?  Digital Kenya tells all from 
a truly African perspective.” 
 — Joseph Mucheru, Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Information 
and Communications, Kenya 
 Praise for this Book 
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 “Th is book just will change your vision of what’s possible in life, 
when people dare to think big.  Digital Kenya explores the country’s 
astounding emergence as a tech powerhouse on the world stage — 
and the challenges still ahead. It’s comprehensive, colorful, and 
one-of-a-kind.” 
 — Victor Kyalo, Principal Secretary, Ministry of Information 
and Communications, Kenya 
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 Digital Kenya is a book of arguments and ideas. Some of these may reso-
nate with your views, others may confl ict, and some may be counter-
intuitive making you want to brush them away or write an immediate 
e-mail to the author or editors. All that is fi ne and intended! 
 We have set out to create this volume not only to document a story 
that has received global attention but also to ignite a conversation about 
the historical, cultural, social, economic, and political dynamics at play 
in one particular country in Africa. To narrow the focus, the book inves-
tigates the entrepreneurial revolution as it is unfolding today in Kenya’s 
technology sector. In this sense, the book risks seeming static, quickly 
outdated, and incomplete, especially during the current period of rapid 
transformation. But it can also be an important repository—a guide, 
really—that provides a stable reference point, refl ecting where Kenya’s 
changes have been coming from and where they are headed. Th e book, 
then, is a snapshot, an attempt to capture some of Kenya’s remarkable 
complexity at the present moment and to bring to life a life-changing 
conversation that started in Kenya but that is ready to spill over into 
other countries on the continent and around the world. Th ere is a lot to 
talk about! 
 To add further to the inherent interest of the book’s topic, we pushed 
the authors (and ourselves) to formulate a specifi c argument underly-
ing each chapter instead of just describing the facts of how Kenya’s ICT 
 Note to t he Reader 
xviii Note to the Reader
 sector is shaping up. We spoke with 14 key fi gures in the fi eld to get a 
sense of the burning issues that matter to them, and in the end, the book 
was written jointly by professionals and scholars. Hence, the chapters 
vary in their balance of practice and theory. Despite the natural diffi  cul-
ties of speaking to both audiences at the same time, we believe that a 
stronger tie between practice and academic scholarship is, in fact, crucial 
for the socioeconomic development of Africa. 
 Digital Kenya is full of opinions, full of life, right down to the intro-
duction and concluding notes. Every chapter went through a rigorous 
review process, with multiple feedback loops among the authors, edi-
tors, and external reviewers, to ensure high quality. And everything in 
the book is purposefully as rich in detail as we could make it—waiting 
to be discovered by readers like you, disassembled, checked for validity, 
and reassembled to build new arguments that fuel future conversations. 
We are moving forward to uncover new terrain, and we want to take 
you along. 
 Having said all that, we are also conscious of the unique historical 
conditions that societal life in Africa is embedded in. We have therefore 
followed the academic leadership of other scholars (see Nkomo 2011) 
and, throughout the book, have placed the word “Africa” conceptu-
ally (if not literally) in quotation marks in recognition of the fact that 
Africa was an invention of colonial powers (Mudimbe 1988)—as was 
well described by Mwalimu Ali Mazrui (1993), who said, “Th e shock of 
colonialism and imperialism had awakened Africans to the fact that in 
relation to the Western oppressors, Africans were  one ”—and to follow 
the many other cultural leaders who continue to remind the world that 
Africa is not a country. 
 Th anks to the generosity of the Ford Foundation, this publication is 
free of charge and accessible to anyone with a laptop, an energy source, 
and Wi-Fi. We deliberately refrained from confi ning ourselves to tradi-
tional publication models, because we seek to make the information and 
insights off ered in these pages available to the many, benefi ting many 
audiences, rather than just to the few. Indeed, we tried to create a book 
that attracts and refl ects a particularly broad range of diverse interests 
and readerships. Th e book will be a handy companion for all those who 
are new to technology entrepreneurship in Kenya and Africa. It will be 
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a muse for those seeking guidance, inspiration, and a frank look behind 
the scenes at one of Africa’s most successful technology scenes. And last 
but not least, it will be an uplifting bedtime read with under-your-pillow 
potential for those who see true value in—and might even wish to partic-
ipate in—working on the grand future challenges, facing Kenya, Africa, 
and the rest of the world today. 
 Although we are academics by profession, we have tried to bring 
together chapters and written conversation sections in an accessible and 
comprehensible style to convey context-specifi c information and high- 
impact recommendations—and to outline a path for future research that 
we hope will help inspire the next generation of Kenyans as they take 
up their work where others have left off . Our purpose is to share rich 
knowledge and bold new notions with you in the dawn of an increasingly 
global quest for answers, both in Africa and around the rest of the world. 
 To us,  Digital Kenya is a treasury of ideas. We hope you will agree—
and enjoy reading it. Th ank you for picking up a copy. 
 Nairobi and Köln  Bitange   Ndemo 
 August 2016  Tim   Weiss 
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been possible without a large number of enthusiastic individuals who 
joined in to write, answer our questions, donate their time, take photo-
graphs, or fi nance this open-access publication. 
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 A paradigm shift is underway in Kenya. New innovations are destroy-
ing old ways of doing business, and smart young start-up entrepreneurs 
are at the forefront of this quiet but historic transformation. Teams of 
skilled developers and programmers have sprung up in innovation hubs, 
incubators, and accelerators across the country to build information and 
telecom solutions that capitalize on the country’s mix of challenges and 
opportunities. At the same time, we have seen a number of spinoff s of 
Kenya’s unique entrepreneurial revolution reach across Africa and into 
other corners of the world, attracting global recognition for the country. 
 Digital Kenya addresses the many diff erent aspects of these technologi-
cal changes, innovations, and entrepreneurial activities, including  policy 
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formulation, impediments, and opportunities. It is the fi rst book to 
chronicle the digital entrepreneurship revolution in Africa and describe 
how it has emerged in the face of high unemployment rates, poverty, lack 
of technological infrastructure, and disparate cultural interpretations of 
entrepreneurialism and risk taking. In this context, the book heralds a 
new way of thinking about and understanding emergent opportunities in 
the digital world and how best to exploit them in the face of signifi cant 
developmental challenges. 
 Th e book also shows how the paradigm shift that facilitated Kenya’s 
digital revolution was the result of a number of overlapping factors. For 
one, India’s experience and policy framework served as a benchmark and 
source of inspiration for growth in the face of real challenges. As in India, 
innovators in Kenya learned that information and communications tech-
nology (ICT) had great potential to help propel the country out of unem-
ployment and poverty. Th e percentage of Kenyans in gainful employment 
compared with those actively seeking employment has been estimated at 
40 percent. Th e World Bank reported that of the Kenyan 800,000 youth 
(ages 15–35) that join the labor market every year, only 50,000 secure 
a job. Some 70 percent of them are unemployed. But rather than view 
youth unemployment as the ticking time bomb it is often described as, 
a number of innovators have used the platforms created by ICT as a 
strategy to absorb large numbers of well-educated unemployed youth and 
thus to contribute to economic growth.  Digital Kenya reviews the many 
diff erent ways this was achieved and the challenges faced along the way. 
 In addition, the book describes the development of pro- entrepreneurialism 
policies and partnerships in Kenya. A simple fi ve-point policy became a key 
driver of the shift—focusing on the development of ICT infrastructure, 
leveraging of ubiquitous mobile platforms to build applications, creation of 
local content, building of human resource capacity, development of pub-
lic–private partnerships, and creation of employment opportunities for the 
growing youth population—with the result that Kenya’s policy environ-
ment has slowly become a conduit for successful ICT development. 
 Th e laying of the fi rst fi ber-optic cable on the Eastern Seaboard of 
Africa, the TEAMS cable, it will be shown, was another crucial step 
and heralded a new chapter for cheaper telecommunication access. 
With it, opportunities to mainstream Internet access were created, such 
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as subsidizing broadband for all universities and creating start-up hubs 
where entrepreneurs had access to high-speed Internet. 
 Soon new Web applications (apps) were being created. M-PESA, the 
money-transferring app, capitalized on the fact that only 5 percent of 
the Kenyan population had access to bank accounts and created a solu-
tion that revolutionized citizens’ fi nancial freedom. Th e post-election 
violence of 2007–2008 also brought some unexpected innovation when 
a small group consisting of Erik Hersman, Ory Okolloh, Juliana Rotich, 
and David Kobia began to collect eyewitness reports of violence from 
emails and text messages and upload them to Google Maps, giving rise 
to Ushahidi (Swahili for “testimony” or “witness”), a groundbreaking 
information-gathering, visualization, and interactive mapping tool that 
is now used around the globe. Ushahidi, along with M-PESA, changed 
the minds of even the doubters that it was possible for innovation to 
stimulate world-class entrepreneurialism in Kenya. 
 Although the landing of the cable was a foundational step in Kenya’s 
emergent entrepreneurial revolution, the opening up of public data was 
equally important. Kenya developed the Kenya Open Data Initiative, a 
portal to fuel new apps and new enterprises. Civil society, through the 
online discussion portal KICTANet, began to push for additional data 
sets and raised many additional policy issues beyond a mere call for data. 
Other factors, such as investments in research and seed capital for social 
enterprises provided by institutions such as the Rockefeller Foundation, 
propelled Kenya’s many ICT programs and projects in ways that involved 
and empowered the less fortunate. 
 The Purpose 
 Digital Kenya seeks to bring into perspective the ongoing debate about 
adoption of disruptive ICTs not just in Kenya but throughout the world. 
Kenya is not new to disruption, considering the fact that our own innova-
tions, such as M-PESA, Ushahidi, BRCK, and BitPesa, are causing dis-
ruptions in other parts of the world—and that many more Kenyan-led 
innovations are underway. To ensure that Kenya and Africa continue to 
contribute to this important growth, we must open up the conversation 
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about entrepreneurialism and risk and be supportive of disruptions com-
ing from elsewhere. Th e ICT revolution is a global and competitive phe-
nomenon that is heralding a new paradigm of creativity and innovation 
in virtually every part of the world. In fact, by the time this book goes 
to press, there will be hundreds of new apps on the market and nations 
newly acceding to disruptive change—alongside new movements to 
restrict rapid technological advancement. 
 It is hoped that the book will help policymakers approach policy dif-
ferently than they have done in the past. Looking at policy from various 
perspectives—such as the entrepreneurial approaches explored in Chap. 
 1 , “Inside a Policymaker’s Mind: An Entrepreneurial Approach to Policy 
Development and Implementation,” by the author of the present chapter 
(and co-editor of the book)—as a strategy for dealing with some of the 
more pressing challenges could revolutionize how we tackle development 
challenges in general and help the world make real progress toward the 
United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals. Opening access to hos-
pital registry records, for example—which can help researchers discover 
new patterns of diseases and ultimately improve health systems across the 
globe—is one such strategy. 
 When historians write Africa’s digital story, Kenya will likely assume 
its place as the cradle of ICT revolution on the continent. Never before 
has an African nation gone through a disruption such as the digital trans-
formation that is still underway in Kenya. With so much creativity and 
innovation going on, the nation is witnessing a gigantic paradigm shift. It 
is a revolution of a kind that is empowering ordinary citizens and reshap-
ing their communities and lifestyles, heralding a new way of thinking 
about and understanding entrepreneurial opportunities and how to 
exploit them. 
 Chapter Overview 
 Digital Kenya investigates the power of technology in Kenya to help 
strengthen every sector and of entrepreneurship as the key driver in innova-
tion creativity and disruption. Th e book records the  so-far- undocumented 
story of technology start-ups, entrepreneurship, and policymakers that 
have been on the forefront of ushering in a new era for Kenya. 
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 Th e words “creativity” and “innovation” were uncommon in Kenya 
and in Africa until the advent of the digital age and thus mark how far 
we have come. In 1982, the Kenyan government banned the use of com-
puters in public offi  ces for fear that the new technology would take away 
secretarial jobs. Today, virtually every public offi  ce has computers—with 
more people than in the past engaged in their use—to enhance service 
delivery. Chapter  2 , “Th e Internet Journey for Kenya: Th e Interplay of 
Disruptive Innovation and Entrepreneurship in Fueling Rapid Growth,” 
by Muriuki Mureithi, takes us back to this time and gives the historical 
background of the foundation of the digital revolution in Kenya. In doing 
so, it describes the evolution of the digital enterprise and also presents the 
signifi cant challenges of the day, including new competition, changing 
customer engagement and business models, unprecedented transparency, 
privacy concerns, and cybersecurity threats. 
 Although most research on the role of the digital economy in eco-
nomic development has focused on the “digital divide,” Chap.  2 also 
describes how new research is linking digital transformation to faster eco-
nomic growth in much the way the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, 
South Korea, and Taiwan) did with industrialization. African countries 
have incorporated (information and communications technology - or 
technologies) ICTs in their development planning—or “vision”—poli-
cies. Kenya’s Vision 2030, for example, promotes ICT as one of the fl ag-
ship areas to help the nation realize its vision. 
 Chapter  3 , “Th e KINGS of Africa’s Digital Economy,” by Erik M. K. 
Osiakwan, describes the history behind the frontrunners in ICT transfor-
mation in Africa: Kenya, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Ghana, and South Africa, 
designating them as the “KINGS.” Th e chapter argues that, like the 
Asian Tigers, the KINGS will lead the continent’s technology innovation, 
thanks to their rapid growth and high-tech entrepreneurship, setting the 
pace for the rest of the continent. 
 Market Opportunities 
 Africa presents a sea of economic opportunities in virtually every sector, 
and the continent’s (comparatively youthful) population structure com-
pared with that of other parts of the world is an enormous opportunity 
1 The Paradigm Shift 5
in this digital era. Th e demand for online services is increasing, including 
the digitization of records to improve data visibility. Th ese are all areas 
that will require a young, educated population—which is now abundant 
in many African countries. Chapter  4 , “Addressing Voids: How Digital 
Start-ups in Kenya Create Market Infrastructure,” by Marissa Drouillard, 
seeks to unlock the hidden market opportunities presented by market- 
enabling digital platforms. It reviews various market-enabling digital 
platforms in Kenya brought to light through research on digital entre-
preneurship ecosystems, fi nding examples where Kenyan digital start-ups 
have achieved success in breaking down traditional barriers and off ering 
better value propositions to customers. 
 Th e combination of knowledge and technologies makes a power-
ful tool for change. Chapter  5 , “Reimagine What You Already Know: 
Toward New Solutions to Longstanding Problems,” by Jay Larson and 
Michael Munger, argues that knowledge and technology combined can 
change societies dramatically, creating opportunities that were previously 
unthinkable. African nations now stand on the threshold of revolution-
ary changes based on ICTs, especially mobile platforms, and the chapter 
makes a strong case for why education needs to be reimagined from the 
ground up. Once society takes education out of the four walls of the tra-
ditional classroom into homes, libraries, Internet cafés, and city streets, 
a completely new learning experience becomes possible—an experience 
that innovators need to harness now in order to leverage our digital 
potential. 
 Th e private sector has had interesting engagements with the ICT sec-
tor in Kenya, specifi cally through social entrepreneurship. Chapter  6 , 
“I-Entrepreneurship: Changing Lives through Technology,” by Carmen 
Merab Wamukoya and Amolo Ng’weno, examines the growth of social 
entrepreneurship in Kenya and demonstrates how businesses can create 
shared value in the fi eld of technology. It illustrates the role of impact 
sourcing as a means of generating employment through an examination 
of Digital Divide Data, Kenya’s innovative ICT program for the training 
and education of disadvantaged youth. It also reviews the potential of 
ICTs to transform businesses and provide an enabling environment for 
the development of technology-based social enterprises. 
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 Customizing a complex technology to local environments makes it 
simpler and more relevant even in the most unexpected areas. Today, 
even the poorest citizens in shantytown areas participate in social media, 
which has given rise to new approaches to communication. Chapter  7 , 
“From Cyber Café to Smartphone: Kenya’s Social Media Lens Zooms In 
on the Country and Out to the World,” by Mark Kaigwa, explores the 
expressions of the “connected Kenyan.” Often used by Kenyans online, 
it is the common denominator in all of the other chapters of the book. 
It seeks to answer questions such as what happens once a Kenyan comes 
onto the grid of Internet connectivity—be it smartphone or cyber. What 
is his or her experience, how do they fi nd their way, and what becomes 
important to them? What is to be said for the digital spaces of commu-
nity and expression that have emerged and become part of the fabric of 
how information now travels? Th e chapter addresses these questions and 
argues that it is not enough to be connected: It is also how you are con-
nected and how the news, for instance, fi nds you that defi nes the depth 
of ICT penetration in a community. 
 The Inner Life of Technology Entrepreneurship 
in Kenya 
 To foster greater opportunity, Kenya has sought to develop an ICT eco-
system—which was soon dubbed the “Silicon Savannah”—in Konza, 60 
kilometers south of Nairobi. Th is project seeks to address the problems 
of disjointed development, in which research communities rarely interact 
with industry, for example, and even less with policymakers. Chapter 
 8 , “Building ICT Entrepreneurship Ecosystems in Resource-Scarce 
Contexts: Learnings from Kenya’s ‘Silicon Savannah,’” by Johannes 
Ulrich Bramann, explores how ICT entrepreneurship ecosystems can 
be  established in resource-scarce contexts, such as a scarcity of fi nancial 
resources, established ICT sectors, and relevant human capital. It sheds 
light on the evolution of Kenya’s ICT ecosystem and examines the barri-
ers and subsequent enabling processes encountered when growing an ICT 
ecosystem in a resource-scarce context, providing a holistic perspective 
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on the barriers and enablers encountered in the areas of culture, human 
capital, fi nance, policy, entrepreneurial support systems, and markets. 
 Many countries in the Global North off er a variety of incentives for 
start-ups. Yet African countries have not, so far, been able to  encourage 
or support start-ups in the same way. Chapter  9 , “Th e Challenges of 
Technology Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets: A Case Study in 
Nairobi,” by Marlen de la Chaux and Angela Okune, investigates why 
the creation of technology start-ups in Nairobi has remained challenging 
despite support from an increasing number of innovation hubs and seed 
capital investors. Th e authors look at three diff erent groups—entrepre-
neurs, innovation hubs, and seed capital investors—and expose the diver-
gent views among these groups that lead to contradiction, misalignment, 
and ambiguity in Kenya’s ICT industry. De la Chaux and Okune attri-
bute this phenomenon to the fact that the industry is still in an emergent 
state, with the result that the many stakeholders hold divergent views on 
the exact challenges—in the areas of fi nance, skills, and market readiness, 
for example—and how they need to be addressed, thereby inhibiting the 
development of a shared agenda for growth. 
 Chapter  10 , “Organizational Cultural Hybrids: Nonprofi t and 
For- Profi t Cultural Infl uences in the Kenyan Technology Sector,” by 
Eleanor R.  Marchant, builds the case that in order for progress to 
take place in the Kenyan technology sector, we need to move beyond 
the stale debate about whether non-profi t grant funding is good or 
bad—and instead fi nd ways to take advantage of the multiculturalism 
that exists in the sector. Th e chapter draws on existing theories about 
culture at organizations to demonstrate that even incubators, often 
associated with the for-profi t model that dominates the discourse, are 
not purely for-profi t when they are examined more holistically using 
the lens of cultural theory. Using Schein’s theory of the three levels 
of organizational culture—that is, observed behaviors and artifacts, 
espoused beliefs and values, and underlying assumptions—the chap-
ter demonstrates in a more nuanced way that cultural hybridity exists 
at key organizations in Kenya’s technology sector and how practices 
and behaviors of these organizations are shaped by their fundamental 
underlying assumptions. 
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 Managing the Fine Details of Doing Business 
in Kenya 
 Th ere are no longer confused arguments about why a country would, 
or would not, seek an ICT-enabled transformation. As Nagy Hanna in 
 Mastering Digital Transformation :  Towards a Smarter Society ,  Economy , 
 City and Nation explained, it is “through ubiquitous connectivity, digi-
tization of content and processes, crowdsourcing, collaborations, tools, 
knowledge networks, sensors, data capture and sharing, artifi cial intel-
ligence, and analytics, [that] ICT can help build innovative enterprises, 
mobilize local knowledge and problem solving, and make global knowl-
edge accessible to all. ICT can network actors and organizations across 
sectors and regions, build collaborative platforms to co-create develop-
ment solutions, and enable client-centric service delivery.” To achieve 
these benefi ts, there must be good leadership and an enabling dynamic 
policy environment. 
 Chapter  11 , “Inside a Policymaker’s Mind: An Entrepreneurial 
Approach to Policy Development and Implementation,” by the author 
of the present chapter, off ers an analysis of the policy process that led 
to the ICT boom in Kenya during President Mwai Kibaki’s adminis-
tration (2003–2013) and of the policy developments that spurred the 
highly successful innovations in the country’s ICT sector. Th e chapter 
explains the course of establishing the institutions that supported ICT 
entrepreneurship and describes the process involved in the making of 
far-reaching policies and analyzes, using three case studies in ICT policy 
development—the TEAMS fi ber-optic cable project, the M-PESA appli-
cation project, and the Posta land development project—and discusses 
their contributions to Kenya’s ICT boom, arguing that if there is any 
lesson to be learned from the Kenyan experience, it is that political will 
is by far the most important aspect of policy development. Countries 
in the Global South are replete with failed projects, in part because of a 
lack of political will. Th e chapter also describes how other factors, such 
as pro-activeness, innovative outside-the-box thinking, and an appetite 
for risk, played key roles in the success of the Kenyan ICT transforma-
tion process. 
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 International organizations seeking to collaborate with local orga-
nizations need more than an enabling policy environment. Th ey also 
need to understand local dynamics. Chapter  12 , “Th e Art of Managing 
Worldviews in Kenya’s International Technology Sector,” by Tim Weiss 
(co-editor of the present volume) and Klaus Weber, documents what a 
prospective investor needs to do to become successful in Kenya’s tech 
scene. It investigates if there is such a thing as a Kenyan recipe—a holy 
grail—for success. Th e research brings into focus two diff erent world-
views, a “Kenyan worldview” and an “international worldview,” that 
stand on diff erent sides of the question of how to do it “right.” Th is 
dynamic sheds light on the contested issues that have surfaced during 
Kenya’s international tech boom. However, it also shows that tension and 
contestation, if tackled with the right mindset, can also become oppor-
tunities. Th e chapter thus introduces the art of managing worldviews in 
order to help equip actors with new tools to work through challenges and 
infuse technology entrepreneurship with a unique Kenyan character. 
 Chapter  13 , “Developing Strategies to Harness the Power of Parallel 
Entrepreneurship in Africa,” by Eskor John, identifi es some of the most 
salient factors related to parallel entrepreneurship—factors that, if bet-
ter understood and supported, have the potential to make a signifi cant 
contribution to the transformation of Global South economies. It also 
explores the contextual factors contributing to the growth of entrepre-
neurship in Africa and the prevalence and implications of parallel entre-
preneurship. It concludes with a number of recommendations on how 
to support and develop parallel entrepreneurship in other contexts and 
countries. 
 Th e success of an enterprise depends on the ecosystem in which it 
operates. Leveraging primary and secondary sources, Chap.  14 , “Venture 
Capital in East Africa: Is Th ere a Right Model?,” by Stephen Gugu and 
Wilfred Mworia, seeks to establish if there a right model for venture capi-
tal in East Africa, concluding that the ideal model does not currently 
exist. Th e study suggests that the high cost of operating a fund in the 
region and the length of time it takes to fi nd, evaluate, and make invest-
ments are the top concerns among fund managers. In addition, fund 
managers in the region are called upon to take on roles that are atypical of 
conventional fund management, including, in particular, getting heavily 
10 B. Ndemo
involved in investees’ businesses. Th e authors conclude that in order to 
succeed, venture capital needs to adapt more eff ectively to suit the con-
text and characteristics of venturing in the region. 
 In Chap.  15 , “Entrepreneuring for Society: What is Next for Africa?” 
by Tim Weiss (co-editor of the present volume), the author weaves the 
chapters of the book and the conversations with thought leaders into a 
single narrative. He highlights key issues and trends, among them a pro-
found mindset change that is underway in Africa, aff ected through self- 
awareness and pro-activity. He goes on and revisits the cultural impact of 
state and non-governmental organisation (NGO) dependency, something 
that has been a critical barrier to innovation on the continent. In his critical 
inquiry on the entrepreneurial revolution he also asks: Which traditional 
norms and values should remain and which new ones should be incorpo-
rated and adopted to foster—rather than impede—societal development? 
Weiss then continues and expands on the mythical character inherent in 
the information age that exposes the deeper wish to level the playing fi eld 
through digital solutions albeit power continues to remain in the hands of 
a few global companies. Th is fallacy, however, he argues should not stop 
us from resolving challenges in the education sector, and advancing social 
impact. Rather a calls for a mindful creation and implementation of inno-
vations, critically assessing the intended and unintended consequences of 
change. He concludes with a roadmap for the years ahead, and with that 
introduces an intriguing discussion that places Africa’s response to various 
grand global challenges on the center stage. 
 Summary 
 Our aim with this book is to generate debate on the role of ICTs in eco-
nomic development through entrepreneurship. It is also intended to cre-
ate awareness of the emerging opportunities in ICT and to present new 
ways of exploiting them. Th ere is no doubt that ICTs are changing the 
African narrative: Africa is no longer the Dark Continent. Africa is rising. 
Th e rate of change in Africa today as a result of ICTs is unprecedented 
and cuts across all sectors. From innovations such as M-PESA to large- 
scale business process outsourcing developments, ICTs are creating jobs, 
1 The Paradigm Shift 11
addressing poverty, reducing inequality, and providing mechanisms to 
monitor and address the Sustainable Development Goals. Governments 
are becoming more productive, farmers are getting value for their pro-
duce, transportation is becoming more effi  cient, and education is increas-
ingly accessible and practical. External stakeholders are noticing, too. 
Multinational corporations are increasingly setting up research labora-
tories in Nairobi, and international policymakers are coming to Kenya 
to learn how we did it. Th ese are just a few examples of ICT’s impact in 
Kenya. Th ere will be even more promise if we continue to adopt ICT 
instead of fi ghting it. 
 We hope that  Digital Kenya will serve as a resource for those wishing to 




 Conversation #1 
 The Past, Present, and Future of the ‘Digital 
Nyika’: How to Fix an Aircraft in Flight 
 Jimmy Gitonga of Afroshok Media
 Jimmy Gitonga  took the scenic road to getting here. Having studied physics 
and applied mathematics at the University of Nairobi, he then studied elec-
tronics at Kenya Polytechnic. He ran a consumer and professional electronics 
fi rm, Audiophilia Electronics, that was involved in designing and installing a 
radio broadcast studio for WorldSpace (a global satellite radio network). 
He then veered into graphic design, web design, Flash development, and motion 
graphic—after which he went into animation, working on the pilot project of 
the British–Kenyan children’s television series Tingatinga Tales. Jimmy is a 
founding member of the ARK , a design house that developed the Zuku brand 
for the Wananchi Group and designed the iHub space. He was also a past iHub 
community lead, overseeing the growing membership base, and targeted pro-
grams toward team members, start-up, and how these members can deliver 
solutions to the enterprise and public sectors in Kenya and across Africa. Today, 
Jimmy runs Afroshok, his own boutique design fi rm, and is an iHub ambas-
sador involved in community projects. 
 Jimmy, what fascinates you about digital technology in Kenya? 
 Recently in Kenya, we witnessed a moderately sized exit through the pur-
chase of a technology start-up at about USD1.7 million. 1 Several months 
later, we had another kind of tech start-up exit, not in realization of dollars 
but in a failure of top management, brought about by what I would call 
culture and vision fi t issues. 2 During this period, I attended a number of 
seminars and industry events, and I began noticing interesting trends that 
aff ect how we, as Kenyans in particular and as Africans in general, are inter-
acting with digital technology and the proliferation of digital products. 
 Let us look at this in more detail. In Kenya, we can see a cultural transi-
tion happening as the generation that witnessed the independence of the 
country moves off  the stage. Th e generation born between 1970 and 1980 
saw the political realignment that came after the Cold War and has now 
grown up. Apartheid and its proxy wars came to an end as propped-up 
countries like Somalia and Yugoslavia collapsed. In the 1990s, Mandela 
became a global icon because of the Internet and easy access to it through 
personal computers. Th e personal computer and the Internet came to 
Africa especially with the backdrop of these global political realignments. 
Remember, the electronics giant Apple could not sell a certain model of 
computers to so-called “enemy states” of the USA. Th e mobile phone 
arrived on the scene in the 2000s, and now so has cyber- warfare, where 
1  See Moraa, Hilda. 2015.  A Kenyan Startup Journey: My 10 Key Lessons . 
2  See  https://medium.com/@brendawambui/corruption-in-the-silicon-savannah-9e393a00aa0e#
.8uz9dnugf . 
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politically opposed countries have taken their diff erences online. So the 
place of governments and the ICT sector are intertwined. 
 For most Kenyans, the mobile phone and the Internet arrived 
together—and the people picking up these two technologies are mostly 
below 35 years of age. 
 Jimmy, what would you say were the key milestones that brought 
Kenya’s ICT sector to where it is today? 
 I handled my fi rst computer at the University of Nairobi. Th ere was no 
degree in computer science then, just a post-graduate diploma. For pro-
gramming languages, we studied Basic, FORTRAN, and COBOL. We 
worked on Wang terminals connected to the university’s mainframe. I 
fi nished at the university and joined Kenya Polytechnic for a transition 
course to electronic engineering, where we studied everything related to 
“light [electrical] current” technology. I was equipped for the computer 
age in Kenya. Th e pre-Internet software development industry was also 
gaining traction at the time, with names like Lotus, FoxPro, and Dbase 
coming in. 
 Around this time, the Internet landed visibly in Kenya through a com-
pany of young Turks called Africa Online and an older-guard company 
called FORM-Net Africa. Almost anyone who has become prominent 
in the Internet space in Kenya came from or passed through these two 
companies. One thing that did not happen is the landing of fi ber-optic 
cables on the East African coast. Th e cables went round Southern Africa, 
passing Mauritius and landing in India. Kenya and other Eastern Africa 
countries would have to rely on expensive satellite Internet connections 
for another decade. 
 At the same time, most of Africa was in political upheaval as the Cold 
War period closed with the emergence of “multi-partism” and human 
rights. Th ese were attached to the Bretton Woods institutions’ Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that were implemented from the 1980s 
onward. Th e SAPs wiped out most of the social facilities that African 
countries had created after their independence. In Kenya, health and 
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education were hit hard. A system called Cost Sharing was introduced. A 
lot of people who had already been hammered by falling prices of local 
goods, due to liberalized markets, could not aff ord medication for their 
babies or schooling for their children. 
 Th e real Kenyan economy shrank relative to population growth with 
rural-to-urban migration growing earnestly. Nairobi’s population grew 
by over 61 percent between 1989 and 1999, compared with a 34 percent 
growth in the entire country. Th is is the time that Microsoft’s Windows 
95 spread and with it the Microsoft Offi  ce suite of packages. Computer 
manipulation skills were in demand, creating a market for computer- 
related training that was colloquially known as “learning packages.” Th is 
fed the need for alternative tertiary training for the urban immigrants 
and school-leavers as well as bringing current management executives in 
many companies up to digital speed. 
 By the time the Internet 1.0 dot-com bubble burst, in 2001, Kenya 
entered into a “Second Liberation” political era, with the end of the rule 
of the political party that had been in power for close to 40 years. Foreign 
investment and the eff ects of the privatization of state corporations con-
tinued, with the entry of mobile telephony networks in Kenya as well as 
most of Africa. Safaricom, a spin-off  from the state corporation Telkom 
Kenya, brought in aff ordable mobile connectivity to a country that had 
slightly over 320,000 fi xed lines at the time. By 2002, there were 500,000 
mobile phone users, and the growth has been in double-digit percentages 
ever since. 
 At this time, the Kenyan government removed importation-related 
taxes on mobile devices and computers. Th is allowed almost anyone to 
aff ord a mobile phone, and laptops began to be a common site at univer-
sities. Kenya’s then Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information 
and Communication, Doctor Bitange Ndemo, led a move to break away 
from the bureaucracy-plagued Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System 
and set up Th e East African Marine System (TEAMS) consortium. Once 
launched in 2009 and after a number of cable mishaps, the TEAMS 
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cable has upgraded its designed capacity from 640 Gbps to the current 
1200 Gbps, and Kenya—along with most East African countries—uses 
this cable because of its better transmission quality and reliability. Other 
cables have come in, too, leading to a total of four fi ber-optic cables in 
Mombasa. Access to the Internet has become a reality for many people. 
 In 2007, Vodafone, through Safaricom, launched the M-PESA money 
transfer platform. Since then, M-PESA has become the global leader in 
mobile money transfer and raised the possibility of Kenya and Africa 
being at the forefront of world m-commerce. Just a year later, the crisis 
crowdsourcing platform Ushahidi was created to monitor the increas-
ingly opaque Kenyan election scenario in early 2008. Th is platform then 
went on to become a globally recognized and used way to monitor crises. 
 In 2010, the fi rst tech community-led “hub” was opened. Th e iHub, 
which stands for “innovation Hub,” is a co-working and hacker space 
and, in its own words, “a nexus for technologists, investors, young entre-
preneurs, designers, researchers, and programmers.” Th e iHub was the 
pioneer among the numerous co-working and incubation spaces across 
Africa today. It is here and in other African technology, art/culture and 
co-working spaces that the question of the global positioning of the 
African digital entrepreneur began to be raised. 
 If Africa Online and FORM-Net Africa formed the fi rst wave of digi-
tal entrepreneurs and companies, these four events—the Kenyan govern-
ment’s genuine commitment to ICT, the M-PESA platform, Ushahidi, 
and the iHub—were the milestones in the making of the Kenyan tech-
nology landscape (with its new moniker, the Silicon Savannah). 
 What do you think of the Silicon Savannah’s future? What can we 
expect? 
 Th at is a good question. And such questions have started to be posed 
in the expounding of the vision of the Silicon Savannah. Is it possible 
or is it a dream, driven by the hype of tech-savvy Kenyans? Are these 
dreams realistic? What will it take to put Kenya and Africa on the global 
Conversation #1: Jimmy Gitonga of Afroshok Media 17
technological map? In Kenya, again, you can see the two parties in it, the 
government with its politico-economic agenda and the people’s relation-
ships with this as they go along doing their business. 
 As the initial media spotlight continues to dim, a number of funda-
mental issues about business anywhere are becoming apparent. Kenyan 
entrepreneurs do not yet have the requisite knowledge and commercial 
infrastructure to build globally recognized technology companies when 
compared with their Western counterparts. What is being asked of them 
is equivalent to fi xing an aircraft while yet in fl ight. Not only is the 
global technology landscape changing rapidly, but African entrepreneurs 
are being asked to stake their claim as it changes. And if that is based 
on the timeline of California’s Silicon Valley, then we are 50 years late 
to the party. 
 Being late to the party is one thing. But what are the underlying 
issues at play? 
 Africans seem to have a penchant for accepting foreign ideas and 
absorbing them without critically investigating their source, history, 
necessity, and workability in the context of the African space. Look at the 
words being used in the African technology environment—words like 
Silicon Savannah—and you can see that not a lot of thought was put into 
the connotation, as if the perception of the American Silicon Valley had 
been taken wholesale and simply plastered onto an African scenario. Th is 
way of thinking started some time ago, and Silicon Valley is just the most 
visible part of that iceberg. 
 Stepping back a bit, Africa’s destiny in the world began much ear-
lier and changed signifi cantly in the 1500s, when the Portuguese began 
sailing to Africa. At that time, Africa south of the Sahara could stand 
toe-to-toe with Europe in social, commercial, and military prowess. Th e 
Portuguese became the most active Europeans in Central Africa and met 
the Kingdoms of Kongo and Ndongo, among others, that were as good 
as the Portuguese were in diplomacy, war, and commerce. Th e Portuguese 
carried out the business of slavery in earnest to provide for the labor 
 necessary to conquer the new colony of Brazil. 
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 In order to gain a foothold in the kingdoms of Benin, Kongo, and 
Ndongo on the African western coast, a number of missionaries were sent 
to “Christianize” the Africans. One of the most important concepts was 
that “slavery was a normal part of world aff airs”—a European Christian 
construct and a position favored by King Afonso I, ruler of the Kingdom 
of Kongo (1456–1543). 3 
 Th e Portuguese slave traders had a plan. As the people became “enlight-
ened” by Christian education, communities were convinced to rebel 
against Afonso’s rule. Th e ensuing rebellion would be used as an excuse 
by the Portuguese to wage war against these communities in the name of 
aiding Afonso, thus creating prisoners of war who invariably added num-
bers to the slave trade. Before long, Afonso’s kingdom was falling apart, 
his authority diminished, and some areas became depopulated. Th is was 
a strategy used again and again across Africa by the “other” Europeans. 
 Th e Industrial Revolution took this state of aff airs to an even higher 
level. With the “Scramble for Africa” and colonialism, Africa fell behind 
the development of the European and later American and Asian nations 
in world aff airs. Globalization picked up speed, accelerating in the twen-
tieth century because of two World Wars and electronic communication. 
Now, in the twenty-fi rst century, globalization is spreading at the break-
neck speed of the Internet and the mobile phone. 
 Today, in the post-Industrial Age, a new concept has emerged—that 
of the digital entrepreneur. Th ese two words carry a diff erent emphasis, 
depending on whether you use the Western or African perspective. In the 
West, “entrepreneur” is massively important right now because it virtu-
ally disappeared during the Industrial Age. Before that, everyone was an 
entrepreneur. In Kenya, particularly, almost everyone is  still an entrepre-
neur. It is the “digital” that is new. Th is means that in the future, formal 
3  See ‘Portuguese and other Europeans in Africa in the early 1500s,’  http://www.fsmitha.com/h3/
h17port2.htm . 
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employment, especially in ICT, will increasingly be seen as an option to 
an “informal” vocation or a transition to self-employment. 
 But this state of aff airs is not spread evenly across Africa. Canal+, a 
French media company, held a conference in Nairobi where I partici-
pated as one of the organizers. Delegates from French-speaking coun-
tries in Africa were invited to understand how ICT hubs are spreading 
throughout Africa and the possibility of this happening in their countries 
in particular. As we talked about thinking outside the box, it became clear 
that most of French-speaking Africa lags behind the English-speaking 
communities in digital entrepreneurship, because the France-based edu-
cation system follows the old paradigm of standardized learning, in which 
innovation is not encouraged. An entrepreneur needs critical thinking, 
persistence, adaptability, creativity, and initiative. Th e situation is not 
helped much by the fact that most Western technological ideas are shared 
on the Internet in the English language. 
 What is the way forward for the future of digital technology in Africa? 
 Let me give you an example. Africa is still portrayed in Western media 
as if we were in the sixteenth century. Adding post-colonialism and the 
international aid guilt trip, Africans are relegated to handouts that come 
in many forms while the extraction of minerals and human resources 
continues. Africans consume the messaging that they must take what 
they are given and become entrapped by Western ideas and ideology. Th is 
leads to collective low esteem and apathy, creating passive people who are 
absent from the conversations that aff ect them on the world stage. 
 Th ere are things we as Africans can learn from our history when looked 
at from a Western worldview. But as Minna Salami, an African writer 
said, “Th ese images are so negative that it takes us tremendous eff ort to 
not see ourselves through the eyes of this distortion.” 4 It will take a lot of 
work and some time for the Western worldview of Africa to clear. 
4  See Minna Salami. ‘To change the world, change your illusions’;  https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=PiVB5niLrWg&feature=youtu.be . 
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 In this digital era, African entrepreneurs need to see themselves clearly 
and consider a diff erent, bolder perspective as they strike out to make 
their mark in the world. We need to reinvent Africa and use digital 
technology, the mobile phone, and the Internet to do it. Just as most of 
Europe is defi ned through the Industrial Revolution (“German engineer-
ing,” etc.), perhaps African communities can be defi ned and reimagined 
through the lens of digital technologies. 
 What are some of the lessons, implications, and changes in mindset 
that you think are necessary? 
 Allow me to propose three lessons that we need to take from our history. 
First, we must remove our Western-colored view of Africa and look at it 
in a new way in order to create a conducive environment. Individualism 
is the lens through which people in the West view themselves. We must 
recognize that we Africans base our social outlook on collectivism. Th is 
immediately explains the diff erences in approaching the identifi cation of 
innovative solutions. For the West, innovation stems from solving con-
cerns revolving around the individual. In Kenya, the innovations that 
have been built are to solve non-individual problems. 
 Before M-PESA, there was Sambaza. Th is was—and still is—a service 
designed to allow one person to buy mobile phone airtime for someone 
else, say, a son in the city buying for his mother, who lives up-country. 
Th e problem was that the airtime was sold in large denominations, even 
though most subscribers wanted small amounts at a time. So, enterpris-
ing Kenyans would buy the large-denomination cards, usually for 100 
Kenyan shillings or more, and resell airtime to others in smaller amounts, 
charging a fee for the service—with the result that using a service devel-
oped for one purpose created opportunities for another. M-PESA took 
advantage of this enterprising nature, allowing two individuals to transfer 
money to each other and Safaricom to make some money off  that, unlike 
in the Sambaza system. Safaricom then produced small-denomination 
airtime cards branded as Bamba. M-PESA and Bamba cannibalized 
Sambaza. Th is mobile commerce innovation was based on non-indi-
vidual needs. Th e same non-individual premise could be attributed to 
Ushahidi, the company that I talked about at the beginning. And so, we 
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should expect more non-individual and social innovations to come from 
Africa (mobile banking and retail have already taken hold). 
 Second, the initial innovations in Silicon Valley focused on “silicon” 
based ideas. It was used in the production of electronic components 
and microcircuits. Some of the companies involved were Shockley 
Semiconductor Laboratory and Fairchild Semiconductor, from whom 
Intel and Advanced Micro Devices, among others, were spawned. Th ese 
innovations were taking place in the Santa Clara Valley in San Francisco. 
It is these innovators who “developed a culture of openly denying the hier-
archical culture of traditional corporations. People remained faithful to 
each other, but not to the employer or the industry.” 5 Th is is Silicon Valley. 
 We need to recognize this, because nowhere in Africa is silicon itself 
being used to innovate through production. Africans are joining this 
innovation space during the digital—and, more correctly, the mobile—
era. So “digital” is a better description of African innovation at this time. 
Also, though “savannah” is used to depict an African landscape, it is not 
an African word. It comes from a Native American community for the 
grassland prairies they inhabited. 6 Should we not be using the name that 
Africans themselves gave their grasslands?— Nyika ! 
 Th is renaming—“Digital Nyika”—even though a seemingly small 
change, is an exercise that forces us to look at the African innovation space 
without biases. We can then learn from other innovative spaces around 
the world, copy what is necessary, build what infrastructure we need, and 
innovate for Africa fi rst. Only then can uniquely African knowledge and 
fi nancial investment grow in an environment that is in itself unique. 
 Th ird, it should be noted that most of the tech solutions that have 
come out of Africa and ventured onto the international stage had a local 
problem at their core. Th at is all well and good. But the current Silicon 
5  Access Wikipedia. ‘Traitorous Eight’.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Traitorous_eight for more 
information. 
6  Access Wikipedia ‘Savanna’,  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savanna for more information. 
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Valley thinking in Africa has caused the ideas we see coming out of our 
innovation space to be mostly copies of what we see in America and other 
places, with the only new ingredient being “How can it work here?” Still, 
Ushahidi is an example of a global problem solved fi rst locally. Th ere 
was no other solution like it nor would there have been one, because the 
conditions for its creation were unique to Kenya and other developing 
economies. 
 Africa in space and time must take charge of its destiny, using digital 
technology to take advantage of the confl uence of a young and grow-
ing demographic, an increasingly multipolar political world, and all the 
advantages of not being saddled with generally older populations and 
analogue technological systems. If you look around, this is already tak-
ing place—and is increasingly crossing over to innovations that combine 
software and hardware. 
 Th at is our Kenya, a new Africa, the birthplace of mobile money and 
crisis maping. 
 What will be next? 
 Th ank you, Jimmy! 
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 Part I 
 Looking Back and Looking Ahead 
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 Kenya’s information and communication technology (ICT) sector has 
witnessed a dramatic turnaround. Barely 20 years ago, in the mid-1990s, 
the sector was an irritant to the political system and was best discussed 
by geeks in hushed tones. Th e political system saw emerging ICTs as an 
aff ront to challenge its leaders’ power and control over information fl ow. 
Such was the environment that the fi rst eff orts to introduce the Internet 
in Kenya, in 1995, were met with an offi  cial rebuff  through a full- 
page advertisement by the then Kenya Posts and Telecommunications 
Corporation (KP&TC), a monopoly state enterprise, declaring that 
Internet services amounted to resale, and were therefore illegal. It was 
in this harsh environment that the Internet was born in Kenya. In short 
order, it was banned entirely in the government civil service until 1999. 
 In such an environment, the Internet was only for brave nongov-
ernment organizations (NGOs), geeks, and small companies with 
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 international business interests. Indeed, none of the universities had 
Internet connections. Concerted advocacy changed the tide, and by 1997, 
the government promulgated the Telecommunication and Postal Sector 
Policy recognizing ICT’s contributions to development, and by 1999, 
passed the Kenya Information and Communication Act, a new telecom 
law establishing a multi-operator environment—followed shortly there-
after by offi  cial recognition of the Internet. However, the market still had 
to endure a monopoly international gateway through the state-owned 
incumbent operator for another seven years, till 2007. 
 Th e Telecommunication and Postal Sector Policy had envisaged 
a national teledensity (i.e., telephone lines per 100 people) of 5 % by 
2015. But in fact, rapid growth realized a teledensity of fully 88 % by 
September 2015 (Communications Authority of Kenya  2015 ). 
 In the two decades before 2015, the sector came of age, and so did the 
institutions driving the Internet. Today, the Government of Kenya has 
now fully embraced the Internet and ICTs as drivers of socioeconomic 
growth and, in a very bold move, established a high-level agency to main-
stream e-government as a tool for governance and for reaching out and 
interacting with the nation’s citizens. Working with various stakeholders, 
the government has even promulgated a national ICT policy that actively 
envisages national growth driven by ICTs. 
 Slowly but surely, new and revolutionary technologies and business 
processes have come into the market, disrupting older technologies and 
business processes. Th e policy and regulatory framework has had to give 
way to respond to the new environment, and fi nally, the early actors have 
had to give way to new actors. Indeed, none of the key actors from 20 
years ago exist in 2015. KP&TC, for example, has given way to Telkom 
Kenya, which is quite diff erent from the old monopoly, KP&TC. 
 Th e evolution is profound. At the technology level, Kenya has moved 
from offl  ine store-and-forward (FidoNet) technologies and reliance on 
copper for connectivity to cellular, and now, to fi ber optics. Similarly, 
the bandwidths of 2015 would have been inconceivable two decades ago. 
In September 1995, Kenyan Internet users shared 32 Kbps to serve the 
entire country—a far cry from the 1.7 Gbps available 20 years later. From 
the international NGOs who introduced email, Internet service is for 
the masses today and is used by many in daily activities. Th e Kenyan 
 government, which through KP&TC was dead set against email and 
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Internet and banned it in government services, is now a key promoter of 
a digital future for Kenya. 
 Th e net eff ect is that the Internet is widely available and much cheaper, 
with applications for numerous aspects of daily life. Still, 26 % of Kenyans 
are not using the Internet for various reasons, including gender disparities 
in access and use, aff ordability, content relevance, and basic access. Th is 
chapter attempts to document the disruptions that have brought Kenya 
this far over the past 20 years and to explore lessons that can help guide 
the nation over the coming 20 years—while addressing new frontiers that 
have not so far benefi ted from the rise of the Internet. 
 Evolution of ICTs 
 Th e evolution of ICTs has been very fast and has aff ected all stakehold-
ers—users, operators, and the government. Th e following phases can be 
discerned in the evolution of ICTs in Kenya and the role of civil society 
organizations (CSOs):
•  Phase 1 Before 1994, electronic communications other than email 
were hardly known. Users were largely international NGOs for inter-
national communications. Email service providers relied on upstream 
Internet service providers (ISPs) based abroad to poll its servers once 
or twice a day to collect and deposit mail. Th e upstream ISPs distrib-
uted the mail globally. Because of the high cost of leased lines, calls 
were reversed, that is, instead of Kenyan operators initiating calls, the 
calls would be initiated from abroad. Th e Association of Progressive 
Communications (APC) network of organizations was one of the 
principal upstream distribution supports for local email service 
providers. 
•  Phase 2 In this phase, awareness of the Internet increased and email was 
launched. A milestone workshop organized by the Telecommunica -
tions Foundation of Africa in July 1995 attracted ten email service 
 providers—a relatively high attendance, refl ecting a growing interest in 
understanding the new technology. Immediately after the workshop, 
KP&TC made its declaration that Internet services were an illegal use 
of leased lines. 
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•  Phase 3 In 1994 and 1995, the African Regional Centre for Computing 
launched a full Internet system with fi nancial support from the British 
Government’s Overseas Development Agency to pay for an interna-
tional leased line. With increased awareness, clear business opportuni-
ties were emerging and attracting private-sector businesses that wished 
to launch commercial Internet services. Regulatory and operational 
bottlenecks aff ected access to bandwidth, however, leading to very 
high costs of access for consumers. Th e role of the CSOs as suppliers 
of Internet services declined dramatically because of competition from 
commercial operators. Funding of Internet development also evolved, 
from donor funding to commercial funding by entrepreneurs. 
•  Phase 4 Since 2000, with the entry of the Communications 
Commission of Kenya (CCK) as the nation’s telecommunications reg-
ulator, the government has legally recognized the Internet and estab-
lished a proactive relationship with CCK as a development partner. 
Entry barriers in licensing and fees came down. Th e government also 
accepted the Internet as an integral tool for development. Challenges, 
however, have remained—emerging monopolies, access to rural areas, 
aff ordability, the high cost of equipment, and the lack of content. 
 It is clear that the evolution of the Internet in Kenya has been rapid, 
with fundamental changes aff ecting every stakeholder:
•  At the institutional level, this evolution has seen a decline in the infl u-
ence of the East African Internet Association (EAIA), a nonprofi t orga-
nization founded in 1995, that advocated and catalyzed the growth of 
the Internet to Telecommunications Service Providers of Kenya, a 
nonprofi t organization representing technology service providers, in 
order to address the Internet’s then-current operational problems. 
•  Th e evolution has seen the role of CSOs move from the supply side of 
services in 1992–1995 to the demand side. Today, the CSOs’ concern 
is to reach higher levels of equity of access in terms of aff ordability for 
rural areas and the poor and of application in governance. Th e private 
sector drives the supply side on a commercial basis. 
•  At the operational level, the dominance of the CSOs in driving the 
growth of the Internet before 1994 has given way to the private sector, 
and the effi  ciency of distribution of local mail has been addressed with 
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the launch of the Kenya Internet Exchange (an Internet exchange 
point launched by Kenyan ISPs in 2000 to cut costs by avoiding the 
use of expensive international links [mostly satellite at the time]). 
•  At the technology level, FidoNet technology dominated in 1994. 
Because of the high cost of international calls, operators reversed traffi  c 
to upstream ISPs on a periodic basis. Transmission was through 
KP&TC, low earth orbiting satellites, and high-frequency radio to 
rural areas. Th e technology has since changed to make use of online 
connectivity after the introduction of the Internet in 1995. 
 Internet Diffusion and Impacts of Disruptive 
Innovation 
 Network Establishment, from 1990 to 2000 
 Technology moved from FidoNet store-and-forward systems being 
polled by GreenNet in the UK every six hours to a 64-Kbps online link 
for the country and then to today’s high speeds of 1.7 Gbps over the 
submarine cables in 2015. End users could only reach 14 Kbps to poll 
into the FidoNet systems, which had a limited number of dial-in lines, 
all owned by KP&TC. Th ese have given way progressively from analog 
fi rst-generation (1G) systems to today’s fourth-generation (4G) systems 
as coaxial cables have been superseded by fi ber optics. 
 New technology has also seen disruptions and the consequent demise 
of planned projects. Regional telecommunications networks, Code 
Division Multiple Access, trunked radio, and paging networks are some 
of the planned projects that failed to take off . In addition, innovations 
have killed legacy technologies and businesses, including postal services, 
money transfers, and copper-line access. 
 Offl ine Technologies 
 FidoNet was the technology of choice in the early years, when a customer 
would have to compose an email message and send it from a computer 
with a modem to an internet service provider (ISP) server, where it was 
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stored. Th e email would be picked up only after the server had been polled, 
sometimes up to six hours later, by an upstream ISP (hence the “store-
and-forward” terminology). Th e upstream provider helping most of the 
NGOs in Africa at the time was GreenNet, established by the Association 
for Progressive Communications (Levey and Young  2002 ). Th e upstream 
provider would download all email destined for the various Kenya-based 
NGOs and distribute mail for their international clients. Given the very 
limited bandwidth, the mail consisted principally of text messages and, 
rarely, attachments—which had to be encoded by the sender, and then, 
decoded by the user. It was only after decoding that the user knew if the 
attachment was, for example, additional text or a spreadsheet. 
 Email set-up at the customer end was expensive. A customer had to 
invest in a computer, a modem, and a telephone line. Similarly, the ISPs 
had to invest in telephone lines 1 and modems for connectivity to their 
customers. With a teledensity of less than 1 % nationally, installing the 
telephone lines was a major barrier—not to mention that the modems 
had to be of a type approved by KP&TC (which, incidentally, did not 
have the skills needed to keep up with approvals for the ever-increasing 
array of new technologies). 
 Kenya had deployed mobile cellular in 1992 using Enhanced Total 
Access Communications System network technology, which—being ana-
log—could not support the Internet. 
 At USD9 per minute, tariff s for international calls were high—much 
higher than for a similar call from the UK to Kenya (hence the need to 
reverse calls so that charges were borne from the UK end). 
 With all these challenges, the email service was almost entirely for use by 
international NGOs operating in Kenya (such as the Environment Liaison 
Centre International [ELCI], African Organisation for Standardisation, 
and Mission Aviation Fellowship), which provided store-and-forward 
email services that were largely for communicating with their affi  liated 
organizations—and that were not available to the general public. ELCI was 
the fi rst to introduce email out of Kenya in 1990 (Levey and Young  2002 ). 
 In 1992, electronic mailing was being piloted at the University of 
Nairobi and the Kenya Medical Research Institute—the earliest local 
1  Th e African Regional Centre for Computing started with two dial-in lines. 
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encounters with email in Kenya’s academic circles (National Research 
Council  1996 ). 
 Outside the major organizations, the African Regional Centre for 
Computing came on board as a local NGO to off er services to other 
NGOs and commercial entities. Th e work of the Centre catapulted 
Kenya to online connectivity for the fi rst time in October 1995 on a 
32-Kbps link to the UK, setting the stage for disruptions that radically 
changed the communication systems in the country and slowly nibbled 
away the mighty KP&TC—whose response was not only to ignore the 
technology but also to attempt to block it entirely, a decision that has 
haunted the organization ever since. 
 Online Internet 
 October 1995 was a turning point in Kenya’s communications history, 
when a leased line connection was established, providing Internet for the 
fi rst time. At 32 Kbps, Kenya was at last connected to the Internet, and the 
dream of information sharing became a reality. Th e system’s bandwidth 
was low even for those days and not much for information gathering—but 
now, at least email did not have to wait to be polled up to six hours later. 
 Shortly thereafter and in quick succession, two ISPs serving the com-
mercial and personal markets—Africa Online (Prodigy USA) and Form- 
Net—started off ering service, and for the fi rst time, competition entered 
the market. By the end of 1995, the two each had a 64-Kbps link and 
100 lines to serve their clientele. Th is opened a fl oodgate of other opera-
tors, and by the end of 1995, more than 10 were advertising for services, 
and reported accounts totaled approximately 5000 (Aguyo  1997 ). 
 Sector Regulation Defi ning Connectivity 
 Kenya’s telecommunications sector was regulated under KP&TC Act 
Cap 411, promulgated in 1977. Under this Act, KP&TC was the exclu-
sive monopoly provider of telecommunications services. It enforced 
this monopoly with zeal and, when expedient, could spin off  services or 
licences to third parties at its discretion (GOK  1978 ). 
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 As an example, KP&TC sold its paging interest under a fi ve-year 
exclusive licence to a private company. Other services licensed included 
providers of customer-premises equipment, telephone bureaus, and 
Internet services. Th e discretion aff orded to KP&TC by the Act was used 
selectively to lock out competitors, and when necessary, to enforce its 
monopoly powers through the courts. On at least two occasions, entre-
preneurs were arraigned in court for operating radio communication ser-
vices without the approval of KP&TC. 
 As a monopoly, KP&TC controlled all telecommunications services. 
Th e emergence of an alternative communications system (albeit one 
using the same infrastructure) was threatening KP&TC’s stranglehold on 
the sector, which is why KP&TC could not support the new service and 
indeed went all out to stop its use in July 1995. Email services nevertheless 
continued to grow, but KP&TC’s actions created a very hostile environ-
ment. Th is had a negative impact especially on government email use and 
that of large corporate organizations. Indeed, the government banned the 
use of email and the Internet in its communications until 1999. 
 Eventually, however, the winds of change across East Africa seeking 
to dismantle monopoly telecommunications operators had a signifi cant 
impact in Kenya. In 1996, the government promulgated its fi rst policy 
envisaging competition among telecommunications services in a liberal-
ized environment (GOK  1996 ), and by 1999, parliament had enacted 
a legal framework that ushered in true competition (GOK  1998 ). Th e 
Internet now became fully recognized as a service for development. Th e 
year 1999 was therefore a turning point that unshackled the Internet and 
set the pace for Kenya’s growth in the coming decade. 
 Th e continuing challenges, however, were the continued control of 
international connectivity by Telkom Kenya and the last mile to the cus-
tomer, which the ISPs had to deal with until 2007. 
 Connectivity 
 In the early days, connectivity to customers and to international band-
width were controlled as a monopoly by KP&TC, and with KP&TC’s 
limited capacity, telephone lines were inadequate. Unfortunately, even 
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when they were available, the failure rate was extremely high, and leased 
lines were very expensive. 
 Because of the lack of the telecommunications services in rural areas, 
the only available options for reaching out to NGOs were the use of 
high-frequency radio and low earth orbiting satellites. HealthNet, for 
example, used low earth orbiting satellites extensively to reach out to 
its community-based-organization partners in rural areas (National 
Research Council  1996 ). 
 Agents and Market Responses 
 KP&TC managed the telecommunications system as a monopoly, with a 
total switching capacity of 380,000 lines and slightly more than 269,000 
connected customers as at the end of 1997. International services were sat-
ellite-based through Atlantic and Indian Ocean Intelsat satellites and two 
earth stations in the town of Longonot, Kenya. An additional earth station 
was built in the town of Kericho, Kenya, to serve Japan and later retooled 
to provide local satellite services by very-small-aperture terminals (VSATs). 
 At the end of 1997, Kenya had 77,163 people waiting for telephone 
services but was only capable of connecting 10,000–13,000 lines per 
year—implying that it would take more than 7 years to connect all the 
waiters (International Telecommunication Union  1998 ). Clearly this was 
a good time to facilitate the entry of fresh capital into the sector rather 
than crippling the local entrepreneurs. As of the end of April 1998, the 
number of waiters had increased to 80,000, and it was clear that unsatis-
fi ed demand existed in cellular, data services, and paging largely because 
of the monopolistic tariff s. 
 Th e network was creaking with age and obsolescence because of limited 
investment. Th e main switching exchange systems required urgent atten-
tion to replace old exchanges and transmission systems that had outlived 
their useful life and were therefore prone to failure. Several old exchange 
systems were upgraded. Th ese strategic communication facilities were 
running on obsolescent crossbar technology that was diffi  culty to sup-
port because spare parts were diffi  cult to procure. In total, 150,000 tele-
phones, or half of the total telecommunications network, were  connected 
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to exchanges based on old, obsolescent technology. It was just a matter 
of time before key parts failed and the system became disabled (Mureithi 
 1999 ). 
 In addition to age, the network suff ered from serious congestion 
because of its lack of expansion of facilities, making it diffi  cult to place 
calls, particularly in industrial areas. Lines to the customer were of copper 
wire and prone to damage by water, rodents, and cable theft. As a result, 
failure rates were high. On average, there were 186 faults for every 100 
telephones per year, which compared poorly with a world average of 5 
faults for every 100 telephones per year (International Telecommunication 
Union  1999 ). To address the high failure rate of the last mile, KP&TC 
launched Instafone, a fi xed wireless service designed to overcome faulty 
customer lines. 
 As in other public telecommunications networks in Africa, the domi-
nant product was voice telephony, followed by data services. Th ese 
brought in annual revenues of USD307 million in fi scal year 1996–1997, 
making KP&TC the fi fth largest operator in the Africa in revenue terms 
(International Telecommunication Union  1998 ). 
 Customer-Premises Equipment and Telephone Bureaus 
 Customer-premises equipment and telephone bureaus, including private 
automated branch exchange systems, terminal sets, and faxes, had been 
liberalized since 1991. Product availability and the easy mode of entry 
into the market segment had brought more than 245 companies into 
the customer-premises-equipment market, with tangible benefi ts for the 
consumer in terms of lower prices, better-quality products, and more 
reliable support. 
 In addition, KP&TC had also licensed 250 telephone bureaus, with 
many more operating without licences, particularly in residential areas. 
 Service Offerings That Supported the Emerging 
Internet 
 Th ree years after the Internet launch, Kenya was on track to develop ser-
vices that anchored the emerging Internet ecosystem. With its monopoly, 
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KP&TC continued to play a key role in complementing an emerging 
private sector. 
 Some of the key infrastructure provided by KP&TC included data 
services and leased lines. KP&TC had introduced Kenpac X25 (packet 
switched), available since May 1994, with a capacity of 1200 ports; ana-
log leased circuits; and KenStream (64 Kbps), with a capacity of 2000 
ports. By 1998, the analog leased lines in use had increased to 1695, and 
the digital lines had increased to 196 (64 Kbps). KP&TC also launched a 
national Internet backbone known as the East African Internet Exchange, 
with a capacity of up to 30,000 customers by 1998 intended to ensure 
that 90 % of the population would be within reach of the Internet at 
local call rates. 
 To complement the terrestrial infrastructure, which was severely lim-
ited, KP&TC launched Kensat (off ering VSAT) and Safarisat (off ering 
Inmarsat) satellite services. 
 Th e private sector exploited the KP&TC infrastructure by launching 
a range of ISPs, including the African Regional Centre for Computing, 
Africa Online, Form-Net, Inter-connect, Swift Global, Net 2000, 
NairobiNet, and Insight Technologies. Th is unleashed further competi-
tion, which brought down prices, increased the points of presence in all 
major towns, and generally raised Internet awareness. 
 Th e greatest challenge was the low level of locally relevant content 
on the Internet, and therefore, its utility in daily life. Another challenge 
was in the area of licensing and pricing of leased lines by KP&TC. ISPs 
had to pay an initial fi ve-year operating licence fee of USD8330 and 
an annual operating fee of USD4200. Kenya restricted the use of satel-
lite technologies (e.g., VSAT) that would otherwise have off ered cheaper 
international connectivity and provided more capacity to ISPs than was 
available through KP&TC. Th e restriction was to safeguard KP&TC’s 
monopoly on international connectivity. 
 Interest in the Internet was growing. Kenya had 458 Internet hosts—
the highest number in any country in Sub-Saharan Africa (International 
Telecommunication Union  1998 ). Th e number of email accounts was 
estimated at 20,000 and growing rapidly. Th e total number of dial-up 
lines was estimated at 600, and the number of .ke domain names at 292. 
 Cost was also a major barrier in the early years. Th e costs for Internet 
dial-up service included installation at USD20, monthly charges of 
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USD72, and an hourly use rate of USD5. Use of Internet bureaus was 
equally expensive, with a fee of USD0.20 per minute. At the same time, 
access to computers was very limited, because of costs and numbers. By 
1997, the estimated number of computers in the country was 50,000 
(Aguyo  1997 ). 
 Th e greatest handicap for the development of Internet services was the 
regulatory restrictions they faced. Access to customers and international 
bandwidth had to go through Telkom Kenya. ISPs had very little leeway 
on quality of service to consumers and on input costs—and hence had 
limited marketing leverage—as well as limited means for innovation. 
 Implications for the Knowledge Industry 
 Because of the poor infrastructure, the access to, sharing, and storage 
of information were all still manual. And even with the arrival of the 
Internet, access to information was still limited because of the lim-
ited capacity of the links—with the result that information access was 
very expensive. Yet the dream of an information society was alive and 
growing. 
 Th e downloading of large fi les (around 1 MB in those days), especially 
presentations with graphics, was a nightmare, often taking hours. Users 
had to visit ISPs for assistance in downloading such fi les onto fl oppy 
disks, Internet surfi ng was discouraging because of the limited informa-
tion on the Net, search engines like AltaVista were problematic, and any 
useful information had to be downloaded immediately because one could 
not be sure of getting it again on the Net! (Today’s Google had yet to 
come into the market.) 
 Internet Evolution from 2000 to 2010 
 Th e decade from 2000 to 2010 unleashed the full capacities of the 
Internet. By the end of 2000, it was clear that local Internet traffi  c was 
increasing rapidly but had to be switched from overseas at great cost. Th e 
ISPs therefore made the pioneering decision to build the Kenya Internet 
Exchange to switch local traffi  c. Unfortunately, it was shut down by the 
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regulators for an entire year on the grounds that the traffi  c exchanged 
through it contravened the exclusivity of Telkom Kenya. 
 Finally, with the entry of second-generation (2G) digital cellular com-
munications, it became feasible to use an alternative for carrying Internet 
traffi  c through General Packet Radio Service. In line with the existing 
market structure, cellular operators could not be licensed as ISPs and 
therefore had to transit their email traffi  c through other licensed ISPs. 
 In 2007, the curtain came down on Telkom Kenya’s monopoly on 
international gateway, which brought down many barriers to the Internet. 
Evolution was driven through connectivity via submarine fi ber optic 
cables in 2009, liberalized international gateways and last- and fi rst-mile 
solutions, and fi nally, the convergence in services. 
 Th e government came back into the market with initiatives to inter-
vene in areas the private sector was not addressing, specifi cally in rural 
areas and in international connectivity. In this regard, the government 
invested in international submarine fi ber optic cables and national fi ber 
connectivity. In addition, the decade saw activities that helped entrench 
the Internet. Th ese included infrastructure to develop data centers, eff orts 
in the domain name space, and government intervention on costs to end- 
user terminals by the elimination of certain taxes. Th e decade, in short, 
ushered the Internet onto a high-growth path. 
 Geographical: Network Coverage 
 At the advent of email and the Internet in Kenya, the access to the Internet 
was restricted to the availability of copper lines. With under 300,000 
lines nationally (80 % in the urban areas), this access was severely lim-
ited. Cellular in the early years since 1992 was analog, and the emergence 
of the GSM standard in 1995 was exclusively voice. It was only on the 
introduction of General Packet Radio Service in 2002 that an alternative 
last mile was fi nally introduced in the market. 
 Fast growth in cellular rapidly increased the customer based in 2001, 
as cellular connections overtook fi xed lines. Th is was a typical market 
disruption, with cellular becoming the platform for Internet access going 
forward. Th e rapid growth of cellular with improved technologies from 
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2G to 4G and widespread coverage has continued to enhance the Internet 
experience. From nine base stations in 1995 covering Nairobi City 
Centre, coverage today is nationwide, reaching 90 % of the population. 
 Lessons from the Internet Revolution 
 Th e Internet evolution has presented some key lessons: 
 Disruption Is the Sweetener That Drives Change 
 A dynamic environment that spawned disruption and was not limited to 
the technologies and processes but also included the actors was a key to 
change. Internet advocacy has seen a large turnover among CSOs because 
of disruptive pathways to enabling policies. Government-imposed bar-
riers that spawned innovations included banning the Internet outright, 
closing the Kenya Internet Exchange, and imposing punitive costs. 
 Defensiveness was a principal barrier thrown up by the incumbents as 
they defended their positions—sparking innovation and market disrup-
tion. Th is behavior has been consistent and keeps refreshing the market 
with new and improved services at lower costs. 
 Disruptive Innovation Is the Weapon against Big 
Players 
 Th e Internet introduced by the African Regional Centre for Computing 
was a game changer, and today, all the organizations that did not change 
have been killed by it. 
 Disruption Is a Deadly Game 
 Many of those who innovated and disrupted others were to undergo the 
same trials themselves eventually, and unless they transformed themselves 
in turn, they fell by the wayside. Today, only Wananchi Online still exists 
as an entity. 
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 An Agent Is Critical for the Game Change 
 CSOs were the pioneer developers and promoters of email service provision 
in the mid-1990s. After establishing the business case, the private sector 
came on board and commercialized the Internet—in the process, pushing 
out the CSOs from an operational role. Th e CSOs took on a new role in 
expanding the service, with particular focus on the demand side, based on 
their advocacy of empowerment, access rights, and personal development. 
 The Agent Itself Must Change Tactics 
 Th e role of CSOs has changed radically from that of developer and pro-
moters to that of advocates. Th e rapid evolution of the technology and 
business models has spawned the rapid rise and fall of the CSOs. None of 
the CSOs existing in the early days still exist today, except the Computer 
Society of Kenya. Typical CSOs are cited in Table  2.1 .
 Table 2.1  Civil society organizations driving Internet evolution 
 CSO  Mission 
 East African Internet Association  Introduce the Internet in the country 
 Kenya National ICT forum  Contribute to formulation of ICT policy 
 National E-Commerce Task Force  Lobby the government on the 
implementation of e-commerce 
 Telecommunications Dealers 
Association of Kenya 
 Bring down the cost of telecom 
accessories 
 Kenya Information Society  Catalyze the growth of an information 
society 
 Telecommunications User Association  Lobby for service-level agreements with 
providers 
 Information Technology Standards 
Association 
 Foster IT standards 
 Computer Society of Kenya  Make information technology more 
accessible 
 Telecommunications Service 
Providers of Kenya a 
 Liberalize Internet provision 
 Linux Chix  Promote women in computing and the 
use of open source 
 a Rebranded in November 2015 as the technology service providers of Kenya 
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 Th e demise of the various CSOs was caused by their narrow focus in 
the market, and once their issues were addressed, their reasons for exis-
tence ceased. 
 Th e Kenyan government has come full circle, from being dead set 
against the Internet in the mid-1990s to embracing it as a key tool for 
development, and now, intervening in areas that the private sector is not 
willing to venture into. 
 Conclusion 
 Twenty years of Internet evolution have propelled Kenyans to the edges 
of a knowledge society and empowered them in profound ways in how 
they relate, conduct business, and even structure their society. Th e turn-
ing points in this evolution have always revealed passionate individuals out 
over the stumbling blocks ahead, whether they were of a regulatory nature 
or the suff ering of their fellow citizens caused by lack of services. Th is com-
bination has been instrumental in disrupting business processes and tech-
nologies that did not address societal needs, thereby releasing the power of 
innovation. Th is is the power Kenyans need to harness in order to sustain 
their momentum and to continue to lead as an innovation hub for Africa. 
 At the same time, the fast growth has spawned growing disparities in 
Internet use and benefi ts to society—including a gender gap (because more 
men than women use the Internet), a poverty gap (when cost becomes a 
barrier to access), and an urban–rural gap (because those in rural areas are 
worse off ). Th ese gaps will continue to be a challenge in the next decade. 
But to judge from the experiences of the past 20 years, they will provide the 
fertile ground to inspire innovation and new disruptive business processes 
that can close the gaps and propel all Kenyans into the knowledge society. 
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 Conversation #2 
 Exploring the Ideal Role of Government, 
NGOs, Angel Investors, and Universities for 
Technology Entrepreneurs 
 Erik Hersman of BRCK 
 Erik Hersman  is an entrepreneur and technologist focused on advanc-
ing the use of technology in Africa. He is the chief executive offi  cer (CEO) 
of BRCK ,  makers of a wireless WiFi device designed and engineered in 
Kenya for use in emerging markets. In 2010, he founded the iHub ,  a 
pioneering innovation hub in Nairobi for the technology community , 
 bringing together entrepreneurs ,  hackers ,  designers ,  and the investment 
community. He is also a co-founder of Ushahidi ( “ witness ”  in Kiswahili) , 
 a nonprofi t company whose free open-source software is used to collect 
and map information for crowdsourcing ,  social activism ,  and public 
accountability ;  and of afrigadget.com and whiteafrican.com ,  online 
communities that explore Africa ’ s creative solutions ,  entrepreneurship , 
 and development challenges. He is also a general partner in the Savannah 
Fund and sits on the boards of Akirachix ,  Angani ,  the Kijabe Forest 
Trust ,  and the Whitaker Peace and Development Initiative. You can 
fi nd him on Twitter at @ WhiteAfrican. 
 Erik, you are wearing multiple hats in Kenya’s ICT sector. What is the 
story behind that? 
 What gives me the right to do what I do rather than anybody else is 
actually what it comes down to. Well, nothing—besides that I am the 
one who did it, right? Anybody can do the same things I do! It just takes 
your desire and ability to champion something. I will go back into some 
of the history. So if you look back to 2005, that is when I started blog-
ging about tech in Africa. Fast-forward three years from that, I had writ-
ten about a lot of start-ups, I knew a lot of people, and I was part of the 
blogging ecosystem that was really burgeoning at that time. So it was a 
network of people who knew each other. 
 Th en, we came across the post-election violence and craziness that 
were happening after the elections. Ushahidi was formed, and I was one 
of the founders. I remember that I came to Nairobi in August of 2008 
and was sitting down with a bunch of other guys at BarCamp Nairobi. 
Th ere was a large turnout. A great amount of interest, and there was 
everybody present. All the guys who are now CEOs of their own start-
ups in the ecosystem, but we were still just ordinary tech guys at the 
time. 
 So, we were sitting around afterward, and we were saying, “Why is it 
that the tech guys in the city only meet up once or twice a year at these 
events? What if we had a place of our own?” And that was the seed that 
would eventually grow to become the iHub. So why did not somebody 
else do the iHub? Because it is a lot of work to come up with the money, 
to come up with the bigger vision of where this thing needs to be. And 
keep in mind that I was running operations for Ushahidi at that time, 
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and actually through all of my time running the iHub, I still did. It is 
the ability to and the desire to champion an idea, even though there are 
way too many excuses not to do it. So how do you still push that idea 
forward beyond what your normal day-to-day job is? I think that is the 
biggest challenge. Look across the continent. Look at the people who 
are leading the tech hubs, generally. Th ey are champions of the idea that 
we can build something together that is greater than any one of us and 
brings us all together in a diff erent way. It is a desire to champion the 
idea and do the hard, scrappy work to get people together and convince 
people to show up for meetings and do all those little, oftentimes unno-
ticed things. 
 Th e iHub started, and that was after we talked to many people, asking, 
“Hey, will you give us some money for this or that and the other thing?” 
Nobody wanted to give us any money. Google and Nokia at the time, 
you name it. Nobody wanted to give us money. So fi nally, as Ushahidi, 
we sat down and said, “Listen, as Ushahidi, we can be a really good vector 
for the money that is needed for the iHub.” And so that is what we did. 
Omidyar Network and Hivos funded Ushahidi and we built the founda-
tions for the iHub with that. 
 But very early on, even before we had the space, I went out to people 
that were in the tech community already, that were my peers and people 
I respected and who were also respected by the general community—
people like Becky Wanjiku, Conrad Akunga, Riyaz Bachani, and Josiah 
Mugambi. I said, “Hey, will you be the iHub advisors alongside me and 
help make the big decisions in the iHub’s future, for the community?” 
We cannot make everything a purely democratic, everybody-votes-on-it 
process, but we can have a group of us who will help make some of the 
bigger decisions. And so, that was what we did. 
 When we fi rst launched the iHub in March of 2010, Conrad Akunga 
told everybody, “Listen, here is the foundation. What gets built on top 
of this is up to you. Now, it’s over to the rest of the community to help 
make this community what it is.” And I think that is the kind of magic 
that makes the iHub, compared to most of the other tech hubs that are 
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focused on incubation and other things. It is about the idea that we, as 
a community, need to be connected to each other and we need a space. 
We need a place, we need a meeting space that will allow us to almost 
accidentally fi nd each other from time to time, which will draw us in and 
connect us in ways that would not exist if we did not have it. 
 After Ushahidi and the iHub came Savannah Fund and BRCK. How 
do they fi t into the picture? 
 I think this is oftentimes deceptive. Th ere are teams built around each 
of these ventures. Teams that are actually more involved in operations 
than I am. What happens is that there are obvious gaps in the market that 
need to be addressed. And if I put my name behind it, with, for example, 
Savannah Fund or with some other initiative—Gearbox is a newer one—
it is not so much that I do anything day to day on it. I will sit there in 
board meetings and help with the ideation, the formation, the  governance 
structure, but I do not have to be involved in the operations. It is more 
about fi nding the right people who capture the right vision of it. 
 So what hats do I wear? Now, I no longer wear this hat, but one that 
is relevant here was forming the Afrilabs Association and being the fi rst 
chair for the initial years before passing it on. Th ere is the Savannah Fund 
and being a general partner in it, but Mbwana Alliy actually runs it day 
to day. Th ere is forming Gearbox, being on the board and helping create, 
but Kamau Gachigi leads it day to day. Th ere is AkiraChix, which was 
the women in this community who built the whole thing, and they just 
asked me to join the board when they became an offi  cial organization 
three years into it. 
 And there is BRCK, which I spend 90 % of my time on. I focus on 
BRCK because it is a venture-backed, for-profi t company. All the other 
things take up that other 10 %, where I am just dipping in and helping as 
needed. Th e most valuable thing about me in each of these things is that, 
by being a part of it, I can either use my knowledge, network, or experi-
ence to help make decisions better and faster, but more importantly, I can 
help push things to actually get them done. Th ere are a lot of people who 
talk about things, and there are very few people who do them. 
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 Erik, there is a lot of controversy about government intervention into 
private-sector activities. What is your take? What should be the ideal 
role of government? 
 So the role of the government is very simple: To reduce friction in the 
system for the technology industry to grow. What does that break down 
into? It breaks down into regulation that is actually good for business—
speed of setting up business, tax breaks for new companies, things like 
that. Another example of friction in the system that does not need to exist 
is legacy laws that are 30 to 40 years old and put a 20 to 30 % duty on 
components imported into the country. I can import a fully assembled, 
packaged BRCK duty free. Yet the components to make it have a heavy 
import duty—which means it does not make sense to import. In other 
words, I cannot create a new manufacturing industry in Kenya if we do 
not have the ability to bring in raw materials that are not produced in 
Kenya. Like this, we never will create industries unless we change these 
legacy laws. So again, government’s job is to reduce friction. And by 
reducing friction, they increase wealth and they increase jobs. 
 Th en there are other things, such as providing foundational access, of 
which the subsidization of the undersea cable by the government was a 
massive example. Th at is exactly what the government should be doing, 
massive projects that bring in both the public and private sectors and 
help things move further. Another one is regulation around spectrum 
allocation or licencing. 
 How about foreign aid and NGOs? What should their role be? 
 In a well-functioning state, most NGOs would not exist. Th ere is only a 
limited role for them, because the market answers many of the problems, 
and the government should answer the rest. However, here in Kenya, 
we have one of the highest count of NGOs per capita in the world. It 
is an interesting dynamic though, because international NGOs bring in 
money for some things, which bastardizes the market for other things. It 
creates a whole realm of craziness that you would not fi nd in other places. 
 Let me give you an example. NGOs build bridges that after two years 
become dysfunctional. Th is cost a few million US dollars to make, and 
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after two years, is no longer relevant. Other examples are new livestock 
programs in northern Kenya that only work as long as the NGO  workers 
are there. As soon as they leave, it all falls apart. Th ese are the kinds of 
things that we have seen for fi ve decades now, and it does not seem to stop. 
 Now, if a business had this high of a failure rate, they would not keep 
operating. NGOs, however, seem to have a limitless amount of money 
that comes from unilateral and bilateral aid and just keeps on coming 
in. NGOs keep on having to fund something, and it goes a bit like this: 
“Oh, let’s quickly procure something, because, shoot, we gotta spend this 
money before the end of the year.” Or, “Hey, let’s go fund innovation!” 
Not knowing what “innovation” means to them. Th ey know that 80 to 
90 % of the money will be absorbed in overhead and HR costs instead of 
the innovation that the NGOs say they are going to fund. If you want to 
see innovation happen, then fi nd vehicles where people are already doing 
interesting stuff  and dump money into the companies that are growing 
great things and trying new models. 
 Having said all that, I think there actually is a role where international 
NGOs can help, and that is with government. Th at is, funding some of 
the regulatory research. Research so that laws can be made or something 
like public–private partnerships on large-scale intra-country projects, 
such as installing terrestrial cables. Helping to subsidize some of that stuff  
as it gets built out across the country is valuable, and if it can reduce some 
of the load on the government, then, sure, that can work. 
 As someone who runs a for-profi t company, if someone wants to pro-
vide you with grant funding, you look at all that is going on in the market 
and you are to decide if it fi ts the company’s focus and mission. I will 
take the free money if you hand it to me, but it has to be aligned with 
what I am trying to do. You need to dump money into me because what 
I am doing is great, not because what you are doing is great and you want 
me to do it for you. Th is type of decision is hard for younger executives, 
because it comes with some experience. If you are a leader of a company, 
you have to be strong enough to make the right call for your company. 
And if you are not making the right call and take a grant that does not 
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make sense for your company, well, that is on you. Do not blame an 
industry because you made a bad decision. 
 Angel investors are crucial in funding the ideational phase of a busi-
ness. What is the current state in Kenya? 
 For angels investors, those who have signifi cant-enough disposable 
income to risk on investing, in Kenya it is a lot easier to put money into 
something like property and real estate. Th at is because we are seeing year-
on-year growth of that. It is just astronomical! So it tends to be a smart 
decision to put your money into those things. What we are starting to 
see, however, are people in business who have made enough money that 
they are willing to diversify their portfolio out of just real estate. Where 
it has changed over the past two to three years is that we are seeing a few 
more people willing to dabble in tech investments locally. It is not large 
money—maybe USD25,000 here, USD100,000 there—but it is enough 
to get some companies off  the ground. Th is will continue once angel inves-
tors start seeing a little bit of success, and this will bring in more of their 
peers. 
 Local angel investors can bring to the table more than what outside 
investors can off er. Outside investors largely bring in money and experi-
ence for early-stage company growth, strategy, and management. Th at is 
all good. But what they do not bring is connections to other businesses 
here in Kenya. Connections can immediately increase the share value of 
the business that the angels have invested in, and so, making the right 
introductions to CEOs or other companies is powerful. Th e problem 
currently is that angel money in Kenya is usually too expensive compared 
to money from abroad. If you have an investor coming in from the USA, 
they will give you USD50,000 and take 15 % of your early-stage, pre- 
revenue company. Th e Kenyan angel will give you USD50,000 and want 
50 % of your company, if not more. We need to fi nd a balance where we 
decrease the cost of equity-based money from local angel investors and 
increase the knowledge base and connectivity of the money for outside 
investors. It should not just be money invested in a company. What actu-
ally needs to happen is that you are investing mentally and physically in 
the start-up in order to help it grow their company. 
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 How do you see the current state of human capital development in 
Kenya for the next generation of entrepreneurs? 
 I do not think universities will be the answer; at least, I have not seen 
them work for technology education. Graduates fresh out of university 
are, in general, not prepared to work in a technology company. Th ey are 
not coming out of these institutions with the necessary skills. Th e people 
who do are usually the ones that are self-taught. Th at is quite disappoint-
ing. Th e universities in Kenya are too bureaucratic and not teaching the 
right stuff  in the classes. Not across the board, but generally, students 
still learn the same computer languages that they were being taught eight 
years ago, even though current technology has changed. 
 Why are people still learning these things? And why are they not being 
challenged to learn new things? And why are university professors not the 
ones leading the charge on this? I like what the Moringa School is doing, 
and I like what a couple of the fi nishing schools for software engineers 
are doing. I think that is an interesting model and where we will see more 
hiring happen in the future. 
 I love bringing on people into my own company. Th e young people 
who have been self-taught and have a raw sense of what they should do. 
A raw skill set which allows building and growing them in my company. 
I think on-the-job training—whether it is for the Mike Macharias and 
Seven Seas of the world, or Safaricom, or Google, or IBM, or M-Kopa, 
or Intel—is actually one of the benefi ts of Nairobi. We have enough of 
those medium and large companies, and this is what sets us apart from 
Kampala and Kigali and Dar es Salaam. When you come out of univer-
sity or even without university, you can get a job with Conrad Akunga or 
myself in our smaller companies. You can get a job with Mike Macharia 
at his company or with John Waibochi over at Virtual City or with any 
number of the smaller fi ve-to-ten-person-size startups scattered across the 
city. Th ere are a number of tech companies from small to large that are 
accessible to you, whereas they are not accessible in some of these other 
cities. Th e off take of that is amazing. It means that there are more and 
more people who are being polished into seeing technology as a business 
opportunity. Th ey develop an important and unique skill set. Th is does 
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not necessarily happen in other places, simply because others do not have 
the critical mass of companies to even hire them. 
 Refl ecting upon the past years, can you point out one of the biggest 
“Aha!” moments that you have had? 
 I think it is diff erent for each stage when you are part of growing an 
ecosystem. I have been here for fi ve and half years now. Th ere are dif-
ferent things that happen throughout that time, and there are diff erent 
things that matter, depending on the stage that we were in. Th e fi rst 
“Aha!” moment was that this little idea of having a physical space would 
be good for the community. Th e “Aha!” moment was, “Holy crap, we’re 
oversubscribed by 2,000 people and, yeah, it worked.” Th e insight was 
this—that, yes, actual face time with people is important, even for 
technologists! 
 I had a conversation with Eric Schmidt of Google on his visit a couple 
years back. We were sitting downstairs grabbing lunch at Pete’s, and I 
mentioned the numbers we were seeing and the success rates of those 
companies being around 10 to 15 % for their fi rst year. He responded 
that in Silicon Valley, the numbers are much, much higher, but the suc-
cess rates are even lower—meaning that we should expect to put out 
many more companies if we want to see a few succeed at a very large level. 
Th is was the “Aha!” moment tied to the need to generate more start-ups. 
It is a numbers game. So how do we help get more things started? 
 We understand many will fail and that is fi ne. But the more we get 
out there, the better. It is like if you want the real, sort of bigger investors 
to come off  the sidelines and jump into the system for more start-ups to 
scale, then we need at least one of them to exit at maybe USD20 million 
in order to prove to people that there is something here. Th at is what the 
ecosystem is fi guring out right now. 
 For the iHub, the “Aha!” moment came as we realized that we did not 
have to charge our members if we come up with a service model that 
allows us to charge for other services, such as consulting. Th at is why we 
built the iHub Research arm, the UX Lab, and iHub Consulting. Th ese 
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new departments allowed the iHub to be 85 % self-sustaining, generat-
ing its own revenue and still fulfi ll its mission of catalyzing the tech com-
munity in Nairobi. 
 I have realized over time that as you are fi guring things out, it is impor-
tant to be open to the idea that you really are experimenting and impro-
vising a lot of the time. And if things do not work, you stop them. And if 
they do work, double down on them, and hopefully, it turns into another 
“Aha!” moment. 
 Th ank you, Erik! 
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 Th e twentieth century saw the economic rise of Asia through the 
 signifi cant economic rise of the “Asian Tiger” countries (Kojima  2000 ; 
UNCTAD  1996 ). 1 But the twenty-fi rst century has been dubbed the 
African century (Wikipedia  2016 ). Tech Crunch, renowned technology 
media company, recently published an article entitled “Th e Future Is 
African” (Nash  2015 ), which aptly described how Africa is unleashing 
innovation by combining mobile and web technology to lead the world 
in the twenty-fi rst century. 
 Th e digital economy in Africa started in Cape Town, South Africa, in 
1995 when Mark Shuttleworth built Th awte, a leading certifi cate author-
ity, and sold it to Verisign when Vodacom championed prepaid airtime. 
Th e wave then moved to Ghana in 2001, when, together with Mark 
1  Th e Asian Tiger economies consist of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Th ailand. 
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 Chanzo Capital ,  Quatre Bornes ,  Mauritius 
Davies and others, BusyInternet was built—a multipurpose tech hub 
through which I started the Ghana New Ventures Competition in part-
nership with the MIT $50K Competition, bringing about  www.smsgh.
com . Th e tech wave is now moving through Kenya and has produced 
some of the country’s and the continent’s leading tech innovations—for 
example, Erik Hersman’s iHub and Safaricom’s M-PESA (made possible 
because of Vodacom’s prepaid airtime). Th e wave is now making its way 
to Lagos, Nigeria, and Abidjan, Ivory Coast. In my view, the wave’s route 
across and within these countries—namely, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, 
Ghana, and South Africa (KINGS)—is worthy of exploration. 
 Like the Asian Tigers, these fi ve countries lead the continent’s technol-
ogy innovation and will be referred to throughout the chapters as Africa’s 
“KINGS,” an acronym I coined 2 to label not only the fastest-growing 
economies on the continent but also the pillars of innovation and high- 
tech entrepreneurship. Th e KINGS, it will be shown, are the countries 
leading the development of the digital economy in Africa and setting the 
pace for the rest of the continent. 
 Th e World Economic Forum asked the question “Is Africa Leading the 
Innovation Revolution?” (Moosajee  2016 );  Fortune magazine also focused 
on “Why Africa May Be on the Verge of an Internet Boom” (Bright 
 2015 ); the  Wall Street Journal suggested that Africa may very well be har-
boring the next Mark Zuckerberg (Johnson and Aboyeji  2015 ); and busi-
ness news site Quartz Africa published “African Startups Are Defying the 
Global Tech Slowdown” (Kuo  2016 ). Buttressing the observations made 
in these articles, Quartz Africa also reported that the KINGS are receiving 
the most investments, adding that these countries have built and sup-
ported the ecosystems required to power start-ups. Th ese innovative new 
companies then develop into the small- and medium-size enterprises that 
create jobs, pay taxes, and eventually create wealth in local economies. 
 Th e purpose of this chapter is to describe the key developments in 
digital innovation in the fi ve KINGS countries, providing anecdotal 
evidence and proof to support the argument that their economies have 
the  potential to develop Africa’s unicorn businesses (i.e., companies with 
2  For more about the launch of the term, see the video of the author:  https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=vNUrICNUiiI 
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almost  vertical growth). It will be shown that in the same manner that 
Asia produced Alibaba, the biggest tech company of the twentieth cen-
tury, Africa is well on its way to producing the tech giants of the twenty-
fi rst century. 
 Symbolically, the label KINGS takes its inspiration from the concept 
of kingship in African culture. In the African traditional governance sys-
tem, the king is the revered leader who sets exemplary standard for others 
to follow (Ayittey  1991 ). African kings were—and in some countries, 
still are—the highest authority, the leading light in our traditional estab-
lishment. Just like these kings, the KINGS leadership models off ers good 
examples of growth and transformation to be emulated by the rest of the 
continent. 
 Africa Rising 
 Th e “Africa Rising” narrative is underpinned by an “Africa Tech Rising,” 
which was jump-started by the mobile revolution as Africa leapfrogged 
the world from a few landlines to massive mobile phone use in just a 
decade. 
 In 1998, there were fewer than four million mobile phones on the 
continent. By 2011, there were more than 500 million (Fox  2011 ). Th is 
exponential growth was led by private mobile companies that started 
from scratch, some in partnership with foreign operators. Th ese enter-
prises have today built world-class mobile operators, such as South 
Africa’s MTN, Kenya’s Safaricom, Airtel Africa (which bought Celtel, 
a local company started by Sudanese billionaire Mo Ibrahim), Orange 
(which bought a number of local operators like Sonatel in Senegal, 
Sotelma in Mali, and others), Econet Wireless (started by Zimbabwe 
billionaire Strive Masiyiwa, who is still the chairman), Glo (started by 
Nigeria billionaire Mike Adenuga, also still the chairman), and many 
others. A report by Freshfi elds Bruckhaus Deringer ( 2014 ) revealed that 
investments in the telecom, media, and technology sector in Africa over 
the last decade earned 19 % annualized returns, higher than the Africa 
MSCI Index of 11 % and higher than revenue from the oil and gas  sector 
at 6  %. Th is suggests that while most of the African growth story is 
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focused on natural resources, the telecom, media, and technology sector 
made more than double the return. 
 Th e title of the Freshfi elds Bruckhaus Deringer report ( 2014 ) was 
“Africa Is Poised for Tech Take-Off ”—and aptly so, because mobile 
growth has laid the foundation for Africa’s tech renaissance, a point also 
underscored by the BBC in 2014 (Wall  2014 ). Th e arrival of subma-
rine and terrestrial cables brought broadband to the masses and catalyzed 
the digital economy. Increasingly, Africa’s millennials and digital natives, 
instead of looking for jobs overseas or another way to vacate the con-
tinent, have caught on to the development of African mobile and web 
applications and are unleashing their creative juices and entrepreneurial 
prowess to disrupt traditional markets and address problem areas for both 
rich and poor customers. 
 Africa’s population is 70 % youth (18–35 years old) (Hinshaw  2015 ), 
a segment that is transforming itself into an asset class—asking less about 
who will help them and more about what problems they can solve and 
which businesses they can build, thus creating value through employ-
ment and taxes (Jackson  2015a ). By leveraging the internet, this gen-
eration is developing programming and business skills—sometimes 
without any formal education—and, coupled with their need to survive, 
is expressing itself through innovative software and other product solu-
tions. Economist George Ayittey calls these individuals the “Cheetah 
Generation” and argues that they could be Africa’s salvation. 
 In monetary terms, the mobile ecosystem contributed USD102 bil-
lion to the GDP of the Sub-Saharan Africa region in 2014, a fi gure pro-
jected to rise to USD160 billion by 2020 (GSMA  2015 ). More generally, 
McKinsey & Company reported (Manyika et al.  2013 ) that the inter-
net will contribute USD300 billion to Africa’s GDP by 2025. Th is is 
signifi cant because, according to the World Bank ( 2009 ), mobile and 
broadband have more impact in developing economies than in devel-
oped economies. While developed countries have been transformed by 
information, communications, and technology, the transformation in the 
developing world is often even deeper, benefi tting not only the wealthy, 
but also middle- and lower-income citizens. According to McKinsey & 
Company, economic activities at the bottom-of-the-pyramid markets, 
brought about through technological innovations, are enabling many 
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poor people to join the emerging middle class (Manyika et al.  2013 ). Th e 
development of mobile money, for instance, has created signifi cant fi nan-
cial inclusion for many (which was not the case earlier), as pioneered by 
Kenya’s Safaricom with the M-PESA brand (Stahl  2015 ). Mobile phone 
services account for 5.7 % of the continent’s GDP and are forecast to hit 
8 % by 2020 (GSMA  2015 ) (Fig.  3.1 ).
 Characteristics of the Kings 
 Digitally, the KINGS economies have led the rest of the African continent 
by laying a strong foundation through increased broadband penetration 
and development of pro-innovation public policies that facilitate inno-
vation by digital natives and millennials. Th e  Harvard Business Review 
included Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa in its global list of the fastest- 
moving digital economies (Chakravorti et al.  2015 ). 
 Certain characteristics—economic growth, entrepreneurial ecosys-
tems, vibrant telecoms, tech infrastructure, and supportive policies—
distinguish the KINGS economies from others on the continent. Th e 
balance of this chapter explores how these unique features have enabled 

































Mobile's Impact Greatest In SSA
 Fig. 3.1  Mobile phone impact by regions (Source: GSMA  2015 ) 
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 Economic Growth 
 Th e economies of the KINGS are vibrant, robust, and among the fastest 
growing on the continent. Ivory Coast, which suff ered civil unrest after 
the 2010 elections, has stabilized and its economy is growing. According 
to the World Bank ( 2015a ), the country is close to experiencing a double- 
digit economic growth rate (10.7 %, 8.7 %, and 9–10 % in 2012, 2013, 
and 2014, respectively). Additionally, Ivory Coast was ranked among the 
ten best reformers in 2014 and 2015 in the World Bank’s  Doing Business 
report. 3 
 Kenya, like Ivory Coast, bounced back from the 2007–2008 post- 
election violence within two years. According to the World Bank ( 2015b ), 
devolution was the biggest gain emanating from the new constitution 
promulgated in August 2010. Th e report said that the economy grew by 
5.4 % in 2014, and the World Bank projected an economic growth of 
6 % in 2015. Although Nigeria just overtook South Africa as the largest 
economy in Africa (Th e Economist  2014 ), Nigeria is growing at a rate of 
5.4 % while Ghana’s rate is 7.1 % for the same year. 
 Th is economic growth is underpinned by high mobile penetration 
rates (90  %) and widely available broadband. Lower smartphone and 
broadband prices have boosted penetration and access. Th e youth bulges 
in these countries mean that they have a critical mass of youthful people 
creatively leveraging the mobile web platform to create solutions for busi-
nesses and solve social problems, some of which may become global role 
models. Just as major tech giant Alibaba came from Asia in the twentieth 
century, it would not be too much of a surprise if the current century’s 
next giant came from Africa (Jackson  2015b ). 
 Entrepreneurial Ecosystems 
 Th e KINGS economies have multiple tech hubs, co-working spaces, 
incubators, and accelerators that serve as their centers of innovation, 
creativity, and entrepreneurship. Th e iHub in Kenya, Orange Fab in 
3  For regular updates, check  http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings 
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Ivory Coast, Leadpath in Nigeria, Meltwater Entrepeneurial School of 
Technology in Ghana, and 88mph in South Africa are examples of spaces 
where millennials and digital natives work to unleash their innovations 
(Kelly  2014 ). Th ese innovations are attracting investment to these coun-
tries as more investors are putting more into the creative industry. As 
these spaces gain momentum, the building of technology parks is next in 
line, led by the government, the private sector, or in some cases, public–
private partnerships. Further, these countries have strong academic and 
research institutions, capable of producing the human resources required 
to fuel their digital economies. 
 Vibrant Telecoms 
 Th e information, communications, technology, and telecom sectors in 
these countries are very competitive. On average, each of them has at 
least three operators in the mobile sector, and their incumbent postal, 
telegraph, and telephone (PTT) fi rms have liberalized their own sector. 
According to Lancaster ( 2015 ), Telkom Kenya lost control of the telecom 
sector to Safaricom and gained competition from Airtel Kenya and Orange 
(which bought Telkom Kenya). Unfortunately, Yu (a brand of Essar 
Telecom and the fourth operator in the market) recently folded, partly 
because of market-dominant practices by Safaricom, which together with 
Airtel Kenya, agreed to split Yu’s license, assets, and customers. Statistics 
on subscriber numbers reported by Kenya’s Communications Authority 
in December 2014 indicated that Safaricom controlled 67.4 % of Kenya’s 
telecoms market and that rivals Airtel and Orange controlled 22.6 % and 
10 %, respectively (Business Daily  2015 ). 
 Th e fi rst mobile virtual network operator (MVNO), called Equitel, 
was recently established in Kenya as a partnership between Equity Bank 
and Airtel (Tredger  2015 ). Equitel is expected to compete with Safaricom 
in the mobile money space. In Ivory Coast, Orange bought out the coun-
try’s incumbent PTT, which had signifi cantly lost the landline business 
but is the market leader after rebranding as Orange Ivory Coast with 
stiff  competition from MTN, Moov (which is the Etisalat brand for 
Francophone West Africa), Comium, and Green SA. 
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 Nigeria’s mobile market is led by Glo, with stiff  competition from 
MTN, Airtel, and Etisalat; other Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) 
operators like Starcomm, Visafone, Multilinks and ZoomMobile are also 
active in the market. Ghana’s incumbent PTT was bought by Vodafone 
to enter the market, but MTN is still the market leader, with other com-
petitors being Airtel, Glo, and Tigo. Telkom South Africa, the incumbent 
PTT in South Africa, is still strong in the fi xed-line business. Telkom 
South Africa has a mobile business called Telkom 8ta, but Vodacom is the 
market leader in the mobile space, with competition from MTN, Cell C, 
and MVNO Virgin Mobile. 
 Tech Infrastructure 
 Th e KINGS economies and their broadband experience are driven 
by a multiplicity of submarine cables. Kenya uses Th e East Africa 
Marine Systems (TEAMS) (2009), followed by SEACOM (2009), 
EASSy (2010), and LION2 (2012) submarine cables (Commonwealth 
Telecommunications Organisation  2012 ). Th e dramatic increase in 
international bandwidth not only ended Kenya’s dependence on expen-
sive satellite bandwidth, but the 90 % decrease in the cost of broadband 
access ensured that services have been made aff ordable for a large popu-
lation, including those at the bottom of the pyramid (Lancaster  2015 ). 
 Ivory Coast has a number of cables—namely, the SAT3, WASC, and 
ACE.  MainOne and GLO will be introduced soon. Nigeria and Ghana 
have SAT-3, WASC, Main One, ACE and GLO-1 submarine cables—while 
South Africa has SAT3, SEACOM, WASC and EASSy (Song  2015 ). Th e 
KINGS economies also have multiple terrestrial fi ber networks connecting 
people to broadband through mobile networks. Th e Kenyan government 
has the National Optic Fiber Backbone Infrastructure (NOFBI), and the 
Kenya Power Company, together with the government, owns  terrestrial fi ber 
networks running on power pylons. Jamii Telecom, KDN, and Wananchi 
have their own local fi ber networks. Competition among these local terres-
trial fi ber networks has signifi cantly reduced the cost of broadband in Kenya. 
 In Ivory Coast, Orange and MTN are the main competitors. However, 
the launch of three additional operators between 2006 and 2008—Moov, 
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KoZ, and Oricel’s Green Network—has accelerated market growth and 
pushed mobile penetration well above the African average (Lancaster 
 2015 ). Orange dominates the national fi ber network, which it is using to 
hold back the market. Th e government is therefore in the process of build-
ing a competing fi ber network under the auspices of the National Agency 
of Universal Service in Telecommunication/ICT (ANSUT). MTN has 
built some of its own local fi ber to mitigate the actions of Orange. 
 Vodafone, on the other hand, inherited the national fi ber network 
when it took over Ghana Telecom and has since been using it to hold 
back the market in Ghana, thus compelling MTN and Airtel Ghana to 
build their own local fi ber networks. Th e government of Ghana recently 
launched the Eastern Corridor long-distance terrestrial fi ber network 
connecting Ho in the South-East to Bolgatanga in the North-East and 
plans are underway to provide the same on the Western Corridor under 
an open access model so that all players can access the fi ber infrastruc-
ture under similar terms and conditions. Th e national power company, 
GRIDCo, is about to commercialize its fi ber network on its power 
pylons on the national grid. Google has also launched Project Link fi ber 
in Ghana, which provides access on a wholesale basis to its fi ber net-
work, which covers Accra, Kumasi, and Takoradi, with plans to expand 
nationwide. 
 In Nigeria, Glo, MTN, Multilinks, and Airtel have extensive national 
fi ber networks, and there are also specialized fi ber networks such as 
Phase3 and Suburban Telecom. South Africa similarly has local special-
ized fi ber operators like DFA and Fiberco, while Telkom and Vodacom 
also have their own fi ber networks. Th ese specialized fi ber providers oper-
ate on an open-access model, which means they sell equally to all opera-
tors at the same price without discrimination, thanks to an absence of 
vested interests. 
 Supportive Policies 
 Finally, the KINGS economies have been able to develop their digi-
tal economies because of their pro-innovation public-policy agendas. 
When regulators do not put restrictions on mobile transactions, it spurs 
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 innovation. In Kenya, for example, Safaricom launched M-PESA, the 
mobile money platform, with minimal restrictions from the country’s 
Central Bank. 
 M-PESA subsequently fi lled an important gap for the large numbers 
of people without bank accounts by providing them with an electronic 
money-transfer option. Today, a farmer in a rural area is able to make 
electronic payments using mobile money. Of particular signifi cance to 
this development is that mobile money is building an inclusive fi nancial 
ecosystem that enables noncash transactions at the bottom of the pyra-
mid. Mobile phones are indeed the primary means both to access infor-
mation and to communicate for those at the bottom of the pyramid. In 
South Africa, the government allowed Vodacom to innovate by off ering 
prepaid airtime, and this became the basis for the mobile money innova-
tion in Kenya several years later. 
 All fi ve countries have explicit government ICT policies and, in some 
cases, implementation plans. At the national level, they all also have 
experts who advise the presidents on ICT and telecom industry mat-
ters. Th ey have further revised the mandates of their various government 
ministries and departments to include ICTs and have set up specialized 
government agencies that are responsible for implementing the policies. 
 Kenya has the Kenya ICT Authority (KICTA), Ivory Coast has La 
Société Nationale de Développement Informatique (SNDI), Nigeria has 
its National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA), 
Ghana has its National Information Technology Agency (NITA), and 
South Africa has its National Information Technology Agency (SITA) to 
implement ICT policies. Th ese countries have also enacted regulations 
that govern the smooth operation of the ICT sector and have established 
regulatory institutions, some of which are very independent. Kenya has 
the Communication Authority of Kenya (CAK), Ivory Coast has the 
Autorité de Régulation des Télécommunications/Tic de Côte d’Ivoire 
(ARTCI), Nigeria has the Nigeria Communications Commission 
(NCC), Ghana has its National Communications Authority (NCA), and 
South Africa has the Independent Communications Authority of South 
Africa (ICASA). 
 Th ese regulatory institutions perform the function of enabling equity 
and fairness in the industry. ICASA and ARTCI are perceived to be least 
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independent; CAK, NCC, and NCA are perceived to be more indepen-
dent and do exert some nongovernmental control over their respective 
industries in the countries in which they operate. Th e development of 
sound institutions is fundamental to the growth of any democratic econ-
omy, and creating independent regulatory institutions builds investor 
confi dence and makes for a level playing fi eld. 
 As Table  3.1 shows, these unique attributes of the KINGS econo-
mies make them stand out from the other 54 countries on the African 
continent:
 Profi les of the KINGS 
 Although the KINGS are drawn from a number of regions on the con-
tinent, West Africa has the greatest representation in the group. Ivory 
Coast, Nigeria, and Ghana (the ING of KINGS) have unique features 
that justify their inclusion in the group. Th e combined population of the 
three ING economies is 300 million, equivalent to that of the USA, and 
yet, they occupy just one-third of the US landmass. Further, the ING 
economies, representing both Anglophone and Francophone Africa, are 
closely knit and within a 45-minute fl ight from each other. 
 Th ese groupings are strong and can facilitate an examination and 
understanding of Sub-Saharan Africa’s various subregions. Kenya and 
Ivory Coast, for example, have proven that it is possible for countries to 
recover from election crises; Nigeria recently established its democratic 
credentials, having been able to successfully hand over power through 
the ballot; Ghana is recovering from various setbacks, such as the current 
 Table 3.1  Profi le of KINGS countries 





 Kenya  44.35 M  5.7  32.2 M  16.2 M 
 Ivory Coast  20.32 M  8.7  17.9 M  5.6 M 
 Nigeria  173.6 M  5.4  133.2 M  70.3 M 
 Ghana  25.9 M  7.1  29.53 M  14.62 M 
 South Africa  52.98 M  1.9  59.5 M  21.73 M 
 Sources : WorldBank, ITU, Buddecom, Telegeography, Country Telecom Regulator 
websites 
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electric infrastructure and currency risk crises; and South Africa, though 
also suff ering from electric infrastructure and currency risk crises, off ers 
infrastructure of world-class standards with a technology ecosystem that 
is the most sophisticated of all the fi ve countries. South Africa could be 
considered a “soft landing” for any international market player coming 
to Africa for the fi rst time. 
 A more detailed focus on each country shows what makes them tech 
leaders. 
 Kenya 
 Kenya leads the KINGS because it is at the forefront in three critical 
areas:
 1.  An aggressive and conscious government program to develop a broad-
band infrastructure; 
 2.  Two critical innovations—mobile money and a crowdsourcing plat-
form; and 
 3.  Th e development of a tech incubator and accelerator model for the 
continent, catalyzing the innovation agenda that has swept through 
Africa like wildfi re. 
 In a clarion call to government, researchers, academia, and the pri-
vate sector to make it a reality, President Uhuru Kenyatta declared that 
Kenya is a “start-up nation” (Government of Kenya  2015 ), and since 
making this statement, several events in Kenya confi rmed it. In 2015, 
the country hosted its fi rst ICT Innovation Forum as a catalyst to 
accelerate collaboration and growth in the ICT sector. In the same 
year, US President Barak Obama visited Kenya to open the Fifth 
Global Entrepreneurship Summit, which recognized Kenya as a center 
of tech entrepreneurship. Confi rming the “Africa Tech Rising” narra-
tive, Obama said, “I wanted to be here because Africa is on the move…
young people are harnessing technology” (Euronews  2015 ). 
 In a clear message of Kenya’s commitment to ICT growth, President 
Kenyatta appointed two industry champions to key positions: Joe 
Mucheru as Cabinet ICT Secretary and Victor Kyalo as Principal 
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Secretary (Kenya Current  2015 ). Mucheru co-founded Wananchi 
Online (now Zuku) and was among the very fi rst staff  of Google 
Africa. Kyalo was instrumental in building up the KICTA and the 
Kenya Educational Network (KENET). 
 Microsoft chief executive offi  cer (CEO) Satya Nadella followed up 
the Global Entrepreneurship Summit with the global launch of 
Windows 10 in Nanyuki, Kenya. When asked why he chose Kenya, he 
said that he wanted to listen and learn from the Kenyan innovators on 
the ground who are building amazing start-ups from the bottom up 
and are not big multinationals (Madowo  2015 ). Th ese developments 
point to the fact that Africa in general, and Kenya in particular, is get-
ting the attention of the world when it comes to entrepreneurship and 
high- tech business opportunities. Kenya made Africa proud by hosting 
the summit and the Windows 10 launch, which is being perceived as 
the turnaround operating system for the software giant (Gosier  2015 ). 
 Kenya also spearheaded the mobile money revolution through the 
introduction of M-PESA, which currently constitutes roughly 20 % of 
the country’s transaction fl ow (McKay and Mazer  2014 ). Kenya also 
gave the world Ushahidi—a disaster-management platform based on 
crowdsourcing now used for monitoring disasters in countries around 
the world, from Haiti, Chile, and Pakistan to Congo, Philippines, 
Peru, Kenya, China, and Russia (Halliday  2010 ). 
 Kenya currently has one of the fastest internet connections on the 
continent because of an entrepreneurial government policy initiated in 
2007 under the leadership of Professor Bitange Ndemo (former 
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information and 
Communications). Professor Ndemo, with the support of Minister 
Mutahi Kagwe and President Mwai Kibaki, eff ectively navigated 
through bureaucracy and vested interests that stifl ed growth in Kenya’s 
telecommunications sector. Th eir eff orts paid off , and Kenya became 
the home of M-PESA, the world-famous mobile-money platform that 
enjoys staggering success in advancing fi nancial inclusion as well as 
cutting down transaction time for Kenyans. 
 In addition to M-PESA, the Kenya government entered into a pub-
lic–private partnership to build the fi rst submarine cable, TEAMS, 
and a terrestrial fi ber infrastructure, the NOFBI. Th ese projects laid 
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the foundation for other submarine and terrestrial fi ber networks to be 
built by private operators, resulting in a competitive environment that 
drove down the cost of broadband and increased connectivity speeds. 
 Th e convergence of the availability of broadband with the creative 
ingenuity of digital natives and millennials has resulted in new ven-
tures applying high-tech solutions to real problems. Kopo Kopo’s sys-
tem, for example, allows merchants on its network to increase revenues, 
NikoHapa off ers a customer loyalty reward system that uses QR issued 
codes, Weza Tele provides mobile solutions in commerce, and M-Farm 
connects farmers and buyers. Others ventures include MPrep, an 
e-learning platform; the PesaPal payment aggregation platform; 
Uhasib, a web and mobile cloud-based accounting system for accoun-
tants and small- and medium-size enterprises; Arifu, an SMS-based 
learning platform for individuals and corporates; Sprint Interactive, a 
digital agency with a unique storytelling approach; and Elimu, an 
award- winning, engaging, and fun interactive application for children 
learning and preparing for their exams in the Kenyan Primary School 
system (iHub Research  2013 ). 
 According to  Business Daily (2015), Weza Tele recently sold to AFB 
for USD1.7 million—the fi rst exit in the nascent tech industry in Kenya 
(Jackson  2015c ). Most of these entrepreneurial activities take place on 
Ngong Road in Nairobi, which is likened to America’s Silicon Valley. 
 To buttress the growth of a technology economy, the Kenyan gov-
ernment has set aside 5000 acres of land to set up Konza Techno 
City—a USD9.4 billion undertaking envisioned as a smart technol-
ogy city where innovation, technology, knowledge, and research come 
together to create wealth (MIT Technology Review  2015 ). 
 An example of a next-generation company from Kenya is Cellulant, 
which Kenyan Ken Njoroge and Nigerian Bolaji Akinboro founded in 
2002. Th e company has won wide recognition as a mobile fi nancial 
services provider and is considered to be Kenya’s biggest export to the 
rest of Africa. Jenkins writes that the  Financial Times recognizes 
Cellulant’s provision of a mobile payment system across 10 countries, 
including Kenya, Zambia, Botswana and Gambia, with plans to 
expand to another 13 countries in the next 15 months (Jenkins  2015 ). 
 Th ere are other new-generation Kenyan innovative companies like 
Mike Macharia’s Seven Seas Technologies, a leading provider of 
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 integrated business and technology solutions; John Waibochi’s Virtual 
City, a leading provider of innovative mobility solutions that simplify 
lives; Segeni Ngethe’s Mama Mikes, an online shopping platform for 
Africans in the diaspora; and Craft Silicon, a fi nancial solution pro-
vider of software for banks, microfi nance, mobile, and switch solution 
in the global market (Adar  2015 ). 
 Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire) 
 Ivory Coast, the second country in the KINGS economies, has mobile 
penetration of 90 %, with the creative economy beginning to emerge 
in places like Plateau and Cocody. Th e government put together a huge 
investment forum in 2014 as part of its plans to showcase the country and 
attract investment. A well-patronized event, it resulted in Entrepreneurial 
Solutions Partners putting together the fi rst national business plan com-
petition, which rewarded 10 start-up businesses with cash investments 
and the opportunity to engage with investors at the forum as well as 
develop their businesses. 
 Th e African Development Bank has moved its headquarters back to 
Abidjan after a temporary relocation to Tunisia attributed to the post- 
election violence. Th e institution apparently prefers Abidjan for its 
headquarters despite off ers from other countries to host it—a move that 
provides a signifi cant boost of the city’s economy in terms of the fi nancial 
transactions and the employment and trade activities generated. 
 SocialSpot is a leading Ivorian start-up focused on providing social ser-
vices via a Wi-Fi mesh hotspot network in strategic locations in Abidjan 
and beyond. Its founder, Bacely Yorobi, is a leading light of the next 
generation of entrepreneurs. La Régionale is another interesting start-
 up, co-founded by Christophe Kaiser with the mission of delivering 
premium news content via SMS alerts directly to mobile handsets. Eric 
Kacou of Entrepeneurial Solutions Partners and Franck Berthod of Focus 
Group are seen as local champions of the start-up ecosystem in Ivory 
Coast because of their leadership in the start-up activities in Abidjan. 
Th e former organized the national business plan competition, provides 
consulting to start-ups; the later organized the fi rst Global Entrepreneur 
Week in 2015, and has recently set up ADN Accelerator in the Plateau 
3 The KINGS of Africa’s Digital Economy 69
business district for tech start-ups. Th e accelerator plans to start a six- 
month cohort program in which select entrepreneurs are groomed to cre-
ate start-ups with funding from a proposed national angel network. 
 Orange, the leading mobile operator in the country, has set up Orange 
Fab, an incubator and accelerator for nurturing start-ups that currently 
serves as the nerve center for the local start-up ecosystem. It houses start- 
ups such as Sportif 225, an online platform that provides content and 
events for sports; Syceliman, an IT company specialized in development 
(web and software), computer systems, and networks; Smartsell, a point-
of- sale management system; and ICT4D, an e-agriculture start-up. Th ese 
start-ups are eff ectively disrupting existing markets in the local economy. 
 Seedstars World hosted its fi rst start-up pitch competition in Ivory 
Coast in August 2015. Of the ten start-ups that pitched, Airshop, a 
duty-free preordering app, won the prize to represent Ivory Coast at a 
global pitch competition in Switzerland, proving that though the start-
 up ecosystem in Ivory Coast is relatively new, it has the potential to pro-
duce globally competitive businesses. Th e government plans to build a 
technology park along the coast in Grand Bassam, 30 minutes outside 
Abidjan, as part of a new urbanization plan. 
 Simplice Anoh’s Digital Afrique Telecom is an example of a next- 
generation business from Ivory Coast. It provides mobile value-added 
services and has a presence in 27 African countries where agreements 
have been signed with 40 mobile operators to provide premium-rated 
short codes for SMS/IVR/USSD services. Th e company also has a con-
tent distribution platform and is able to carry out loyalty or campaign 
management services on behalf of its numerous clients, which are pre-
dominantly in Francophone countries in the West, Central, Eastern, and 
Southern regions of the continent. Th e company’s current consolidated 
revenue is about USD3 million from the various countries it operates in. 
 Nigeria 
 Nigeria sits symbolically in the middle of the KINGS group of economies 
because it holds the key to how fast Africa will rise in the twenty- fi rst cen-
tury. Nigeria is one of the MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey) 
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countries identifi ed by Jim O’Neill of Goldman Sachs (who also created the 
term BRICS, referring to Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) as 
the next global economic giants. After rebasing its gross domestic product 
(GDP), Nigeria recently overtook South Africa as the largest economy in 
Africa and followed that with its fi rst democratic alternation of power. 
 Nigeria’s start-up ecosystem is dominated by e-commerce ventures and 
is recognized as the e-commerce capital of Africa, with start-ups such as 
Sim Shagaya’s Konga, Jumia (which raised USD150 million to expand 
into other African markets), Chris and Tope Folayan’s Mall for Africa 
(which raked in USD17 million in sales in 2014), and Raphael Afaedor’s 
Supermart (specializing in grocery deliveries and more). Jason Njoku 
built iROKOtv, a successful platform for video-on-demand content 
from Nigeria’s Nollywood, and has attracted huge investments that have 
enabled him and his business partner, Bastian Gotter, to launch Spark—a 
company building and incubating other start-ups. Spark is enabling the 
next generation of start-ups like Hotels.ng, which recently raised USD1.2 
million from Omidyar and EchoVC partners after being seeded with 
USD250,000 by Spark three years ago. Olumide Soyombo and Kazeem 
Tewogbade built Bluechip Technologies, a business intelligence company, 
from scratch and are now using the proceeds to seed the next generation 
of entrepreneurs through their accelerator and seed fund called Leadpath. 
 Considered Nigeria’s Silicon Valley, the start-up ecosystem built in 
Yaba, a suburb of Lagos, is home to a number of educational institu-
tions like the University of Lagos, Queen’s College, and Yaba Institute 
of Technology. CC Hub, IdeaHub, Leadpath, and Passion Incubator are 
some of the many co-working spaces, incubators, and accelerators located 
in the city. Yaba is also home to many tech companies (Akwagyiram 
 2015 ), such as Paga, Jobberman, Easy Taxi, and others. Th e Lagos Angel 
Network is rising to the challenge of feeding the ecosystem with capital 
and has so far invested in two start-ups. Like Kenya, the Nigerian govern-
ment is constructing an idyllic campus called Technology Village outside 
the capital, Abuja, 400 miles north of Lagos. 
 Jason Njoku’s iROKOtv is an example of a next-generation company 
and has been described as the Netfl ix of Africa (Iwuoha  2016 ). Th e company 
purchases the rights to Nigerian fi lms and distributes them online. Its 
subscription platforms stream music and movies in 178 countries. 
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 According to Jason, he started the company to satisfy his own desire 
to be able to fi nd online the Nigerian movies available on DVDs on the 
streets of Lagos. Having grown up in the UK, he fi gured that if he could 
get these movies online as Netfl ix had done, people would subscribe to 
watch or buy them. iROKOtv has since built a global audience, especially 
among Nigerians in the diaspora and other Africans who prefer to access 
their content via web-enabled devices. Not too long after its launch, the 
company secured USD8 million from investors to scale up the platform 
to target a global audience. Major American music and fi lm outlets now 
use iROKOtv to distribute their digital content in emerging markets. 
 Interswitch is another next-generation business from Nigeria. It is in 
line to become Africa’s fi rst public tech unicorn, with announcements to 
list on both the London and Lagos stock exchanges (Bright  2016 ). 
 Ghana 
 Ghana’s reputation as a safe destination for investment attracted Mark 
Davies in 2001 to set up BusyInternet, a multipurpose tech hub that 
started incubating start-ups. Hosted at BusyInternet, I started the Ghana 
New Ventures Competition that begot SMSGH— the leading value- 
added service provider that made USD5 million in revenue last year. 
SMSGH celebrated its tenth anniversary in 2015 with the opening of its 
own ultramodern offi  ce built without external investment or debt. 
 In 2008, the Meltwater Entrepreneurial School of Technology was set 
up as a two-year software training school, which then accepted students’ 
ideas in its incubator program. Meltwater Entrepreneurial School of 
Technology has so far invested USD15 million in more than 20 early- 
stage companies, some of which are Retail Tower; Dropifi , a customer 
support widget by the fi rst Ghanaian start-up to be accepted into the 500 
start-ups accelerator in San Francisco; Nandimobile, a business direc-
tory service; Leti Arts, a games developer focusing on African characters; 
ClaimSync, an electronic medical claims processing company (which was 
acquired by Genkey, a biometric solutions providers); and Saya Mobile, 
a mobile street messaging platform that was acquired by Kirusa of the 
United States (Nshehe  2014 ). 
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 Th e start-up ecosystem is not only building up in East Legon (where 
Meltwater Entrepreneurial School of Technology is located alongside two 
other incubators, Mobile Web Ghana and ServLed), but also in Osu and 
Labone, where co-working spaces Impact Hub Accra and iSpace, respec-
tively, are located. Th ese incubators and co-working spaces constitute the 
nerve center for the start-up ecosystem in Ghana. 
 mPedigree and Sproxil are leading Ghanaian start-ups that have gone 
global with technology that allows one to authenticate medications and 
other materials via SMS. Farmerline and Esoko have similarly gone global 
with mobile web technology that allows farmers to communicate among 
themselves in their local dialect, get weather updates, access markets directly, 
and negotiate prices for their produce. Ghana’s SMSGH has expanded into 
three African markets and is increasingly global (Venture Burn  2015 ). 
 Th e government’s eff ort to channel capital into the ecosystem resulted in 
the establishment of the Venture Capital Trust Fund, a fund of funds man-
aged by third-party fund managers, and recently started the Ghana Angel 
Investor Network to enable early-stage investments. Th e government plans 
to build a technology park in the free-zones enclave in the port city of Tema 
to enable business process outsourcing and provide for additional develop-
ment of technology companies. In addition, there is the Ghana Cyber City 
initiative, a private sector-led eff ort to build Ghana’s Silicon Valley, which 
would be located in East Legon, nestled between the University of Ghana 
and the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration close 
to where the current start-up ecosystem is developing. 
 SMSGH is a model of a next-generation company with an interest-
ing story. It was started by Alex Bram and Ernest Apenteng, childhood 
friends who attended the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and 
Technology in Kumasi. Th e university was built by Ghana’s founding 
father, President Kwame Nkrumah, to advance the cause of science and 
technology education. Like most Ghanaian families, Alex’s and Ernest’s 
parents expected them to complete their university education and get 
white-collar jobs. However, in their penultimate long university vacation, 
they decided to enter the Ghana New Venture Competition instead of 
going to London to earn some money from a part-time job. 
 Th e Ghana New Venture Competition program—according to Gregg 
Zachary ( 1997 ), author of  Endless Frontier :  Vannevar Bush ,  Engineer of 
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the American Century —was a revolutionary movement to activate the 
entrepreneurial spirit of the Ghanaian youth. In the afternoons of the 
three-month-long program, the program brought in successful Ghanaian 
entrepreneurs to tell the participants their life stories and how they made 
it on their entrepreneurial journey. According to Alex, it was during one 
of these sessions that he decided to become an entrepreneur. 
 After college, he partnered with his friends Ernest and Leslie Gyimah 
to start Urban Hive, which later became SMSGH, a mobile value-added 
service provider that focuses on communication, content, and commerce. 
Th e company has been growing year on year for the last ten years, earn-
ing USD5 million in revenue in 2014. SMSGH is a role model in many 
ways and proves that although the entrepreneurial environment is tough, 
it is possible to break through and build a great business from nothing, 
with no investments or debt. Th e company is a market leader with a great 
execution team of 42 employees and an exceptional chief technology offi  -
cer in the person of Kwadwo Sienti, who joined later. Th e company now 
has expansion offi  ces in Kenya for East Africa, Cameroon for Central 
Africa, and Nigeria for the greater West African market. Th e company’s 
next 10-year plan is to become Africa’s most useful mobile applications 
company by blending communication, content, and commerce into a 
mobile-cloud platform that works for 200,000 businesses, serving 250 
million people across the continent by 2025. 
 Ghana has other innovative next-generation companies such as 
Rancard Solutions, a multinational mobile telecom software and adver-
tising business; DreamOval, a data science enterprise software and cloud 
services company; and Farmerline, a platform that empowers small-scale 
farmers with innovative mobile technology and information services. 
 South Africa 
 South Africa is the only African representative among the BRICS econo-
mies that are deemed to represent the world’s emerging markets and act 
as a counterweight to the G8 and G20 economies. South Africa has long 
been a leading light in showcasing political stability and the diversity 
of the African continent. Th e country successfully hosted Africa’s fi rst 
World Cup, which helped change the global perception of the continent, 
74 E.M.K. Osiakwan
and it has been leading the innovation space with the introduction of 
prepaid airtime by Vodacom. 
 Before that, Mark Shuttleworth built Th awte in 1995 and sold it to 
Verisign in 1999 for more than half a billion dollars, opening the way 
for others to establish themselves from his investment vehicle. Fundamo, 
a mobile money fi nancial services platform, which was partly owned by 
HBD (Mark Shuttleworth’s investment vehicle), was acquired by Visa for 
USD110 million in 2011, and in that same year, Twangoo was acquired 
by Groupon for an undisclosed amount. 
 Earlier in 2015, Garmin, the satellite navigation multinational, bought 
iKubu, a backtracker bicycle radar technology company, and in May, 
Automattic, the parent company of WordPress, acquired Woothemes, a 
WordPress plug-in, for USD30 million. Th ese acquisitions made South Africa 
the country with the most acquisitions among the KINGS’ economies and 
confi rm South Africa’s leadership in building global technology companies. 
 Cape Town has been dominant in tech innovation, both in Stellenbosch 
and now in Woodstock, an old industrial estate that recently emerged as 
South Africa’s Silicon Valley. Johannesburg has been experiencing its own 
regeneration and is inching into the tech innovation space with loca-
tions in the Maboneng Precinct and 44 Stanley. Th e Innovation Hub in 
Pretoria is the government’s innovation cluster, which houses all kinds of 
innovation activities, from water technology to any form of high tech. 
 Section 12J of the Income Tax Act of South Africa allows investors to write 
off  100 % of their investment capital against their taxable income in the year 
in which they make an early-stage investment. Th e policy has resulted in the 
formation of a venture capital fund called Grovest that is investing in early-
stage companies using the tax write-off  as an incentive for its investors. 
 Invenfi n, AngelHub Ventures, 4Di Capital, Team Africa Ventures, 
Silver Tree Capital, and Knife Capital are some of the other funds that 
have being seeding early-stage tech companies. Th ey target start-ups in 
incubators, accelerators, and hubs such as JoziHub and Seed Engine (in 
Johannesburg) and Bandwidth Barn and 88mph (in Cape Town). 
 Naspers is a model of a successful next-generation South African com-
pany. With a market capitalization of more than USD66 billion, Naspers 
is regarded as the largest company in Africa. It recently became the biggest 
publicly traded company by market value in Africa through the sale of 
bonds to fund emerging market internet acquisitions. It has been making 
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global acquisitions as consumers make the switch to mobile and smart 
devices for activities such as shopping and banking. Naspers already has 
an impressive portfolio that cuts across internet media, television, inter-
net services, and the print media with companies such as OLX, Flipkart, 
Allegro, Ibibo, SuperSport, MultiChoice, MWEB, and Media24. 
 Industry Events 
 In addition to the policies, acquisitions, and partnerships that have accel-
erated Africa’s tech innovation, industry events have also contributed in 
catalyzing the continent’s digital economy. 
 Angel Fair Africa brings selected start-ups to pitch to investors. It was 
launched in South Africa in 2013, and the second event was held in 
Nigeria the following year. In the 2015 Ghana event, two deals were 
announced on the spot for the fi rst time. Th e event took place after the 
Africa Technology Summit, with active participation from Silicon Valley 
and European investors that follow Africa tech. 
 Demo Africa is another start-up industry event that serves as a 
launch pad for start-ups in Africa. It is the African version of Demo, 
the annual US event. Demo Africa has helped launch a number of 
African start-ups since it began in 2012  in Nairobi. Th e event was 
moved to Lagos after two successful events in the East African city. Th e 
event is a fl agship of the LIONS@FRICA partnership led by the US 
State Department. 
 Pivot East is East Africa’s premier mobile start-ups pitching compe-
tition, held annually since 2011 and led by the mLab consortium of 
East Africa. Th e event brings selected start-ups to pitch to an audience, 
including investors. Currently in its fi fth year, the event has produced a 
signifi cant number of start-ups in the region. 
 Seedstars World is a global start-up competition out of Switzerland that 
takes place in emerging markets with the focus of enabling  entrepreneurs 
through providing investment dollars to the best start-ups to build their 
business. Last year’s event had a major focus on Africa, with events in 
Cairo, Gaborone, Algiers, Dakar, Dar Es Salaam, Luanda, Nairobi, 
Kampala, Kigali, Accra, Lagos, Maputo, Gaborone, Cape Town, and 
Abidjan. 
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 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 It is clear from my case studies of the KINGS economies that Africa is 
the twenty-fi rst century home of tech innovation. Innovations in these 
countries have the capacity to add immense value to their respective 
economies through job creation, taxes, and creating effi  ciencies in the 
economy. 
 Other African countries should follow suit and try to position them-
selves to capture the innovation wave by considering the following 
recommendations:
 1.  Build strong local infrastructure to enable broadband availability and 
accessibility. Governments and the private sector need to invest in sub-
marine and land-based fi ber networks and wireless last-mile connec-
tivity to bring mobile and broadband to the masses. 
 2.  Create an enabling environment for strong competition in the tele-
com and technology ecosystem. Regulators need to take the lead in 
creating a level playing fi eld that allows for equity and fairness in the 
marketplace, and this must be backed by policies that discourage 
incumbency and market-dominant practices. 
 3.  Build independent regulatory institutions and match them with the 
requisite public policy agencies. Governments, through acts of parlia-
ment, must build regulatory institutions that are independent and 
under the supervision of parliament or some bipartisan national 
institution. 
 4.  Use a pro-innovation public policy agenda that empowers each 
country’s digitally inclined natives and millennials to lead the 
charge. Governments should place technology innovation and cre-
ativity at the center of their economic development agenda and fos-
ter innovation policies that allow the youth to lead the national 
agenda. 
 5.  Ensure that there is a community of practice among the key stake-
holders (government, academia, researcher, the private sectors, and 
civil society). Innovation thrives best when there is a coalition of 
actors who work together while playing their individual roles eff ec-
tively. Governments must champion this strategy as they lead from 
behind. 
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 Final Remarks 
 Steve Case, co-founder of AOL and now chairman of Revolution LLC, 
and his wife Jean Case, CEO of the Case Foundation, recently visited 
three of the KINGS economies — Kenya, Ghana, and Nigeria. Impressed 
by the entrepreneurial ecosystems they saw, Steve said, “Th e most excit-
ing thing I’ve seen is great entrepreneurs…they really have great ideas. 
Some of them are going to be great businesses that change the world and 
create a lot of value and create a lot of jobs. It has been encouraging” 
(Ventures Africa  2015 ). 
 For her part, Jean added, “You know I have also tried to underscore 
that the other area that is very impressive here is the degree of partici-
pation by women in the entrepreneurial sector. Everywhere we’ve gone, 
we’ve seen amazingly talented strong women really bringing it and build-
ing some really great new enterprises” (Egbedi  2015 ). 
 Eghosa Omoigui, managing partner of EchoVC, said, “Our ideal 
entrepreneur has a Nigerian hustle, a Ghanaian integrity, and a Kenyan 
smoothness” (Baird  2015 ). Allow me to add Ivorian persistence and 
South African diversity as additional ingredients for making a start-up 
successful. 
 Th e KINGS countries are therefore an embodiment of smoothness, 
persistence, hustle, integrity, and diversity. And Africa—led by the 
KINGS—is truly on the move. 
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 Conversation #3 
 Changing the Game: Building Mindsets of 
Hope and Possibilities in Africa’s Future 
Leaders — One Game at a Time 
 Anne Githuku-Shongwe of Afroes 
 Anne Githuku-Shongwe  was recently appointed the UN Women 
Representative in South Africa for multiple countries in the region. At 
heart ,  Anne is a social entrepreneur ,  a digital innovator ,  and has been a 
thought leader and pioneer on the future of digital learning and digital 
work for Africa ’ s youth. She founded Afroes in 2010 to create innovative 
ways to help equip African youth for more promising futures. She and 
Afroes have received multiple awards ,  including the prestigious Schwab 
Foundation World Economic Forum Social Entrepreneur of the Year 
2013 Award and the National Award :  Order of the Grand Warrior 
from the President of Kenya. Other awards include the PEACEApp 
award of the United Nations (UN) ,  Meff ys Award in London ,  and 
Netexplo Award in Paris. Before starting Afroes ,  she was an interna-
tional development professional for 20 years ,  including 15 years with the 
United Nations Development Programme on the African continent and 
with management consulting fi rms in the USA. 
 What is the story behind Afroes? 
 Afroes (the name comes from a play on “African heroes and hero-
ines”) was inspired by conversations with my own children. I worried 
that they were not being exposed to any positive African media content 
and that their ideas and aspirations for Africa were being infl uenced by 
the Western media’s pervasively negative messages about the continent. I 
got tired of complaining about it and decided to do something to change 
that. 
 My vision was to revolutionize social skills learning in Africa through 
edutainment platforms that would embed values and shape new mind-
sets of hope and possibility in the youth market across the continent. 
Watching my own children playing computer games gave me the inspira-
tion I needed. I realized that kids were captivated by computer games and 
had the opportunity to learn complex skills in a fun yet subtle way—and 
I knew that there had to be a way to harness computer games to inspire 
the change to African children that I desired. 
 Th e business challenge for Afroes was recognizing that to reach mass 
numbers of children in Africa, mobile phones were the only viable 
medium to deliver computer games en masse. Today, with reach of over 
450,000 users, Afroes has created a series of mobile games designed to 
shape new choices and stimulate challenging conversations for children 
and young people in Africa. 
 Our Moraba is an award-winning mobile game addressing diffi  cult 
questions about gender-based violence and challenging the user to 
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 contemplate what she or he believes about sexual relations and sexual vio-
lence. Th e game provides valuable information to the user, empowering 
them to make informed choices. Another powerful game, Haki: Chaguo 
Ni Lako (“Justice: Th e Choice is Yours”) was designed to inform, inspire, 
and empower Kenyan youth, helping them make considered choices as 
they went to the polls in 2013. 
 Afroes has developed a design approach that engages young mobile- 
game users in the co-creation of the mobile application, with social enter-
prise partners including the Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund and Child 
Rights partner organizations; UN Women and Gender-Based Violence 
stakeholders; the Tuvuke Initiative for a Peaceful, Inclusive, and Just 
Society; the Ford Foundation, as well as the Rockefeller Foundation, 
Microsoft, Intel, Nokia, and Vodacom. 
 What is the underlying motivator, the driver behind your life trajec-
tory and the various projects you are engaged in? 
 I have always been driven by the belief in an Africa of great promise as 
defi ned by Africans and not dictated by the West. In all my years work-
ing in the development and multi-lateral sector, I noticed that we were 
stuck! We focused obliviously on copying the Western or even Eastern 
models without recognizing that we were actually selling out our conti-
nent’s destiny. 
 One of the real turning points for me was a moment as we (United 
Nations Development Programme colleagues and African governments) 
were working with colleagues from the government of Singapore. One 
of them, a woman from the government of Singapore, turned to us as 
we were debating what lessons to take back to Africa from our trip, and 
she asks candidly, “Why are you Africans always so willing to give up 
your destiny for others to defi ne it for you?” And she was right. For too 
long, this had been the play in Africa. I sat there and felt a combination 
of insult and paralysis. I felt challenged, and then I realized that yes, 
she was right. Th at is the core of it all. Th e public servants from my 
delegation who were very senior and smart were really only interested 
in a quick, simple fi x that would somehow bypass the 40 years of Lee 
Kuan Yew’s work that had resulted in today’s Singapore. It bothered me 
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that these smart public servants never once asked about the transfor-
mational investments in the mindsets of Singaporeans that had begun 
when they were six years old. So deeply embedded was the mindset 
of possibility, excellence, and patriotism that every Singaporean from 
street sweeper to cabinet minister spoke the same language and under-
stood the vision of the nation. I have hardly seen this anywhere else in 
the world. 
 I mean, Singapore was no diff erent from us in the 60s! Th ey did not 
develop suddenly and dramatically. No! Th ey went through struggles 
similar to ours in Africa so that in the 60s, for example, they had high 
levels of corruption in the public sector. Under the astute leadership 
of Lee Kuan Yew, they made a dramatic and transformational decision 
that Singapore would never be great unless they started by investing in 
a new generation that would emerge with the right values and mindsets 
to shape a diff erent future. Th e results that we see today are the result of 
40 to 50 years of investment in the right mindsets and values that have 
shaped their nation. 
 I am dreaming of a future when youth of my village will not run in 
hope at the sight of a Land Cruiser with a foreign agency logo on the car 
door—only to turn away dejected by yet another broken promise of their 
fi nally being saved by the Land Cruiser guy. Instead, I have dreamed that 
the youth of my village will be so invested in ensuring that they not only 
defi ne and shape their own destiny but also will build their own Land 
Cruisers! But I knew this was not going to be easy, given that the mind-
sets were already distorted, and therefore there was urgent need to invest 
boldly in those young ones who were not yet a lost cause. 
 Th at triggered my thinking, and I embarked on asking one important 
question: How do we begin to invest in the mindsets of young Africans? 
How do we create mindsets that are built on the foundations of hope, 
possibility, and integrity? And how do we do this en masse? Afroes was 
my response to this, given that mobile today is the most powerful educa-
tional platform on our African continent. 
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 Where do you think that mindset is coming from? 
 Th is is a complex set of theories that we cannot do justice to here. 
However, there are two that I feel are inarguable and that, to me, have 
really shaped our mindsets. One is what I would call a “village chief” men-
tal model. Th e village chief mental model is built on a convoluted mesh 
of cultures that took the African traditional leader and superimposed the 
poll tax administrator from colonial administrations. Th is resulted in a 
perverted leadership model that vested all power in the hands of a chief 
who at a whim could determine the fate or fortune of his “subjects” and 
direct the resource fl ow as he chose. It is a model that I believe we have 
never been able to break out of. It reveres authority and promotes strong 
patron–client relationships that determine the fl ow of resources and one’s 
economic or political destiny. We see these patterns perpetuated in the 
way we choose our political leaders and how our leaders conduct them-
selves once in offi  ce. 
 Th e “development savior” mindset in all its forms—whether external 
or internal—has also perverted the mindsets of many in our countries 
who have given up their power to investments that have often highly 
distorted our political and economic landscape. One of the greatest ills 
of the development savior has been its perverse intentions and external 
value system. Rather than invest in the core agenda of a nation, it is 
mostly designed to serve external agendas that create islands of pilots and 
projects—some even excellent at times. But rarely does it invest in build-
ing the mindsets and value system of the potential leaders of the future in 
any meaningful way that could result in real long-term nation building. 
One of its biggest problems, just to mention an example, is its absurd 
impatience, its short-term goal orientation, and the fact that the objec-
tive, even if well intended, is ultimately defi ned by the aid giver. I worked 
for the UN previously and have since returned to lead the work of UN 
Women in Southern Africa. Th e UN is less about aid. Th e UN is more 
about normative principles signed by member states, working alongside 
a government and enabling governments to implement these normative 
standards. In practice, however, the less developed a country is, the more 
the UN and development partners are tempted to defi ne, almost take 
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over, the role of its government. At the end of the day, the mindsets that 
have been shaped by the development industry include dependency and 
distorted priorities. It reminds me of this famous adage: He who pays the 
piper, calls the tune. 
 What is your approach to changing that? 
 During my work with united nations development programme 
(UNDP), we worked with a team that invested in mental models as the 
catalytic capacity required for public service and development. We learned 
so much from our partnership with the Singaporeans, particularly how 
they owned their own vision and agenda. Th ey would never allow another 
government to infl uence how they shape their own policy. Never! Th eir 
mindsets were steeped in excellence, integrity, possibility, and growth. 
 In Kenya, and I dare say in many of our African countries, our mindsets 
are our weakest link! Mindsets of “scarcity” rather than abundance; mind-
sets of “eat now” rather than invest and preserve our future; and mindsets 
of “homogeneity” that perpetuate inequality across gender, ethnicity, and 
class—mindsests that hold us back from our destiny. Th e sad truth is that 
these mindsets have been transferred to our youth, who argue that their 
choices and posturings are in line with their survival! In Kenya, people 
talk about the hustle. It is always my hustle. It can be read positively: “I 
am hustling to do my thing,” or I am just struggling and surviving. It 
frustrates me when I see someone who cannot see the massive opportuni-
ties in front of them. Many public servants epitomize this mindset and 
were just marking time, just surviving. It is about the paycheck, never 
about the citizens. Too few exhibit the heart of public service. Service, for 
me, is another aspect of the mindset that is very important. 
 For us, the core of who we are as Africans—and we demonstrate it 
when the chips are down—is that we are an engaged collective. When 
the chips are down, somehow in Kenya, we are able to bring it up. When 
there was drought four to fi ve years ago and the Kenyans4Kenya initiative 
came through, now, that was incredible! Th e way people responded when 
the Westgate shopping mall attack happened, where the very Somalis 
who were being implicated were out there feeding each other. Th at is the 
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core of what we have to go for. And I fear that because of the impact of 
the media, this notion of the collective is getting rapidly eroded. 
 How do you build the mindset that has a collective response rather 
than an individual one at its core? It starts by looking for assets where 
you are. It starts with the insight that we ourselves are our own resource. 
We have lost some of that. Th e thinking was that our assets and resources 
come from somewhere else. So as a logical consequence, I will have my 
own asset and resource, you will have your own asset and resource, and 
we will end up not sharing any of that. 
 Can we invest in a generation that will emerge with some of these values 
embedded in them? You have to think about this as a 30-year journey so 
that a new generation comes to fruition that can make the real transforma-
tion happen. I searched for a platform that could deliver these values in a 
simple, covert, and fun way. It was here that I got motivated by my own son, 
who was playing computer games for hours on end. As we argued about his 
“addiction” to games, I had the opportunity to observe him play—“Come 
see what I’m doing!” Th at is when I recognized that there was a bigger pic-
ture to games and the power that it brings along. I started doing research 
and found out that there was a global network called GamesforChange. 
Th is network fi lled me with confi dence to go out and build Afroes—using 
games as a tool to deliver complex but important messages to our youth. 
 Now I know it is much tougher than I thought. Th e process of invest-
ing and fi guring out how to build games, how to make them work well 
enough, and how to penetrate existing structures is much harder than 
imagined. 
 What are some of the diffi  culties when it comes to profoundly aff ect-
ing and shaping mindsets? 
 I thought the school system would be the natural partner with Afroes, 
but despite their expression of excitement, the Ministries of Education were 
really not very open to change. In my experience, schools are very tradi-
tional and very conservative, and so change is slow. Th e school that we work 
with is the African Leadership Academy, which invests heavily in  mindset 
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change. In their model, the academy invests two to three years in an individ-
ual. Th at is obviously the best model! However, I truly believe that there is 
a place for mass pop culture-based learning built on simple mobile phones. 
I am now concerned with how we can create these kinds of experiences for 
every African child, even if it is just for a few days, so they can start seeing 
the real possibilities rather than the problems. Th e idea was to create that 
content and place it in the hands of young people who individually or as a 
group would learn new values and skills via this mobile platform. 
 How do you reach youth? And why does gaming have such importance? 
 First, gaming is a platform. It is not the end. If we want to have any 
legitimacy in what we do, then we need to talk with the youth on their own 
terms. At Afroes, we spend a lot of time doing facilitated  conversations 
with young people. We use the games to enter into a conversation. Play a 
game on gender-based violence, and then all of a sudden, it gives you an 
inroad to really start having conversations about things like “So how do 
you feel about gender-based violence? Where are you on this issue? What 
is your value system? How do you feel about relationships between you 
and young women? Do you value women? How do you value yourself as 
a woman?” And you start having conversations that you would never been 
be able to have. For example, in one of our games, we have focused a lot 
on young peoples’ understanding of rape, gender- based violence, and the 
abuse of young women and men. We realized that young men in particular 
abuse young women without realizing it. Th ey think that this is just how 
relationships work, because this is what their role models taught them. 
 We started a campaign for 12 months. Young people who played the 
game created conversations and shared comments on their own experi-
ence. One young man pointed out in the comments section, “I did not 
know until I played this game that I am a rapist.” He said, every time 
a young girl said “No,” he thought that what she actually meant was 
“Yes,” because that is what his socialization had taught him. For him, a 
“No” simply called for more persuasion from him, and he believed that 
crying was part of the “game” between men and women. Th is man was 
suddenly shocked to learn with our game that girls who say “No” mean 
“No.” It spurred a whole lot of new thoughts in him, and he realized that 
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he lost his girlfriend because of the way he treated her. It was incredible 
to see the realization process and the way his mind opened. Th is is a 
beginning, but it is an example that shows the power of games in shift-
ing mindsets. 
 How can the minds of Africans be aff ected at scale? 
 For scale, we have to go through the public school system. Th e 
president talked about ethics and corruption classes in school. Th at is 
exactly what will make the diff erence. Th e tools we use can be manifold. 
However, we have to confront ourselves with the behavior change in a 
communal context. What does a new behavior look like collectively, not 
individually? Circles of dialogue that leverage technology, inside schools 
and outside of schools, can become a fruitful way to bring about a mind-
set shift at scale. Not all of us have the privilege of attending a college or 
academy for two years. If we use the opportunities of mobile learning and 
 gamifi cation and embed them in the public school system, then we can 
imagine a new way. We need a large cohort of leaders, particularly young 
and women leaders, equipped with new mindsets of possibility, abun-
dance and hope—who can get us even sooner to Kenya’s vision 2030. 
 Having said all this, especially in the eight years since I left the UN, 
remarkable developments have taken place. What is striking is that the 
African narrative has changed dramatically for the better, with many 
young ones who have had global and African exposure plus a new breed 
of heads of state and business leaders defi ning a new, hope-fi lled, and 
African-led agenda. We need to continue that journey. 
 Th ank you, Anne! 
Th is chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ), which permits use, dupli-
cation, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit 
to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes 
were made.
Th e images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work’s Creative Commons license, 
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 Th e current chapter will introduce market-enabling digital platforms 1 —
that is, technology companies, particularly start-ups, that are specialized 
intermediaries providing the necessary information and facilitation for 
buyers and sellers to do business—as a new lens and frame of reference. 
Th e lens will fi rst be applied to several successful technology compa-
nies founded in the Northern Hemisphere to show how the framework 
explains the signifi cance and impact of particular start-ups on the market-
place, including making the underlying mechanics of “disruption” more 
evident. Th e lens is then applied to technology start-ups in Southern 
Hemisphere markets, specifi cally in Kenya, to illustrate how the same 
1  Th e term is a fusion of “market enablers” from Khanna and Palepu ( 2010 ) and various defi nitions 
of “platform” as adapted from and expanded by Evans ( 2009 ), Brynjolfsson et al. ( 2006 ), Bakos 
( 1998 ), Eisenmann et al. ( 2006 ), Baldwin and Woodard ( 2008 ), and Rochet and Tirole ( 2003 ). 
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fundamentals hold true in developing economies. Although ideally, every 
country would have business-enabling structures and institutions, (e.g., 
credit bureaus, payment processing systems, and supply chains), unfor-
tunately many developing economies fall short. By building cutting-edge 
technology companies that create the digital market infrastructure neces-
sary for smooth functioning of markets, emerging market start-ups can 
create competitive advantages and help enable new waves of entrepre-
neurial activity and market dynamism. 
 My understanding of the Kenyan digital entrepreneurship ecosystem is 
grounded in a study I led in 2013 on behalf of the GSMA Mobile for 
Development organization and several other development organizations 
(Drouillard et al.  2014 ). Th e study, published in 2014 by GSMA, told the 
story of the challenges Kenya’s digital entrepreneurs face and encouraged 
stakeholders to increase their collaboration eff orts. Th e overarching ques-
tions were: (1) Who are the principal stakeholders in the ecosystem and 
what are their interests? (2) What is unique and interesting about the emerg-
ing population of digital entrepreneurs in Kenya? And (3), What particular 
challenges do entrepreneurs face in developing and scaling their ventures? 
Th ough the study introduced some of the fundamental market infrastruc-
ture challenges (especially payment mechanisms), they were not discussed 
at length. Th e current chapter picks up this discussion and focuses on the 
nascent market- oriented dynamics of emerging markets, with an emphasis 
on Kenya. Core market infrastructure concepts will be introduced and then 
applied to digital services markets to create the notion of a market-enabling 
digital platform. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a discussion of why 
digital platforms have value and signifi cance. 
 Market Voids 
 Kenya is like other emerging markets in that it has persistent challenges 
that hinder entrepreneurship and economic growth. Frequent fi nancial 
crises, unreliable quality, and insuffi  cient local talent are often cited as 
some of the headaches. Khanna and Palepu ( 2010 ), however, see such fea-
tures of emerging markets as “symptoms of underlying market  structures 
that share common, important and persistent diff erences from those in 
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developed economies.” Th e investigators defi ned the concept of “institu-
tional voids” as missing or ineff ective market structures and intermediar-
ies that are the source of higher transaction costs and operating challenges 
in emerging markets. 
 Before delving further into Palepu and Khanna’s framework describing 
the types of essential market intermediaries, it will be useful to examine 
several recent studies that also categorized and quantifi ed business envi-
ronment voids. From them, we can get an initial sense of the common 
threads of infrastructure that are necessary to do business in emerging 
digital economies and how others have been thinking about the impor-
tance of market intermediaries—as well as how Kenya benchmarks in 
these areas regionally and globally. 
 Th e World Bank’s  Doing Business report ( 2015 ) is an annual report on 
the state of health of various economies, based on detailed diagnostics of 
their underlying and embedded characteristics, such as regulatory systems, 
the effi  cacy of the bureaucracy, and the nature of business governance. 
Th e report is used by policymakers and businesses to catalyze debate and 
improve reform. Kenya’s overall ease of doing business ranking (1–189, 
with higher numbers worse) was 108th. Th e country ranked higher than 
100th across all factors except “Getting credit,” where it ranks 28th. In 
spite of a thriving entrepreneurial culture, the country was 151st for ease 
of starting a business, particularly because of the costs (percent of income 
per capital) of starting a business and the number of procedures. Indeed, 
these rankings were not surprising, given Kenya’s classifi cation as a lower-
middle-income country (i.e., having annual gross national income per 
capita of $1046–$4125) (Th e World Bank  2015 ). 
 Th e World Economic Forum’s annual Global Competitiveness report 
( 2014 ) is an analysis of the institutions, policies, and factors that deter-
mine the level of productivity of a country and of the country’s rates of 
return and growth. It is an attempt at explaining why some countries are 
more prosperous than others, prompting discussions at annual gatherings 
of policymakers, particularly when a country moves signifi cantly up or 
down in the rankings. Th e report breaks down determinants of com-
petitiveness into 12 pillars, including institutions, infrastructure, and 
macroeconomic environment. Kenya ranks 99th out of 140 countries 
indexed, with an overall score of 3.9 (on a 1–7 scale, with higher numbers 
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better). On business sophistication and innovation factors, Kenya ranked 
relatively high (42nd out of 140). On basic requirements (institutions, 
infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health, and primary educa-
tion), however, it ranked poorly (116th out of 140). Th e low scores on 
basic requirement factors were signifi cant, given that infrastructure and 
institutions are cornerstones for markets to function. 
 Boston Consulting Group’s eFriction report looked at how certain 
factors inhibit consumers and businesses from fully participating in the 
Internet economy, thereby constraining economic activity (Zwillenberg 
et  al.  2014 ). Th e report was signifi cant in that it attempted to defi ne 
the factors driving economic growth caused by having a more digital 
economy. Th e four categories of voids discussed in the report were: 
(1) infrastructure-related, limiting basic Internet access; (2) “industry” 
sources (e.g., workforce ICT skills, trade barriers, access to capital, and 
the strength of intellectual property protection), aff ecting the ability of 
companies to maintain an Internet presence and engage in online trans-
actions; (3) “individual” sources, constraining consumer Internet activ-
ity; and (4) information-related voids aff ecting the general availability of, 
and access to, online content—have some overlap with the framing used 
by Palepu and Khanna. Countries were scored on a 0–100 scale, using 
indicators selected for each of the four categories. Higher scores denoted 
higher levels of eFriction; an overall score and ranking were also calculated 
(better rankings aligned with lower scores). Across the four areas, Kenya 
ranked 64th in Infrastructure, 50th in Industry, 48th in Individual, and 
33rd in Information, ranking the country 57th overall (of 65 countries 
profi led) and in the highest quintile of countries analyzed. It is interesting 
to consider Kenya’s much higher ranking in Information versus its lower 
rankings in other areas (which, given the fi ndings in the previous stud-
ies, are not surprising). What appeared to be driving this was the level of 
open encyclopedia pages in home languages, number of micro-messages 
made in home languages, and freedom on the Net. 
 Finally, the Global Entrepreneurship Index (GEI) report looks at 
the entrepreneurial ecosystem of a country, combining individual data 
with institutional components (Acs et  al.  2015 ). Th e GEI is made 
up of three sub-indexes (Attitudes, Abilities, and Aspirations), each 
 composed of several pillars. Kenya ranks 86th out of 130 countries stud-
ied by the index, and 5th out of 29 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Its 
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areas of best performance were Competition, Opportunity Perception, 
and Internationalization; the areas of worst performance were Process 
Innovation, Technology Absorption, and Risk Capital. Indeed, the poor- 
performing areas refl ect the fact that fundamental intermediaries in 
capital markets and basic modern infrastructure necessary for product 
markets are still developing in Kenya. Moreover, it is not surprising that 
Opportunity Perception was high, given that there are currently many 
voids across a number of sectors. 
 Market Enablers 
 Th ere are some accepted categories, or types, of market enablers that can 
fi ll the voids outlined above. In Khanna and Palepu’s book  Winning in 
Emerging Markets ( 2010 ), the authors listed several basic market-enabling 
institutions required for any market (capital, products, labor, etc.) to 
function 2 :
•  Credibility enhancers are institutions that independently certify 
qualifi cations or claims made by suppliers or consumers. Examples 
include auditors, who certify that a business has adequately refl ected 
its state of aff airs in accounting documents, and Kenya Bureau of 
Standards marks of standardization and excellence, which certifi es that 
a product meets specifi c criteria. 
•  Information analyzers and advisors are institutions that collect or 
analyze information about suppliers or consumers. Examples include 
credit rating bureaus, which provide information to fi nance institu-
tions and others about business or consumer credit-worthiness, and 
market research organizations, which review products and provide 
decision-making guidance. 
•  Aggregators and distributors , probably the most fundamental type of 
market institution, work to match supply and demand. Examples 
include banks, which aggregate supplies of money (e.g., savings 
2  Khanna and Palepu ( 2010 ) introduced six institutions in the book—the four identifi ed here in 
addition to regulation and adjudication. However, given that the latter two are government- and 
parastatal-led, rather than private-sector led, they are not discussed in this chapter. 
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accounts) and make money available for consumers who need cash, 
and mass retailers such as Game, which aggregates many diff erent con-
sumer products and sells them to customers through its chain of stores. 3 
•  Transaction facilitators are institutions that make it possible for 
exchanges to take place, typically money for information, goods, or 
services. Examples include stock exchanges, credit card issuers such as 
VISA or MasterCard, and mobile money wallets such as M-PESA. 
 Market enablers are readily available in most advanced economies. 
Auditors, for example, enhance the credibility of companies seeking 
fi nance by certifying the companies’ solvency. Enterprises can turn to 
management consultants or technology product reviews when evaluat-
ing a new human resources system. And various credit card issuers and 
payment-gateway infrastructures exist to transact seamlessly with cus-
tomers. Th e existence of market enablers also improves the prospects 
for new entrants entering the marketplace by reducing barriers (such as 
information, distribution channel, geographical, and other barriers). In 
this regard, the international grocer Whole Foods has helped both new 
companies and new products reach scale on the back of its reputation. 
Th rough its regional program, the organization regularly reviews poten-
tial new products, trialing them in stores and regions and sometimes 
helping small producers expand their operations (Whole Foods Market 
 2016 ). Likewise, payment-processing company PayPal has enabled any 
business (or individual) to transact or collect payments on eBay without 
having to handle cash or be present in the same room as the buyer. 
 In emerging markets, however, market enablers are nascent—fewer 
organizations play enabling roles, specifi c types of market functions are 
not present, and in some markets, organizations are present but ineff ec-
tive in their role as an enabler (e.g., a government institution that register 
businesses using a process that takes multiple months). Th ese challenges 
are what Palepu and Khanna referred to as “voids,” and because such 
gaps exist, businesses and consumers experience information asymme-
tries as well as uncertainty, resulting in a higher cost of doing business. To 
3  Game is the fl agship store for South African Massmart, now majority-owned by US giant 
Wal-Mart. 
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illustrate the point, compare the process for obtaining fi nancial services 
as a small business or start-up. In the UK, after completing an appli-
cation online and submitting paperwork with a signature and proof of 
address, HSBC (a leading personal and business retail bank) creates an 
account and issues a business credit card. By contrast, many of the start- 
ups interviewed for my Kenya study (Drouillard et al.  2014 ) faced chal-
lenges accessing any kind of fi nancing, particularly from banks. Indeed, 
stringent requirements (cited by 31 % of respondents) and high interest 
rates (8  %) were reactions by banks to information asymmetries—for 
example, if creditworthiness is uncertain or costly to obtain, then the 
banks must charge more and demand more signifi cant collateral, such as 
property titles. 
 Special Type of Market Enabler: A Digital 
Platform 
 Th ere is signifi cant variation in what gets called a “digital platform”—
from software (e.g., Microsoft Windows, Amazon, and Uber) to business 
archetypes (e.g., software as a service and advertising networks). Some 
of the key aspects of digital platform businesses that academics have dis-
cussed include highly effi  cient matching and large ecosystems of comple-
mentary products and services. 4 
 Indeed, digital platforms are special types of market enablers, and 
there are characteristics common to large-scale and often-disruptive digi-
tal businesses that distinguish them from other technology start-ups: 
 First, digital platforms tend to enable a two-sided marketplace. A 
two-sided (or multiple-sided) market refers to two (or more) distinct 
user groups that transact through the market. Importantly, the value 
for people in one group is dependent on the number of people in the 
other group. Th e more developers are creating apps on iOS for the Apple 
App Store, for example, the more attractive iPhones are for consumers. 
And the more merchants accept American Express, the more valuable 
4  Th e defi nitions of “platform” were adapted from Evans ( 2009 ), Brynjolfsson et al. ( 2006 ), Bakos 
( 1998 ), Eisenmann et al. ( 2006 ), Baldwin and Woodard ( 2008 ), and Rochet and Tirole ( 2003 ). 
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AmEx cards are for consumers. 5 Furthermore, their operating models 
both depend on and benefi t from network eff ects, in which the value of 
the company increases with the size of the user base (both suppliers and 
consumers). For example, as more drivers onboarded on Uber’s platform, 
wait times decreased for customers, making the service more valuable—
and as more customers shifted to Uber for rides, profi t-making oppor-
tunities for Uber drivers increased. Moreover, digital solutions also have 
a comparative advantage in scaling networks, because once core network 
infrastructure and software have been deployed, there is typically a very 
low marginal or incremental cost for adding another user. 
 Second, digital platforms tend to enable digital marketplaces by pro-
viding multiple functions, and digital marketplaces enable exchanges for 
physical or digital goods (e.g., eBay and most of Amazon). All digital 
markets are great at connecting otherwise hard-to-coordinate buyer–
seller relationships and enabling search and discovery, allowing a much 
broader range and diversity of participation by buyers and sellers and 
thus of transactions (e.g., the long tail). 
 Th ird, digital platforms tend to off er an improved, more seamless service 
to the customer than incumbents or competitors, typically by combining 
multiple market-enabling functions. Uber, for example, matches custom-
ers with ride providers and collects payment through its mobile app, and 
AirBnB makes it easy for customers to search for and book stays in other 
people’s houses by showing possible units that are available for the desired 
stay period while sharing reviews by other guests and collecting payment. 
 Fourth, in addition to providing a better value proposition for cus-
tomers, digital platforms tend to create ripple eff ects in supplier ecosys-
tems. Amazon in the UK, for example, engages many local companies 
to provide expedited last-mile delivery to customers. Having now built 
the coordination processes and technology necessary to manage such 
deliveries, the more that Amazon is able to stimulate online purchases, 
the greater the opportunity for the local delivery companies. Uber cars, 
similarly, must meet certain quality standards (e.g., cleanliness and model 
year), which increase business for, for example, car washes. 
5  It is important to note that, although these examples are all two-sided markets, they are not all 
platforms. 
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 Finally, digital platforms may eventually become “software platforms,” 
enabling further ecosystem innovation. A software platform usually refers 
to a core technology that can be extended in innovative new ways by 
external parties. Th e platform owner typically controls it (either through 
the user interface or the application program interface [API]) but relies 
on external parties to innovate, adding value to the entire ecosystem 
around the software platform. Examples include Google Android, Sony 
PlayStation, and  Force.com . 
 In the current chapter, I refer to this unique class of digital technology 
ventures as market-enabling digital platforms—entrepreneurs’ response 
either to voids or to opportunities to improve the current system. Indeed, 
across all markets and entire economies, market-enabling digital plat-
forms are replacing traditional analogues (e.g., Uber displacing taxis or 
Amazon disrupting Barnes & Noble—indeed, this is one form of indus-
try disruption) or creating new infrastructure where voids existed previ-
ously. Th e sections that follow will describe several examples of digital 
platforms in Northern Hemisphere economies and in Kenya, discussing 
the characteristics that make them market enabling. 
 Market-Enabling Digital Platforms in Northern 
Hemisphere Economies 
 When digital platforms disrupt the status quo in an advanced market, 
they capitalize on the fact that what was considered well-functioning 
was not, in fact, market clearing 6 : incumbents were limited by capacity, 
geography, or territory, among other factors. An example is how AirBnB 
disrupted the traditional hotel industry by making it easier for people 
who wanted to rent out their house or room to do so and by making it 
easier for those who were interested to search for and book stays. Digital 
platforms also have the eff ect of redistributing the power and control that 
incumbents had in the marketplace. Even in so-called well-functioning 
markets, a certain amount of information asymmetry or ineffi  ciency 
allowed some stakeholders to profi t, sometimes at the expense of con-
sumers. When digital technology solutions disrupt existing markets, the 
6  Market clearing means that there is no leftover supply or demand. 
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centers of power that were reinforced by information asymmetries shift 
to platform owners, who now provide the information that incumbents 
withheld, capturing value often in a very diff erent way. 
 Consider the real estate market as an example. In advanced economies, 
real estate agents, property assessors, escrow fi nance institutions, and oth-
ers facilitate a property transaction. When real estate agents controlled 
access to information about the marketplace—the properties that were 
available for sale, how much a property might sell for, and so on—home 
seekers were at their mercy, and the agents enjoyed signifi cant transaction 
fees. Th e Internet disrupted the real estate market by introducing inde-
pendent real estate listing services, such as Craigslist, where sellers could 
self-promote property for sale or rent and home seekers could declare 
interest in a particular market. Although Craigslist does not explicitly 
match buyers to sellers, its ability to aggregate supply and demand par-
tially replaced the need to fi nd listings via a real estate agent. Other real 
estate listing services, such as Trulia 7 and Zillow, 8 provide additional 
information that was not easily available for independent buyers and sell-
ers before, such as when the property was last sold, comparisons across the 
neighborhood, crime statistics and incidents, and dates of open houses. 
But they also develop and protect a new set of data about their users and 
users’ behavior online as well as information about mortgages and other 
third parties that the site directs users to. Th ese data become the new 
information asymmetry, creating competitive advantages. 
 Th ere are many other examples of market-enabling digital platform 
businesses (that were once start-ups) in advanced economies that have 
disrupted markets for products or services. Table  4.1 below shows several 
success stories, describing the two- or multi-sided markets involved (e.g., 
consumers, publishers, and specialized service providers), the market- 
enabling functions of the business model (e.g., credibility enhancer, infor-
mation analyzer and advisor, aggregator and distributor, or transactions 
facilitator), how the business addressed defi ciencies in the marketplace 
(e.g., transaction friction and relevance to customers), and the analogue 
that was disrupted (bricks-and-mortar stores, paper catalogs, etc.). Th e 
7  See  www.trulia.com for additional information. 
8  See  www.zillow.com for additional information. 
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examples were identifi ed from a list of “unicorn start-ups” (i.e., start-ups 
with a valuation of USD1 billion or greater). 9 
 One such example is Yelp, which provides online directories of ser-
vice providers together with crowdsourced reviews. Although reviews and 
guides did exist for high-end restaurants (e.g., Zagat), for example, the 
vast majority of other service providers were lauded or lamented via word 
of mouth. Yelp solved the challenge of geography, because any restaurant 
anywhere could be added to the directory and reviewed; the challenge of 
relevance, because the reviews are written by everyday people and include 
a wide variety of businesses that people use, such as barbershops and 
salons; and fi nally, the challenge of incentives, giving service  businesses 
the ability to market their ability to “provide good service.” In this respect, 
Yelp functions as a credibility enhancer (via the crowdsourced reviews) 
and an information analyzer and advisor (through its directories, which 
have fi ltering functionality to aid decision-making). 
 eBay is a digital platform that fi lls all of the market-enabling functions. 
It has credibility enhancers that help sellers with positive feedback and 
large volumes of transactions to sell out. Ebay’s money-back guarantee 
also enhances the credibility of merchants selling through the platform, 
especially because some portion of the goods sold are used. Many tools 
are provided that help analyze information for both buyers and sellers. 
Buyers are able to refi ne search results and locate very specifi c items or a 
range of items that meet their criteria. Sellers benefi t from dashboards and 
analytics to help increase sales. eBay is also an aggregator and distributor, 
innovating with standard product categories to help customers look at 
products across a number of “stores,” and a digital fulfi llment service (in, 
e.g., the reselling and distribution of event tickets). As a transaction facili-
tator, eBay’s credit card processing capability (through PayPal) enables the 
consummation of transactions, and its online auctions provide a unique 
way for private sellers to unload items when they are not sure of the value. 
 Similarly, Amazon also fi lls all of the market-enabling functions in 
similar ways. As a credibility enhancer, Amazon shares customer reviews 
and seller ratings and off ers a fl exible return policy. As an information 
analyzer and advisor, its search and refi ne capabilities are similar to eBay’s. 
9  See  www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies for a complete list of unicorn start-ups. 
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However, Amazon also has targeted advertising capabilities, which means 
it is mining and extracting value from information about customer 
searches and purchases. Its core feature is the ability to fi nd anything 
online—aggregating and distributing products that eff ectively enable a 
global marketplace. Finally, Amazon’s stored credit card information and 
one-click checkout facilitate transactions by making it easy for Amazon 
shoppers to make purchases at any time. 
 More recent unicorn Uber also fi lls all of the market-enabling func-
tions of a digital platform. Both riders and drivers are rated through the 
App, enhancing the credibility of people who are otherwise strangers. Th e 
company also has several information analyzer and advisor features for its 
network of riders and drivers: Its demand pricing engine uses information 
about demand and supply to optimize revenue for Uber and its  drivers. 
In addition, the estimated price of rides and length of journeys is now 
integrated into Google Maps route queries in some cities. Its key feature 
is being an aggregator and distributor, matching independent transport 
providers with customers seeking rides; it also aggregates disparate riders 
into pools for carpooling and lower fares for each individual. Finally, the 
company facilitates transactions by billing riders via stored credit card 
details and paying drivers on a weekly basis. 
 Market-Enabling Digital Platforms Emerging 
in Kenya 
 Digital platform businesses emerging in Kenya share the same character-
istics as successful ventures in Northern Hemisphere economies, but the 
role that they play varies. In more advanced economies, the companies 
mentioned earlier achieved success by  replacing incumbents with their 
own platforms. In Kenya, the business environment is still nascent, and as 
revealed by the reports discussed above, infrastructure is a challenging area. 
However, with fewer incumbents, there are also more opportunities for 
new players. Several start-ups that have achieved some success have done 
so by  creating digital infrastructure where none had existed previously (or 
where it was so ill-equipped that it might as well have been nonexistent). 
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 One such example is Cellulant, 10 a transactions facilitator, aggregator, 
and distributor, that was founded in 2004 by Ken Njoroge 11 after he real-
ized that mobile payment infrastructure was lacking in Kenya and that it 
was aff ecting his music downloads business. Th e company focused fi rst on 
connecting banks, and eventually, mobile operators, enabling customers 
to pay directly for goods or services via their mobile phones. As Ken said 
during an interview in 2013, “We became very effi  cient at laying pipes” 
(Drouillard et al.  2014 ). Cellulant currently provides digital fi nancial ser-
vices in ten countries in Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa, Ghana, 
Rwanda, Botswana, Zambia, Ethiopia, and Mozambique). Ken now sees 
his business as a connector of digital wallets (whether mobile operators, 
banks, or independent entities) and marketplaces, enabling interoper-
ability and payments among various banks and mobile operators—mak-
ing Cellulant one of the broadest transaction facilitators in Kenya. 
 Cellulant’s model shares some of the same characteristics that were high-
lighted in successful Northern Hemisphere digital ventures. Th e fi nancial 
transactions marketplace that Cellulant’s technology enables is multisided, 
connecting merchants or businesses with digital currency issuers (banks and 
mobile operators) and consumer wallets. Network eff ects enhance Cellulant’s 
off ering in that the more connections Cellulant has with merchants and busi-
nesses, the more valuable the company is to digital money issuers, and vice 
versa. Th ere were core infrastructure challenges, in that banking infrastructure 
and systems in Kenya were not prepared for mobile commerce, especially in 
2004. Even after M-PESA launched, integration between mobile operators 
and banks and businesses still needed to happen. Cellulant built technology 
to manage reconciliations and aggregate fi nancial transactions, particularly 
transfers and payments, functioning as an aggregator and distributor in the 
marketplace for mobile fi nancial transactions. As systems matured, Cellulant’s 
technology facilitated transactions between consumers and businesses by 
making it possible and seamless to use a mobile device to pay bills and per-
form banking tasks. As an early pioneer in architecting and building a mobile 
fi nancial ecosystem in Africa, Cellulant’s solution has certainly had an impact. 
10  See  www.cellulant.com for additional information. 
11  See “Conversation with Ken Njoroge: How to Be a Rebel and Build a Business at the Same Time” 
in this book for additional information. 
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Th e company’s integration products are enabling further innovation, such as 
mobile banking products for farmers linked to integration and analytics pro-
vided by the company (TechMoran  2015 ). 
 Th ere are, in fact, many start-ups developing market-enabling digital 
platforms in Kenya. Brief profi les for several that have attracted invest-
ment and attention follow below, with an explanation of how they func-
tion as platforms in Table  4.2 .
 EatOut 12 : Restaurant Review and Booking Platform 
 EatOut, founded in 2010 by Mikul Shah 13 , provides a directory with 
crowdsourced reviews of local restaurants in addition to a booking engine. 
Th e idea for the start-up stemmed from Mikul’s observation of the gap 
in the marketplace for comprehensive restaurant information in Nairobi. 
EatOut helps restaurants ranging from tiny neighborhood cafés to top 
tables to engage with diners, and it helps diners fi nd their next meal. Th e 
company is solving the challenge of discovery and search by making it 
easy for diners to hear about new or established restaurants. In fact, most 
restaurants in Kenya, even in Nairobi, are not online. EatOut enables 
them to have an online presence and be discoverable. Its crowdsourced 
reviews enhance the credibility of restaurants and create incentives for 
good service. For a select number of restaurants, bookings can be made 
online, reducing the transaction friction of having to wait on hold to 
speak with a host. EatOut is backed by Netherlands-based venture capital 
fund Africa Media Ventures Fund and has plans to scale across Africa. 
 Weza Tele 14 : Digitizing Supply Chains 
 Weza Tele was co-founded by Hilda Moraa after a university internship 
revealed an opportunity to improve the fast-moving consumer goods 
(FMCG) supply chain system in Kenya. Th ere are many small retail shops 
and kiosks in Kenya that sell FMCG products, such as Coca-Cola, water, 
12  See eatout.co.ke for additional information 
13  See “Conversation with Mikul Shah and Ritesh Doshi: Th e Hustling Entrepreneur on Trial” in 
this book for additional information. 
14  See  wezatele.com for additional information. 
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and shampoo. Because the informal supply chain is not yet digitized 
(i.e., retailers do not have electronic point-of-sale systems or comput-
ers and technology to keep stock and place orders electronically), store 
owners end up wasting valuable time standing in lines at distributors. 
Furthermore, a lack of digital recordkeeping makes it diffi  cult for shops 
to prove creditworthiness. Building an easy-to-use ordering platform 
using basic mobile technology, Weza Tele was able to increase visibility 
to demand patterns for retailers and relieve pain points for distributors 
(Moraa 2015). By analyzing transaction histories, Weza Tele was able 
to provide summary information to retailers about the performance of 
their distributors. Weza Tele was acquired by AFB, a fi nancial services 
institution that uses data to understand customer behavior and provide 
unsecured credit digitally. 
 Sendy 15 : Optimizing Pick-up and Delivery 
 Sendy, founded in 2014 by Alloys Meshak, is an Uber-style motorbike 
delivery service that lets customers book, track, and pay for deliveries 
directly from mobile phones. Th e platform aggregates and distributes 
demand for deliveries by matching requests from customers with the 
company’s network of crowdsourced delivery couriers, who also lever-
age the company’s enhanced location and route planning intelligence 
(Wakoba  2015 ). As noted by the company’s COO Maliaka Judd, “We 
are not a courier business. Everyone thinks we are… but actually we are 
a marketplace for courier providers. Anyone who wants to do deliveries 
and passes our vetting process can ‘sell’ through our platform. Whether 
you’re on foot, ride a bicycle or a motorbike, drive a van or a pickup, 
manage a fl eet of vehicles, or fl y a plane… if you want to sell your services 
through Sendy — we’re happy to have you! We’re not trying to rebuild 
the existing vehicle/courier infrastructure. We’re trying to optimize and 
aggregate it to make it more transparent and effi  cient” (White  2015 ). 
Sendy is an example of a company in the e-commerce ecosystem, because 
online shops such as Jumia and OLX depend on distribution and last- 
mile delivery service providers. 
15  See api.sendy.co.ke for additional information 
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 Kuhustle 16 : Job Matching for Freelancers 
 Kuhustle brings together several interesting platform functions, includ-
ing being a transactions facilitator through its freelance job listing and 
bidding and escrow payments system and enhancing the credibility of 
bidders and job posters by making the network exclusive. Everyone who 
joins Kuhustle gets three invitations to share with other people; if the 
invited person posts jobs or delivers work, then a percentage of the value 
of the job is given as a bonus. Kuhustle boasts over 2000 freelancers on its 
network and over kenyan shillings (KES) 1,000,000 in jobs. 
 Duma Works 17 : SMS-Based Talent Matching 
 Duma Works connects growing companies to talent via an SMS-based 
job-matching platform that ensures quality through a screening process. 
Th e platform is enabling the marketplace for talent by enhancing cred-
ibility through its screening process and by aggregating talent and match-
ing it with demand for skilled resources from various businesses. Founded 
in 2012 by Arielle Sandor and Christine Blauvelt, Duma Works was the 
winner in the Enterprise category at 2015 Pivot East. Th e company cur-
rently has over 22,000 job candidates and 200 employers registered on 
the system, and has matched over 5000 jobs, with an average time-to-hire 
of 10 days. 
 Conclusion and Recommendations: The Impact 
of Market-Enabling Digital Platforms 
 Although there are impact investors and donors who actively invest in 
and otherwise support start-ups in developing-world markets, many 
questions have been raised about the theory of change behind these 
activities. Although there are many possible ways that start-ups contrib-
ute to economic development, we have aimed this chapter to shed light 
on how digital platforms create and enhance market infrastructure and 
16  See  www.kuhustle.com for further information. 
17  See  www.dumaworks.com for further information. 
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intermediaries. Th e examples from both the Northern Hemisphere and 
Kenya have shown that this framework is applicable to emerging markets 
and has considerable power as a paradigm for evaluating start-ups with 
potential to have signifi cant impact. 
 Particularly powerful digital platforms not only solve a direct problem, 
or fi ll a void, but also, by doing so, help to develop the overall market 
ecosystem so that other products and services can also fl ourish. A great 
example of this is how Cellulant is enabling an ecosystem of fi nancial 
services products for businesses and consumers through the services it 
provides as a transactions facilitator and aggregator. Th is includes not 
only banks and other institutions leveraging Cellulant’s capabilities to 
build mobile banking applications but also unlikely innovations such as 
eWallets for farmers in Nigeria. Additionally, Sendy’s Uber-like delivery 
marketplace is making e-commerce in Kenya tangible and even stream-
lined through its API, which can request and track deliveries. 
 Digital platforms having similar ecosystem-enabling eff ects are also 
emerging in other Sub-Saharan African countries. For example, Where 
Is My Transport 18 is a South African start-up that is optimizing the trans-
portation system in major emerging-market metros. Its market-enabling 
functions include being an aggregator and distributor of public and 
private transportation services and analyzing information for private 
transport providers and transport authorities. It has created a market-
place for informal and diverse transportation providers, such as taxis and 
municipal bus systems, and for public transport riders. Its solution is 
already enabling Cape Town’s myCiTi bus service to optimize routes and 
improve bus stops through more intelligent information about riders’ 
desired beginning and end points. Another example, expressPay, 19 is one 
of many Ghanaian start-ups working to improve the payments ecosys-
tem. Th e national payments system in Ghana is still very nascent, and 
interoperability challenges make it diffi  cult for merchants to adopt digital 
payments. expressPay aggregates various methods of payment (mobile 
money, credit cards, and debit cards) and facilitates transactions through 
its smartphone app and technology-and-productivity solution. Other 
18  See  www.whereismytransport.co.za / for further information. 
19  See  www.expresspaygh.com/index.php for further information. 
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start-ups can then leverage expressPay in their own solutions, whether 
they are e-commerce marketplaces or tablet-based point-of-sale systems 
for small retailers. 
 In summary, the potential for digital start-ups in emerging markets to 
enable marketplaces for fi nancial services, products, capital, and so on, 
and even for entire ecosystems is extraordinary. In Kenya, there are still 
opportunities to reduce transaction costs in digital payments, possibly 
through bitcoin and blockchain solutions. Furthermore, trade fi nance 
and credit for small businesses in informal markets are still major areas 
of opportunity. Companies that can develop algorithms to assess cred-
itworthiness based on alternative information, such as mobile phone 
top- ups, can play a signifi cant role as information analyzers and advi-
sors. Digital identity solutions, perhaps enabled via blockchain, could 
increase the credibility of local job candidates in a global marketplace 
for talent as well as reduce the costs and corruption in providing govern-
ment services. Finally, resolving voids in aggregation and distribution, 
especially in agriculture supply chains, will have a signifi cant impact on 
market functioning and attractiveness and off er benefi ts for the econ-
omy as a whole. 
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 Conversation #4 
 Finding the Right Problem to Solve 
 Timbo Drayson of OkHi 
 Timbo Drayson  is co-founder and chief executive offi  cer (CEO) of OkHi ,  a 
start-up based in Nairobi whose mission is to enable the four billion people 
in the world without a physical address to “ Be included. ”  Born in the UK , 
 he studied engineering at the University of Oxford before starting at Google , 
 where he spent more than six years working in marketing and product man-
agement in London and San Francisco. He built the YouTube apps on your 
mobile phone ,  marketed the fi rst Android phone ,  and has seven US patents to 
his name. Outside of work ,  Timbo wastes his time fi xing up his VW camper 
van or doing some form of exercise to keep his mind sane. 
 What is the story behind OkHi? 
 Well, I was supposed to be moving to San Francisco for a dream job at 
YouTube but decided to take a three-month sabbatical before I sold my soul 
to Silicon Valley. I did a tech tour of Sub-Saharan Africa and was inspired by 
all the start-ups I met that were impacting the world through their profi t-
able businesses. Realizing it was now or never, I left Google in mid-2013 to 
move to Kenya to have a better chance at solving a bigger problem. 
 I chose Kenya because it just felt right. I loved my time in Nairobi 
because of the amazing people I met, the lack of language barrier, the 
exciting tech community, and ultimately because I felt I could live a 
happy and integrated life as an expatriate. 
 As for how OkHi started, an important learning from my previous 
start-up was that it is not the idea that counts, it is the underlying prob-
lem that you need to focus on. I therefore purposely arrived in Kenya 
with no business ideas but spent three months trying to fi nd the right 
problem to solve. I settled on the lack of physical address system in Kenya 
and beyond. 
 Did you explore the problem all on your own or did you look for 
co-founders? 
 During my three months of research, I spent all day meeting new peo-
ple and was always looking for co-founders who could complement my 
skill set and provide local Kenyan insights into the business. It was at an 
event called Startup Weekend that I met Wes Chege and Evans Mutai, 
and soon after I was introduced to Navraj Ghataura by a common friend 
in the tech community (thanks, Adam!). We were all interested in the 
problem of physical addressing, and so, we started working together in 
early 2014 to validate how big the problem was and whether businesses 
would pay for a solution. 
 Since then we have had Henry Ingham, Punit Shah, Dennis Mutugi, 
and Mugethi Gitau join the team, all from very diff erent backgrounds 
and experience, but all passionate about our mission to make the four 
billion people in the world without an address “Be included.” 
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 You mentioned that you are all passionate about OkHi’s mission. 
What do you have in mind when you refer to a mission? 
 I am sure there are many defi nitions out there, but for me, a mission- 
driven business is one that focuses on solving a big problem. My previous 
start-up is a good example of what happens when you focus too much on 
a solution, and not the problem or mission. We had this idea for a service 
that could pool money from a group of friends to enable them to buy a 
better gift for a mutual friend. We were really obsessed with the idea and 
spent every hour outside of our day jobs working on it. After 18 months 
of tireless work we launched, but no one came. We tried to make it work, 
but we were so demotivated that we had to shut down the business. 
 My main learning was that our business was far too focused on the 
idea. Th is meant that when the idea didn’t work, we had no reason to 
continue running the business. If, however, we focused on the underly-
ing problem, even if the initial idea didn’t work, the problem would still 
be there and so too would the reason to continue running the business. 
 Th at is the point of being a mission-driven company: Th e underlying 
problem remains unchanged and constantly keeps the team challenged 
and motivated to fi nd the  right solution. 
 How did you fi nd out just how big the problem is that OkHi seeks to 
solve? And how did you turn that into a mission statement? 
 So there are two parts to this. One is, how did I settle on the right 
problem? And two is, how did we come up with our mission statement 
to “Be included”? 
 During my research phase, I chose the logistics and supply chain space 
as my broad problem area because I saw that its ineffi  ciencies were having 
such a detrimental impact on the economy and anyone living in Kenya. 
I spent three months interviewing 120 people and observed a number 
of businesses in order to fi nd the right problem to solve. I observed van 
drivers taking crazy routes and motorbike riders having to follow crazy 
directions like “Turn left where the goats used to graze.” It was after all 
these insights that I realized that the lack of a physical address system was 
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one of the most fundamental reasons for the ineffi  cient logistics and sup-
ply chain industry. 
 Th ere were two further insights that told me this was the right problem 
to solve. First, during an interview with a Red Cross ambulance driver, 
she told me that she was so lost trying to fi nd someone’s house that when 
she arrived it was too late, and the person was already dead. Th is made me 
realize that the problem of physical addressing was so much bigger than 
just the logistics and supply chain industry. Th e second insight was from a 
United Nation (UN) spokesman, who said there were four billion people 
in the world without a physical address today and that this number would 
double to eight billion by 2050. Th at was when I realized quite how big this 
problem is for the world and that fi nding the right solution for it would be 
a mission that I wanted to dedicate the next decade or more of my life to. 
 Th e last step was to turn the problem into a single mission statement 
that inspired not only the team but also anyone who touched OkHi, from 
friends to journalists, family members to prospective employees. It actually 
took us 18 months to come up with our current statement. At our fi rst off -
site retreat, we spent time trying to answer why OkHi needs to exist and why 
it is so important to solve the physical addressing problem. We settled on 
an initial statement that was to “physically connect the world with a global 
address system.” Over time, though, it became clear that the statement was 
not inspiring enough, or emotional enough, so recently, we worked hard 
to revise it to something more human and aspirational. And that is what 
our mission statement is today, to “Be included.” What do we mean by 
that? Well when someone gains a physical address, their life changes; they 
can now get access to emergency and fi nance services that they could not 
otherwise get access to. Th ey are now part of society. Th ey are now included. 
 As a side note, it often feels like certain elements of a company need to 
be 100 % right from day zero, such as the mission statement and values. 
A big learning from building OkHi is that it is much better to make a 
quick decision that is 80 % right than to worry about the last 20 % and 
potentially never make the decision at all. 
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 If the mission is the kernel of your venture, how do you select new 
team members? Let us imagine you selected me: What do you think I 
would fi nd surprising in my fi rst week on the job? 
 It is funny—I do not think our hiring process is all that conventional. 
But judging by the caliber of the team, it seems to be working. As an 
example, I have not seen the CV for a single one of the seven OkHi team 
members. I do not even know how old everyone is! 
 Our hiring process is based on three principles. First, we hire for 
aptitude, not experience. Someone’s aptitude is their natural ability to 
do something—it is in their DNA. Th is is much more important in a 
 fast- changing start-up where responsibilities often change than someone 
who can only do one thing very well because that is all they have known 
for fi ve years. 
 However, aptitude is very hard to test in an interview. So we test it 
through our second principle, which is to trial the candidate before mak-
ing an off er. Th is is designed to be a two-way benefi t—as much for the 
candidate to work out if OkHi is right for them as it is for us to test their 
aptitude and ability to exceed the expectations of their role. 
 Th e last principle is that we hire for cultural fi t, meaning that we test a 
candidate on how well they align with our company values. Th is is often 
a deal breaker for me. For example, if a candidate does not align with 
our company value to “Grow together”—which means they need to be 
motivated to give and take feedback—then it does not matter how high 
their aptitude is, working at OkHi is not going to work out for us and, 
more importantly, for them. 
 To answer your other questions: In your fi rst week, you would not 
fi nd anything surprising, because you would have already spent enough 
time working at OkHi during your trial! And what makes OkHi special is 
 defi nitely the team. Th ey are the foundation of the company. It is incred-
ible the power that comes from bringing a group of people together who 
are all aligned on the same company mission and values. 
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 You and your team are strong advocates for the lean start-up mental-
ity. Why is that? 
 “Find a problem, not a solution”—which I have already mentioned—
is actually part of the lean start-up mentality. I think it really resonated 
with all of the co-founding team because we had all run companies 
before and had all made similar mistakes. Th ese mistakes could be attrib-
uted to the fact that we made wrong assumptions. We assumed that 
our thoughts or ideas were right—until we were proven wrong. Th is is 
really the fundamental principle of the lean start-up: You are wrong until 
proven right. 
 When you are starting a business, you are trying to get to a point of 
success with the minimal cost possible, whether that cost is fi nancial, 
your time, or otherwise. Th e Lean Start-up’s mantra is that you do this 
through an iterative loop of Build, Measure, and Learn. You build some-
thing quickly that can test your assumptions, which is called the mini-
mum viable product, or MVP. You then measure the success of this MVP 
in a qualitative or quantitative way, learning from what worked and what 
did not. And then you restart the loop again. 
 I wish I had known about the Lean Start-up during my previous start-
 up, because it was only after 12 months of engineering that we learned 
our users did not understand our homepage. If we had put paper screen-
shots (“Build”) in front of our target users (“Measure”), then we would 
have realized that no one understood our homepage in 2 weeks rather 
than 12 months (“Learn”). Th ough to be honest, the theory is the easy 
part. Th e hard part is putting the theory into practice, because there are 
so many open questions you need to answer. For example: Do we build 
one product or three diff erent ones? What design fi delity should we build 
the product to? And, How many users do we need for the results to be 
statistically signifi cant? 
 Th ese questions highlight the many potential pitfalls of implement-
ing a Lean Start-up, and the frustrating thing is that there is no right 
answer. Each company is so unique that you need to work out the right 
recipe yourself. Ironically, my best advice is to use the Build, Measure, 
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Learn principles of the Lean Start-up to implement it successfully. In 
every work sprint, we defi ne the process of how we are going to work 
(“Build”). Th en after the sprint, the whole team reviews how it went 
(“Measure”). And then, we discuss why some things worked and some 
did not (“Learn”). If you do this enough times, you will generate a pro-
cess for running the Lean Start-up principles that is optimized to your 
business, team, and culture. 
 An entrepreneur is often seen as the individual hero that develops 
innovative solutions for long-lasting problems. How much is the 
entrepreneur really that lonesome fi ghter as opposed to a function of 
a wider community eff ort? 
 From both working at Google and running OkHi, I have come to 
realize that every successful business is like an iceberg. I think everyone is 
guilty of seeing a company that has been successful with just a simple idea 
and thinks, “Why didn’t I think of that?” or even worse “Wait, I had that 
idea — they stole my idea.” But as someone who knows nothing about 
that business, all you can see is the tip of the iceberg above the water, 
the working solution. As soon as you start understanding more about 
the business, you realize there is so much more to it than you originally 
thought. Whether it is that they made a big pivot one year into the busi-
ness (Twitter), had to fi re one of the early co-founders (Facebook), or ran 
out of money and had to sell cereal boxes to make ends meet (Airbnb), 
every business has so much more to it below the surface. 
 So what I am saying is that it is never just the CEO or co-founders 
that make the business, it is the whole ecosystem around the business, 
from the employees to the partners, from the investors to the customers. 
Especially in the technology sector, the wider community is a hugely 
important factor to the success of the business, and it is often overlooked 
because it is one of the parts of the iceberg that remains under the water. 
 While I was at Google, I spent two years leading Google’s developer 
outreach eff orts across Europe, Middle East, and Africa and gained a 
unique perspective on seeing what was a small technology community 
in London in 2008 turn, in just fi ve years, into one of the largest tech 
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 ecosystems in the world. Th ere is no way the successful companies com-
ing out of London today could have done so back in 2008, because there 
was not the capital, the mentors, or employees to make it happen. Th ere 
just was not the ecosystem, or community. 
 For me, the biggest thing I see missing in Kenya is the lack of this 
kind of community. Th ere is an amazing buzz here, but as entrepreneurs 
(and I include myself here), we do not do a good enough job of sharing, 
learning, and generally making the most of each other. We also lack the 
experience in Kenya of tech entrepreneurs who have built successful busi-
nesses multiple times. It is these people who are the ideal mentors, with 
vital advice for those of us who are inexperienced founders. 
 So it is up to us founders to actively make this change, to run and host 
local events ourselves, and forge relationships with more advanced eco-
systems like Silicon Valley. It is happening—and will happen. It is just up 
to us as entrepreneurs how much fuel we want to put into the local tech 
ecosystem fi re. I think we need a lot more! 
 Let us imagine you could start OkHi all over again. What would you 
change? 
 Th is is a tough one. Th ere are so many things! I suppose thinking 
through the timeline of OkHi, I would say the following: 
 First, I would fi nd a co-founder who could run the operations of the 
business. Th ere is a lot of company infrastructure to build as a start-up, 
especially in Kenya, where you cannot yet buy solutions off  the shelf 
to set up your payroll, benefi ts package, or stock option plan. It takes 
time to get it right, especially because I was doing this in a new country. 
Operations is also not a strength of mine, so I spent a lot of time doing 
it when it would have been better for me to focus on other areas of the 
business. 
 Second, I would solidify the values of the company early on. As a 
team we have spent time talking about our values, doing exercises to 
understand what our personal values and therefore our company values 
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should be. But it took me almost two years to clearly defi ne a set of val-
ues, because I put so much onus on them that I was scared of not getting 
them 100 % right. Th is was actually where I learned the importance of 
making a decision, even if it is only 80 % right. Now we have a set of 
fi ve company values that the whole team is proud of (you can fi nd them 
on our website), and they have really helped me, and the team test cul-
ture alignment in interviews, make decisions internally, and know how to 
act when talking to potential customers. Th ey have become our internal 
compass. 
 Th e third would be to complement raising smart money with just 
money. Smart money is investment in your business that adds value 
beyond the money itself—things like mentorship, for example. Our fi rst 
round of fi nancing took over fi ve months to close because I would not 
accept money from an investor unless it was smart money. In hindsight 
though, there should have been a balance. 
 Th e last thing I would have done diff erently would be to leverage men-
tors and investors more. It is very hard when you are in the weeds of 
running a business and trying to plow through the next wall ahead to 
take a step back and gain the perspective you need to steer the ship in the 
right direction. Th is is the support that great mentors and investors can 
provide—support that I need more of and support that I need to do a 
better job of getting. 
 Th anks, Timbo! 
Th is chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ), which permits use, dupli-
cation, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit 
to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes 
were made.
Th e images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work’s Creative Commons license, 
unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included in the work’s Creative Commons 
license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory regulation, users will need to obtain permission from 
the license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce the material.
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 Knowledge and technology can combine to change societies dramatically, 
opening opportunities that were previously unthinkable. But creating 
the right combinations and providing access require a particular blend of 
planning and luck; such points in time are rare and should not be missed. 
We are at such a historic point in Africa right now, where information 
and communications technologies (ICTs) have brought forth impressive 
innovations that have developed new solutions for longstanding prob-
lems. Th ese developments have moved some to issue bold statements in 
which Africa should skip industrialism entirely and leap directly into the 
information era (Barlow  1998 ). A few years ago, this sentiment might 
have seemed far-fetched, but now new futures can be imagined that might 
just show that “the rise of 3D printing could do for Africa what semicon-
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ductors did for Taiwan in the 1960s” (Juma  2014 ). In fact, the statement 
highlights once more how a previously agrarian society—Taiwan—went 
from being a producer of mushrooms and shrimp to a leader in creating 
new value with technology. Juma outlines a powerful phenomenon called 
leapfrogging—the signifi cant jump from one step in an economy’s evolu-
tion to another, skipping a few steps in between. ICT is doing exactly that 
for Africa right now. 
 In Kenya, this is especially true in the case of the homegrown M-PESA, 
a mobile money transfer platform that has radically reduced transaction 
costs of capital exchange. In a remarkably short period of time, people in 
developing nations, who until recently lacked access to formal fi nancial 
services, now have ways to connect to the global grid of fi nancial fl ows 
and clearing of transactions. Instead of painstakingly developing a tradi-
tional banking sector—with decades of wasted human lives and oppor-
tunities—the introduction of mobile technology unexpectedly brought a 
completely new solution to a generation of people hungry for the chance 
to participate in the global economy  right now . But the solution did not 
stop at facilitating transfers and transactions; on the contrary, the reduc-
tion in what economists call “transactions costs” kicked off  an entirely 
new industry, developing new ways to enable mobile money to disrupt 
industries and business models. In times when the minds of state offi  cials, 
industry experts and business owners are preoccupied by other pressing 
challenges, ingenious new ways to solve longstanding problems can set 
off  a domino eff ect that changes society and the economy at large in ways 
that allow an entire country to leapfrog the traditional barriers that vex 
development. 
 Education, arguably the backbone for innovation and economic devel-
opment, is ripe for leapfrogging. Although innovators are seeking new 
ways to educate the next generation, the diffi  culties of delivering ade-
quate educational services to those without the means to aff ord expen-
sive private schools remains a crucial problem. Even though the physical 
classroom with a standardized curriculum and textbooks has worked for 
many, it may well not be the timeliest response for the next generation of 
students. Without adequate access to both foundational and specialized 
knowledge, many will remain held back from the potential that the future 
has to off er. In turn, inequality will be on the rise and most likely exclude 
rather than empower many Africans. As African economies become the 
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narrator of homemade stories on economic success and development, 
new educational solutions need to ensure that the broader public will 
be able to latch on to the opportunities made available by rapid growth. 
 Because the education sector relies on traditional learning models and 
has only slowly opened up to the power of modern technology, we need 
an approach that  reimagines education from the ground up. In other 
words, the whole learning experience, including the physical “place” of 
learning, needs to be up for new solutions. Once people take education 
out of the four walls of the traditional classroom into homes, libraries, 
internet cafés, and other places (Collins and Halverson  2009 ), a com-
pletely new learning experience is imaginable—one that innovators need 
to harness now in order to  transform the way in which education is deliv-
ered in Africa. Th e “digital” setting will not face the same constraints as 
old models, and students will decide what, where, and when to learn. We 
need these digital models to start reimagining education in Africa. 
 In this chapter, we build a case for such an approach in the education 
sector. We start by introducing the sharing economy, recent advances in 
the open source movement, and the power of the internet, all of which 
provide key tools to put leapfrogging into action. Ultimately, the idea 
is that by carefully combining insights of diff erent advances in technol-
ogy and business-model innovation, new opportunities will be uncovered 
that allow a reimagination of the traditional, resource-intensive class-
room model. We will reimagine several elements in the education sector, 
including school management, the classroom, the learning experience, 
and certifi cation. 
 Th ese elements are just a short list of the many innovations that, when 
brought together, start to fundamentally change education as we know it. 
We will use the insights gained from education to delve further into other 
industries—namely, logistics, fi nance, and health, in order to sketch out 
new innovations that reimagine products and services. Th e chapter will 
equip the reader with a specifi c analytic tool that can be and should be 
applied to other industries. We argue that the future for Africa resides in 
unleashing ideas and reconceptualizing solutions for longstanding prob-
lems rather than imitating outdated strategies from other contexts. In the 
next section, we take a step back and look at “the fundamentals,” that 
is, at the underlying conditions and economic forces that have created a 
context in which a reimagining will be fruitful. 
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 The Fundamentals 
 Reimagining Ownership: The Sharing Economy 
 Th e self-storage industry in the USA has nearly 50,000 facilities, with 
more than 15 billion cubic feet of space (Clark  2014 ) cluttered with … 
stuff . Americans and Europeans are storing bicycles, mattresses, and old 
televisions in facilities that may be more solidly constructed than many 
human habitations in developing nations. 
 But even in “more developed” nations, this abundance of stuff  does 
not make sense. People do not fundamentally want physical things, 
which wear out and take up space. What they want is the  stream of services 
that tools, clothes, and other physical things provide over time. People 
prefer owning things, ranging from tools to houses, rather than renting 
things because owning appears to secure services more reliably and at 
lower transaction costs than renting. But this preference for owning is 
not real. And it could change quickly if entrepreneurs can fi gure out a 
way to sell reductions in transactions costs. In a claim that looks prescient 
fi ve years later, Suellentrop ( 2010 ) wrote, “We woke up in a Rentership 
Society, and it’s starting to look permanent. And you know what? Th ank 
goodness. Ownership, it turns out, is for suckers.” 
 If you own something, you have to pay the  average cost of using it, 
because no one can share it, and you have to pay for what it cost to create 
that thing. But why not just pay the  marginal cost, rather than the  average 
cost? If I already own a fl at, I am already paying for utilities and making 
mortgage payments. But what if I am not always there, or if I have an 
extra room I almost never use except for storing junk? I would be will-
ing—maybe even happy—to off er someone else my place to stay at the 
cost of having to clean it afterward, plus whatever extra I can get to pay 
toward my rent. I am willing to off er rides in my car at the cost of gas, my 
time, and wear and tear on the vehicle. 
 Th e reason we do not see more sharing is “transactions costs.” Th ere 
are some people who have an extra room, and others who need a place to 
stay in a strange city. What is missing (Munger  2015 ) is: (1) information 
about identity and location, (2) a way of making payment that both par-
ties can trust, and (3) a way of outsourcing trust on performance of the 
terms of the contract. 
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 Th e usual answer to sharing a living space is “hotels,” because they 
provide all three of these needs. But hotels are expensive because they 
have to cover their average costs: all of their expenses are involved in the 
business of selling rooms by the night. Th at is not true of apartments or 
homes where people live, because those other expenses are being paid 
already. Th at is better for the buyer also, of course, as long as the three 
needs listed above can be satisfi ed reliably. Th e company called Airbnb 
fi gured this out, and sells a product based precisely those three needs. 
Th ey do not rent out space: they sell access to renters to people who 
have space and access to space for people who want to rent. Th at means 
that the existing stock of “stuff ” can be used far more effi  ciently. As 
transactions costs fall, which means as entrepreneurs fi nd new ways to 
“sell” transactions-cost reductions, the status of much of what we now 
own will change. All of us will rent more and own less. Some of us may 
specialize in being “sellers” in these new rental markets for things we do 
own. But still, overall each of us will have actual possession of far, far less 
stuff  at any given time. 
 Reimagining Production: The Open Source Movement 
 An implication of this change—the change from selling new stuff  to sell-
ing better access to stuff  that already exists but is underutilized—is that 
more and more things will be “open source.” To understand what “open 
source” means and how we should think about it for education materials 
requires a look at some background. 
 Ironically, investigating the history of open source illustrates some of 
the problems and paradoxes at work. One of the ur-texts of open-source 
history is Philip Elmer-Dewitt’s article, “Computers: Software Is for 
Sharing,” published by  Time magazine on July 30,  1984 . If you can get 
access to it, you will see that the article describes the problem of splitting 
software from the physical electronic platform for which it was created. 
Th e reason we say “if you can get access” is that this article about free 
availability is behind a paywall at the  Time website. 
 Th ere may be good reasons for that.  Time is providing a service to 
make the article available, and the author may still want the copyright 
to be enforced. In many cases, people write stuff  to get paid. But how is 
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that kind of “stuff ” diff erent from the stuff  piled up in garages and storage 
units? How can we make better use of all  that kind of stuff , the kind that 
is made up of information? 
 Th e notion of open source is generally associated with software, but 
for a very long time, people in a variety of fi elds have recognized the 
underlying problem: information wants to be free. 1 “Free” might mean 
 libre , or exempt from restrictions, meaning that there are no restrictions 
on publication or dissemination. But “free” also has the literal meaning 
of  gratis , being available without charge, and available for use, reuse, 
and modifi cation in contexts quite diff erent from its creation or original 
use. 2 
 Open-source software is freely available (including source code, not just 
compiled programs), freely reproducible, freely editable, and  technology 
neutral. 3 DiBona et al. ( 1999 ) pointed out the analogy between software 
and information, using the narrative of the “discovery” of the double-
helix structure of DNA. Th e passage is worth quoting at length:
 Th e quest for the secret of DNA became a fi erce competition between, 
among others, Watson and Crick’s lab in Cambridge, and Pauling’s lab at 
Cal Tech…Th e story here centers on Max Delbruk, a mutual friend who 
traveled between Cambridge and Cal Tech. While sympathetic to Watson 
and Crick’s desire to keep the discovery secret until all results could be 
confi rmed, Delbruk’s allegiance ultimately was to science itself. In this pas-
sage, Watson describes how he learned that Pauling had heard the news: 
1  Th is phrase, or the sentiment it embodies, is ancient, as Clarke ( 1999 ) shows. But the modern use 
in the context of software and widely disseminated information is usually dated to 1984, when 
Stewart Brand [creator of the  Whole Earth Catalog ] told Steve Wozniak [of Apple Computer]: “It 
seems like there’s a couple of interesting paradoxes that we’re working here …. On the one hand 
information wants to be expensive, because it’s so valuable. Th e right information in the right place 
just changes your life. On the other hand, information wants to be free, because the cost of getting 
it out is getting lower and lower all the time. So you have these two fi ghting against each other. 
 WOZNIAK: Information should be free but your time should not. 
 BRAND: But then, at what point of amplifi cation is your time being so well rewarded that it’s get-
ting strange or so under-rewarded that it’s strange? Th ere’s problems there with the market.” 
 Quoted in Brand and Herron ( 1985 ). 
2  See Clarke ( 1999 ) for more on the distinction. 
3  Th e full requirements to qualify as “open source” are more extensive, and more technical. See 
Open Source Initiative ( n.d. ). 
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 Linus Pauling fi rst heard about the double helix from Max Delbruk. At 
the bottom of the letter that broke the news of the complementary chains, 
I had asked that he not tell Linus. I was still slightly afraid something 
would go wrong and did not want Pauling to think about hydrogen- 
bonded base pairs until we had a few more days to digest our position. My 
request, however, was ignored…. Delbruk hated any form of secrecy in 
scientifi c matters and did not want to keep Pauling in suspense any 
longer. 
 Clearly the need for secrecy made Watson uncomfortable. One of the 
poignant themes that runs throughout the book is Watson’s acknowledg-
ment that competition kept parties from disclosing all they knew, and that 
the progress of science may have been delayed, if ever so slightly, by that 
secrecy. Science, after all, is ultimately an Open Source enterprise… [U]
ltimately the process of discovery must be served by sharing information: 
enabling other scientists to go forward where one cannot; pollinating the 
ideas of others so that something new may grow that otherwise would not 
have been born. 
 Th ere is a further analogy, one that is clear to anyone who works in edu-
cation or who has tried to become educated: the fact that information 
is available does not mean that students have learned it. But the more 
expensive information is—in either the sense of not being  libre or not 
being  gratis —the harder it is to learn. 
 Th e problem is clear, but seemingly intractable. Society wants, and in 
fact needs, for individuals to have reasons to discover new information 
and to create new software. We have to cover the average costs of this 
valuable service. Once that new information is discovered and once that 
software is written, that information “wants” to be priced at marginal 
cost. In the case of data, source code, or ideas, the notion of any positive 
price is diffi  cult to sustain. Th e cost of dissemination is a few keystrokes, 
an internet connection, and space to store the digital content. 
 For these reasons, the roles of collection, curation, and organization 
have become central to the development of new platforms for education 
and means of disseminating information. In economic parlance, these are 
“middlemen.” Th e role of the middleman has always been ambiguous: 
crucial, yet destructive, seen sometimes as valuable and sometimes as an 
obstruction to progress. We turn aside for a moment to consider the role 
of middlemen as entrepreneurs and revolutionaries. 
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 The Middleman and the Information Revolution 
in Education 
 Joseph Schumpeter ( 1942 ) famously described entrepreneurs as destruc-
tive: “Entrepreneurs are innovators who use a process of shattering the 
status quo of the existing products and services, to set up new products, 
new services.” Th is is something more than arbitrage or making money 
by buying low and selling high. Rather than simply “correcting” errors in 
the price system and causing the convergence of prices of a single exist-
ing commodity, entrepreneurs imagine alternative futures, new products, 
and possible ways of organizing production. 
 It is diffi  cult to overstate the importance of this distinction. An entre-
preneur does not (just) take advantage of errors (i.e., diff erences) in 
prices. An entrepreneur is alert to entirely new possibilities, to products 
and innovations that consumers may well not even be aware that they 
could have, much less want. Steve Jobs, of Apple Computer, famously 
observed that entrepreneurs could not rely on static conceptions of 
“demand”: “You can’t just ask customers what they want and then try to 
give that to them. By the time you get it built, they’ll want something 
new.” (Burlingham  1989 ). 
 A decade later, Jobs went further: “But in the end, for something this 
complicated, it’s really hard to design products by focus groups. A lot of 
times, people don’t know what they want until you show it to them.” 
(Reinhardt  1998 ). Th is echoes Henry Ford’s famous, though perhaps 
apocryphal, claim that: “If I had asked [consumers] what they wanted, 
they would have said, ‘Faster horses!’” (Vlaskovits and Ford  2011 ). 
 For our purposes, this notion of entrepreneurship is crucially linked 
to the changes in the forms and availability of information. Traditional 
models of education are likely to be destroyed entirely and replaced, 
rather than changed at the margins. But this transformation can only 
take place if the information being passed on can be both free, and yet, 
conveyed in ways that compensate both creators and educators—which 
brings us to the middleman. 
 We tend not to like middlemen. Th ey seem parasitic, buying products 
and then reselling them without improvement. If middlemen make prof-
its, surely they do not earn them. And in fact, “eliminate the middleman” 
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is the maxim of many simplistic schemes for increasing profi t or reducing 
costs. Why do middlemen exist? 
 Th e anwer is that middlemen make possible transactions that oth-
erwise could not take place. Transportation, information, assurance of 
quality through brand name, fi nancial clearing services—all of these are 
means of making possible transactions that otherwise would be blocked 
by transactions costs. An example makes this clear. Suppose that A is will-
ing to rent widget W for any price over USD40 per day. B wants to use W 
for a day and will pay any price less than USD75. In principle, there is a 
bargaining space where any rental off er greater than USD40 and less than 
USD75 makes both parties better off . And in a social sense, W “should” 
be used by B, because he values it more than A. 
 But A may not know where or even who B is, and it is expensive to go 
looking. Th ey may be physically distant, meaning that there are transport 
costs. Th e medium of exchange may be cumbersome, requiring costs to 
clear the transaction if it takes place. And they do not trust each other: 
say W is valuable and A is not sure B would not break it. Th ese costs 
could easily be USD50 or more. Assume the transactions costs are split 
evenly, USD25 each. Th at means that A will require a payment of at least 
USD65 to sell W, and B will pay at most USD50. Th ere is now no price 
where the transaction can take place. And because of this, A and B may 
not even imagine the idea of renting widgets. No one has ever made an 
eff ort to set up a widget rental company, and no eff ort has been devoted 
to developing institutions for reducing the transactions cost. 
 To succeed, a middleman has to reduce three key transactions costs: 
(1) provide information about options and prices in a way that is search-
able, sortable, and immediate; (2) outsource trust to assure safety and 
quality in a way that requires no investigation or eff ort by the users, and 
(3) consummate the transaction in a way that is reliable, immediate, and 
does not require negotiation or enforcement on the part of the users 
 It is tempting to think that the reason that Uber, a mobile ride hail 
company, has succeeded is that it avoids the costs of complying with 
the regulations, taxes, and restrictions that aff ect taxis. And that may 
be part of the story. But if you call an Uber driver, she appears almost 
immediately; you do not have to wait or wave at taxis that do not stop. 
Th at driver comes looking for you using the software and GPS features 
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in your phone. Further, you can see the name and license information of 
the driver and you know the company has the driver’s personal and fi nan-
cial information. You do not need to give the driver directions, because 
you have already provided your destination to the software, which the 
driver can then use to navigate while you think about something else. 
And the driver is paid, and tipped, without you having to touch your 
wallet. Finally, you get to rate the driver and the ride, and Uber pays for 
background checks. Drivers whose ratings drop below a threshold, which 
varies by location, are fi red. 
 Th us, it is important to recognize that the changes we are observing 
are not simply driven by passive, exogenous changes in transactions costs. 
Ronald Coase ( 1937 ) was rather scornful of the notion that transactions 
costs were a defi nable, measurable variable that should be seen as driving 
economic change. Th e key factor is the innovation in software platforms 
that reduce the costs of the entire transaction to the point where that 
activity is now profi table for the entrepreneur and benefi cial for the con-
sumer. Th e transaction is paid for within the software itself, and both you 
and the renter (who may just be a private citizen who happened to have a 
drill) will rate each other. Services like this already exist in many cities for 
high-quality bicycles, luggage, clothing, and appliances. As transactions 
costs are reduced by software platforms, enormous value is created for 
consumers and entrepreneurs grow rich. 
 Th e question is how, or maybe if, this model can be adapted to educa-
tion. Th e challenges are daunting, and the potential for “success” carries 
with it the likelihood of massive disruptions in existing means of deliver-
ing information. Let us see why. 
 Reimagining Education 
 Traditional Education 
 Th e importance of developing one’s mind has been appreciated for mil-
lennia, but only recently has the chance to learn in a structured manner 
been aff orded to the masses. Alexander the Great is reputed to have said, 
“I am indebted to my father for living, but to my teacher for living well.” 
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(Vries  2014 ). Alexander’s teacher was, of course, the legendary philoso-
pher, Aristotle. So Alexander was also indebted to his kingly father for 
having the resources to be able to aff ord such a teacher. 
 But Aristotle has been “teacher” to millions of other people, long after 
Alexander had also become a legend. In the years between the Greek 
philosophers and the invention of the printing press, Aristotle’s works 
were kept alive by armies of scribes, hired by the Library of Alexandria 
in Egypt to copy and preserve any written works passed through the 
port. After that library’s destruction, other institutions, most notably 
the Islamic House of Wisdom in Persia, carried on the great tradition 
of preserving knowledge (Al-Khalili  2011 ). Th at tradition, working its 
way through medieval scribes in European monasteries, was eventually 
brought to America by the scientist-businessman-diplomat Benjamin 
Franklin (Korty  1965 ). It scaled up with the fortunes of industrialists-
turned- philanthropists, like Dale Carnegie. Th us, for nearly a century, 
a large percentage of Americans have been able to take for granted free 
or low-cost access to a wide variety of books and related services (Harris 
 1999 ). Th e same does not hold true for much of the world. 
 We may not think of books as technology, but they are. Even paper is 
a software technology: the English word is derived from the word “papy-
rus.” We often forget how remarkable it is that technology enables us 
to copy books and move them through time and space so easily. In the 
ancient libraries in Egypt and Persia, each work had to be copied by hand 
by an educated scribe. Written works were thus valuable and rare. In 
Europe, the majority of such eff orts centered around copying bibles onto 
expensive vellum in candle-lit basements of churches and monasteries, 
which incidentally ran a large number of schools (Harris  1999 ). 
 When Guttenberg’s printing press started production in Germany 
around 1440, it quickly transformed the position of the Catholic Church 
by making the Bible available to the masses without the control and 
interpretation of the clergy (Eisenstein  1979 ). When, in 1517, Martin 
Luther nailed his “Ninety-Five Th eses” (condemning many practices of 
the church, such as selling indulgences) to the ornate main door of the 
Schlosskirche in Wittenberg, his challenge was written, not spoken; the 
handwritten manuscript was printed and then spread rapidly through 
Europe. Th us, with the aid of some wealthy friends and the  technology 
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of printed paper, one man helped spark the Protestant reformation 
(Eisenstein  1979 ). 
 Th e printing press was also a revolutionary instrument in the develop-
ment of science, as well as a revelation. Th e printing of treatises and jour-
nals allowed ideas to be developed at length and understood and debated 
by people distant in space, and even time, from the writer. As intellectual 
communities grew, it became possible to settle disputes about compet-
ing theories by dramatically increasing the number of minds focused on 
a problem. It became possible to teach students about what was already 
known. Scholars no longer had to start over with every new generation; 
science became cumulative in education and incremental in research. 
Ideas could be spread through libraries, and new ideas could be accumu-
lated through spreading networks of universities (Eisenstein  1979 ). 
 Still, education was mostly available to only the elite because the tech-
nology of printing and the use of vellum were still very expensive. Th e 
basic technology of producing books improved slightly in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, with production-line methods and improve-
ments in the production of high-quality, low-cost paper, but books and 
paper were still expensive to produce, transport, or store, and all but the 
highest-quality bindings and paper degraded in just a few decades. Th e 
truly revolutionary change took place in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-fi rst centuries. It was at this point that information, words, and 
educational material were divorced completely from having any physical 
medium. Digital information, once produced and stored on a magnetic or 
other medium, could be infi nitely reproduced in ways that are very nearly 
costless, and transmitted around the globe in ways that are very nearly 
instantaneously. Th ough we cannot speak directly with Aristotle the way 
that Alexander the Great did, almost anyone can now instantly have access 
to Aristotle’s works on a mobile phone, from practically anywhere on the 
globe. Aristotle has more readers—and a greater impact—today than any-
one could have imagined during his lifetime or in the Middle Ages, when 
he had to be read in Greek or Latin from a handwritten manuscript. But 
more importantly, Aristotle can now be read, in almost any language, by 
anyone who has a screen and an internet connection. 
 Nonetheless, most schoolchildren do not read Aristotle. One aspect of 
such educational materials remains elite: priority. Th e level of  education, 
and the breadth of knowledge, required to make the careful study of 
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Aristotle a core priority is beyond most communities. Fortunately, the 
same technological revolution that divorced information (sometimes 
called “content”) from medium works for the basics of algebra and gram-
mar. What until now has required the expensive printing and shipment 
of fragile, heavy textbooks, which can wear out or become obsolete, can 
now be achieved through digital learning resources—often called open 
educational resources when they are truly free. Teachers, like scientists, 
can benefi t from someone else’s work and teach students using materials 
other people have developed. 
 As a result, a new kind of modern learning experience is being born. 
And the consequence is that many things we imagine we know about edu-
cation are being called into question. We can all imagine a classroom with 
a trained teacher standing at the front and silent students taking notes 
or working on exercises from a textbook. We all know that each school 
needs an army of administrators, from the principal on down, to make 
it run and keep the teachers in line. We all know that a highly skilled 
teacher with years of training needs to stand up front and maintain disci-
pline so that the children can be molded. We also know that the learning 
is certifi ed through a series of tests followed by the issuance of a paper 
diploma—turning years of mental toil into a series of numbers and letters 
(grades) with a brand name (the school’s name) and logo on the top. 
 Th e question is which, if any, of these features of education are essen-
tial for the future we now need to reimagine. Just as Airbnb has reimag-
ined hotels, the Open Source movement has reimagined production and 
ownership of intellectual “property,” and the Internet has reimagined dis-
tribution, so, too, are groups and entrepreneurs attempting to reimagine 
education. Some are reimagining the classroom, others are reimagining 
school administration, others reimagining the learning experience itself, 
and still more are taking a fresh look at the certifi cation process with new 
ways to document learner eff ort and achievement. 
 Technology-Driven Education 
 Traditional education has had many successes, and the way traditional 
education has been conducted is based on centuries of experience. But 
recent changes in capacities and a dramatic expansion of needs have 
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created a setting where reimagining may be fruitful. Th ere are several 
technology- driven innovations that have been tried in a number of places, 
and there is great promise of success if change can be managed. Th e pri-
mary focus of our discussion will be on East Africa. We will consider the 
disruptive capacity of these innovations and their potential impact on the 
most marginalized communities. Hopefully, change-makers will be able 
to take and remix some of these ideas and help in bringing forth a new era 
of learning. Th e space is complex, but headway is being made. 
 Traditionally, classrooms are physical locations in which a single trained 
teacher and a larger number of students show up at the same time to pro-
duce what we call education. But over the past decade, Massive Open 
Online Courses (MOOCs) have been released online—either free or at a 
very low monetary cost—allowing learners with Internet access to see lec-
tures from top universities. Unlike in a traditional classroom, learners watch 
videos online from a (possibly remote) location; take quizzes that can be 
automatically graded by software; and submit assignments, such as essays, 
which are often peer-graded. Learners receive certifi cates with the name of 
the MOOC provider (such as Coursera, EdX, Open2Study, or Udacity) as 
well as the university that the professor is affi  liated with (such as Stanford, 
Harvard, or MIT). Th ough completing a MOOC does not normally con-
fer university credit, many universities allow enrolled students to earn credit 
by taking online courses in lieu of traditional classes (Boven  2013 ). 
 Th ese innovations have also moved into classrooms for younger learn-
ers in primary schools. Khan Academy, a nonprofi t organization, devel-
oped a collection of free videos covering a wide range of subjects, like 
math and science, which were fi rst released on YouTube (Khan  2013 ). 
Classrooms around the USA have been “fl ipped,” as students watch vid-
eos at home and then do work in class, where the teacher can help mini-
mize the time the learners spend struggling (Berrett  2012 ). 
 Th ese technology-enabled innovations have moved classrooms out of 
their traditional physical location and thus changed the learning experi-
ence for many. Despite these signifi cant advances, data show that those 
who complete courses tend to be relatively highly educated, with univer-
sity or Master’s degrees. For now, the people thriving in the new digital 
classrooms are the same people who already thrived in traditional class-
rooms (Ho et al.  2015 ). 
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 But there are other possibilities. Here are three examples of  organizations 
that have reimagined education. 
 Example 1. Bridge International Academies :  Reimagining School 
Management 
 Traditionally, a “school” requires a bevy of costly administrators and sup-
port personnel to operate. Bridge International Academies is a Nairobi- 
based chain of low-cost primary schools. Th ey are the fastest-growing 
chain of private schools in the world and have secured investment upward 
of USD100 million, including a high-profi le investment of USD10 mil-
lion from Facebook’s founder, Mark Zuckerberg (Stevis and Clark  2015 ). 
 As did industrial companies of the past, Bridge uses economies of scale 
and standardization to dramatically lower costs, to provide low-income 
families an alternative to government-run primary schools in Kenya 
and other parts of Africa. Like a highly effi  cient Amazon distribution 
center, Bridge uses software and data to monitor thousands of teach-
ers in hundreds of schools. Lesson plans are centrally created in Boston 
by an elite team of top teachers and are distributed, using the Internet 
and mobile phone networks, to e-readers which teachers use to deliver 
scripted lessons (Rangan and Lee  2010 ). Th is standardization allows less- 
trained adults from the communities to become teachers and the software 
enables tracking of lots of data, such as how fast digital pages are turned 
on the e-readers and how students in various classes score on exercises. 
Bridge can also use A/B testing, a technique used widely by tech startups 
and digital marketing fi rms, to give a diff erent lesson plan to diff erent 
sets of teachers and see which has the greatest impact on students’ perfor-
mance. Were Bridge to open up their curriculum, they could also have 
examples improved and kept up to date with crowd-sourced input, just 
as Wikipedia articles are improved and updated. 
 Using mobile money networks (such as M-PESA in Kenya) to pay 
teachers, staff , and suppliers alike minimizes administrative overhead at 
each school, decreases opportunities for administrative fraud, and presum-
ably decreases the risk for a robbery incident. Maintaining control and 
standardizing the education experience across schools has allowed Bridge 
to make great headway in providing low-cost primary education at scale by 
reimagining how schools are administered and how teachers are monitored. 
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 Example 2. Tunapanda Institute :  Reimagining the Learning Experience and 
Teacher Training 
 Traditionally, learners listen to lectures from highly trained teachers who 
are much older than the students and far removed from their own learn-
ing experiences. Tunapanda Institute is now reimagining the learning 
experience and teacher training by empowering relatively inexperienced 
young people in East Africa to teach each other within the context of 
a fl exible curriculum focused on technology, design, and business skills 
that help young people enter the workforce as professionals, become 
innovative teachers, and someday engage in entrepreneurship. 
 Th e nonprofi t organization (in which both authors of this chapter are 
involved, as founding director and co-founder, respectively) operates a 
training facility in Kibera, a large Nairobi slum, for young adults (from 19 
to 25 years old). Th e facility recruits and trains young people from the area 
and similar areas around Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. After three-month 
intensive training courses in technology, design, and business, most gradu-
ates fi nd jobs, normally as teachers or working for technology companies. 
 A few graduates, however, are selected to remain as apprentice- teachers 
and train future cohorts while learning to take over the operation of the 
facility. Th e system works because the curriculum is designed to be prac-
tical and hands-on. Rather than working to pass tests and earn higher 
grades, learners work in teams to program video games, build educa-
tional websites, prototype Android apps, and present startup pitches. 
Each activity ends with a presentation that is attended by a larger team. 
Because learners derive intrinsic joy from the activities and also want to 
look good when presenting to the group, high levels of engagement can 
be maintained despite very few formal rules or a grading system. Past 
graduates who are working in industry also return to share the value they 
derived from what they learned at Tunapanda, validating the program. 
 Th e peer-to-peer learning experience, where some young people are 
teaching the classes to young people, and both students and teachers are 
judged primarily by their peers, creates a diff erent learning experience that 
many say provides more value over a shorter period of time than other 
available learning avenues, including local universities. Because teaching 
and coaching are also viewed as learning activities, graduates of former 
classes want to be a part of teaching and coaching their favorite classes at 
148 J. Larson and M. Munger
least one time after they have gone through the program—meaning there 
are 3 to 4 more experienced trainers and coaches working with a cohort 
of 25–28 fi rst-time learners. 
 By reimagining the learning experience, young people are able to envis-
age a transformation in their future and become not just lifelong learners 
but also lifelong teachers. 
 Example 3. Mozilla Open Badges :  Reimagining Certifi cation 
 Traditionally, certifi cates are issued by the learning institution, with exter-
nal testing authorities in some way validating the learning through test-
ing. Examples include the Scholastic Aptitude Test SAT and Advanced 
Placement examinations in the USA, and the Kenya Certifi cate of 
Secondary Education (KCSE) examination in Kenya. Th ese grades and 
exam scores are used as an important means of helping universities decide 
who to admit, helping governments decide who to fund, and helping 
employers decide who to hire. 
 Mozilla, the nonprofi t entity most known for maintaining the open 
source web browser Mozilla Firefox, began an initiative to create an open 
badging system. Just as Uber uses a rating system to show the quality of 
drivers and passengers, Mozilla’s Open Badges system could let others 
know about the quality of your work for more complex tasks. Mozilla 
manages “participating issuers,” who are able to design and issue badges 
if users are able to demonstrate profi ciency. 
 Th e importance of these badges being “open” cannot be understated, espe-
cially in the context of enabling people in less-developed countries to earn 
higher incomes. Currently, Uber’s rating system is closed, that is, the experi-
ence ratings earned in the system by either a customer or a driver cannot be 
taken to, say, Easy Taxi (an Uber competitor) or Airbnb. As work evolves 
and people begin to piece together income-earning activities, rather than 
having a single “job,” the ability to take one’s rating system from platform 
to platform becomes highly valuable. Not only might these certifi cation sys-
tems enable someone in an African slum to earn income doing digital work 
for someone living in Beverly Hills, the systems might also enable people to 
access credit markets and even gain access to a foreign country. 
 Although the execution quality of Mozilla Open Badges and other 
badging systems remains to be seen, the ability to connect educational 
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certifi cates directly to a portfolio could open a range of new paths into 
modern global professions. 
 Conclusion 
 Th e U.S. space agency, National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA), demonstrated the power of technology when it designed a 
needed tool, a ratchet wrench, on Earth and then sent the model to the 
International Space Station where it was 3-D printed and used. “In less 
than a week, the ratchet was designed, approved by safety and other 
NASA reviewers, and the fi le was sent to space where the printer made 
the wrench in four hours,” reported Niki Werkheiser, the space station 
3-D printer program manager (Harbaugh  2014 ). 
 Humanity stands to gain a great deal by leveraging technology to cre-
ate more inclusive economies and engage more people in solving both 
hyper-local and global problems. Although it took centuries to go from 
the invention of the printing press to making books widely accessible 
around the world at low cost, today, software can be written in Kenya and 
then downloaded anywhere else in the world within seconds. Th e same 
is true for textbooks, test banks, and videos of lectures or presentations: 
Space is no longer a barrier and time for transport is no longer the cost 
for the transmission of ideas and information. 
 But there are many other barriers, and costs, that have yet to be man-
aged or surmounted. A MOOC is of little help to rural schools that lack 
electricity or an Internet connection. Learning to write code on paper is no 
substitute for writing and debugging actual programs on a computer. Th e 
widespread availability of digital tools and free or open learning resources 
does not mean that opportunity will spread to all of the ten billion humans 
expected to inhabit our planet by the end of the twenty-fi rst century. 
UNICEF ( 2014 ) predicted that by the middle of this century, 40 % of the 
planet’s children will be in Africa—a prediction that highlights the urgency 
of using successful leapfrogging education solutions in the region. 
 One computer can “teach” another simply by transferring code, instruc-
tions, and content fi les, copying identical information repeatedly. Human 
education does not work that way—information in the brains of children 
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and young adults is acquired by learning from a teacher, not download-
ing. But the technology of teaching is not fi xed; the tradition of a teacher, 
managed by administrators, in a physical building, dealing with students 
who are  seeking a well-defi ned terminal degree in a set curriculum and 
whose learning is verifi ed by standardized tests, is changing. For the less- 
developed world to develop further, it will be necessary to leapfrog over 
the gradual development of physical facilities and infrastructure (such as 
reliable electrifi cation and Internet connections) and skip ahead to a more 
decentralized environment where almost everything is open source. 
 Poor people are not lazy; uneducated people are not dumb. Th e world 
is full of humans who would like to take part in creating value and solving 
problems, but just have not had access to the type of learning experiences 
that develop such skills. Th e shortage of teachers, the chronic problem of 
many regions, might be solved by giving students access to lectures from 
the greatest teachers in other countries, using digital preservation and 
transmission, or by enabling students to teach each other using software 
designed partly by previous students who understand local conditions. 
 Although there is no unique magical combination of imported for-
eign and dedicated local materials that make up a successful ICT, the 
solution does lie in some such combination. Th e reimagining of produc-
tion, distribution models, fi nancial services, and systems of education by 
innovators and entrepreneurs can help create a much more prosperous 
and inclusive future. But that future is not guaranteed—it still needs to 
be created. 
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 Conversation #5 
 To Keep Disrupting, You Have to Listen 
Closely to What the Client Wants 
 Elizabeth Rossiello of BitPesa 
 Elizabeth Rossiello  is the founder and chief executive offi  cer (CEO) of 
BitPesa, a Pan-African digital payment platform that uses bitcoin for settle-
ment with its international partners, enabling low-cost international  payments 
and transfers. Before founding BitPesa, she was the deputy director of Planet 
Rating’s East and Southern African offi  ce, conducting microfi nance institu-
tional ratings and analysis across the region. She started her career at Credit 
Suisse in New York, London, and Zurich, and worked at Goldman Sachs and 
the German Bundestag as a Robert Bosch Fellow. She is an alumna of Columbia 
University’s School of International and Public Aff airs. She speaks four lan-
guages and has two children. Elizabeth is a native New Yorker but has lived in 
Kenya for the last seven years. 
 What is the story behind BitPesa? 
 We began BitPesa with a focus on developing a remittance product that 
reduced the average cost of sending money to Kenya from 12 % to 3 %. We 
wanted to replace traditional money transfer services by having senders pur-
chase bitcoin in their origin country via an exchange and selling it in their 
destination country to us. Our fi rst corridor of focus was the UK, specifi -
cally working with the Kenyan diaspora, who we believed sent home regular 
remittances to support household expenses for their families and friends. 
 What we learned, however, while we were doing our focus groups and 
talking to customers, was that many in the diaspora were actually send-
ing money to themselves. We started to question the term “remittances” 
and wondered how much of the USD1.4 billion sent to Kenya was for 
families and friends and how much was for small and “home” business 
operations and investments. Many in the diaspora whom we spoke with 
were sending money from abroad to their own accounts in Kenya. Th ey 
would then use this money to invest, pay salaries, or buy supplies for 
businesses they ran semi-remotely. 
 A lot of our early customers were young businessmen, between the 
ages of 18 and 35, who understood how the technology can be used to 
run more effi  cient businesses. Th ey were tech savvy and really excited 
about a new, digital way to send or collect payments. Our customers 
could not use credit cards for their purposes, and mobile money was not 
working internationally for them. Before BitPesa, these customers would 
often have to use middlemen, fi xers,  hawala (traditional informal broker 
networks), or expensive bank transfers to run their businesses. 
 We create liquidity in markets where there was previously low liquidity 
or only liquidity if you used informal cash payments. We buy or sell African 
currencies at a better price and quicker settlement than local banks can off er. 
Now businesses working in or across Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Nigeria and 
the DRC can easily make or receive global payments from their African cur-
rency banks and mobile money accounts. BitPesa accepts local bank transfers 
in local currencies and pays our bitcoin to global brokers to settle in foreign 
bank accounts in foreign currency. Bitcoin is used only between the brokers, 
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removing any volatility from the end-user experience.  Payments start and end 
with local bank transfers. 
 What other user cases did you identify? 
 Th e initial product was started without necessarily a user-centered design. 
It imposed a use case on the customer, suggesting that there was a personal or 
social connection for payments. Our latest iteration introduced more busi-
ness and trading features to support our users’ buying and selling bitcoin for 
commercial uses. We also off er bulk payments, bank transfers, and quicker 
trading times. We marketed these features as “BitPesa for Business.” Before 
using BitPesa, these businesses told us, they had to deal with many counter-
parties, both banks abroad and in Kenya, as well as mobile money providers. 
Th ey either went through multiple aggregators or spent time and money 
building custom integrations. Th ey experienced forex (foreign-exchange-
market) losses associated with long settlement times and were forced to hire 
more staff  and oversight to facilitate international and domestic steps of the 
payment process. By using BitPesa, they have a one-step option of sending 
international payments into local African currency accounts; either in one 
country or across several countries. 
 How easy was it to establish a new and disruptive technology in the 
market? 
 It is hard to be one of the fi rst adopters of a new technology. Th ere 
are few people to compare notes with and share the task of educating 
regulators and potential partners. When we started BitPesa, I continually 
heard the message that “Kenya was not ready for bitcoin.” Th is surprised 
me, especially because I heard it from members of the ICT community 
and innovation teams at local banks. Kenya is famous worldwide as an 
innovator in digital payments. But in the end, we saw super-fast uptake 
of the product in focus groups. 
 To stay motivated and on track, we used a customer-centric approach. 
Even if a potential partner did not believe the market was ready, we lis-
tened to our customers in product sessions and demos. We looked at 
our growing transaction volume rather than the opinion of managers in 
traditional fi nancial institutions. 
Conversation #5: Elizabeth Rossiello of BitPesa 157
 How did you fi nd out what your future customers really wanted? 
 In early 2014, we started to organize meet-ups at the iHub in Nairobi. 
Th ese were casual meetings over samosas and beers, where we talked 
about bitcoin and BitPesa. We held demos and traded between friends. 
Th e fi rst meet-up was with fi ve people who already knew about bitcoin. 
Th e next meet-up was with 20 people, and then, the next was with 40. In 
a few months, we had a long contact list. At our kick-off  party during the 
World Cup, we had 170 people and we had only a skeletal product. But 
all of these people were really excited about it! 
 Simultaneously, we had team members in London meeting regularly 
with community leaders in the diaspora community. We held market 
research sessions, teach-ins, and demonstrations. We were ever-present in 
the community through agents and brand ambassadors. We had a large 
funnel of information from our contact with potential customers. I saw 
what the customers wanted—I mean, real people who wanted to use 
it from day one. So even if someone said, “Oh, they’ll never like it” or 
“Th at doesn’t make any sense” or “You don’t know the market,” I would 
then go back to the focus group and people would tell me the opposite. 
So I would just listen to the customers rather than the talking heads and 
partners. 
 What is the future for digital assets? 
 I believe that money transfer operators and telcos, companies like 
MoneyGram and Safaricom, will use decentralized payment systems and 
adopt technology like bitcoin in the next fi ve to ten years. All of the 
major banks, payment companies, and FinTech companies are fi ling pat-
ents, making investments, and developing products. Billions of dollars 
are being spent on exploring the use of this technology. Th ose products 
will enter the market in the next few years and leave all the other compa-
nies behind that refused to take the time to understand the technology. 
 People are not going to send physical cash when they can send digital 
cash. A bank in Zambia and a bank in Hong Kong need to communicate 
in the same way. You cannot expect that a local mobile payments company, 
like Zoona in Zambia, will have spent the time and money to integrate 
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with a digital e-money network based in Hong Kong. All of these local 
companies need one uniform rail to link into and act as a decentralized 
ledger. I do not think that the global payment infrastructure should be 
owned by a single company, like Mastercard or Vodacom, but rather, use 
decentralized ledger technology to be robust, secure, and unbiased. 
 How much could you rely on investments from Kenya to fi nance 
BitPesa’s operation? 
 I would love to have had local investors invest the whole amount, but I 
have not found that much fi nancing available for FinTech (fi nancial tech-
nology) start-ups. I would love to have not traveled so much away from 
my family and my business to fi nd investors. Th ere are very few early- 
tech investors in the region. We have just received fi nancing from a few 
Nigerian investors, which is exciting because their expertise is essential to 
our growth across West Africa. 
 What do you think is the missing puzzle piece to get more Kenyan or 
African investors on-board? 
 Well, there is currently a lot of opportunity in relatively familiar invest-
ment options, like real estate. So why would an investor go into an unfa-
miliar, and seemingly higher-risk, area like tech? Why would they want 
to invest in a “very fi rst of its kind” business? We still need to see more 
buyouts and M&A activity in the sector—some successful exists. I think 
those exits will act as data points for Kenyan and African investors to real-
ize that FinTech is a viable investment opportunity. 
 You are one of the few tech companies with a female executive team. 
Was that a coincidence or a deliberate decision? 
 I hired people that were talented and experienced and that I was con-
vinced would work hard to build something new. In Kenya, you often 
fi nd tech start-ups with groups of friends from high school. I did not go 
to high school here, so my fi rst hire was a fellow fi nancial services consul-
tant, Charlene Chen, with whom I had worked on a few projects over the 
years. Similarly, our second hire was forex trader Amy Ludlum, who had 
a stellar fi nance background at a major global bank but was highly moti-
vated to work for a start-up. Once we had three women leading the team, 
Conversation #5: Elizabeth Rossiello of BitPesa 159
we became a magnet for other talented female professionals who knew 
there would be nothing standing in their way for career advancement. We 
now have a 50/50 gender split and work hard to create an exciting and 
rewarding environment for our team. 
 We have tried to build a company that is fair, open, and welcoming. 
We do work very hard and expect all our team to perform at a high level. 
However, we reward our employees for their work and dedication. 
 What excites you about Kenya’s tech scene? 
 It is interesting to be in Kenya at this particular time. I mean, there 
are a lot of hardworking people who are very entrepreneurial and start-
ing these amazing businesses. I feel honored to be part of it. I think the 
banks have a hard time keeping up with all this innovation. Th ere is just 
so much innovation coming out of this ecosystem. People are almost like, 
“What do I focus on next? An e-ledger or new digital money or some-
thing else?” I, however, wish there would just be way more support out 
there for entrepreneurs by other entrepreneurs. Th ere are private clubs for 
the very wealthy, but nothing where techpreneurs get together regularly. 
We are a diverse group of women and men from all sectors living across a 
sprawling metropolis. We connect a lot over WhatsApp in a few techpre-
neur groups and are just now starting to organize events and meet-ups for 
founders across sectors. We are all really busy building our business. As 
our companies mature and our incomes rise, we can then start investing 
in the next wave. Th is is the next evolution! I think it is going to be even 
more exciting once the founders grow up and now are able to invest. It is 
an exciting time to see this graduation. 
 What was your biggest “Aha!” moment during your time with BitPesa? 
 It came when we started to sell bitcoins. We struggled to project our 
fi rst few months of sales numbers, because the product was so new to the 
region. We had an intern at the time who encouraged us to start selling 
bitcoin instead of just buying it as part of our fi rst remittance fl ow. He 
told us his friends were interested in buying bitcoin and he had been 
trading informally. We started selling bitcoin, and our volume growth 
went through the roof! We asked ourselves, “Why didn’t we do this four 
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months ago?” Th at was defi nitely an “Aha!” moment. It reminded me 
that I needed to keep my ear to the ground and listen to what the market 
wants—rather listening to what my bigger, fi nancial institution partners 
think the market wants. To keep disrupting, you have to listen closely to 
what the client wants! 
 Th ank you, Elizabeth! 
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 In today’s highly competitive environment, new technologies and ventures 
have transformed the way we do business. Social enterprises have gained 
increasing prominence as key players in developing innovative solutions 
to societal challenges. From a conceptual standpoint, the ideas that drive 
them bring new approaches to challenges once viewed as insurmount-
able, and the services they provide can serve as the tools and enablers of 
the change desired, be it in employment, economic empowerment, and 
so on. However, social enterprises struggle to remain relevant in a rapidly 
changing business environment where innovation has become funda-
mental to their survival and success. Social enterprises therefore require 
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ICT innovators who can transform ideas into tangible opportunities that 
produce real results. 
 Th is chapter examines the business model of a social enterprise in the 
ICT sector that uses impact sourcing as a tool for creating employment 
opportunities. Th e title “I-Entrepreneurship: Changing Lives through 
Technology” refl ects the chapter’s thematic focus on entrepreneurship, 
and in particular, its examination of entrepreneurship with an impact—
hence the term i-entrepreneurship. Th e case study of Digital Divide Data 
(DDD) Kenya, a social enterprise that provides outsourcing services to 
clients, serves as a strong example. 
 Th e fi rst section provides an overview of social entrepreneurship and 
impact sourcing. Th e second section examines the state of unemployment 
in Kenya and the role of social entrepreneurship and impact sourcing in 
employment creation. Th e third section focuses on the business case of 
DDD Kenya. Th e chapter closes with a discussion of the challenges and 
successes experienced by DDD Kenya and a number of recommenda-
tions for the country’s ICT sector. 
 The Concept of Social Entrepreneurship 
 Social entrepreneurship is at the root of organizations pursuing sustain-
able and profi table methods of creating social impact. It is a label that 
merges the excitement of having a social purpose with the model of using 
innovation and business structures to solve social problems. Th e phenom-
enon, which involves combining resources in new ways to create social 
value, is increasingly popular, gaining attention from both academia and 
practice (Kupolokun  2014 ). Although the term “social entrepreneurship” 
and its current meaning are relatively new, the phenomenon as a prac-
tice is not. Both government aid agencies and private foundations have, 
over many years, supported initiatives, introduced programs, and imple-
mented interventions to attempt to assist impoverished and marginalized 
groups around the world in innovative ways (Noruzi et al.  2010 ). 
 Zahra et al. ( 2009 ) posited that social entrepreneurship encompasses 
the activities and processes necessary to discover, defi ne, and exploit 
opportunities to enhance social wealth by creating new ventures or 
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 managing existing organizations in an innovative manner. Th e idea of 
enhancing social wealth is what sets social entrepreneurs apart from other 
types of entrepreneurs, such as those using a for-profi t model, whose prin-
cipal goal is to make profi ts. At the same time, this defi nition sets apart 
social entrepreneurs from not-for-profi t ventures and non-governmental 
organizations. Social entrepreneurs, according to Dees ( 1998 ), identify 
an opportunity to satisfy an unmet need that the existing public and 
non- public welfare institutions will not or cannot provide. Dees added 
that for social entrepreneurs, the social mission is explicit and central and 
that any wealth generated is merely a means to a social end. Austin et al. 
( 2006 ), similarly, stated that for-profi t entrepreneurship has the purpose 
of maximizing profi ts and that social entrepreneurship’s main objective is 
to generate and maximize social value. 
 Social enterprises, therefore, are fi rms that do business for a social pur-
pose. Th ey link innovation and entrepreneurship with social purpose and 
seek to be fi nancially sustainable by generating revenue from business 
activities. Simply defi ned, social enterprises are organizations seeking 
business solutions to social problems. 
 Defi ning Impact Sourcing 
 Impact sourcing emerged from the business-process-outsourcing (BPO) 
sector, the contracting of specifi c business processes or operations to a 
third party. Also known as socially responsible outsourcing, impact sourc-
ing arose as a result of social entrepreneurs in the BPO sector developing an 
innovative employment model that used technology to hire disadvantaged 
youth in developing countries. It is the practice of employing people with 
limited opportunities at the base of the bureaucratic pyramid in BPO cen-
ters to provide high-quality, information-based services to domestic and 
international clients (Th e Monitor Group  2011 ). Th e base of the pyramid 
is thus made up of individuals from among the 4 billion people earning 
annual per capita incomes of less than $1500 (Prahalad and Hart  2002 ). 
 DDD Kenya was one of the early implementers of the social impact 
model, off ering employment in Kenya’s BPO industry to people from 
low-income families. 
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 Statement of the Problem 
 Over 25 percent of the current world’s population consists of young 
people between the ages of 10 and 24 (UNFPA  2014 ). In Kenya, youth 
aged 15–34 years constitute 35 percent of the total population (Institute 
of Economic Aff airs  2010 ) and face a daily struggle in fi nding work in 
the context of particularly high unemployment rates (KIPPRA  2013 ). 
Th e bulk of employment opportunity lies in the informal sector, where 
job stability, reliable income, and career growth prospects are defi cient. 
It is therefore imperative that interventions are put in place to reduce the 
stark level of youth unemployment in the country. 
 Fortunately, technological advances are opening new frontiers to tackle 
the problem of youth unemployment, with ICT emerging as a key sec-
tor. Kenya’s ICT sector has seen one of the fastest and largest expansions 
of this sector on the continent, with far-reaching social and economic 
impacts, such as the creation of digital employment opportunities. 
 Some of this digital work is carried out through impact sourcing (as 
defi ned above). In order to help the huge numbers of disadvantaged 
youth in the country, social entrepreneurs and their ideas are needed to 
create social wealth for society across the age spectrum. It is on this con-
cept that DDD Kenya was founded. 
 Th is chapter explores DDD Kenya in detail to bring out not only the 
company’s potential, but also the potential for similar social enterprises to 
create sustainable, formal employment for the innovative but disadvan-
taged youth of Kenya. It is against this backdrop that social enterprises 
are seen as potential sources of employment. 
 DDD Kenya 
 DDD Kenya is a social enterprise that generates employment for low- 
income, disadvantaged youth by using impact sourcing, professional 
training, and higher education to give the youth practical, hands-on 
knowledge in the business and ICT fi eld. DDD Kenya was founded 
in 2011 as an impact sourcing service provider, with one of us, Amolo 
Ng’weno, as its fi rst managing director. 
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 Vision and Mission 
 Th e company’s vision is of “a world in which youth develop themselves 
through education and employment.” It is based on four core values—a 
high-performing organization, a positively motivated workforce, people 
empowerment, and a collaborative environment. Its mission is to “create 
better futures for disadvantaged youth in developing countries through 
employment in our fi nancially sustainable business” (Digital Divide Data 
 2015a ). Th e idea behind the company was to create an organization that 
would bring outsourcing services to Africa that simultaneously provided 
employment opportunities for low-income disadvantaged youth and 
opportunities to participate in the global economy. 
 Services 
 DDD Kenya off ers a range of content-processing services, including digi-
tization, tagging, data entry, records management, Web research, tran-
scription, digital marketing, and e-book conversion to clients both locally 
and internationally. 
 Business Model 
 DDD Kenya’s business model starts by identifying and recruiting young 
people from poor and low-income families, mostly from urban slums. 
Th e young people selected are recent high school graduates who have 
achieved good enough grades to enrol at a university but are unable to 
pursue higher education because of fi nancial constraints. DDD Kenya 
also recruits people with disabilities, especially those with hearing impair-
ment. Th ese young people go through a rigorous selection process to test 
their skills. Th e testing includes computer skills, language skills, speed 
and accuracy in typing, and math and logic assessments. Home evalua-
tions are also conducted to ensure that the young people are from low- 
income families. 
 After successfully passing all of the assessments, the young people 
undergo training in computer skills for three to six months. Selected 
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trainees who pass the training are employed by the company to work 
on IT projects as associates. Th e training equips the associates with ICT 
skills and enables them to deliver services such as data entry, digitization, 
document conversion, and Web research. 
 Associates are then provided with the opportunity to participate in a 
work–study program where they work on projects while simultaneously 
studying for a degree over the course of three to four years. Th e associates 
in the program have fl exible work schedules to enable them to both work 
and study. 
 DDD Kenya’s partnership with Kenyatta University, a public univer-
sity, allows the associates to take classes at the Digital School of Virtual 
and Open Learning, where they can combine short on-campus sessions 
with virtual learning. Th e partnership was formed after a quality assess-
ment of local universities was carried out. Th e aim was to fi nd a univer-
sity that was the best value and that had the capacity to work with the 
associates to develop a four-year course of study that both matched the 
associates’ interests and was relevant to DDD Kenya’s program. 
 DDD Kenya associates typically work at the company for four or fi ve 
years, during which time they are supported in their pursuit of goals in 
higher education through partial scholarships, educational loans, and a 
work schedule that makes time for study. Because of DDD’s commit-
ment to its staff ’s higher education, the associates are required to make a 
long-term commitment to the company. Unlike other companies in the 
BPO sector, DDD does not lay off  employees when a project is complete. 
Clients prefer this work model—especially repeat clients—because they 
are assured of long-term service. Th e company therefore attempts to fi ll 
its pipeline with recurring projects that employees can work on for a 
period of several years. 
 Associates may qualify to receive a partial scholarship from DDD 
after three months of employment and after they meet university admis-
sion requirements. Th eir education is paid for through a combination 
of scholarships from the company, their own salaries, and loans. DDD 
Kenya relies on philanthropic support to cover the cost of its extensive 
training and scholarships. Th e government education lender, the Higher 
Education Loans Board, fi nanced a portion of the tuition costs until 
2014, when it changed its policy on supporting private institutions. 
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Since then, DDD Kenya has been forced to fi nd social investor lenders 
to support the cost of this portion of its social enterprise. 
 After graduating from the university, most DDD Kenya employees fi nd 
themselves with increased employment opportunities. Based on DDD’s 
experience in Asia going back to 2001, DDD ensures that employees 
with a university degree and work experience leave the company more 
attractive to corporate employers than before, with the result that the 
placement rate of DDD graduates has been nearly 100 percent (Digital 
Divide Data  2015b ). 
 In this model, high-performing associates often have the opportunity 
to grow within the company as managers. Th e typical associate employ-
ment period and the time it takes to complete a university degree allow 
DDD staff  members to develop personally while building critical skills 
and knowledge to ensure continuous improvement in their incomes. 
 Th e educational and professional development and maturity of the 
workforce and the increase in incomes have had a deep social impact. 
In DDD’s experience in Asia, alumni go on to high-skilled positions in 
which they earn more than two times the average regional wage, enabling 
them to break the cycle of poverty that often traps their families and 
communities. Th ey are also able to send other family members to school 
and raise their households’ general standard of living. 
 Setting Up the Company 
 Internet connectivity is at the heart of the BPO sector, and in Kenya, was 
enabled by the arrival of submarine fi ber-optic underwater cables in East 
Africa in 2010. Faster and cheaper connectivity is a necessary condition 
for BPOs, although it alone is not suffi  cient. Other important factors—
such as a favorable regulatory environment, clients, availability of aff ord-
able and reliable power, and talented employees—complete the profi le of 
a thriving BPO sector. 
 Th e fi rst of Kenya’s undersea cables to deliver relatively low-cost, high- 
speed Internet bandwidth was laid in 2010, paving the way for at least fi ve 
more. Th e availability of this bandwidth was one of the factors that made 
it possible to set up DDD in Kenya—and without which most of its work 
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would not be possible. Th e year 2011 proved to be the right time to establish 
DDD from a technology standpoint, because the Rockefeller Foundation 
started to test the question of whether digital jobs drive employment in 
Africa, and in doing so, gave DDD the grant to set up shop in Kenya. It 
was one of the Rockefeller Foundation’s initial grants in the fi eld of digital 
jobs, now a core focus of its work. Th e company also had very strong sup-
port from the ICT Board (the government agency charged with developing 
the ICT sector at the time; it is now known as the ICT Authority), in the 
form of lending it offi  ce space while the company established itself. 
 Administrative processes, such as registering the company, fi nding 
an offi  ce space, and working with contractors, were slow but relatively 
straightforward. Th ere were no bribes, incidents of disappearing fi les, or 
long bureaucratic delays. Registration took three months, as was stated. 
 DDD Kenya launched in April 2011 with 30 associates and 6 manag-
ers and administrators. As of June 2015, the company has approximately 
500 employees, 400 of which are associates. 
 Running the Business 
 DDD’s leaders at the time said they chose Kenya because the existing 
domestic economy was relatively strong and vibrant, making it possible 
to develop a BPO model for Kenyans. 
 However, things did not turn out as expected. When DDD Kenya 
started, it was anticipated that 80–90 percent of the business would be 
from local and government contracts, largely because of the prominence 
of the BPO and IT-enabled sectors in the Kenyan government’s Vision 
2030 goals and its sharp focus on the digitization of the economy. BPO 
is a key government strategy for economic growth and one of six key 
sectors explicitly highlighted in Vision 2030 (Republic of Kenya  2007 ). 
However, in practice, the managing director of DDD found the govern-
ment to be extremely slow and opaque, and after bidding on many gov-
ernment tenders, the company only won two out of 30. 
 Eventually, the company also won some additional government-related 
work. One of its early contracts was with the then–Kisumu Municipal 
Council (before counties were introduced) and with parastatals (intergov-
ernmental organizations) such as the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 
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and the Kenya Bureau of Standards. However, securing good business 
domestically did not really succeed as projected. 
 On the fl ip side, DDD found that the Kenyan education system was 
quite effi  cient, even across the socioeconomic divide. DDD’s associates 
were from some of the worst schools in the city but still turned out to be 
some of the most impressive graduates. High school graduates from these 
schools typically have strong English language skills and good problem-
solving abilities. Th ey were also work-ready in terms of understanding 
basic requirements of employment, such as punctuality, following instruc-
tions, and meeting deadlines. Th e associates hired at DDD typically have 
average grades, rather than top grades, in national exams. Th ose with top 
grades are usually absorbed into the government scholarship system, and 
the rest have to pay their own tuition fees. DDD’s prospective employees 
have high school grades good enough to get into university, but not good 
enough to obtain a scholarship. 
 In terms of infrastructure, Kenya does not rank well against a num-
ber of global BPO hubs. Electricity, rent, and all the rates for inputs used 
are higher than in India, Bangladesh, and the Philippines, for example. 
However, because DDD Kenya is able to work with people of a lower edu-
cation level, the company is able to be more competitive in certain markets, 
especially those requiring high mastery of English. DDD Kenya has also 
found that the types of services the company can off er are more complex 
and sophisticated than what was expected in the initial business plan. 
 DDD Kenya competes on quality, delivery, and schedule rather than 
on price, which has turned out better than expected as a result of the 
available talent pool. Th e company’s international market is consequently 
bigger than anticipated, and the company has adjusted itself to the fact 
that the local market and economy have been disappointingly sluggish. 
 Challenges of Operating a BPO Company 
 Electricity supply is one of the biggest challenges faced by DDD Kenya. 
Despite the advantageous location of DDD Kenya in Nairobi’s central 
business district and its access to comparatively cleaner power than the 
rest of the country, frequent power outages persist in particular seasons. 
Th e building in which DDD Kenya is housed has a backup generator 
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that does not always function during power outages. Electricity is also 
quite expensive in Kenya, compared with other countries, and accounts 
for the bulk of DDD Kenya’s overhead costs. Electricity is the principal 
cause of downtime: Outages are extremely disruptive, because without 
power, operations cannot run, and the company must spend money on 
backup generators. 
 Th e company’s second biggest challenge has been the Internet, which, 
although cheaper and more readily available in Kenya than it used to be, is 
still not up to the quality and reliability standards required for the indus-
try. Outages, again, are excessively frequent. In 2012, one of the undersea 
cables out of order, and DDD Kenya’s Internet went out for two to three 
weeks. No work could be delivered to clients; only the work based on the 
servers could be completed. Although Internet speed has improved since 
2012, Internet quality is still a source of frustration, considering that as a 
business, BPO depends entirely on Internet availability and access. 
 Successes 
 DDD Kenya’s main success is arguably the growth of the business: Th e 
company has nearly 500 employees and serves an international clientele 
in a highly competitive market. DDD Kenya has a number of brand- 
name clients and has strong, ongoing relations with many of them. In 
terms of the Kenyan audience, DDD Kenya has also successfully com-
pleted the digitization of the  Kenya Law Reports , making the laws of 
Kenya available—for the fi rst time—to the general public. 
 In general, DDD Kenya has had many successes by sticking to its 
social mission—enabling disadvantaged youth to acquire new skills 
through training, employment, and higher education. Clients are sat-
isfi ed with the work done, and the company is continually improving 
its quality and productivity for even better services. DDD Kenya has 
also won a number of awards—the Disability Inclusion Award 2014, 
Google Innovation Awards (in Education and Training for 2013–2014 
and in Business Process Outsourcing for 2013–2014), CIO 100’s Top 
100 Firm for Innovative Technology for 2013, ICT Value Award for 
Excellence in Digital Content Development for 2013, and Connected 
Kenya Innovation Awards Best in BPO and Outsourcing for 2012. 
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 Lessons Learned 
 DDD Kenya achieved ISO 9001:2008 certifi cation in 2014, marking a 
milestone in its growth to maturity. ISO 9001:2008 is the International 
Standard for Quality Management Systems, the most widely used qual-
ity management system standard in the world. It provides a framework 
and set of principles to ensure that eff ective processes are developed for 
the management of an organization to consistently satisfy customers 
and other stakeholders in delivering quality services. ISO certifi cation is 
also a management method specifying that an organization should have 
procedures for what it intends to do, should stick to them, and should 
review them on a yearly basis. Th e ISO Certifi cation has been invalu-
able in making DDD Kenya more consistent, reliable, and predictable. It 
has also enabled a reduction in work-related crises and increased owner-
ship of quality issues among the associates. Stability of processes has also 
improved as a result of the ISO processes. 
 The Future 
 DDD has an additional small offi  ce in Tanzania. Th e company has 
also been exploring opportunities in other African countries, including 
Nigeria. Th e most growth is expected to come from the international 
market as the company builds its reputation. 
 Kenya’s BPO Sector: Policy 
and Recommendations 
 Kenya has a large, well-educated English-speaking youth population and 
a favorable geographical location. Th ere is a growing outsourcing  sector 
and an innovative ICT industry, making it an ideal location for BPO 
services. Th e ICT Authority, a government parastatal under the Ministry 
of Information and Communication, has been actively involved in leading 
the growth of the information-technology-enabled service (ITES)–BPO 
sector. Some of the challenges that ITES–BPO companies face—and our 
recommendations for helping overcome them—include the following:
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•  Building of a domestic market Accessing work from both local and inter-
national clients remains a problem for Kenyan fi rms because of high infra-
structure costs. Th is makes it diffi  cult for Kenya to compete for international 
clients with other cheaper outsourcing destinations, such as India and the 
Philippines. On the other hand, local demand for BPO services remains 
low in the private sector. Th e Kenyan  government should provide support 
in the acquisition of work from its ministries and county governments by, 
for example, structuring contracts in a way that allows local fi rms to com-
pete more eff ectively, including giving hiring priority to local labor. 
•  Insuffi  ciently comprehensive policy, legal, and regulatory frame-
work Th ere is need for a more comprehensive policy, legal, and regu-
latory framework to facilitate the ease of doing business and to address 
issues to do with data protection and intellectual property rights. 
•  Lack of established industry standards Th e industry association 
Kenya IT and Outsourcing Society (KITOS) should develop clearer 
standards and codes of conduct and should liaise with government 
agencies to ensure that these standards are bolstered by relevant legisla-
tion. Th is would also improve worker protection, a key concern in 
certain parts of the BPO industry. 
•  Insuffi  ciently widespread marketing of BPO services Th e govern-
ment has been considerably successful in marketing the IT sector, but 
more eff ort is required to market the BPO sector. An increase in local 
and international awareness of the BPO sector and services could 
increase demand for services. Th e government should continue brand-
ing the ITES–BPO sector to increase general awareness and to show-
case the opportunities available. It should also actively promote Kenya 
as a destination for BPO services at international forums and confer-
ences and make eff orts to counter the bad press that has arisen from 
the likes of terrorist incidents and other challenges in the recent past. 
•  Lack of a BPO incentives structure to motivate BPO companies To 
attract more clients and investors, the government should develop an 
incentives framework, including, for example, tax incentives, training 
subsidies, and youth employment incentives. 
•  Lack of training in basic BPO skills Although there are ambitious 
plans to develop BPO curricula at several universities, simpler skills 
such as typing and Excel are not emphasized in the current education 
system. Th e government and KITOS should establish a basic 
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 certifi cation that would allow new associates to enter their fi rst employ-
ment with proof of basic skills. 
•  Shortage of verifi able information and statistics on the BPO sector 
Th ere are insuffi  cient data on ICT. Industry statistics are needed to estab-
lish the size of the sector, key players, GDP contribution, growth rate, 
services off ered, and the number of people employed—so as to monitor 
the progress being made and inform evidence-based policy decisions. 
•  Unreliable infrastructure Kenya has inconsistent electricity supply 
and unreliable telecommunication infrastructure despite recent and 
ongoing substantial investments by both the private and public sec-
tors. For the BPO industry to grow successfully, investment should 
continue and the relevant regulators should pay particular attention to 
reliability and uptime, not just to access. 
 Despite these challenges, Kenya still has great potential to scale up the 
BPO sector and attract investment as a BPO destination. Government 
and industry eff orts should concentrate on addressing the stated issues of 
attracting investors, developing a comprehensive policy, legal, and regu-
latory framework, establishing industry standards, developing an incen-
tives structure to motivate BPO companies, preparing industry statistics 
on the BPO sector, and providing reliable infrastructure to create a more 
conducive environment for BPO investment and growth. 
 Th ese recommendations, if implemented, would greatly strengthen the 
BPO sector in Kenya. Kenya has a growing BPO industry, but the market 
remains largely untapped because it is still a comparatively more expensive 
destination. Although connectivity continues to improve gradually, policy 
adoption still tends to be slow. Vision 2030 guidelines are directing policy-
making and helping to create awareness about the opportunities in impact 
sourcing. However, there is still room for the national government and coun-
ties to do more for Kenya to become the “top BPO destination in Africa.” 
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 Conversation #6 
 How Technology Makes 
Farming Sexy Again 
 Su Kahumbu Stephanou of Green Dreams Tech Ltd. 
 Social entrepreneur  Su Kahumbu Stephanou  is a passionate organic farmer 
and the founder and Chief executive offi  cer (CEO) of Green Dreams Ltd. and 
Green Dreams Tech Ltd. She is a pioneer in the organic industry in Kenya , 
 working with smallholder farmers for more than 15 years. Her goal is to inspire , 
 enable ,  and support farmers across Africa as they engage in sustainable 
 agro-ecological agriculture in order to alleviate poverty and to contribute both 
to food security and to a sustainable environment. Th rough Green Dreams Tech 
Ltd. ,  she developed the award-winning mobile phone application iCow 
(www.icow.co.ke) ,  winner of the fi rst Apps4Africa Award ,  winner of the Vision 
2030 Innovation Award for Agriculture in Kenya ,  and fi nalist in the Innovation 
Prize for Africa 2012. iCow today serves hundreds of thousands of farmers 
across Kenya. Su sits on the advisory boards of a number of global and local 
agricultural initiatives and is a TED Global Fellow. 
 What is particularly exciting about being an entrepreneur and why 
do you consider yourself as one? 
 I believe you cannot make entrepreneurs. Th ey are born this way. It is 
something in their DNA that creates this particular insatiable drive that 
is so characteristic of an entrepreneur. True entrepreneurism cannot be 
forced through education, only honed by it. I think that is one of the 
reasons why we see high failure rates among businesses and start-ups. Not 
everyone is born to be an entrepreneur. One key factor that diff erentiates 
entrepreneurs from other people is passion. Entrepreneurs will go beyond 
the call of the business plan and the idea of making money. Th ey will 
knock their heads against the wall trying to solve a problem, because they 
have become extremely passionate and obsessive about it, and they will 
keep on going at it against all odds. 
 Sometimes I look down my career path and question whether it could 
have been diff erent. Th e answer is always the same. No way. No regrets, 
and no brakes. Th ere is nothing in me that would allow me to stop. I 
cannot see into the future, but I just know that this is what I am made to 
do, and that makes me a passionate entrepreneur. I believe in what I do. I 
am driven by an unseen and uncontrollable force, and I love it. I call this 
the entrepreneurial spirit. It is captivating and hugely exciting. A lifelong 
rollercoaster ride. 
 As an example, I was not educated or trained in agriculture at all, and I 
do not even think that my core is really about agriculture. I think just like 
many entrepreneurs: We look at the world through a lens of connecting 
dots and are able to see many more dots than other people. Entrepreneurs 
pick up ideas from many diff erent spaces, sectors, and experiences and 
manage to put them together into something new. Whether I am watching 
a movie or walking down the road and whether the movie is about science 
fi ction or about wildlife, I am always picking up new ideas that I can bring 
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back into my context. It is a constant awareness that allows new light bulbs 
to light up inside you—hugely challenging and hugely satisfying. 
 My fi rst job was in a bookshop, where I learned early on that I was not 
an employable person. I found it deathly boring. I realized very early on 
that I could not be employed and that I like to charter my own course. 
Th at I like control and like to be in the driver’s seat. Looking back, this 
determined streak was evident even at 18 when I left school to join a band. 
Th is period gave me the creative space to learn how to earn my own living, 
despite its ups and downs. Coming from a very creative family, I found it 
easy to start income-generating projects and did everything from making 
wooden key chains to selling pies and biscuits. I set high standards for 
myself in everything I did. Th ey had to be the best. All or nothing. 
 I was always making something and selling something while I was 
doing music. Later, I married and moved to South Africa with my hus-
band and two children to join my sister-in-law in business. It did not last 
very long, because I found it impossible follow someone else’s instructions 
while feeling that mine were more creative, constructive, and productive. 
 You started your entrepreneurial journey with the organic vegetable 
company Green Dreams before you ventured into technology. Tell us 
how it all started! 
 It started with a hydroponic farm visit in South Africa where lettuce for 
the fast-food industry was grown. In hydroponics, you do not use soil. Th e 
system used plastic-lined troughs and small stones as a growing medium. 
It is a chemical- and pesticide-intensive process aimed at growing high 
yields in minimum spaces. It really triggered my interest, and I began to 
imagine its value in our slums in Kenya. I am not quite sure whether I 
actually came into agriculture with an interest in agriculture or because of 
the curiosity for something that just seemed so cool and diff erent. 
 We returned to Kenya and tried to put up demo sites — and failed 
abysmally because we knew nothing about the real requirements of 
plants. We were not from an agricultural background at all, so in the 
beginning, we faced lots of failures. I have learned to think of my failures 
as “learnings” and, like many entrepreneurs, expect a continual stream 
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of them going forward. Th e talent of an entrepreneur is really to fall 
forward, often. Th e crops were infested with pests and disease, failing to 
grow until we got rid of the hydroponics and put them into soil with drip 
irrigation in my mother’s garden. In no time, we ended up with a whole 
bunch of lettuce that we then had to sell with the added value of being 
cleaned and packaged. Th at is how Green Genes started which turned 
later into Green Dreams. We (my family and I) crafted little labels, stuck 
them on the bag, washed the lettuce, and bagged it—and they sold like 
crazy. We continued developing mixed lettuce bags that were popular in 
South Africa but nowhere to be seen in Kenya. As the demand grew, we 
started to involve out-grower farmers in the vicinity, and eventually we 
had our products in the supermarkets, airlines, and hotels. 
 My role required managing a growing team as well as a growing range 
of products and customer preferences. After two years and a close call 
where my mother became quite ill after being exposed to a lethal pesti-
cide, we changed our production system from conventional, using agro 
pesticides and fertilizers, to organic production, which is better for our 
producers, customers, soils, and the environment. 
 You worked intensively with Kenyan farmers. Can you give us an idea 
on what farming is like in Kenya today? 
 As my business grew, I started to look at widening my supply chain and 
increasingly worked with smallholder farmers as out-growers. A tragic 
instance where my mother got caught downwind with pesticide and 
became very sick shifted my mindset about safe food production com-
pletely away from industrial production to organic farming. Producing 
safe food—called organic at the time (we call it agro-ecological today)—
is, of course, food that you grow without the use of artifi cial or synthetic 
pesticides or toxins. It required educating my entire supply chain on how 
to produce organically. 
 In Africa, being a farmer is quite diff erent from the heavily subsidized, 
trained, and incentivized farmer from the West. Here, the majority of farm-
ers are people who just try to eke out a living on their land and sometimes sell 
some of their produce in the market. Unlike in developed countries, farmers 
here were not growing only wheat or only maize. Smallholder  farmers grow 
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on average around 5–8 diff erent crops and vegetables, an assortment of root 
vegetables, brassicas, fruit, and grains as well as keeping up to four diff erent 
species of livestock—cows, chickens, goats, sheep, and pigs. Production of 
this diversity requires a lot of knowledge, and in Kenya we do not have an 
adequate extension system in place that can deliver so much diverse knowl-
edge at scale. Th e risks in agriculture are high, and farmers cushion their 
risk through diversifi cation. To reduce their risks further, they need in-depth 
knowledge on each of the crops and livestock they keep. Th e problems the 
farmers were facing became more obvious to me as I trained them on the 
product requirements for my business. Lack of knowledge was manifesting 
itself in reduced yields, poor quality crops and livestock, low farmer income, 
and poorer and older farmers, because young people were not interested in 
working in such a tough industry. I also began to realize how the problem 
was much bigger than just in the organic sector, but countrywide. Where 
80 percent of the food that comes to market in Kenya is produced by small-
holder farmers, it was becoming apparent that the low-yield production 
from farmers plus the vagaries of climate change would soon be aff ecting 
food security for the nation. Th is began to concern me and at the same time 
interest me in creating a solution to this humongous problem. 
 How can small-scale farming be turned into a market opportunity? 
 To begin with, we need to understand the parameters within which 
small-scale agriculture exists and the opportunities that are available 
when we combine it with technology and other factors. 
 As a nation of tribes, we are connected to our land—where the big-
gest asset we have is our land. Culturally, we inherit and pass on land to 
family members. Th is has resulted in many land subdivisions, with the 
result that most farmers or landowners own relatively small parcels of 
land—meaning that a model for increasing food yields and quality in 
Kenya must take this fact into consideration. 
 While the biggest employment opportunity in Kenya lies in agricul-
ture, young people are the targeted segment of the population to move 
agriculture forward. Th e challenge therefore is to attract young people 
into agriculture, given the many obstacles—small parcels of land, land 
ownership issues, lack of access to capital, lack of access to knowledge 
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(production and processing as well as other opportunities in the vari-
ous agricultural value chains), and lack of access to markets. Parts of 
this complex puzzle have been solved in other countries, such as China, 
where the use of micro mechanization has tackled the problem of small 
land-parcel sizes. In Kenya, we do however have the advantage of mobile 
money. When we couple mobile money, a large youth bracket, micro 
mechanization, millions of landowners, and millions of consumers, we 
can create exciting hybrid businesses models and industries that create 
wealth and build the economy. In so doing, we can build food security 
not only for Kenya, but for Africa. 
 One model could be contract farming, where young people—through 
consultancies and businesses—till the land and install drip irrigation for 
landowners, who then buy the crops for value addition, processing, and 
marketing. Th is model is customizable to Kenya and the complexities 
mentioned above about land and culture, and it is also much more equi-
table and better for the country and its people as a whole. 
 Th e challenge is to make these kind of opportunities appealing to 
young people by, for example, empowering them with knowledge on the 
availability of various agri-technologies—such as drip irrigation, shade 
netting, micro mechanization, and so on— so that they can build, col-
laborate, and even create businesses with landowners. 
 Th ere is a more effi  cient way of farming in Kenya, if we combine our 
cultural inheritance system with the power of technology. But we have 
not yet fully fi gured this out. 
 What are some examples and success stories of new ways of farming? 
 Th ere are many ways to make agriculture sexy again. First of all, let us 
look at what makes it unsexy. 
 Farming is back-breaking hard work. At the smallholder level, it is 
mainly manual and is fraught with risks, some manageable and others 
completely out of one’s hands (e.g., the weather). A farmer’s life is made 
even harder because he or she is bound to the farm through weekends and 
holidays and typically does not have a pension or healthcare or  livestock 
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insurance. Although farmers perform the most important function of 
any sector in a country—that is, to produce food—in Africa they are 
typically ignored and left to their own devices. Th ere are no guarantees in 
farming. Th e challenge thus is to turn this around to attract the youth to 
get engaged in the sector. 
 During the post-election violence of 2007–2008, I was asked to sup-
port a group of young people in Kibera who had been thugs but decided 
to turn a garbage site into an organic farm. In three days, the land went 
from garbage to soil as the garbage was removed. One hundred days later, 
the group was feeding their families and selling surplus vegetables to fam-
ilies in the slum. Th e success was remarkable because the job was not back- 
breaking. What made it easy was the use of drip irrigation and a planting 
system that allowed for an easy way to grow a multitude of vegetables and 
crops while reducing the likelihood of fungus and other diseases. Making 
these technologies visible to these young people allowed them to see the 
benefi ts and opportunities of making a living from agriculture. 
 Look at one of our customers on iCow, for example. We stumbled 
across Aaron when we conducted research on farmers using the iCow plat-
form. He initially went to IT school and tried to fi nd a job in Nairobi. He 
could not get a job and decided to go back home to his rural area. Here 
his mom was growing broiler chickens, and he came back to join her in 
production. Once he made his plans clear, she said, “Not unless you do 
it with iCow!”—an agricultural information service that you subscribe 
to, to help enhance your productivity. She learned how to do it the right 
way, and because she experienced it by retrieving information from us, 
she was in a better position to produce chickens. He followed her advice, 
and by the time we got to interview him he was already on his ninth yield 
of chickens—and his vision of opening up the equivalent of a Kenchick 
or a KFC has unleashed his entrepreneurial spirit. He is a  wonderful 
example of the kind of young person who learns the nitty-gritty details 
from the ground up and becomes an expert in his fi eld, which then allows 
him to look for new opportunities to create value. For him, agriculture is 
sexy, because he has the ability to grow his knowledge and has aff ordable 
tools at his fi ngertips to do so. He is automatically ahead of a farmer who 
delves into chicken production without knowledge. 
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 I envision the following model for Kenya: Imagine 40 plots, each a 
quarter of an acre in size, cultivated by elderly people in a rural area. 
Tough work. Low yields. Now imagine an organized crop-contracting ser-
vice run by young people, providing these farmers with services to plow 
their land, install drip irrigation, and market their yields. Th e young peo-
ple go a step further and engage in value addition as well as wholesale and 
retail sales. Meanwhile, payments are organized over mobile money. And 
retail outlets passionately market “Buy Kenyan, for Kenya,” supported by 
government policy. It can happen! Th ese kinds of approaches take into 
account our local customs, our opportunities, and our national needs. 
 What exactly is the service that iCow is delivering? 
 iCow is a mobile phone-based agricultural platform that provides farm-
ers with a variety of products that helps them build agricultural knowl-
edge, reduce risks, and connect with their relevant agricultural experts. 
 When I designed iCow, the target user I had in mind was a small-
holder farmer in Kenya. Sustainability of the product was based on a 
payment model by the farmers. Starting with a payment model from day 
one enabled us understand and build products that were of value to our 
users. It is diffi  cult to evaluate a free product. 
 Th e information products on iCow are either subscription or pay-as- 
you-go products. Th e farmers receive their content to queries and educa-
tion in SMS format that they pay for. What we are seeing in the fi eld is that 
farmers archive the SMS content in exercise books for future reference. 
 One of the tools on iCow is the cow calendar. Th e farmer can register his 
pregnant animal and receive SMS messages about the specifi c point in the 
gestation of the animal so that he is aware of what he needs to think about 
next. He needs to feed the animal diff erently during this period, which is cru-
cial for future health and milk productivity. Currently, the average Kenyan 
dairy cow produces six liters of milk a day. Th e exact same breed produces 
40 to 60 liters a day in Europe. Th ey are bred for heavy, high-intensity feed-
ing, and in Kenya they are kept in small farms. Th ere is still unmet potential 
as well as a disconnect between production systems and animal phenotypes. 
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 We also have chicken calendars on iCow that help farmers with chicken 
breeding for the broiler market. Th e broiler’s lifespan is only about six to 
seven weeks, so farmers register the day they get their day-old chicks, 
and we drip feed SMSs with a comprehensive approach to best broiler 
practices. Th ese include feeding, vaccinations, hygiene, brooder tempera-
tures, and much more. 
 Another tool is for soils, enabling farmers to learn about the general soils 
in their area and advising them to have their soils tested while also provid-
ing them with contacts for soil testing-service providers. We have uploaded 
the entire national soils database on the platform, allowing farmers 
to get loads of information on the particular soil quality in their area and 
recommendations that allow them to improve their soil quality. Knowing 
your soil quality or the specifi c problems of your soil allow you to make 
the right decisions about fertilizers—whether to use natural or synthetic 
and in what volume. Our objective is to enhance the knowledge of the 
farmer so that he can make informed decisions and decisions he can aff ord. 
 How did you scale iCow so that it could reach the broad mass of 
farmers in Kenya? 
 Initially, I had wanted to keep iCow agnostic across the three mobile- 
network operators, because I did not want to push the decision as to which 
network to choose onto the farmers. Later, because of our marketing strategy, 
we were fortunate enough to form a partnership with Safaricom. In the early 
phase, we did a lot of prototyping, tweaking, and product development, 
resulting in a good product that users liked. Our data showed that within 
three months of being on the iCow platform, farmers were beginning to 
see an increase in yields of between two and three liters of milk per animal. 
 Our exclusive agreement with Safaricom gave us access to their mar-
keting machinery and we used a variety of diff erent channels to market 
iCow. Th e response was astounding. At one point between 8000 and 
14,000 farmers signed up on our platform every day, and eventually our 
system crashed. Once we hit 182,000 users in our database, we realized 
that our back end was not up to the task. Messages did not get sent, and 
our system became unreliable. We had to redesign iCow in its entirety. 
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 During the one and a half year redesign phase, we added some new tools 
that came from both farmer feedback and my own experiences as a farmer. 
Th ese were designed to tackle some of the main pain points in farming. In 
the redesign of iCow, with help from our partners Th e elea Foundation for 
Ethics in Globalisation and Accenture Switzerland, we increased our scope 
to cover multiple languages and territories, as by this time, we had also 
received many requests from countries in Africa, Asia, South America, and 
North America that wanted to use various components of iCow. 
 We have a variety of feedback loops with farmers that make product devel-
opment demand driven and easier. So right now, 56,000 farmers use our 
SMS service three times a week. Th ey are from over the entire country and 
range in age from 82 to early teens. Interestingly, the average age of farmers as 
reported by the government is 55. Once we started to do our marketing via 
Safaricom—using SMS—our average age dropped signifi cantly, and accord-
ing to our latest survey it is 33 years. With Safaricom, we managed to reach 
out to a whole new customer segment, which is incredible. We now know that 
farmers can aff ord a certain amount of SMSs in a week and are also willing to 
pay for it as long as they realize impact. My next challenge is to see whether we 
can provide more information in a shorter time span to create impact faster. 
 Th ank you, Su! 
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 End of the Cyber Café’s Reign 
 Th e cyber café has been described as an intermediary of the digital divide 
(Bhan  2011 ). In 2007, basic connectivity through General Packet Radio 
Service prevailed in Kenya for the nation’s ten million mobile subscribers. 
Th ird-generation (3G) mobile telephony technology had yet to arrive, 
and mobile penetration stood at 28.97 % (CA  2009 ). In that year, two 
new cellular mobile operators were licensed. Telkom Kenya (now trading 
as Orange) and Econet Wireless with its brand yuMobile (TeleGeography 
 2007 ) got set to take on Safaricom and Celtel. In March of that year, 
mobile network operator Safaricom launched its mobile money transfer 
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service, M-PESA. By the end of the same year, a milestone of one million 
registered users was reached (Safaricom.co.ke  n.d. ). So began a transfor-
mative epoch for Kenya’s technology history. 
 In the developed world, one could consider the desktop computer 
as the gateway to the Internet—and perhaps even consider one’s email 
address as a “passport” to the Internet. In Kenya, these two things were 
available to those who had access and could aff ord the cyber café as a 
physical location with Internet access and desktop personal computers. 
 Cyber cafés were seen as commercial ventures for entrepreneurial 
Kenyans (Bhan  2013 ). Cyber café attendants charged for per-minute use 
of desktop personal computers. Mobile Internet, though developing, was 
not as widespread. 3G service only came to Kenya in 2008 (Wanjiku 
 2008 ) for Safaricom, 2011 for Orange (TeleGeography  2011 ), and 2012 
for Airtel (Mayton  2012 ). 
 Cyber café owners had seen the opportunity of connectivity and built 
on it. Th e list of services provided by cyber cafés included printing, lami-
nation, and binding as well as typing—be it learning how or paying an 
attendee to type one’s documents. It was not uncommon to see visitors 
charged to obtain an email address or open a profi le on a social network. 
Facebook, the global social networking site based in Palo Alto, California, 
was growing in popularity since its launch in 2004. Cyber cafés began to 
realize this and had an incentive to help create Facebook accounts and 
profi les to increase customer frequency and usage in time spent online. 
 Th at said, as the hard-wired Internet reached parts of rural Kenya 
by 2009 (Wyche et al.  2013 ), so came changes in how urban and rural 
Kenyans experienced connectivity. However, usage was not equally dis-
tributed countrywide. For low-income rural Kenyans, accessing the 
Internet at a cyber café or on an Internet-enabled mobile phone repre-
sented a signifi cant expenditure (Wyche et al.  2013 ) and Facebook was 
seen as a luxury. 
 Email became an important part of the cyber café ritual. Email was 
reported as the leading activity on the Internet (Ipsos Synovate  2011 ). 
Th e narrative of having an online mailbox to check for emails and using 
one’s email address to sign up to receive communication led to the ascent 
of cyber cafés. As mobile telephony developed and more aff ordable 
devices were launched into the Kenyan market, the cyber café industry 
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faltered. Cyber cafés, selling mobile broadband modems, would soon put 
themselves out of business with a key segment of their customer base, the 
casual or social browser—that is, those chatting on Instant Messaging, 
Facebooking, exchanging occasional emails, and so on—who seemed to 
cut down on their cyber visits. Th ey were the largest segment of people 
going online (Bhan  2013 ). 
 Connected Kenya experienced a tectonic shift in the following four 
years, thanks to the arrival of the fi ber optic cables. As slow and steady as 
the pace of growth was, M-PESA had taken off . Transfers on the mobile 
money network had reached Ksh. 23 billion by the time the fi ber optic 
cables made landfall in June 2009. Facebook’s growth by that time had 
seen 300,000 Kenyans users join (Lorica and O’Reilly Media  2009 ). 
With that, the net eff ects began to be felt in people’s wallets. Speeds were 
expected to increase and become more reliable, while prices, which had 
been constant with very little motion in the market, were expected to 
slowly drop, and then, to continue doing so. As Calestous Juma noted 
in an interview, “Th e speed that knowledge currently moves in Africa is 
5 mph — walking pace. But with decent connectivity, knowledge will 
travel at the speed of light” (Rice  2008 ). 
 Habits began to transform too. In just the fi rst 12 months after the fi ber 
optic cables made landfall, the Internet-access point of Kenyans started 
shifting from cyber cafés to mobile phones (Ipsos Synovate  2010 )—and 
the devices themselves were more widely available, with greater capacity 
to consume and connect to the Internet. 
 Th ese shifts came about thanks in no small part to transformative 
devices and device partnerships, such as the historic Huawei IDEOS 
mobile phone. When Google, Huawei, and Safaricom saw that mobile 
Internet use had grown 180 % in 2009–2010, they partnered to launch 
the IDEOS to accelerate this trend (Vota  2010 ). For Kenya, this was a 
watershed moment. Th e Android-powered touchscreen device sold more 
than 500,000 units (Okwii  2014 ). It was a true winner. 
 Priced at Ksh. 8500 (USD100), it came with 600 MB of data and Ksh. 
1000 (USD10) worth of talk time. Seven of every ten phones sold in 
February 2011 were Huawei IDEOS phones. In that quarter, the phone 
single-handedly had 45 % of market share in the smartphone segment 
as the most aff ordable smartphone in the market (Kemibaro  2011 ). By 
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August of that year, more than 350,000 units had been sold as the phone 
went on course to break the half a million mark (Talbot  2012 ). 
 Th e shift taking place was one of space, in a sense, the physical spaces 
of connectivity were shifting. It was moving from being dominated by 
the static settings of cyber cafés to an increasingly mobile-driven world 
that included feature phones, smartphones, broadband modems, and 
laptop computers. 
 When it came to where Kenyans were spending their time online, 
another shift was also taking place. By the beginning of 2012, social net-
working had replaced email as Kenyans’ number one activity on the Web, 
followed by entertainment, games, and music (Ipsos Synovate  2012 ). 
 It was now that online, too, a shift began to take place—that is, the 
spaces people were using to interact with one another. Th e key space was 
no longer the one built by email companies of the 1990s and 2000s, 
which  had email at their core (with online groups driven by email, early 
social networks such as MySpace, or instant messaging clients such as 
Yahoo Messenger). On Opera Mini, a leading mobile browser, Facebook 
now ranked as the Number One most visited website by Kenyan users, 
solidifying its position and growing popularity (Opera Software  2010 ). 
 A prophetic remark from the past was about to come to fruition. 
Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s founding president and the father of modern- 
day Pan-Africanism, famously said, “We face neither East nor West, we 
face forward.” For Kenya and the rest of Africa, at least for the connected 
class, a virtual manifestation of this was beginning to take place. 
 At the time, two Chinese technology companies, Huawei and Zhong 
Xing Telecommunication Equipment (China), were responsible for the 
telecoms infrastructures in 53 of 54 African countries (Zhongxiang 
 2011 )—underpinning the fact that the East has one way in on the connec-
tivity of Africans. Th ey also manufactured most, if not all, of the devices 
that have been used to connect to the infrastructure and the Internet. But 
if you look to where Kenyans have spent their time online, you fi nd that 
they look “West,” spending their time on Facebook, Google, and other 
websites that have their main headquarters in Silicon Valley. 
 To better understand social media’s growing infl uence, we need to 
examine the fi ve years following the arrival of the fi ber optic cables and see 
them in context through the lens of Twitter. Twitter began as a fl edgling 
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social network launched in 2006 at South by Southwest, an American 
technology and culture conference. Th e fi rst Kenyan on Twitter, accord-
ing to Digital Rand, a social media and blog tracking platform, is con-
sidered to be @kamuiri, a system administrator who signed up in March 
2007 (Digital Rand  2014 ). Th e social network then began in earnest, 
with a fl ock of early adopters, including a number of bloggers following 
suit. 
 M-PESA’s early adopters were “relatively upscale (and banked) male 
urban dwellers” (Omwansa et al.  2012 ). Twitter may have been no dif-
ferent. In M-PESA’s case, users were transmitting more than Ksh. 100 
million (about USD1.5 million) a day to their unbanked relatives all 
over the country, creating the very fi rst core of M-PESA’s users during 
the pilot phase, in 2007. 
 Twitter is perhaps best seen through the lenses of its hashtags over the 
years—each with its own description of a movement catalyzed and accel-
erated by the microblogging social network. Th ey have ranged from the 
melodic, the culturally transcendent, the evocative, the terrorizing, the 
resplendent, and the heartwarming. Each day, dozens of trending topics 
catch the attention of Kenyans on Twitter, and a number cross from the 
virtual world into shaping outcomes for Kenyans on Twitter, legitimizing 
them for the world, for their leaders, and for themselves. 
 The Backstory of Blogging and Kenya’s 
Content Creators 
 When it comes to Kenyan content creators, blogs trace back to an 
informal online community. Th e Kenya Bloggers Webring (KBW) 
was launched in 2003 by blogger Daudi Were of  mentalacrobatics.
com (Monitor  2015 ). It picked up the feeds of Kenyan authors online 
through Really Simple Syndication (RSS) feeds to help Kenyans read 
Kenyans—whether internationally or locally. Th ere were even awards, 
dubbed the “Kaybees,” given to members of the community and vari-
ous publishers (Were  2006 ). As searches became more dominant and 
Kenyans, whether in the diaspora or at home, made searches for con-
tent closer to home, content creators found their audience coming to 
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them. Searches of Kenyan topics became more likely to yield a variety 
of Kenyan-populated websites, including Kenya-focused message boards, 
forums, and even email listservs for those who still considered email their 
passport to the Internet. Th e largest Kenyan sites at the time blended the 
best of community forums and message boards with content sourced to 
spark conversations. In some ways, they could even be considered social 
networks (Obura  2009 ). 
 A frontrunner and innovator in this space was David Kobia’s  mashada.
com , which was considered to be Kenya’s most popular online forum, 
even being referenced as a news source (BBC  2008 ). It was a digital home 
away from home for Kenyans in Europe and the USA, with local con-
nected Kenyans frequenting the discussions. It had such importance that 
during the 2007–2008 post-election violence, it had to be shut down—
and was called “Kenya’s fi rst digital casualty”—for the vitriolic and heated 
ethnic discussions going on around politics in the contested elections, 
mirroring Kenyan society at the time (Hersman  2008 ). 
 With the rise of Facebook, Mashada’s star diminished as the almighty 
juggernaut of the globe took center stage. Th ough Mashada still had its 
faithful users, other diaspora-based message boards and websites com-
peted for the attention of the 3.2 million Kenyans in the diaspora and 
cannibalized its audience. 
 Of Twitter, it can be said that the Kenyan users of the microblogging 
social network site were early adopters and bloggers. A steady fl ow of 
prominent Kenyan bloggers joined at the time, and many are still iden-
tifi able by their original blogging identities and pseudonyms to this day. 
Th ey were seeking ways to use Twitter to build community outside of the 
existing comment sections, blogs, and email exchanges. For some, the 
purpose was to publicize their own content. Globally, it was not uncom-
mon at the time for bloggers to slowly trade their longer forms of writing 
and communication for the faster-paced world of 140-character tweets. 
 Th e years 2007 and 2008 were signifi cant in Kenya’s history. As the 
members of the diaspora tried to keep in touch with those on the ground 
in Kenya during the country’s post-election violence. Twitter was nota-
ble as one of the few sources where people sought the perspectives of 
Kenyans in Kenya. Th e news media and publishers were self-censoring or 
not representing the scale of the unrest. 
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 Ory Okolloh, with her digital space at  kenyanpundit.com , started 
with a blog post asking, “Any techies out there willing to do a mashup 
of where the violence and destruction is occurring using Google Maps?” 
(Okolloh  2008 ). Her readers, who were also fellow bloggers with whom 
she had interacted frequently in the blogosphere, responded. Th ree 
days later—thanks to David Kobia, also a blogger at  dkfactor.com ; Erik 
Hersman, a blogger at  WhiteAfrican.com ; and Juliana Rotich, a blogger 
at  Afromusing.com —Ushahidi was born (Goldstein and Rotich  2008 ). 
 Each of the founding members met because of their blogs. Th ey had 
chosen and built their own digital community online and connected 
beyond borders, thanks to blogging. For Ushahidi, Twitter soon became 
the platform’s input channel that it mapped across the world from crises 
to elections and emergencies. Ushahidi went on to make history as the 
quartet and the organization became a recognizable African technology 
brand—software for sifting through the complexities of multiple inputs 
from social networks, individual SMS texts, and other data points, all 
plotted geographically. 
 The Rise of Kenyans on Twitter 
 Looking at Twitter today, it is clear that it operates as Kenya’s virtual 
“town square” (Kaigwa and Wu  2015 ). Journalists now consider it to be 
a part of their beat, staying tuned to trending blogs and other updates. 
It has become common to see news broken on Twitter by a blogger—
whether a hobbyist, informed industry insider, or cyber-roving reporter 
pouncing on a story—legitimizing it (at times, plagiarizing it outright!) 
and publishing it in the Kenyan news media. At least once a week, each 
of the daily and weekly newspapers sources and quotes tweets and other 
comments from social media. 
 News bulletins on Kenyan radio and television networks often make 
specifi c calls to action, whether the broadcast is in Swahili or English: 
“Tweet us your views” or “Our hashtag is…” and similar phrases. Th ese 
are all appended to raise audience participation as announcers, newscast-
ers, and stations promote a call to action. Some brands have even come 
to expect that social media will be part of their advertising package, and 
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some Kenyan newspapers consider their social media audience as another 
channel for their clients’ digital advertising. 
 As of 2016, only fi ve of Africa’s 54 countries have their own list of local 
trending topics on Twitter. For Kenya, this milestone proved to be a nota-
ble transition in Kenyan cyberculture. Previously, the focus for Kenyans 
had been the rest of the world’s trending topics. If Kenya got a hashtag 
trending, it had to be on a global scale. During that time, when Kenyans 
referred to themselves as “trending,” it was inevitably synonymous with 
worldwide trending, because this was the only way to see the social 
proof—that is, on Twitter’s list of the “Worldwide Trends.” However, 
starting on April 11 (Cheng-Yue  2013 ), there was now an in-country 
“micro-mirror” showing the daily, hourly, and minute-by-minute trend-
ing topics of Kenyans. 
 Makmende: Meme, Muse, and Model 
 In 2010, an eclectic house/funk/disco band consisting of Daniel Muli, 
Jim Chuchu, Bill Sellanga, and Mbithi Masya learned in their own way 
how their personal networks could catapult them to becoming one of 
Africa’s fi rst viral Internet sensations originating from Kenya (McKenzie 
 2010 ). Known as Just a Band, the group had been releasing a genre- 
bending collection of electronic, funk, and Afro-pop hits for just over 
two years. Th eir next release, which launched in March 2010, would 
change African cyberspace. 
 Th e way that the band would raise awareness and create expectation 
for their singles was simple. Th ey would ask close friends to change their 
profi le pictures on social networks to an agreed-upon set of photographs 
prepared by the band. Th eir second single of their sophomore album 
“82” would be no diff erent (Justabandwidth  2010 ). Th e band shared 
cryptic status updates to be published by their respective friends pro-
moting “Ha He” proclaiming “Makmende Amerudi” (“Makmende Is 
Back”) featuring images such as those of Makmende, a fi ctional Kenyan 
superhero character, from the soon-to-be-released music video on the 
cover of GQ, TIME, and Esquire magazines. Th e profi le pictures and 
status updates created awareness and curiosity in the larger “degrees of 
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 separation” of friends of the band and in their social networks. Compared 
to their previous single, “Usinibore,” of 2009 (Justabandwidth  2009 ), 
there was greater expectation. “Ha-He,” with its blaxploitation theme, 
nostalgic fi lters, and quirky character references, drew urban Kenyans 
back to their upbringing in the 1990s and 1980s. 
 Th e music video was released in March 2010 and proved a roaring suc-
cess. Th e built-up anticipation led not only to viewership on the band’s 
YouTube channel, but soon to the establishment of Makmende as an 
Internet cultural icon, a meme, that others felt fully licensed to contribute 
to. Th e resonance of the video soon prompted other enterprising Kenyans 
to co-opt Makmende’s currency as a variety of individuals created “fan 
art” about Makmende while others created websites such as  www.mak-
mende.com , impersonating the brand and likeness of Makmende. Th ere 
was even a radio station that created a call-in game based on Makmende, 
all of which the band distanced themselves from, encouraging the trend 
to go on (BrandKemistry  2010 ). 
 Makmende’s seeming invincibility led to a longstanding trending topic 
on Twitter that catalyzed it all through the hashtag #Makmende, sparked 
by Kenyans who had watched the video. #Makmende was lit up by the 
world as a global trending topic, making Twitter’s top ten list for hours. 
It was viral. Across the world, Twitter users followed and joined in. Th e 
jokes about it took on a style perfected in Internet culture when referring 
to Hollywood martial artist Chuck Norris (Know Your Meme  2012 ). Th e 
recipe was to set up satirical factoids with absurdly exaggerated claims 
about Makmende’s toughness, invincibility, fi ghting style, and masculin-
ity. As the world chimed in with its comments, quips, and one-liners, the 
view count on the video rose and rose. 
 Kenyans on Twitter began to believe, following all the screenshots that 
were tweeted on the day, that no matter how few they were, they could 
not only get the digital ear of the world, but they could rally a global digi-
tal community to chip in. Th e Makmende phenomenon has been cited 
as an example of a transnational cultural fl ow originating in the Global 
South (Jenkins et al.  2013 ; Zuckerman  2010 ). Th e participatory playful-
ness around Makmende led to a “meme of aspiration” (Ekdale and Tully 
 2013 ), a meme through which a certain niche of Kenyans collectively 
reimagined a hypermasculine hero who could lead the country toward 
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political and economic stability at home, and cultural and technological 
dominance abroad. Here, Ekdale and Tully’s article ( 2013 ) drew from 
multiple texts about and within the Makmende meme, including videos, 
artwork, tweets, Facebook posts, blog messages, and news reports. 
 Makmende even featured in short fi lms about voter registration pro-
duced by Just a Band as part of their civic-action creative campaign 
Kuweni Serious (Kiswahili for “Get serious”) (Kuweni Serious  2010 ). 
From the fi rst few tweets to the front cover of the  Wall Street Journal 
online, the campaign made a historic statement in Internet culture. 
 Makmende also caused what would later be called a Wikipedia war, in 
which online editors deleted various attempts to create a Makmende page, 
citing rules such as copyright infringement, vandalism, or incomprehen-
sibility. Th e phrase “Makmende’s so huge, he can’t fi t in Wikipedia” was 
coined because the editors disagreed on whether the fi ctional character 
deserved a page. 
 Th is back-and-forth battle was characterized as one between inclusion-
ists and deletionists (Ford  2011 ). For the deletionists, Makmende was an 
imaginary character from a small African country. He did not deserve a 
Wikipedia page, because, frankly, no one in the English-speaking world 
would really care about him. Although he was big in Kenya, he was not 
notable enough to deserve an encyclopedia entry (Zuckerman  2010 ). 
 Digital Identity Spurs Drought Intervention 
 In July 2011, digital marketing executive Ahmed Salim began a per-
sonal initiative around an impending drought and famine facing Kenya. 
Th e drought was described as the most severe since 1995 (UN OCHA 
 2011 ) and was anticipated to be the worst in 60 years (BBC  2011 ). Salim 
started with a pair of hashtags, #Sacrifi ceAMealKE and #FeedKE, the 
latter of which he ultimately proceeded with. He noted that, a day after a 
plea to his timeline and followers, 58 people came forth to donate a meal 
to the Kenya Red Cross (Salim  2011a ). A week later, he had raised Ksh. 
140,880 from 172 people (Salim  2011b ). 
 As the campaign gained momentum, it was adopted by the Red Cross, 
which later turned it into a national public–private partnership (Kenya 
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Red Cross  2014 ). It was then launched into the public domain with 
a facelift, including a new title—#KenyansforKenya—and corporate 
 partners, including telecommunications company Safaricom and KCB 
Bank (formerly known as Kenya Commercial Bank). What started as a 
Twitter hashtag got people to act on their country’s behalf and grew into 
a historic nationwide campaign. 
 Th e result was a national conversation that traversed Kenyan society, 
with endorsements by celebrities and other noteworthy Kenyans and 
touching montages and songs composed by the country’s biggest artists. 
Th e giving was done by ordinary Kenyans, including individuals and 
institutions pledging to solve the crisis with their own local contribu-
tions. Th e campaign raised more than Ksh. 677 million, reaffi  rming the 
ability of Kenyans on Twitter to spark changes that touched the nation 
as a whole. 
 Snippets in Cyberspace Lead to Songs 
in Public Space 
 Also in 2011, spurred by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, civil soci-
ety groups in Kenya were inspired by conversations among Kenyans 
on social media, as they discussed what a local response similar to the 
Arab Spring might look like. From this, #Kenya28Feb movement was 
born. 
 Th e call to action for the hashtag that turned into a movement was 
based on Kenya’s national anthem. Th e anthem was originally composed 
as a prayer (Muindi  2015 ). Th e anthem is a common denominator for 
those who grew up singing it, hearing it, and committing it to memory 
as youth. For Kenyans of all faiths, ethnic backgrounds, interests, and 
socioeconomic backgrounds, the three verses of the national anthem were 
seen as a call for unity, not as an outright protest (Kenya 28 Feb  2011 ). 
 At 1:00 p.m. East African Time, Kenyans commemorated February 28 
on the fourth anniversary of the signing of the National Peace Accord. Th e 
Accord had followed Kenya’s 2007–2008 post-election violence, when 
the two principals formed what would become the coalition  government 
(National Accord and Reconciliation Act  2012 ). 
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 Kenyans of all walks of life tweeted their photos, recorded audios of 
their singing, and even convinced co-workers, staff , and passersby to 
pause and sing. Th e movement was hosted by Inuka Kenya Trust, a grass-
roots advocacy group founded in 2009 by journalist and former anti- 
corruption czar John Githongo. Th ese events went on to last for another 
year, with an even larger campaign beforehand, featuring recognized 
Kenyan athletes, media personalities, and others. 
 Medics Mobilize against Ministry before 
Masses 
 In October 2012, Dr. Christine Sagini, a Kenyan doctor and member of 
the Kenya Medical Practitioners and Dentists Union, recounted how—
during negotiations between the union and the Ministry for Medical 
Services—Minister Peter Anyang Nyong’o had “called medical doc-
tors sulking children, crying for peremende” (Kiswahili for “sweets”) 
(K24TV  2012 ). After this exchange and a breakdown in the negotia-
tions, the doctors resolved to strike. “We’ll tell Anyang Nyong’o and 
the world exactly what kind of peremendes we want,” Dr. Sagini said in 
an interview with K24, a Kenyan television station. Irene Kimacia, the 
journalist on assignment, described the movement as “spreading like a 
bushfi re (online), with 3,000 doctors tweeting their experiences to the 
public” (K24TV  2012 ). 
 Th e title of the campaign was “Th anks for your taxes, here is a 
sweet” (Peremende Movement  2012a ). Th e name of the movement 
was a hidden reference to a certain Kenyan supermarket chain that 
was infamous for claiming to be out of loose change, particularly one-
shilling coins, and off ering shoppers their change in the form of sweets 
(Kajilwa  2015 ). Th e #PeremendeMovement struck a chord with the 
public through a well-coordinated attempt by doctors to tweet in sync 
and through infographics, blog posts, and media appearances chroni-
cling their challenges (Peremende Movement  2012b ). Th e  government, 
according to union Chairman Victor Ng’any, noted that after the pro-
test, there was good will from the government in their negotiations 
(K24TV  2012 ). 
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 Kenyans Online Make Their Voices Heard 
in Electoral Debates 
 Twitter was gaining in legitimacy as a channel for those willing to try 
their cases in the court of public opinion, rallying the public to engage 
and amplify their messages. 
 Th e 2013 election stood out because it was the fi rst one in which 
Kenya had a signifi cant number of social media users. More than 1.8 
million of Africa’s 50 million Facebook users were in Kenya (Colic  2013 ), 
and there were hundreds of thousands of Kenyans on Twitter, all follow-
ing and interacting with the candidates. Th e pre-election push ensured 
that voters were being courted in cyberspace ahead of the ballot. 
 Th e presidential debates stood out as an electoral event never seen 
before. Th e fi rst of their kind in the country’s history, the debates were 
geared toward putting the candidates before a global audience in cyber-
space, with broadcasts on 8 television stations, on 32 radio stations, and 
on YouTube. Th e debates generated buzz both before the live event and 
then during it, with speculations on whether there would be only six main 
candidates or the full eight running for offi  ce. Th e frontrunners preferred 
fewer candidates, selected on the basis of polling data, while the media 
organizers pushed for more candidates, arguably to dilute confl ict on-stage 
(Moss and O’Hare  2014 ). Anxiety crept in as it took a last- minute court 
decision to ensure that media organizers included fringe candidates lawyer 
Paul Muite and teacher Mohammed Dida. Th is court intervention further 
illustrated how contested and coveted the debate platform was, off ering—
especially for the minor candidates—free and unparalleled publicity. 
 When asked if the presidential debates made a diff erence, Kenyan politi-
cal analyst Kwendo Opanga remarked to the BBC that they had off ered 
smaller parties a chance to shine in the eyes of the public (Okwembah  2013 ). 
 Al-Shabaab versus the Administration: Twitter 
Amplifi es Terror during Westgate Attack 
 Later that year, the Westgate Mall attack would change the face of Kenyan 
history. At noon on Saturday, September 21, 2013, an agonizing attack 
began. Four gunmen associated with Al-Shabaab laid siege on the upscale 
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Nairobi mall. However, their real-world actions had ramifi cations both in 
cyberspace and in real spaces, leaving 67 dead, 175 injured, and a nation 
in mourning. 
 Th e attack proved a watershed moment on social media. On one 
side were the aggressors, the four Al-Shabaab gunmen inside the mall. 
Authorities, fi rst responders, and journalists descended on the scene 
but stood clear, with various security personnel going in. Th e public 
was put in a position not seen previously in terrorist attacks, watch-
ing through their phones and television screens as individuals trapped 
inside the mall sent updates into cyberspace. Some of these were pleas 
for help; others were messages to family or warnings to all who would 
see them. 
 Al-Shabaab, the terrorist group that claimed responsibility, was also 
online. Th e group had, as was common at the time, a pair of Twitter 
accounts, @HSMPress_ and @HSM_Press. From these accounts, 
members live-tweeted the siege and struck a chord of palpable fear. 
Th e exchanges in cyberspace involved the offi  ce of the President, the 
Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, 
Al-Shabaab, various journalists, and Kenyans on Twitter on, and away 
from, the scene. 
 At 1:28 p.m. Kenyan time on September 22, the Kenyan mili-
tary’s official Twitter account announced that most of those trapped 
inside had been rescued and that “most parts” of the mall complex 
were under control (Anzalone  2013 ). The claim that the attack was 
nearly over was disproved in the early morning of September 23, 
when an explosion rocked the Westlands district of Nairobi (where 
the Westgate Mall is located). Larger explosions followed in the early 
afternoon. The siege would not be over for another day. Twitter and 
members of the public were served through blogger Robert Alai’s 
timeline, as he found, verified, and tweeted updates on Westgate—
even tweeting against the Kenya Defense Forces Twitter account 
when he deemed it necessary (Alai  2013 ). Alai was praised by fellow 
Kenyans on Twitter and recognized by the press for his work during 
Westgate, apart from his divisive day-to-day persona as a blogger and 
critic (Stieber  2013 ). 
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 Private Developers Meet Match Thanks 
to Pupils, Protestors, and Pope 
 Coming back from their Christmas holidays, students at Langata Road 
Primary School found an unusual fi xture at their school. Th eir play-
ground was no longer theirs. Fenced off  with a stone wall and a green 
metal gate, it had been claimed by a private developer. Photojournalist 
and activist Boniface Mwangi, writing in a Facebook invitation to what 
he called the #OccupyPlayground protest, called the developers “pro-
fessional land grabbers acting on behalf of a very senior politician in 
the Jubilee government” (Mwangi  2015 ). Th e protest event, slated for 
January 19, 2015, was organized to donate sports equipment, according 
to the invitation, which received approximately 958 RSVPs from those 
who said they would attend. 
 On the day, clad in their green uniforms, students as young as 6 and 
as old as 14 joined Boniface and others protesting the land grab. In the 
group of attendees, placards with messages, such as “Uhuru government 
is protecting land grabbers,” could be seen. Even Member of Parliament 
Kenneth Okoth was in attendance, along with police in full riot gear, in 
case the situation escalated. What started as a chanting of slogans by the 
students and protestors developed into an animated shaking open of the 
developer’s gate and pushing down parts of the walls amidst loud cries 
and cheers. 
 Th e scene was volatile, and as protestors clashed with police, the police 
reacted by shooting tear-gas canisters into the crowd, sending the children 
scrambling. Th e scenes that followed were hard to watch—with children 
screaming, choking, and being rushed away amidst the clouds of smoke. 
 Skeptics judged the protestors, expressing cynicism for their use of 
the children, while opposition politicians tweeted shame on the govern-
ment. It took an apology and a visit from the Minister for Interior and 
Coordination of National Government Major General (Ret.) Joseph Ole 
Nkaissery (Honan  2015 ). Th e political pressure that followed led to the 
naming of the private developers by Lands Cabinet Secretary Charity 
Ngilu (Waruinge  2015 ). Th e Pope in his visit to Kenya in November 
2015 held a session with slum dwellers. He singled out land grabbing, 
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specifi cally admonishing faceless “private developers who even grab play-
grounds” and repeating the phrase “private developer,” which had been 
used extensively on Twitter and in the media (Simiyu  2015 ). 
 #SomeoneTell the World: Kenyans 
on Twitter Make Their Mark 
 However, when it comes to hashtags that engage the rest of the continent, 
nothing has quite had the longevity of the #SomeoneTell hashtag. Th is 
hashtag is many things, most often a rallying cry for the country to put 
away digital divisions, cultural contrasts, and diff ering opinions—a call 
to arms that has Kenyans ready with their data bundles, Wi-Fi hotspots, 
keyboards, and keypads prepared to take digital aim at the latest target. 
 Th e fi rst major instance of the hashtag’s use was that of 
#SomeoneTellCNN, in March 2012. On March 5 of that year, #Kony2012, 
an online campaign and viral advocacy video by the American nonprofi t 
advocacy group Invisible Children, was launched. Th e campaign urged 
the American public to use social media to put pressure on US lead-
ers and celebrities in a bid to make guerilla group leader Joseph Kony 
“famous” (Invisible Children  2012 ). Described as the fastest-growing 
viral video of all time, the fi lm reached 100 million views in 6 days, 
and 3.7 million people pledged support (Invisible Children  2012 ). Th e 
response was a tidal wave of headlines, attention, and spotlights shown 
onto Uganda from the USA and the West. Th is was not without Africans 
online voicing their opinions, many of them fi nding #Kony2012 factu-
ally inaccurate, an oversimplifi cation of a complex confl ict, with a call to 
action that removed agency from those actually on the scene and on the 
ground in Gulu, Northern Uganda. Th ere were also cries that the cam-
paign was fraught with a “white savior complex,” speaking to a Western 
predisposition to see and accentuate stereotypes about the continent’s 
narratives of helplessness in the absence of interventions from foreign 
(i.e., Western) partners. Nigerian author Teju Cole famously wrote about 
Kony 2012, criticizing the backers’ culture for supporting brutal policies 
in the morning, founding charities in the afternoon, and receiving awards 
in the evening (Cole  2012 ). 
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 Members of the African diaspora and signifi cant numbers of local 
Africans decried the campaign (Jardin  2012 ), aiming not to let America 
and the world buy into its one-sided rhetoric. Outspoken Ugandan dias-
pora member TMS Ruge wrote an opinion piece in the  New York Times 
to challenge the claims that Kony 2012 was a revolution (Ruge  2012 ). 
 #SomeonTellCNN: Where It All Began 
 Even without the headlines and exchanges of #Kony2012 having ceased, 
Uganda’s neighbor, Kenya would have a case of its own to answer on 
the world stage. On March 11, 2012, CNN’s East Africa correspondent 
David McKenzie fi led a story about a grenade attack at a bus terminal 
in Nairobi that killed six people and injured more than 60 (BBC  2012 ). 
When the story went on air on the CNN International channel, anchor 
Jonathan Mann stood in front of an animated Kenyan fl ag emblazoned 
with the headline “Violence in Kenya.” Th e fl ag and coverage of the 
story were interpreted as a skewed misrepresentation of the facts, because 
Kenyans were the victims of terror, not the perpetrators of it. And so, 
#SomeoneTellCNN was born (Wamathai  2013 ). 
 Th e narrative behind CNN’s coverage harkened back to various depic-
tions of Kenya strung across international media during the 2007–2008 
post-election violence. Th e same Kenyans who were connecting in cyber 
cafés at their leisure in years past were faced with experiencing or view-
ing on their TV screens as the world watched Kenya in chaos. A local 
media ban muzzled the Kenyan press from reporting on the post-election 
violence as it occurred but international media covered it extensively. 
Meanwhile, hateful SMSes were exchanged through mobile networks 
among Kenyans, thanks to mobile telephony (Goldstein and Rotich 
 2008 ). Th e country sank into a dark part of its history. 
 Kenyans tweeted the broadcaster and the journalist, thereby creating 
another global trending topic. #SomeoneTellCNN was profane, pro-
found, and piercing. Armed with satire, humor, facts, examples, and 
occasional insults, Twitter users made the case—globally—that the news 
report was a mistake and that their country deserved an apology. Th ey 
got it. David McKenzie, the journalist who fi led the story, was the fi rst to 
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apologize to Kenyans on Twitter, with a tweet acknowledging the inac-
curacy of the reporting (McKenzie  2012 ). 
 For Africans who participated and joined Kenyans in calling on CNN 
for an apology, perhaps it was also fueled by the concurrent #Kony2012 
campaign discussions that disgruntled both local Africans and the dias-
pora. A place to vent frustration in the transient ebb and fl ow of Twitter 
trends, buoyed by the energy and agency of the young, connected con-
tinent on display for the world to see. #SomeoneTell was on its way to 
becoming a hallmark of Kenyans on Twitter. 
 #SomeoneTellAfrica: Kenyans 
in Continental Combat 
 Kenya began to use the #SomeoneTell hashtag to combat other digital deni-
zens in African countries. Th e list is lengthy. Kenyans, if asked, perceive that 
they have a 100 % record of defeating foes large and small. Th ese “cyber-wars” 
are often born out of news stories that broke on traditional media or in online 
publication. In the case of #SomeoneTellUganda, an article insinuated that 
Kenya’s President-elect Uhuru Kenyatta was actually a Ugandan. Th e story 
even carried a congratulatory message from the King of Bunyoro, Solomon 
Gafabusa Iguru, to his “cousin” Uhuru after he was confi rmed as president. 
A newspaper carried pictures of relatives who looked like Kenyatta and even 
ran a follow-up story on how Jomo Kenyatta might have been Omukama 
Kabarega’s son. Kenyans were livid and tweeted insults and memes, launch-
ing whatever they could to attack Ugandans on Twitter (Wambui  2013 ). 
 Another example is Botswanan Foreign Aff airs and International 
Cooperation Minister Phandu Skelemani, who warned the President- 
elect not to set foot in Botswana should he refuse to cooperate with the 
International Criminal Court (Wambui  2013 ). Kenyans on Twitter (known 
as KOT) took this hard and started the hashtag #SomeoneTellBotswana 
to defend their president and country. Th e uproar forced Skelemani to 
retract his statement and state that Kenya and Botswana would continue 
having a good relationship (BBC  2013 ). 
 #SomeoneTellZimbabwe serves as a cautionary tale about the matu-
rity of the hashtag. A Kenyan website with a quote from Zimbabwean 
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President Robert Mugabe describing Kenyans as thieves touched a 
nerve of Kenyans (Spectator  2015 ). Th e resulting hashtag war with 
Zimbabweans began, only for Kenyans to realize that the article had 
been on a satirical website—something that had been clear all along to 
Zimbabweans on Twitter (known as Twimbos) (African Exponent  2016 ). 
A  New York Times article by East Africa bureau chief Jeff rey Gettleman 
used the Mugabe quote in a damning article about corruption in Kenya’s 
society—and a retraction was later issued when it emerged that even he 
had been duped (Gettleman  2015 ). 
 Th e hashtag was also used to send a message to the highest offi  ces 
in the land; #SomeoneTellUhuru and #SomeoneTellKagame, for exam-
ple, aimed to speak clearly to the heads of state in Kenya and Rwanda, 
respectively. American televangelists have been particularly notorious in 
some of their inaccurate statements, caught on video, about Kenya and 
have issued apologies and messages of reconciliation after encountering 
thousands of tweets correcting them (e.g., #SomeoneTellTDJakes and 
#SomeoneTellPatRobertson). 
 #SomeoneTellCNN: Election-Fever Brings CNN 
 In 2014, CNN’s new East Africa correspondent Nima Elbagir fi led her 
story “Armed and Ready to Vote” (Elbagir  2014 ), featuring a would-be 
militia group training and ready to defend themselves with what Elbagir 
described as “guns fashioned from iron piping, homemade swords, and 
bullets bought from the black market.” She and the television network 
would draw the wrath of Kenyans on Twitter, Africans, and others 
worldwide. 
 Speaking with the chalk-faced leader of these militiamen rolling around 
doing somersaults on the ground and “ready for war,” Elbagir thought 
she had found her big scoop and big break. Her prediction: Violence 
in Kenya’s election. Th is was the second strike for CNN, and they were 
pronounced guilty once again. #SomeoneTellCNN was back and just 
as vicious as before. A storm of tweets arose, aimed at the broadcaster 
and the journalist in question. Th e diff erence, this time, was that a new 
precedent was about to be set—offl  ine. Dr. Bitange Ndemo, Permanent 
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Secretary in the Ministry for Information and Communications at the 
time, relayed news from a National Security Committee meeting that 
morning with intelligence chiefs. He called CNN’s coverage “stage- 
managed”—a claim that CNN would later refute in its written apology. 
Ndemo said that CNN had planted the story in its international news 
and that the Kenyan government would protest vociferously, viewing 
it as irresponsibility of the highest order in a world news organization. 
He promised to write to CNN’s world news headquarters to protest the 
piece, calling it propaganda that was causing chaos and expressing hope 
that CNN would retract it (Kenya Citizen TV  2013 ). Th is was the fi rst 
time that the government had weighed in on a matter of national security 
inspired by and stoked on Twitter. 
 #SomeoneTellCNN: Presidents Set New 
Precedent against Media 
 Th e year 2015 saw the third and possibly fi nal “strike” for CNN—set on 
the largest stage so far. US President Barack Obama was set to grace the 
Global Entrepreneurship Summit, taking place in Kenya—and Kenya 
was preparing to welcome back its “son of the soil.” 
 CNN America began its reportage with a Web story and initial tweet 
with the words “President Barack Obama is not just heading to his 
father’s homeland, but to a hotbed of terror” (CNN  2015 ). Th is remark 
was followed with CNN’s television broadcast and picked up by Kenyan 
observers in the diaspora and online. Th e phrase “hotbed of terror” was 
contested, even as it fi rst appeared in numerous angles of coverage from 
CNN. It was repeated and appeared in text and in speech several times 
by various pundits and news anchors on the network. Th e live feed of 
the broadcast could not be watched in Kenya, but the screenshot sailed 
back and landed on the timelines of connected Kenyans, begging for a 
response. Th e onslaught of tweets made the global broadcaster modify 
the headline and opening of its story (Mullin  2015 ) away from “terror 
hotbed” to “father’s homeland” (Hopkins  2015 ). 
 While there is no denying that there was some truth to the phrase, the 
description and outright characterization of the country as a resembling 
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other global terror hotspots was a stretch (Mutiga  2015 ). Kenya had suf-
fered a string of atrocities by the Somalia-based terror group Al-Shabaab, 
but most of Kenya did not resemble the parts of the world where terror 
attacks are commonplace, and the phrase was hence interpreted as reduc-
ing all the complexities of Kenya into a single narrative. 
 As the hashtag #SomeoneTellCNN was reactivated once again, it was 
fi lled, this time around, with imagery and memes showing the country’s 
diversity, beauty, landscapes, and urban life as Kenyans sought to counter 
the narrative with positive storytelling and captivating imagery. Kenyans 
on Twitter also got smarter with humor, satire, and quips making their 
case against CNN and its gaff e by ridiculing the broadcaster. Th e state of 
America was put under scrutiny, too, as the contradictions of US life were 
highlighted, including issues such as gun violence. 
 Kenyan media owner and industrialist Chris Kirubi proved to be one of 
the most popular commentators early on. Challenging CNN, he praised 
the country’s local investment opportunities, some of which he was going 
to be showcasing during the Global Entrepreneurship Summit. His key 
tweet was among the fi rst to go viral: “Unless you are the one bringing 
the terror, we are a hotbed of investment opportunities & great people” 
(Kirubi  2015 ). 
 Th e word “hotbed” made its way famously across cyberspace. Kenyans 
on Twitter rallied to show, through tweets, pictures, and videos, that their 
city was safe and the country had more to it than a headline. It also 
became a topic during the summit as “hotbed” was mentioned in two 
speeches from two diff erent heads of state. President Uhuru Kenyatta, 
when opening the Global Entrepreneurship Summit, said that Kenya was 
a “hotbed of vibrant culture, natural beauty, and infi nite possibility” to 
the audience’s applause (Kenyatta  2015 ). Th e Global Entrepreneurship 
Summit’s opening plenary session saw each keynote speaker react to 
the CNN headline. President Obama, President Kenyatta, and Julie 
Gichuru, the master of ceremonies, took turns at rewriting the head-
line, with President Obama adding that Kenya is a hotbed of innovation. 
Kenya was also referred to as a hotbed of entrepreneurship and of invest-
ment opportunity (Clarke  2016 )—colossal endorsements that fl ew in the 
face of the original media story and implicitly sent a nod to Kenyans on 
Twitter. 
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 Th e government chose to issue a response as well. Th e highest- 
ranking intelligence offi  cer in the government, Major General (Ret.) 
Joseph Nkaissery, the Cabinet Secretary for the Ministry of Interior and 
Coordination of National Government, spoke on the issue. At a press 
conference where he spoke in Kiswahili, he called the coverage “lies,” 
describing the network’s message as “propaganda” and ending by inviting 
an apology from CNN (Capital FM Kenya  2015 ). He would later be 
quoted as having termed CNN’s actions a sustained campaign to portray 
Kenya in a bad light and its reportage as demonstrating irresponsibility 
and smacking of arrogance (Angira  2015 ). By then, it was not just the 
thousands of tweets that CNN would have to answer, but to the govern-
ment of Kenya itself. As part of the fallout, a USD1 million advertising 
contract between Kenya and CNN was suspended (Murumba  2015a ). 
Th e Kenya Tourism Board also said it was reacting to “misrepresentation 
of the country’s status” (Murumba  2015b ). 
 After the Global Entrepreneurship Summit, CNN sent one of its 
highest- ranking offi  cers, Tony Maddox, to Kenya. Th e executive vice 
president and managing director for CNN International paid a personal 
visit to President Uhuru Kenyatta to deliver the network’s apology in per-
son. He said, “Th ere is a world at a war with extremists; we know what 
a hotbed of terror looks like, and Kenya isn’t one.” He expressed regret 
and talked down any notion of the story as had been created in bad faith 
(Mutiga  2015 ). President Kenyatta, as part of his statement on their meet-
ing, mentioned his disappointment and explained to Mr. Maddox why 
“Kenyans, as expressed by those on Twitter, were so angry” (Mutiga  2015 ). 
 Conclusion 
 Twitter remains for us a lens to view connected Kenyans as a whole. Th e 
nation’s sense of belief in the power of technology to bring about change, 
shift dialogue, and present a narrative now plays out both on a smaller 
stage for local trending topics and sometimes on the larger stage of the 
world as a whole. 
 Each day, as Kenyans wake up, they receive the mainstream media 
with its headlines and news. Th ey also have Twitter’s list of local  trending 
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topics—an algorithmically generated service that takes popular and 
emerging trends and showcases them. While Kenya may no longer trend 
globally as much because of this, there is now a local lens to study the 
habits of connected Kenyans at a far more granular level. 
 As became clear while researching and creating the A–Z of Kenyan 
Twitter website, a need remains for exploring and understanding the 
depth and breadth of Pan-African digital society and culture (Kaigwa 
and Nendo  2014 ). Th e pace of which African nations with local trending 
topics such as Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Algeria, and Egypt 
continue to create cyberculture invites examination. Th e role of the 
mobile phone has ensured a place for Twitter in Kenyan hearts, minds, 
and headlines (Nzomo  2014 ), but the journey is far from over. What new 
paradigms will arise with the African uptake of new social media plat-
forms? What is to be said of a world where social media “self destructs” 
akin to image-based messaging app and social network Snapchat? Digital 
dictionaries such as A–Z of Kenyan Twitter can be considered as emerg-
ing media formats to guide locals and internationals to provide greater 
African context and perhaps even lead to greater global understanding. 
 What of a world where visual social media dominates the 
globe and challenges stereotypes? In 2015, the Twitter hashtag 
#Th eAfricaTh eMediaNeverShowsYou brought forward the work of 
Instagram users, both professional photographers and hobbyists, with 
pictures of African capital cityscapes and vignettes of life on the con-
tinent that challenged Western media and global stereotypes of disas-
ter and catastrophe (Banning-Lover,  2015 ). Will we see less of these as 
Africans evolve with the social media and mobile times? 
 WhatsApp, the instant-messaging application, which is owned by 
Facebook, can be considered to be the future of social networking, having 
been built entirely around the mobile phone, contacts, and minimal data 
usage. WhatsApp can take the place of Kenya’s largest social network—
despite its appearance as an instant messaging application. Th is shift from 
its perception and packaging as an instant messaging mobile app to an 
informal social network was predicted as a key trend for Kenya’s social 
media evolution (Kaigwa et  al.  2014 ). Th e app will take on a greater 
role as a pseudo social network made up of groups and potentially busi-
nesses in 2016 and beyond (WhatsApp Inc.  2016 ). More mindful work, 
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targeted at a profound understanding of Africa’s cyberculture, is needed 
to answer these and many more questions that will allow us to better feel 
the pulse of contemporary society. 
 And thus has the paradigm fully shifted from cyber cafés to mobile 
phones and, from there, to the niche network Twitter, which presently 
remains a leading public platform in Kenya’s digital economy. While 
the platform faces a tough time in determining its future in the USA 
(Constine  2016 ), its prospects in Kenya—and Kenya’s belief in it—
remain bright, even though it as no guarantee on its position. 
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 Conversation #7 
 Toward Digitizing Information 
for the Benefi t of the Many Rather 
Than the Few 
 Munyutu Waigi of Umati Capital 
 Munyutu Waigi  was raised in Mombasa and left for England when he was 13 
years old. Th e technology bug bit him when he worked in information technol-
ogy (IT) support for the Williams Formula One racing team as part of his four-
year degree program at London ’ s Brunel University ,  where he studied 
information systems. After graduating ,  he joined the global management con-
sultancy Accenture ,  working in communications and high tech. Th e urge to do 
something much bigger that would challenge him became overwhelming — and 
he decided to quit three months short of his three-year anniversary at the fi rm. 
He moved back to Mombasa to start all over again and set up MoComm 
Wireless ,  a Wi-Fi company. About year and a half later ,  he fi nally got his big 
break. Along with Leandro Sanchez ,  he co-founded Rupu ,  a group buying web-
site that has become Kenya ’ s largest e-commerce fi rm. Two years later, Munyutu 
cashed out and used the funds to start his life ’ s true work :  And that is pretty 
much the beginning of Umati Capital. 
 Munyutu, what is the story behind Umati Capital? 
 In a nutshell, Umati Capital is an innovative tech-based lending insti-
tution. We primarily lend to processors and exporters across the agri-
culture sector. Umati provides working capital, invoice discounting, and 
supply chain fi nancing solutions to bridge challenging 30-, 45-, 60- or 
90-day payment terms faced by suppliers. 
 How does the digital solution work in practice? 
 Take, for example, the coconuts value chain. Th ere is the farmer who 
grows the coconuts, and in turn, sells them to a processor–exporter 
who extracts value and sells the compressed oil to international buyers 
across the USA and UK. Having purchased coconuts from hundreds of 
farmers, the processor–exporter has usually less than 30 days to settle 
the debt—but unfortunately has to wait 45 days to receive payments 
from his or her international buyers. Th is leaves a funding gap that the 
processor–exporter has to plug. Instead of approaching banks, which 
require collateral and lengthy processing times, the processor–exporter 
has Umati Capital as a premier solution provider. Unlike banks, Umati 
Capital does not require collateral to lend to the processor–exporter. 
Furthermore, we off er technologies, such as mobile and web apps, that 
help digitize the processor–exporter’s purchasing process, which is usu-
ally very manual. All in all, Umati Capital off ers seamless fi nancing 
along with innovative technology—a value proposition most banks 
can’t match. 
 How will your solution aff ect the agribusiness value chain? 
 According to recent statistics, there are 700 million people across 
Africa engaged in agricultural activities. Th at is seven-tenths of Africa’s 
population, considering recent estimates of just over a billion people. 
Th is is further compounded in Kenya, where statistics have shown that 
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agriculture contributes 25 % of the Kenyan gross domestic product 
(GDP). Surprisingly, only 4 % of bank lending supports this key pillar in 
our economy. Why? Perhaps it has a lot to do with the fact that the key 
actors (farmers) do not have credit profi les—the basis of most structured 
lending—that would give traditional lenders comfort in their economic 
activity. 
 How is Umati Capital addressing this issue? Th e majority of assistance 
(international and local) to the agricultural sector has been tackling the 
issue from ground up. At Umati Capital, we believe the opposite: Th e 
issue has to be tackled from the top down. You can argue that there are 
several reasons why farmers rarely get paid in full and on time. We believe 
that by fi rst tackling the structured value chains—by improving working 
capital across them—you can learn key lessons around using technology 
to streamline their processes before moving on to the larger challenge—
the unstructured value chains. 
 What has been one of your biggest “Aha!” moments while working 
with Umati Capital? 
 Unfortunately, the life of an entrepreneur is fi lled with many unpre-
dictable moments. Th ere are countless “What just happened?” moments 
that leave you trying to make logical sense of events. I have concluded 
that luck and the right timing play a crucial part in my daily struggle. 
 My biggest “Aha!” moment came at the seed investment stage of 
Umati Capital. Like most startups at that stage, we barely had any 
cash and we rode purely on futuristic ideas about how Umati Capital 
would shape the lending sector in the years ahead. Th anks to the pow-
ers that be, we eventually closed an investment round with Accion 
Venture Labs worth USD400,000, at a valuation of USD1.4 million. 
What started off  as a dream to change the way small and medium-
size enterprises in Africa access working capital had suddenly become 
a funded idea. I guess the scale and reality of what we were doing 
crystallized further in 2015, when we were recognized by Citigroup, 
 Forbes magazine, MIT, and the MasterCard Foundation, among many 
global names. 
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 One of Kenya’s own technology entrepreneurs who is also an inves-
tor in Umati Capital, Joseph Mucheru, has been appointed to the 
position of cabinet secretary in the Ministry of Information and 
Communications. What does this mean for the tech community? 
 First of all, Joe is an all-round good guy. He is unlike most who have 
achieved success at his level. His humility, coupled with his calm dispo-
sition, lets him work with people across diff erent spectrums and back-
grounds. I fi rmly believe he is the best person for the job. Joe is Google’s 
former Sub-Saharan Africa lead, based in their Nairobi offi  ce. He was 
Google’s fi rst Sub-Saharan employee and was key in setting up Google’s 
presence in Africa from 2007. Before joining Google, he worked in vari-
ous roles, including chief technology offi  cer and chief executive offi  cer 
(CEO), at Wananchi Online (the leading provider of aff ordable enter-
tainment and connectivity for East Africa’s rapidly growing middle class), 
a company he co-founded in 1999. 
 What does Joe’s appointment mean for the tech community? As much 
as the technology community is about creating scalable enterprises, we 
also want to see government changes aimed at the greater good of the 
nation. We believe Joe’s vision and character can help create such an 
environment. 
 What are some of the key areas that need to be digitized by the 
government? 
 Th e overarching goal should be to achieve transparency through tech-
nology. Th e process of getting your ID card, passport, driver’s license, 
National Hospital Insurance Fund card, or National Social Security Fund 
card needs to be digitized as soon as possible. By digitizing these pro-
cesses, you will eradicate most of the daily corruption in the system. We 
also need to start digitizing basic government services in order to make 
those processes more transparent, less corrupt and, by that, more effi  -
cient. Another aspect is security. If you commit an off ense in Nairobi, for 
example, two weeks later in Mombasa, the police will have no knowledge 
of your off ense. Digitizing our security forces, beginning with the police, 
in a way that signifi cantly minimizes corruption would be marvelous. 
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 Why is the power of technology best deployed to combat corruption? 
 At least once a week, there is a new corruption case that is opened up, 
and the annoying part of it all is that no one will be taken to jail. It is 
immensely frustrating! If we can put technology on the agenda that can 
actually minimize corruption by introducing new, transparent processes 
together with government leaders who own the process, then we are hav-
ing a substantial impact on the lives of Kenyans. It is through technology 
and digitizing basic processes that we can transform Kenya in the shortest 
time possible. 
 Th ank you, Munyutu! 
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 “Kenya’s technology push leaves investors cold” reads an oft-quoted arti-
cle from 2014 (Reuters  2014 ). A lack of talent, a scarcity of seed capital, 
and insuffi  cient profi t potential in a market characterized by low- income 
consumers have, according to the author, driven disappointed investors to 
look for opportunities elsewhere. Th e current chapter shows that establish-
ing ICT ecosystems is indeed diffi  cult in resource-scarce countries. Th ese 
ecosystems tend not only to be in a nascent stage, they are also missing 
essential ingredients and resources—fi nancial resources, specialized orga-
nizations, universities, and relevant human capital—that help enable high-
growth entrepreneurship and that have to be put in place “from scratch.” 
Th e referred to article then closes with an investor’s dubious promise to 
return to Kenya “When real money is ready to be made” (Reuters  2014 ). 
But how do we overcome the challenges to reach that phase? 
 Building ICT Entrepreneurship 
Ecosystems in Resource-Scarce Contexts: 
Learnings from Kenya’s “Silicon 
Savannah” 
 Johannes   Ulrich   Bramann 
 J. U.  Bramann ( ) 
 HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management ,  Leipzig ,  Germany 
 Th e central goal of the chapter is to shed light on the evolution of Kenya’s 
ICT ecosystem and ask “What are the barriers to and enablers of growing 
an ICT ecosystem in a resource-scarce context?” Using Isenberg’s frame-
work of entrepreneurship ecosystems ( 2011 ), my research, conducted 
in Kenya in the fall of 2013, highlights a set of barriers and enabling 
processes necessary for the maturation of Kenya’s ICT ecosystem. Based 
on these, I propose a model that explains ICT ecosystem emergence in 
resource-scarce contexts. Th e chapter ends with specifi c recommenda-
tions that tackle the current barriers in an eff ort to move ecosystems 
beyond their nascent phase. Research into such an endeavor can deduce 
pivotal policy prescriptions that account for context and stage. Th e chap-
ter will therefore conclude with suggestions for further research. 
 Theoretical Background 
 Over the last decades, the entrepreneurship domain has seen a shift from 
investigating the entrepreneur and his or her characteristics and motiva-
tions toward focusing on the context in which entrepreneurship takes 
place (Th ornton  1999 ). In this spirit, I understand technology entre-
preneurship as the creation of new ICT-enabled organizations, which 
occurs in a context-dependent social and economic process (Beckman 
et  al. ( 2012 ); Gartner  1988 ; Low and Abrahamson  1997 ; Th ornton 
 1999 ). In resource-scarce contexts, technology entrepreneurs face a set 
of contextual challenges, such as low- income consumers, dispropor-
tionately higher risk of entrepreneurial failure, and low enforcement of 
formal institutions and contracts (Webb et al.  2009 ). In addition, tech-
nology entrepreneurs in Kenya face particular challenges that arise when 
starting a venture in the formative years of a new industry, such as a lack 
of overall legitimacy for the industry, the need to carve out new market 
structures, and the need to recruit untrained employees (Aldrich and 
Fiol  1994 ). Th e venturing processes, resource requirements, and strate-
gies of entrepreneurial ventures arguably take distinct forms in order 
to respond to such aggravated challenges (Kiggundu  2002 ; Th ornton 
 1999 ). However, many of the existing insights into technology entre-
preneurship arise from resource-rich contexts, such as the USA and 
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Europe and thus have only limited  applicability for  contexts such as that 
of Kenya. Context-specifi c research in resource-scarce environments is 
needed rather than one-size-fi ts-all policy prescriptions that emanate 
from the Global North (Zoogah and Nkomo  2013 ). In this chapter, I 
account for the contextual particularities of Kenya in order to develop 
adequate and relevant knowledge for Kenya. Moreover, I seek to open 
up a conversation for further research in resource-scarce contexts that 
see the model I develop as a point of departure. 
 Today’s focus on ecosystems in the entrepreneurship domain has 
emerged recently but rapidly (Autio et al.,  2014 ; Feld  2012 ; Isenberg  2010 , 
 2011 ; Kantis and Federico  2012 ; Napier and Hansen  2011 ; Mason and 
Brown  2014 ; Zacharakis et al.  2003 ). Th e entrepreneurship ecosystem per-
spective, as understood by Isenberg ( 2010 ,  2011 ) and Mason and Brown 
( 2014 ), provides a framework to understand the ability of regional contexts 
to encourage and support the creation of new ventures. To achieve this, the 
framework builds heavily on the insights of geographic economics, in par-
ticular cluster theory and regional innovation systems (Mason and Brown 
 2014 ). Within the stream of cluster theory, geographical economists have 
sought to explain the reasons for the geographic clustering of economic 
activity, the inner dynamics of clusters, and the economic benefi ts that 
result. Regional innovation systems literature off ers abundant insights into 
the relational elements within regions that govern innovation and entre-
preneurship. Despite the extant research, the entrepreneurship ecosystem 
framework off ers a unique perspective that is distinct from cluster and 
regional innovation systems theory in three ways. 
 First, its specifi c goal is the creation of growth-oriented entrepreneurship 
(Miller  2005 ). As such it focuses on nurturing aspirational entrepreneurs that 
seek to build large and rapidly expanding fi rms rather than on, for example, 
the founding of small businesses that are operated in order to provide income 
for the owner. Th e presence of such high-growth type of fi rms has been shown 
to be vital for job creation (Anyadike-Danes et al.  2009 ) and building regional 
innovation systems (Mason et al.  2009 ; Du et al.  2013 ), which is why their 
promotion has been declared central to policymakers across the  Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD  2010 ,  2013 ). 
 Second, the framework provides a list of the main conditions that 
are required to successfully generate and nurture such ambitious 
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 entrepreneurship. Isenberg’s widely recognized entrepreneurship eco-
system framework ( 2011 ) proposed six main conditions—conducive 
sociocultural norms around entrepreneurship, availability of entrepre-
neurial support systems, availability of qualifi ed human capital, presence 
of appropriate fi nancing sources, relevant entrepreneurship policy, and 
venture-friendly markets for new products. Because of the explicit focus 
of this chapter on technology entrepreneurship in a resource-scarce con-
text, a seventh condition—ICT infrastructure—was added as a further 
condition. See Fig.  8.1 . 1 
 Th ird, the framework provides important insights for the design of 
entrepreneurship policy. On the one hand, regional factors are con-
sidered central in determining an ecosystem’s barriers to and enablers 
of  entrepreneurship. Th erefore, generic strategies to foster ecosystem 
growth add little value. Th is is especially relevant in an ICT sector con-
text, where the “gold standard” of Silicon Valley has in the past inspired 
worldwide generic policy action such as engineering technology clus-
ters, setting up technology incubators, and supporting venture capital 
industries (Isenberg  2010 ,  2011 ). Arguably, these strategies can indeed 
1  See Isenberg ( 2011 ) for a discussion of these conditions and their subcategories. For a more com-
prehensive literature review on the entrepreneurship ecosystem framework and its role in fostering 













 Fig. 8.1  Dimensions of an ICT entrepreneurship ecosystem (Adapted from 
Isenberg  2011 ) 
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add value, but their worth has to be reconsidered in light of each ecosys-
tem’s individual needs and opportunities. Over the last decade, multiple 
governments have essentially wasted millions of US dollars on generic 
technology- cluster policy eff orts (Economist  2007 ; Isenberg  2010 ). On 
the other hand, the framework views ecosystems as interrelated organ-
isms in which corrective actions to remove a barrier in one dimension 
have side eff ects on the entire ecosystem. For example, although provid-
ing grant money to entrepreneurs to address funding gaps may be eff ec-
tive from a fi nancing perspective, it can—if managed too loosely—undo 
the toughening eff ect on human capital that the equity capital market 
usually exerts and retard the formation of a venture capital industry and 
its strategic resources. In the past, many governments prioritized one or 
two dimensions over others, because they deemed these to be especially 
important to entrepreneurial success. However, eff ective approaches to 
fostering entrepreneurship in a region need a comprehensive and holis-
tic approach that takes into account all dimensions of the framework 
(Isenberg  2010 ,  2011 ). Ács et al. ( 2014 ) illustrated this point by show-
ing that when one ecosystem element is far less developed than others, it 
forms a bottleneck that limits the growth of the entire system and hin-
ders the creation of new ventures. Assuming policymakers as the main 
designers of ecosystem-fostering strategies, Isenberg ( 2011 ) therefore 
argued for the need for intensive dialogue with ecosystem stakeholders 
from all ecosystem dimensions. In this way, the policymaker can gain a 
holistic picture of the ecosystem’s unique challenges and opportunities 
and “co-design” interventions with knowledgeable practitioners. Th ese 
interventions will then be executed in iterative circles of experimenta-
tion and feedback to enable the policymaker to fi nd out what works in 
his or her context. 
 For this chapter’s inquiry into the barriers faced by an early ecosystem in 
a resource-scarce country and the resulting enablers, previous  theorizing 
provides little insight. First of all, much previous work on regional innova-
tion systems, clusters, and entrepreneurship ecosystems neglects the time 
dimension of an ecosystem’s development. Mason and Brown ( 2014 ) 
found that ecosystems “are discussed as if they emerged fully formed…. 
Th ere is little understanding of how successful entrepreneurial ecosystems 
come into being and evolve.” Th is is unfortunate, because Feldman and 
8 Building ICT Entrepreneurship Ecosystems... 231
Braunerhjelm ( 2004 ) showed that there is an evolutionary logic to cluster 
formation and that therefore a young ecosystem faces diff erent challenges 
than a more mature one. Th orny chicken-and-egg questions have been 
ignored. For example, if the availability of local fi nancing is a key attri-
bute, did it predate the emergence of businesses in which to invest, or did 
the businesses predate the fi nancing, in which case how were the initial 
businesses fi nanced (Mason and Brown  2014 )? Second, insights into why 
and how such systems get started provide little constructive insights in 
resource-scarce contexts. Cluster theory literature has argued that clusters 
emerge where certain preconditions make for “fertile soil.” Examples of 
such preconditions are the presence of advanced knowledge institutions 
that both generate knowledge advancements and supply the skilled scien-
tists, engineers, and professionals that are considered to be at the source 
of entrepreneurial endeavors (Isenberg  2011 ; Porter  1998 ; Mason and 
Brown  2014 ). Other scholars point to proximity to established indus-
tries and government spending. In America, for example, the role of the 
defense industry in the early growth of Route 128 and Silicon Valley is 
well documented (Adams  2011 ; Leslie  2000 ; Saxenian  1994 ). Further, 
the presence of successful entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial fi rms in cre-
ating spin-off  eff ects that benefi t the ecosystem across its dimensions is 
stressed in multiple studies (Mason and Brown  2014 ). Arguably such 
“fertile soil” is the foundation on which early industry emergence pro-
cesses, such as the emergence of activity networks and the establishment 
of a technological base are built (Gustafsson et al.  2015 ). How is it, then, 
that we sometimes see technology ecosystems growing in resource-scarce 
contexts that generally lack such soil? What substitute institutions and 
processes can ecosystems in such contexts draw on to emerge anyway? 
Th is chapter’s fi ndings concerning the enabling processes that have been 
at play in the Kenyan ecosystem give insight into these questions by 
pointing at, for example, the pivotal role played by the entrepreneurial 
support system . Furthermore, Isenberg’s recommendation ( 2010 ,  2011 ) 
to work holistically and address multiple dimensions at once is only of 
limited practicability. In resource-scarce contexts, there is a need to estab-
lish most of the conditions in the ecosystem perspective from scratch, and 
the question of prioritization arises. Given the unique contextual features 
of resource-scarce environments, which are the  components that have 
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to be established fi rst to kick-start an entrepreneurial ecosystem? And 
in what order should the other components follow so that high-growth 
entrepreneurship can be realized? Th e model developed here of entrepre-
neurial ecosystem emergence provides insight into these two questions 
and shows that despite commonly assumed antecedents to entrepreneur-
ial ecosystem emergence, new ecosystems can successfully emerge in con-
texts where abundant venture capital and highly specialized resources are 
not yet in place. 
 Empirical Context 
 Over the last decade, Kenya’s ICT infrastructure has seen signifi cant 
advancements. In 2012, the connection of LION2, the fourth under-
sea cable, catapulted Kenya’s bandwidth per user to a continent-leading 
24000 mbps (ITU  2013 ). Th e country’s Internet penetration rate of 
43 % in 2014 was very strong compared with that of its East African 
neighbors (Data.un.org  2016 ), and the mobile phone and mobile money 
penetration rate of 83 % and 59 %, respectively, were nothing short of 
impressive (Communication Commission of Kenya  2015 ). A lively tech-
nology scene has grown up around the technology hubs, accelerators, and 
entrepreneurship competitions that have settled near Nairobi’s Bishop 
Magua Center and along Ngong Road. Together, these developments 
have gained signifi cant global media attention as an emerging space that 
was enthusiastically dubbed the “Silicon Savannah” (Economist  2012 ; 
Uhl  2012 ). In 2015, several innovative and expanding ICT ventures 
inhabited the ecosystem, such as Sendy, which uses mobile technology 
to let local motorbike taxis off er courier services, and BitPesa, which dis-
rupts the international remittances market by combining Bitcoin with 
mobile money infrastructure. 2 Finally, important signals of approaching 
ecosystem maturation are the million-dollar exit of the mobile commerce 
fi rm Weza Tele ( Disrupt-africa.com  2015 ) and the latest funding round 
for solar company M-Kopa, which raised over USD19 million in equity 
capital ( pv-magazine.com  2015 ). 
2  See  sendyit.com and bitpesa.co. 
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 Research Method 
 My research followed an inductive theory building approach, using data 
on multiple case studies and additional semi-structured interviews. Such 
qualitative research methods were applied because they are helpful in 
understanding the “why and how” of a phenomenon (Yin  1994 ) and are 
appropriate when little is known about the phenomenon and current 
perspectives seem inadequate in the given empirical context (Eisenhardt 
 1989 ). In a four-month fi eld visit to Nairobi in 2013, ten detailed case 
studies of local technology entrepreneurship endeavors were created. Th ese 
characterized the founders, the venturing process, the underlying business 
model, and, importantly, the problems and enablers faced. To increase 
the generalizability of the fi ndings, intercase variation was maximized 
(Eisenhardt  1989 ) along the dimensions of founder nationality, stage of 
the venturing process, and sector of focus of the enterprise. To verify and 
substantiate emerging themes, 20 additional interviews with a diverse set 
of ecosystem stakeholders were held, including venture capitalists, manag-
ers of local incubators and seed funds, university professors, and manag-
ers of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In line with Eisenhardt 
( 1989 ), the research process was characterized by fl exible, opportunistic 
data collection in which the semi-structured interview guidelines were 
continuously refi ned (Charmaz  2014 ; Glaser  1992 ). In addition, the 
research benefi ted from ethnographical insights gained through working 
on-site in a Kenyan co-working space and taking part in numerous events, 
competitions, and informal activities with technology entrepreneurs. Th e 
interviews were recorded, coded, and analyzed for the relevant barriers 
to and enablers of Kenya’s nascent ICT ecosystem. Cyclical coding pro-
cesses were applied (Glaser  1992 ) to derive the main barriers and enablers, 
grouping them into the framework and assessing their interrelations and 
relative importance . Th e model of nascent ecosystem emergence was then 
developed in a process of abductive theorizing (Tavory and Timmermans 
 2014 ) as an iterative process between the empirical materials and the exist-
ing literature on how new industries emerge and ecosystems evolve. 
 Th e research took a holistic perspective on the barriers and enablers that were 
encountered instead of providing an in-depth discussion of any one ecosys-
tem dimension in particular. Th is is helpful in understanding how ecosystems 
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 function as a whole. In respecting the limitations of conducting one-person 
research on an entire ecosystem, I do not claim to have provided an exhaustive 
view of all the factors, and I encourage the reader to critically assess my fi ndings 
and to use them as a starting point for debate and further analysis. 
 Findings: Barriers and Enablers in Kenya’s 
Early ICT Ecosystem 
 Th e barriers to and enablers of entrepreneurship in Kenya are summa-
rized in Fig.  8.2 , and discussed in the remainder of the section below.
 Conducive Cultural Norms around Entrepreneurship 
 Th e cultural norm dimension includes societal attitudes toward various 
important aspects of entrepreneurship, such as tolerance for risk, innova-
tion, and experimentation. Th e social status of entrepreneurs, attitudes 
toward wealth creation, and the visibility of entrepreneurial success sto-
ries are also important in this dimension. From the interviews, a general 
consensus emerged that the entrepreneurship career path has low prestige 
associated with it, especially among older generations. In the historical 
context of Kenya, fi rst the colonial rule of the British and then the rule 
of Daniel arap Moi from 1978 to 2002 left very little opportunities and 
freedoms for individual business owners and entrepreneurs (Himbara 
 1994 ). Th ere has therefore clearly been a lack of examples of successful 
high-growth entrepreneurs that could have shaped the perception and 
prestige of this career path . Most of the interviewed entrepreneurs had 
completed university-level degrees and indicated that professional careers 
were deemed more appropriate for such levels of education. 
 Two cultural characteristics were found to aff ect the interviewees’ per-
ception of and tolerance for risk. First, the local context seemed to be 
characterized by institutionalized low trust. 3 Respondents mentioned a 
strong fear of being defrauded by business partners, because of little trust 
3  See Welters (2012) for a literature review on high- and low-trust contexts and their impact on 
entrepreneurship. 
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in other people’s integrity, in the enforcement of contracts, and in weak 
national legal institutions. Th is mistrust was especially evident in interac-
tions with a strong imbalance in power such as with large corporations 
or high-ranking offi  cials. Th e institutionalized low-trust environment 
seemed to help discourage the decision to start up a venture . Second, 
the cultural norm of having to provide for extended family members 
in relation to one’s ambition of becoming an entrepreneur was impor-
tant. Respondents indicated that family members in the local context 
were often expected to generate support in the form of fi nancing, jobs, 
and connections for a wide array of other family members. Th is need to 
provide a stable fl ow of resources increases the appeal of corporate job 
positions and decreases the entrepreneur’s tolerance for risk and ability to 
forgo profi ts in early venturing phases. 
 Th e Kenyan ecosystem is a melting pot of numerous diff erent nation-
alities. From the interviews, two particularities of the local venturing 
processes emerged as causing a dissonance between local and interna-
tional stakeholders—fi rst, a “lean mentality” among local entrepreneurs, 
whose limited ability or willingness to forgo revenues and profi ts in 
early venturing phases has led to limited attention to market research 
and business model validation; and second, a “hyperdiversifi cation of 
eff orts,” where local entrepreneurs engaged in multiple entrepreneurial 
endeavors at the same time or were distracted by other jobs. Multiple 
interview excerpts showed that international respondents have inter-
preted these practices as a lack of professionalism or a sign of insuffi  cient 
entrepreneurial knowledge. 
 Availability of Entrepreneurial Support Systems 
 Th e availability and aff ordability of professional services related to entre-
preneurship (e.g., legal, accounting, and technical services) as well as 
entrepreneurship support institutions, such as incubators and accelera-
tors, are included in this dimension. Th e analysis found that Nairobi’s 
multiple entrepreneurship-supporting institutions, such as open tech 
hubs, accelerators, and incubators, provided numerous enabling eff ects. 
Respondents named the possibility of meeting like-minded individuals 
who shared their enthusiasm for technology entrepreneurship to have 
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been key in nurturing and maintaining entrepreneurial ambitions, gain-
ing sociocultural legitimacy, learning basic entrepreneurial and manage-
ment skills, and building a community of like-minded people. Th e events, 
competitions, and workshops that are frequently held in support insti-
tutions were not only important brokers of entrepreneurial know-how 
and information on technical developments, but also fostered innovation 
processes through enabling exchange between various stakeholders and 
interest groups. In a context where power failures occur often and high- 
speed Internet connections and offi  ce space are costly, the shared work-
spaces available at these institutions signifi cantly lowered the threshold 
for technology entrepreneurship. Further, the close contact and frequent 
interaction that have been achieved through these support institutions 
were indicated to have given rise to closely connected communities. Th e 
analysis showed that such networks improve accountability and incen-
tives to stick to the proper conduct of business through reputational 
eff ects within the community. Respondents therefore indicated a lower 
perceived risk of entering into business relations with members of such a 
tech community compared with nonmembers of the community. 
 Availability of Qualifi ed Human Capital 
 Th e human capital dimension includes the availability of relevant human 
capital—in particular, serial entrepreneurs—and of educational institutions 
with the ability to produce the relevant human capital. Th e skill sets needed 
to build a technology venture span management and  entrepreneurial 
knowledge and leadership skills as well as technological know- how and 
relevant local ICT industry insights. Th e analysis showed that individuals 
who could contribute such skills and experiences were in short supply in 
Nairobi’s ecosystem. Th e reason for this shortage lay in the overall youth 
of the ecosystem and the relative absence of knowledge- intensive industries 
or research institutions, where relevant skill sets and experiences could be 
acquired. In contrast to more mature ecosystems, where aspiring entrepre-
neurs have learned the traits of technology management and leadership in 
years of practice before starting their own venture, the entrepreneurs inter-
viewed here often pursued entrepreneurship directly after fi nishing their 
education, because of a lack of alternative employment opportunities. 
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 Although it is hard for educational institutions to stand in for practi-
cal experience in the area of management or software engineering, sev-
eral interviewees indicated that too little emphasis has been placed on the 
provision of entrepreneurship knowledge and practical management skills 
to business and technology sciences students. Some entrepreneurs have 
indicated that universities in the context seem more focused on preparing 
students for professional careers and could do more in promoting entre-
preneurship. Finally, the respondents stressed that individuals who do 
possess the skills required for technology entrepreneurship and have expe-
rience in resource-scarce technology sectors often have attractive corporate 
employment opportunities. Many of these candidates therefore seem to 
choose a relatively stable and prestigious corporate or government job. 
 A key enabler that emerged in the human capital dimension was the 
infl ow of human capital from more mature ecosystems. Incoming expatriate 
entrepreneurs bring valuable skill sets and relevant experiences to the ICT 
ventures they have either founded or worked in. Th e case study research 
showed that some of these individuals seemed to be able to continue to 
draw on top-notch entrepreneurial support resources from their home eco-
systems, such as networks, education, mentoring, and access to fi nancing. 
Further, they provided foreign market knowledge that was valuable in tar-
geting international consumers. Because these resources were used in estab-
lishing a Kenyan technology venture, they can be viewed as an example of 
the successful transfer of such resources. Internationals also seem to play 
leading roles in support institutions as, for example, managers of incuba-
tors, mentors at educational facilities, or venture capitalists. Th e research’s 
fi ndings suggested that such expatriates are often intrinsically motivated to 
create social impact instead of being attracted by profi t potential. 
 Presence of Appropriate Financing Sources 
 Th e fi nancing dimension includes the availability of several funding 
options for entrepreneurs, including angel investing networks, venture 
capital funds, zero- and seed-stage capital, public capital markets, and 
debt fi nancing. Th e most common sources of capital at early venturing 
phases—including personal savings, family, friends, angel investors, and 
early-stage seed funds—were found to be scarce in the Kenyan  ecosystem. 
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Although a local venture capital market had not yet formed, the Kenyan 
technology hype had attracted foreign investors looking for opportuni-
ties. However, the analysis showed a lack of deal-fl ow into local ven-
tures at early and at later stages of the investment funnel. Venture capital 
stakeholders indicated that this was caused by a shortage of fundable 
projects, the low quality of underlying business plans, and the lack of 
entrepreneurial skills of the founders. Another narrative was that there 
seemed to be a mismatch between the Western venture capital model and 
the local market context of Kenya, where low-income consumers and 
local context constraints keep many potential businesses from satisfying 
venture capitalists’ requirements for high-margin, high-growth poten-
tial. Additionally, a cultural distance between the local founders and the 
mostly Western investors—embodied in dissonant values, goals, work 
practices, and communication styles—seemed to impede the formation 
of trust-intensive partnership. A local venture capital sector had not yet 
formed at the time of the research, and Kenyan high-net-worth individu-
als reported being uninterested in investing in local technology fi rms. 
 In the Kenyan ecosystem, new ventures can also access fi nancing from 
nonmarket sources, such as from the NGO sector, the government, and 
international development agencies. Despite the apparent merits of pro-
viding much-needed fi nancing, such funding was shown also to have a 
detrimental eff ect on the wider ecosystem. Some interviewees criticized 
the fact that the rigor of selection in these situations was too low and 
led to the adverse outcome of weak companies getting funding. Th is was 
related partially to the lack of experience and know-how of public sector 
actors in identifying promising technology ventures. Further, respondents 
indicated that the funding had, in this early ecosystem development stage, 
outweighed the number of actually worthy candidates. Th e Tandaa grant 
initiative of the Kenyan ICT Authority, for example, has been criticized for 
not providing the additional mentoring resources that are needed at early 
venturing phases. Finally, several interviewees indicated that the availabil-
ity of grant fi nancing had created situations where fi nancial resources were 
too easily available to local entrepreneurs, giving rise to the term “compe-
preneur,” meaning an entrepreneur who moves from one entrepreneur-
ship competition to another to fi nance his or her livelihood through prize 
money and hence is too distracted to actually focus on building a venture. 
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 Relevant Entrepreneurship Policy 
 Th e policy dimension includes the regulatory framework, existence of 
incentives for entrepreneurs (i.e., through tax benefi ts), and establishment 
of venture-friendly legislation (i.e., through bankruptcy and labor laws, 
contract enforcement, and secure property rights). From the interviews, 
a general consensus emerged that weak government administration pro-
cesses, rule of law, and contract enforcement as well as corruption have 
been damaging the climate for entrepreneurship. Although this chapter 
cannot provide an exhaustive overview of all relevant policy factors, two 
recurring themes deserve attention. One is the attainment of visas, be 
it for foreign entrepreneurs coming to the country or for professionals 
seeking to work in new Kenyan ventures. Interviewees mentioned the 
process of obtaining work visas as being costly and time consuming. Th e 
alternative, receiving an investor visa, requires the applicant to have at 
least USD300,000 in a Kenyan bank account, which can be considered 
a high barrier. Further, processes and fees for business registration as well 
as obtaining business operational permits emerged as being problematic. 
 Venture-Friendly Markets for New Products 
 Th e market dimension refl ects whether or not the market is accommo-
dating for entrepreneurs, as determined, for example, by the presence of 
so-called early adopters who are able and willing to try new products. In a 
market context that is characterized by low income and a relatively small 
early-adopter customer segment, establishing monetization in a business-
to- consumer model emerged as being very hard. Entrepreneurial strate-
gies therefore seem somewhat limited when serving business clients or 
international consumers. A large part of local technology entrepreneurs 
in the study focused on ventures with social impact and monetization 
provided by government or international development stakeholders. 
Finally, a reoccurring theme among the entrepreneurs as well as the wider 
ecosystem stakeholders was the dominance of the telecommunications 
conglomerate Safaricom. Safaricom was suggested as not actively seeking 
interaction with the rest of the ecosystem, despite the potential win–win 
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situation that could be achieved through open innovation strategies (see 
also GSMA  2014 ). Respondents gave examples of such behaviors, such as 
not sharing Application Programming Interface interfaces to its M-PESA 
platform, not publishing data on market developments, and not actively 
seeking cooperation with local entrepreneurs (see also GSMA  2014 ). 
 Discussion 
 Key Barriers to and Enablers of Early ICT Ecosystems 
in Resource-Scarce Contexts 
 Th e research yielded a set of key barriers to technology entrepreneurship 
along the dimensions of human capital, culture, fi nance, and markets. 
For a nascent ecosystem in a resource-scarce country, building a human 
capital resource base able to successfully catalyze technology entrepre-
neurship may be one of the most diffi  cult challenges. Many scholars have 
argued that the required skills, experiences, and mindsets for aspirational 
entrepreneurship are best learned through practice and cannot merely be 
learned in educational institutions. Given a lack of structures to gain such 
practical experience in young resource-scarce ecosystems, this begs the 
question of how those fi rst embryonic structures can be put in place. In 
addition, the necessary educational reforms can be expected to take years 
before producing relevant human capital. 
 Promising candidates aspiring to be entrepreneurs may be further 
demotivated from pursuing their career path by the relatively low prestige 
and legitimacy associated with entrepreneurship, the pressure to provide 
for their family, and the relatively high risk of failure. Again, if success-
ful entrepreneurial endeavors are needed to form positive social norms 
accordingly but top talent is currently demotivated to found new ven-
tures, how should such norms form? 
 Entrepreneurial fi nance is another key barrier. A lack of seed capital 
can be expected in resource-scarce ecosystems, because of low general 
saving levels and the absence of ICT conglomerate managers and serial 
entrepreneurs who combine the expertise and wealth required for angel 
investments. In addition, the signifi cant risks inherent in the context seem 
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to discourage seed investment funds. Th e example of Kenya shows that 
foreign investors may be unwilling to invest in local ventures even at later 
stages of the investment funnel. Th is was found to be caused by the inves-
tors’ perception of a lack of local talent and the inability of local technol-
ogy fi rms to meet the investors’ profi t and growth expectations. As a means 
of overcoming this shortage, alternative funding sources from donors and 
impact investors have been off ered in the Kenyan ecosystem. In addition 
to the apparent positive eff ect of such fi nancing, however, negative impacts 
on the wider ecosystem have emerged, evolving around detrimental eff ect 
son the “entrepreneurial gene pool,” the donors’ inability to provide non-
fi nancial resources, and shortcomings in candidate selection and grant 
administration. Th ese fi ndings are in line with Isenberg’s argument ( 2011 ) 
that nonmarket-based fi nancing often keeps bad companies from failing, 
which is detrimental because it does away with the Darwinist selection 
process otherwise set in motion by the equity fi nance market. According 
to Isenberg ( 2011 ), this process is a rigorous feedback mechanism that 
toughens up entrepreneurs and throws down a motivation to excel. Failure 
is often viewed by aspiring entrepreneurs as a valuable learning experience 
and as a necessary evil from a  societal perspective because it redeploys the 
entrepreneurs and the involved capital to work on other, potentially more 
promising projects (Isenberg  2011 ). Finally, the resources that market-
driven equity investors supply, such as managerial resources, access to net-
works, market expertise, and continuous mentoring (see Avnimelech et al. 
 2007 ), may be considered especially valuable in an early ecosystem, where 
entrepreneurs are comparably young and inexperienced. 
 Th e market environment for ICT-enabled products in resource-scarce 
countries that are still in the nascent years of their ICT industry provides 
a diffi  cult context for technology entrepreneurs. Th e research in Kenya 
has shown that a consumer base characterized by low-income, price sensi-
tivity, and a low willingness to try new products makes it hard to establish 
monetization through consumers. However, successful entrepreneurial 
strategies have emerged that focus on social problems and establish mon-
etization through governmental or donor institutions or that serve less 
price-sensitive local business clients or international consumers. 
 Th e current study found several enabling processes that can help estab-
lish the conditions for technology entrepreneurship in  resource-scarce 
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countries. Most importantly, I argue, the entrepreneurial support system 
in Nairobi has eff ectively substituted some of the resources and processes 
of ecosystem emergence that previous literature attributed to institu-
tions that form “the necessary fertile breeding ground” (Mason and 
Brown  2014 ). Open technology hubs, relevant competitions, confer-
ences, and accelerator programs were shown to be integral in generating 
global hype for the topic of technology in Kenya and play an essential 
role in building an active technology entrepreneurship scene. Further 
benefi ts that surfaced are the provision of entrepreneurial knowledge 
and training, creating and nurturing interest in technology entrepre-
neurship and conducive sociocultural norms, establishing trust among 
actors, and fostering innovation processes through connecting actors. 
Finally, technology hubs seem to play an important role in igniting con-
versations between various stakeholders about potential ICT business 
opportunities. Further, the infl ow of foreign human capital was found 
important in building fi rst ecosystem structures. In the short run, the 
infl ow bridges the talent scarcity seen in nascent phases and helps get 
fi rst entrepreneurial projects off  the ground. Because numerous entre-
preneurship scholars have argued for the need to develop entrepreneur-
ial skills through actual experience and from experienced entrepreneurs 
rather than from textbooks , these fi rst founders and support institution 
managers establish an important context for the development of local 
human capital. Finally, the commissioning of ICT products and services 
on behalf of institutional and NGO stakeholders has emerged as being 
pivotal in building initial market demand. 
 Development Trajectory of Tech Ecosystems 
in Resource-Scarce Contexts 
 Based on the insights from the Kenyan ecosystem presented here and 
using theoretical abduction, I propose a model of ICT ecosystem emer-
gence in resource-scarce countries. Because of the early stage of my 
research on this topic, I encourage others to further refi ne, reframe, and 
change the model. 
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 Th e model outlines four phases of development:
 1.  Establishment of a nationwide ICT infrastructure 
 2.  Establishment of institutionally facilitated corporate entrepreneurship 
to help build embryonic structures of a market for ICT-enabled prod-
ucts and lay the groundwork for an entrepreneurship support 
infrastructure 
 3.  Birth of fi rst ecosystem structures with signifi cant barriers to 
entrepreneurship 
 4.  Formation of fi rst ventures, creating spin-off  eff ects that help build the 
conditions for further entrepreneurship 
 In the fi rst phase, signifi cant investments need to be mobilized to 
achieve a connection to the global grid of ICT infrastructure, and hence, 
set a minimum technological basis for ICT ecosystem emergence. Crucial 
concerns at this stage include the privatization of the telecommunica-
tions sector and collaboration with international development agencies 
to supplement the signifi cant investments. 
 In the second phase, the market for telecommunication products 
needs to be developed by ensuring countrywide accessibility of telecom-
munications products and services. Th e consumer needs to be educated 
to be familiar with new transaction patterns and gain a minimum of 
ICT literacy. Seeing the large scope and signifi cant challenges faced, it 
is recommended that government and development institutions help 
enable corporations to create such a basis. Th e example of Kenya show-
cases these two stages, in which policy actors fi rst collaborated to estab-
lish ICT connectivity and the telecommunication sector was privatized 
and then multiple stakeholders collaborated to empower the corporation 
Safaricom to build the local market for mobile telecommunication and 
mobile payments. Especially with regard to the establishment of M-PESA, 
researchers have stressed the close collaboration among policymakers 
(Kenyan Central Bank), development stakeholders (UK Department 
for International Development), and corporate interests (Vodafone) that 
was required to successfully introduce the service (Hughes and Lonie 
 2007 ). From a regulatory perspective, this requires policymakers to 
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impose  relatively lenient regulations, which is why Alexandre ( 2011 ) has 
argued that at this phase of ecosystem development “regulation needs to 
follow innovation” in cases where the benefi ts of ICT-related products 
outweigh the potential risks of underregulation. Given the necessity for 
ICT-enabled products and services to handle payments and the lack of 
alternatives to cash-based payments in many contexts, the prioritization 
of a mobile payments mechanism stands as a prerequisite for the emer-
gence of an ecosystem. 4 Finally, in this phase, initial community-building 
eff orts among potential entrepreneurs and other ecosystem stakehold-
ers emerge, and discussions around the value, nature, and techniques of 
using ICT to carry out particular activities need to get started (Mezias 
and Kuperman  2001 ; Munir and Phillips  2002 ). Th is is the stage that 
Gustafsson et al. ( 2015 ) called the “emergence of activity networks” and 
“formation of industry identity.” Th e fi ndings presented earlier indicate 
that in resource-scarce countries, these processes can develop around 
entrepreneurial support infrastructure, such as open technology hubs, 
accelerators, and incubators as well as entrepreneurship competitions. 
Th e foundations of such institutions should therefore be established as 
early as in phase two of ecosystem development. 
 In the third phase, the preconditions of basic consumer ICT literacy 
and widespread use of telecommunication and mobile payment services 
are established. Th e previously launched community-building processes 
of the entrepreneurial support system have given rise to a closely con-
nected tech scene. However, given the very early stage of ecosystem devel-
opment and lack of wider ecosystem conditions, the environment is still 
far from conducive to new venture creation. Th e Kenyan ICT ecosystem 
stood at this phase at the time of my empirical research, and as previ-
ously discussed, stark challenges in the state of human capital, culture, 
fi nance, and markets prevailed. Nevertheless, the study also showed that 
enabling processes set in motion by the support infrastructure lead, over 
time, to the establishment of a sounder human capital base as well as 
to the formation of conducive sociocultural norms around technology 
entrepreneurship. Further, the available entrepreneurship support insti-
tutions were central in creating hype for technology in Kenya, which was 
4  See Andersen and Drejer ( 2008 ) for a discussion of systemic innovations. 
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important for the infl ow of fi nancial resources and provided a space for 
fi nancers and policymakers to interact with members of the tech scene. 
Enabling factors include the infl ow of foreign human capital, the devel-
opment stakeholder’s provision of entrepreneurial grant fi nancing, and 
their creation of market demand through commissioning ICT-enabled 
products and services. 
 If the challenges of the third phase are managed and the enablers con-
tinue to build the conditions for entrepreneurship, over time, more and 
more technology ventures will manage to establish themselves. Th e suc-
cessful establishment of fi rst technology ventures advances market emer-
gence in institutionalizing new transactional patterns (Leblebici et  al. 
 1991 ) and demonstrating market viability (Phaal et al.  2011 ). Further, 
identity-building processes that give sociocultural legitimacy to the entre-
preneurs begin to take place (Aldrich and Fiol  1994 ). 
 With increasing venture formation, eventually the fourth phase of eco-
system emergence is reached. In this phase, a critical mass of technology 
ventures has formed, creating spin-off  eff ects that bring improvements 
along all ecosystem dimensions. Th ese eff ects create self-reinforcing vir-
tuous cycles of entrepreneurship activity that leads to the creation of an 
 ecosystem that, in turn, supports further entrepreneurial activity (Isenberg 
 2011 ; Mason and Brown  2014 ). For instance, the human capital base 
is upgraded through training and experience, and serial entrepreneurs 
emerge when former key employees leave their organizations to found 
their own new ventures (Keeble and Wilkinson  1999 ). Financial capi-
tal, mentoring, and access to networks become available when successful 
entrepreneurs act as angel investors after a successful exit (Feldman  2001 ). 
In this vein, Mason and Brown ( 2014 ) stressed the size of entrepreneurial 
exits as an important leverage factor. Ideally exits should leave entrepre-
neurs and senior management suffi  ciently wealthy so that they can rein-
vest their wealth in other ventures and focus full time on the creation of 
more entrepreneurship. Th e vital role of emerging serial entrepreneurs 
and angel investors as drivers of ecosystem growth has been shown empir-
ically in earlier studies (Drexler et al.  2014 ). Furthermore, these emerg-
ing entrepreneurial success stories build legitimacy for the career path 
of entrepreneurship in general, shaping social norms around risk, fail-
ure and wealth creation and inspiring new generations of  entrepreneurs 
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(Isenberg  2011 ). With a critical mass of clients, a support network of 
professional and technological services emerges. Th ese include law fi rms 
with expertise in intellectual property, venture capital fi rms, management 
consultants, and technology-marketing fi rms (Kenney and Patton  2005 ). 
Additionally, the market becomes increasingly easier to penetrate as ICT 
products become more established. Finally, experienced entrepreneurs 
often take on public positions or advise policymakers in the creation of 
entrepreneurship-friendly policy (Isenberg  2011 ). 
 Conclusion 
 Th is chapter has off ered a holistic perspective on the barriers to and 
enablers of the maturation of Kenya’s early ICT ecosystem across the 
dimensions of culture, human capital, entrepreneurship support systems, 
fi nance, policy, and markets. Enriching these empirical insights with rel-
evant theory on how ecosystems emerge and develop, I have proposed a 
model that explains how ICT ecosystems can emerge in resource-scarce 
contexts despite the absence of important preconditions. Th e model 
shows how enabling processes can be drawn on to substitute and estab-
lish the condition factors. Th e recommendations developed below are 
addressed to governments, development stakeholders, and practitioners 
in resource-scarce countries that seek to move their young ICT ecosystem 
toward maturity.
 1.  Get the foundations right—ICT infrastructure, mobile payment, 
telecommunications market, and entrepreneurial support 
infrastructure 
 Th e fact that technology ecosystems need, at the very minimum, ICT 
infrastructure, a way of handling payments, and a functioning telecom-
munications market is not surprising. What is surprising is the central 
role that the research presented here found entrepreneurial support insti-
tutions to play in catalyzing early industry emergence processes and estab-
lishing the conditions for entrepreneurship, particularly for developing 
human capital and creating interest in technology entrepreneurship. Th e 
establishment of support infrastructure, such as open technology hubs, 
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entrepreneurship accelerators, and competitions, should therefore be 
undertaken very early in the ecosystem emergence process, both through 
private and public sector eff orts.
 2.  Enable the enablers—entrepreneurship support infrastructure, 
infl ow of foreign human capital, and public sector market for ICT 
products 
 In addition to the pivotal role of entrepreneurship support infra-
structure, the infl ow of foreign human capital has proved benefi cial in 
overcoming human capital shortages in the short term and in building 
a sounder resource base in the medium term. A structured program to 
increase infl ow and the exchange of relevant human capital between the 
local and more mature ecosystems would further leverage such eff ects. 
Th e program could proactively invite entrepreneurs and facilitate the pro-
cesses through arranging visas, accommodations, and the like. In addi-
tion, an exchange scholarship program for local talent to gain working 
experiences and networks in other ecosystems would also be  benefi cial. 
In this vein, diaspora Kenyans active in ICT industries abroad may prove 
valuable and may be willing to provide mentoring or even angel invest-
ments for emergent Kenyan ICT ventures when invited to do so. Such 
human capital development interventions need to be made alongside 
ongoing educational reforms. Another enabler is the commissioning of 
ICT-enabled products and services to solve social problems on behalf 
of governmental, NGO, or international development stakeholders. In 
Kenya, these have emerged as being key for early market emergence and 
the emergence of fi rst technology ventures. To support the emergence 
of an ICT product market, some governments have also provided tax 
incentives for private sector companies that buy from new and local ICT 
ventures (see Drexler et al.  2014 , pp. 77–80, for more information on 
creating early market demand).
 3.  Create kick-starter fi rms that set spin-off  eff ects in motion 
 Th e establishment of fi rst technology ventures is critical to ecosystem 
emergence because they set powerful spin-off  processes in motion that, 
over time, automatically eradicate some of the barriers to emergence. For 
the provision of entrepreneurial fi nancing, this means that despite the 
8 Building ICT Entrepreneurship Ecosystems... 249
somewhat ambiguous impact of nonmarket-based sources of fi nancing, 
their benefi ts outweigh their drawbacks in this context. Because tradi-
tional sources of early-stage entrepreneurial fi nancing are either not pres-
ent or unattainable, alternatives need to be provided. In addition to the 
competitions and grants that were available in Kenya, I therefore pro-
pose to introduce an entrepreneurial stipend program fi nanced by public 
stakeholders. In such a program, entrepreneurs receive a monthly stipend 
to cover their living expenses during the fi rst phases of the venturing 
process, accompanied with relevant mentoring in order to produce viable 
businesses for market-based investors to invest in. A major example is 
Germany’s EXIST technology entrepreneurship scholarship program. It 
is administered through university incubators and has been shown to 
positively infl uence network formation and the integration of universi-
ties in regional entrepreneurship ecosystems (Koschatzky  2003 ; Exist.de 
 2016 ). In this spirit, developmental fi nance organizations should pro-
vide investment capital and resources for operational costs to existing 
early-stage investment funds and accelerators to address the seed capital 
shortage (see GSMA  2014 ). Th ese funds are already capable of selecting 
promising ventures and providing nonfi nancial resources and hence are 
in a better position to administer seed capital than, for example, gov-
ernmental stakeholders or donor agencies themselves (Avnimelech et al. 
 2007 ). Simultaneous eff orts to support human capital formation, as 
proposed earlier, will off set at least some of the detrimental side eff ects 
of such interventions. Finally, policymakers can enable spin-off  eff ects 
by providing tax breaks for angel investments and entrepreneurs and by 
further removing bureaucratic obstacles to new ventures. To achieve the 
latter, other countries have installed offi  ces or contact staff  that provide 
swift governmental services, such as business registration, operational 
permits, and employee visa arrangements, to technology fi rms. 5 
 4.  Engage practitioners in continuously refi ning your ecosystem- 
fostering strategy 
 It is—and should be—a common recommendation to governments to 
involve local practitioners in the design of their entrepreneurship policy, 
5  See, for example, Berlin-partner ( 2016 ). 
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because these are the actors who know about the unique challenges and 
enablers present in the ecosystem (Isenberg  2010 ,  2011 ; Vogel,  2013 ). As 
this chapter has shown, taking a holistic and multidimensional ecosystem 
perspective requires decision-makers to account for hundreds of diff erent 
factors. Th is can only be achieved through intense and ongoing exchanges 
with ecosystem stakeholders from the respective dimensions. Th e need for 
such bottom-up information and co-design of policies is especially pivotal 
in resource-scarce contexts, where a lack of knowledge of approaches that 
work in such contexts might tempt policymakers to copy generic policy pre-
scriptions that “worked in the West.” In Kenya, many achievements in kick-
starting the ecosystem were driven by practitioners themselves, who took 
the initiative to open technology hubs and other support institutions. Such 
stakeholders are an invaluable resource because they already have a good 
overview of the ecosystem. Policymakers therefore need to put processes in 
place that enable the engagement of practitioners in the design and continu-
ous refi nement of their ecosystem-fostering strategy. Examples for such pro-
cesses include establishing an open-door culture for ecosystem participants 
to talk with policymakers as well as regular fi xed- day meetings and round-
table discussions that bring together experts from all ecosystem dimensions. 
Once such processes are in place, policymakers can start launching ongoing 
rounds of intervention and feedback that facilitate the emergence of an envi-
ronment that breeds high-growth technology entrepreneurship.
 5.  Anticipate the challenges and prepare to meet them 
 A dynamic perspective acknowledges that ecosystems face diff erent 
challenges at diff erent phases and enables participants to prepare for what 
is coming next. Two challenges that nascent ecosystems may encoun-
ter on the way to maturation have emerged. First, the suggested early 
empowerment of a private sector enterprise to build embryonic tele-
communication market structures may later lead to the presence of a 
powerful incumbent that stifl es competition and entrepreneurial eff orts. 
Policymakers should address this from the start, when, for example, nego-
tiating licenses with such a corporation, and fi nd ways to encourage the 
incumbent to interact with the ecosystem at later stages (also see GSMA 
 2014 ). Second, the infl ow of foreign ecosystem participants leads to a 
culturally very diverse entrepreneurship scene. Th e research presented 
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here found that dissonant underlying assumptions around the goals and 
processes of entrepreneurship between local and international stakehold-
ers cause friction that disturbs ecosystem functioning. It is therefore 
important to enter into a dialogue about the value of local venturing 
processes and the need to integrate the various approaches. Continuous 
eff orts in that direction may lead to the institutionalization of better ven-
turing processes that benefi t from internationally proven practices while 
also being locally responsive. 
 Future Research 
 Th e research presented here has provided much-needed insights into the 
challenges and enablers that shape the development trajectory of nascent 
technology ecosystems in resource-scarce contexts. However, these fi nd-
ings have only scratched the surface of what is out there and, given the 
qualitative nature of the research methods, require validation and exten-
sion through further grounded theory research. In this spirit, anthropo-
logical and sociological research is urgently needed to understand more 
about the contexts’ cultural dynamics. Potential starting points for such 
explorations could be the increased uncertainty avoidance of potential 
entrepreneurs caused by feelings of responsibility for their extended family 
members, the role of networks around entrepreneurship support institu-
tions in establishing trust in an otherwise institutionalized low-trust con-
text, and the dissonant cultural values and venturing practices between 
international and local practitioners that impede venture creation. 
Moreover, further research on the question of entrepreneurial fi nancing 
mechanisms that are appropriate in resource-scarce and young ecosystems 
is pressing because as this research indicates, neither non-market- based 
fi nancing nor the Western venture capital model provide a fully satisfying 
fi t (see Chapter  14 Gugu and Mworia in this book). Are there local cul-
tural practices that could be drawn on to develop a fi nancing mechanism 
that is more appropriate to the context? What are ways to draw in more 
local investors? 
 Th is research’s model of nascent ecosystem development in resource- 
scarce contexts outlines relatively broad phases that need refi nement. 
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Researchers may want to compare diff erent ICT ecosystems across 
resource-scarce contexts in longitudinal studies to determine challenges 
that are inherent to diff erent ecosystem development phases and how 
to overcome them. Although the model focuses on very early stages of 
ecosystem development, the Kenyan ecosystem in 2016 seems to be 
approaching maturation. How does maturation integrate into the model? 
What learnings does Kenya’s maturation provide for strategies of fostering 
nascent ecosystems? What new challenges and enablers arise at this phase? 
My research argues that, for ecosystem maturation,  entrepreneurial spin-
off s are pivotal and that both large entrepreneurial exits as well as formally 
new ventures that manage to grow to a large-scale leverage spin- off  eff ects 
(Mason and Brown  2014 ; Mayer  2013 ). Large exits, however, require sev-
eral rounds of growth capital so that entrepreneurs can grow their business 
to a stage where substantial value has been created, and they demand the 
presence of large corporations or potent investors to act as buyers (Mason 
and Brown  2014 ). Moreover, the rapid growth of fi rms may require the 
collection of equity on public capital markets (Mayer  2013 ). Are these 
conditions suffi  ciently established in Kenya and other resource-scarce con-
texts? And: Do phenomena that work in resource- rich contexts, such as 
crowding-in of investors, work in resource-scarce contexts? 6 
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 Conversation #8 
 Women Working in Tech: 
Making the Invisible Visible 
 Judith Owigar of AkiraChix 
 Judith Owigar  is an African entrepreneur who uses technology as a tool to 
empower youth and young women. She believes that exposure to, education 
about, and actual use of technology can improve quality of life—and as such 
change the world for the better. Judith is a co-founder and the operations 
director of AkiraChix, a not-for-profi t that aims to inspire and develop a 
successful force of women who create technology solutions, change women’s 
perception of technology, and change Africa’s future. She is also the founder 
of JuaKali, an online platform that links skilled manual laborers in Kenya’s 
informal sector—commonly known as JuaKali workers (Kiswahili for “hot 
sun”)—with employers in the construction industry. 
 What is the story behind AkiraChix? 
 A group of friends and I started AkiraChix in 2010. It all stemmed 
from the need to see more people like us in the fi eld of technology. Th ree 
of us in the original co-founding team worked in the same company, and 
we constantly felt we needed to prove that our work was good enough. We 
were three women among the total of fi ve developers, and outsiders from 
the neighboring company would come and ask, “Who actually codes in 
this offi  ce?”—then they would look at the dude. We felt invisible. 
 My generation grew up with the common stereotype that women 
have lower mathematical or critical thinking ability than men. Th is has 
aff ected how men view women in the workplace and also how women 
viewed themselves. It has led both men and women to question the place 
of women in science, technology, engineering, and math fi elds. Our per-
sonal experience as women developers led us to start a community for 
women in technology where we are visible, can support each other, and 
can grow our skills—because we wanted to be the best in our fi eld! 
 What is the biggest fear when it comes to working in an environment 
that is male dominated? 
 One of my greatest fears was to be my true self as woman in a male- 
dominated space. When I fi rst entered the technology space as a univer-
sity student, my fi rst thought was to fi nd a way to fi t in. At that time, I 
thought the best way to fi t in and blend with the crowd was to act more 
like my classmates and play down my feminine attributes. Th e fact that 
I was a woman by itself made me stand out. My choice of clothing was 
greatly infl uenced by the fact that I did not want my womanhood to be 
the center of attention. It was easier for me to wear baggy clothes because 
I was not confi dent in my feminity. Over the course of the years, I have 
become confi dent in the fact that I am a woman and I am a technolo-
gist. I have come to realize that I need to hold both identities in order to 
be my true self. I think this is one of the underlying reasons why many 
women shy away from male-dominated spaces, because you feel like you 
have to give up a part of yourself to fi t in. One of the reasons I believe 
AkiraChix is such a strong force is because we give women the freedom 
to be themselves. 
260 J. Owigar
 When was the fi rst time you realized that AkiraChix was going to 
 work? 
 Our point of validation came when we participated in hackathons. 
Th ere used to be very many hackathons at the iHub, and as usual there 
were always more men than women. In the early years of the iHub, 
most of the girls who participated in the hackathons were members of 
AkiraChix. We usually worked together as a team. Th e point of valida-
tion came when other women would come to the event and would look 
at us and ask to join us. From that moment on, it validated our point that 
there was a need to have a women-only space where women could take 
risks, fail, learn, and succeed. 
 What is the vision of AkiraChix? 
 AkiraChix’s vision is to nurture generations of women in Africa who 
use technology to create solutions and positively aff ect their community. 
In order to make our vision a reality, we would like to have organizations 
like AkiraChix all over Africa. Ultimately, we would like to see more 
women join the fi eld of technology. We will say that we have accom-
plished our vision when the representation of women in the fi eld of tech-
nology is no longer an issue. 
 When we started building the technology ecosystem in Kenya, 
we used to copy a lot of what we saw in Silicon Valley. We used to 
read a lot in Mashable, TechCrunch, and so on. We read about all 
these start-ups that seemed to be overnight successes, with their mas-
sive valuations and big IPOs. For a moment, we felt like we were 
in Silicon Valley ourselves, forgetting that we live in Kenya, where 
very few people have much disposable income and when it comes to 
technology, they want to spend their money on something relevant. 
Very few people in Kenya use technology just because it is fun. We 
have realized that in order to sell in this market, the service needs 
to serve a real need or address a clear pain point. Over time we have 
realized that it takes more work to build a software- based business-to-
client service than a business-to-business service—and we really had 
to rewire our thinking with regard to operating a technology business 
in our context. 
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 As a co-founder of AkiraChix, I looked to Silicon Valley to give me 
answers on how to work on the issue of women’s low representation in 
technology. But over time, I realized we had a better chance of solving the 
issue for ourselves right here in Africa, because the technology ecosystem 
was young and in its formative stages. If we tackled the problem before it 
became as institutionalized as it is in Silicon Valley, then we had a better 
chance of success. I came to see that we are operating at the best time to 
address this problem. Our hope is that, 20 years from now, women will 
account for more than 40 % of the workforce in the fi eld of technology. 
 In order to achieve this vision, we want to scale to fi ve training centers 
in towns and cities all over Africa. We also want to expand to the major 
urban centres within Kenya. And in order to reach more African women 
technologists, we plan to partner with hubs and co-working spaces all 
over the continent to support their initiatives of having more women 
represented in technology. We are currently developing the Akirachix 
model that we can share with interested people and organizations. Th is 
is the best way and time for us to write the story of African women in 
technology. 
 How did you create a community for women? 
 We started by having monthly meet-ups for women in technology. 
Over time, we realized that we were sharing a lot of information and 
knowledge among ourselves that other women could benefi t from. We 
therefore decided to start a training program that targeted young women 
from low-income areas. We wanted to target young women who did not 
have an opportunity to be in the technology industry. Over time, we also 
started a high school program so that we could expose girls in secondary 
schools to careers in the technology industry. We had realized that many 
girls did not consider careers in technology, because they did not know 
about them, and if they did they did not see women whom they could 
identify with. 
 As we continue to grow our community of women in technology, we 
have also realized that we need to work with men in the industry as our 
partners. Th is is because the women we work with do not exist in a vac-
uum. Th ey work and study with men in school or on the job. One of the 
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ways we have been doing this is by engaging men in our programs. Many 
of our trainers, for example, are men. On a wider scale, we encourage 
the members of our network to participate in events hosted at the iHub 
co-working space. One of our greatest realizations as AkiraChix was that 
we are a subcommunity within the greater tech community. We are not a 
separate entity. Recognizing this and communicating it to the tech com-
munity has made them more open to supporting our activities. 
 What are the kinds of struggles you get exposed to as a female 
entrepreneur? 
 Th ere is a lot of sexism in Kenyan culture, and it is hard for a woman 
to be viewed as a competent leader. If a woman gets assaulted or bat-
tered, she usually gets blamed for it irrespective of how the man acted. 
It is usually considered to be the woman’s responsibility to prevent such 
acts of violence. For women who are leaders in technology or leaders in 
other professions, the bar is set much higher. We are expected to navigate 
unwritten social rules when dealing with both men and women. Th ere is 
also the assumption that marriage validates a woman’s leadership abilities. 
Th is can make it harder for a young unmarried woman like me to get 
respect in certain circles. 
 Being a part of Acumen’s East Africa Fellows Program has helped me 
understand and appreciate myself as an infl uencer in my community and 
helped me defi ne my purpose. Th rough this experience, I no longer look 
down on myself just because I am young—and I strive to be an example 
in my speech, conduct, love, and faith. 
 How did it happen that you were on the same panel with Presidents 
Uhuru Kenyatta and Barack Obama at the Global Entrepreneurship 
Summit (GES)? What did it mean to you? 
 I was contacted two weeks before the conference and asked if I was inter-
ested in participating in a panel at the GES. I was asked to give a two minute 
pitch of any subject I would like to discuss. I gave a mini elevator pitch on 
Akirachix. At that moment I did not realize I would be giving a more refi ned 
version of that pitch while seated between the President of the US, Barack 
Obama, and the President of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta, two weeks later. 
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 Th at experience gave validation to the work we as AkiraChix have been 
doing. On an individual level, I felt that I represented very many young 
African women who are trying to make a diff erence in their communi-
ties. At that moment on stage, I felt I was speaking for young women all 
over Africa. 
 Th ank you, Judith! 
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 Over the past decade, national and international interest in technol-
ogy entrepreneurship in Kenya has surged, in part as a result of the 
rapid dissemination of mobile technologies, the installation of digital 
infrastructure grids, and the growing consumer markets for technol-
ogy in East Africa (Hussey  2015 ). In Nairobi in particular, computer 
scientists, bloggers, and technology enthusiasts have been creating and 
seizing opportunities to build technology businesses. To support their 
endeavors, a number of innovation hubs—spaces dedicated to nurtur-
ing technology entrepreneurship, usually through business incubation 
or acceleration—have become operational. At the same time, local and 
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international impact, angel, and seed fund investors have been fl ocking 
to Nairobi in hopes of identifying and sponsoring Nairobi’s next big 
technology start-ups. 
 As such, the budding community around technology entrepreneur-
ship in Kenya seems well positioned to “churn out one successful start-up 
after the next,” as one of our informants put it. Yet, entrepreneurs, inno-
vation hubs, journalists, and investors alike agree that creating sustainable 
technology businesses in Nairobi has continued to be extremely diffi  cult 
(Quartz  2014 ; Mulupi  2013 ). What is more, patience is beginning to 
wane—and skeptics have begun voicing doubts about Nairobi’s potential 
as the metropolitan center for East African technology entrepreneurship 
(Reuters  2014 ). 
 For more than 20 years now, a rich stream of research has shown 
that, in emerging markets, low levels of consumer demand, weakly 
developed fi nancial markets, ineffi  cient administrative systems, and 
underdeveloped physical infrastructures can constitute signifi cant barri-
ers to launching a successful business (see, e.g., Honig  1998 ; Pissarides 
et al.  2003 ). Although these factors may partially explain some of the 
diffi  culties that entrepreneurs encounter, our attention was drawn to 
another one—the relative novelty of technology entrepreneurship per 
se in Nairobi: Th e fi rst computer science courses were introduced across 
the city’s universities only in the late 1990s, and the spread of technol-
ogy—especially mobile phones and Internet grids—began less than a 
decade ago (Th e Economist  2012 ).  Could it be, then, that  new forms of 
entrepreneurial activity in emerging economies—in our case, technol-
ogy entrepreneurship in Nairobi—are faced with added challenges as a 
result of their novelty? 
 Drawing on an in-depth qualitative case study consisting of over 
70 interviews and various written accounts, we explored the perspec-
tives of those directly involved in technology entrepreneurship in 
Nairobi, i.e. technology entrepreneurs, innovation hub staff , and inves-
tors. We found that contradictory perspectives about the availability 
of capital, divergent views on what constituted key business skills, 
and misaligned perceptions of potential technology consumer mar-
kets characterized interactions among the actors involved in Nairobi’s 
technology  entrepreneurship. From our analysis, we conclude that 
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these disconnects constitute an additional challenge to novel forms of 
 entrepreneurial activity by complicating capital fl ows, business skills 
development, market identifi cation, and thus ultimately the creation 
of new technology businesses. 
 Th e chapter is organized as follows: First, we provide an overview of 
existing research on the challenges to entrepreneurship in emerging mar-
kets, followed by a brief refl ection on the nature of new forms of entre-
preneurial activities. After a summary of our methodology and research 
context, we explicate our fi ndings. Th e chapter concludes with recom-
mendations for those seeking to foster an environment conducive to 
technology entrepreneurship in Nairobi (and possibly in other contexts 
where technology entrepreneurship constitutes a new form of entrepre-
neurial activity). 
 Challenges to Entrepreneurship 
 Barriers to Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets 
 Emerging markets can be defi ned as contexts that exhibit a high pace of 
economic development while lacking institutional features such as sta-
ble political, fi nancial, and legal systems; regulations; and infrastructures 
(Hoskisson et al.  2000 ). An important stream of research has investigated 
entrepreneurship in emerging markets and, identifi ed four central barriers 
to entrepreneurship that often persist: lack of fi nancial capital, low levels of 
demand for new products and services, ineffi  cient administrative systems, 
and underdeveloped physical infrastructures. Th ese constraints especially 
characterize sub-Saharan Africa, where business creation “is typically more 
diffi  cult than in other parts of the world” (Rivera-Santos et al.  2015 ). 
 First, emerging economies tend to exhibit rudimentary and some-
times barely functioning fi nancial markets. Often linked to more gen-
eral problems of high depreciation and infl ation rates (Pissarides et  al. 
 2003 ), this causes diffi  culties in securing capital for business creation. In 
Kenya, for example, interest rates average around 9 percent (Julian and 
Ofori-Dankwa  2013 ; World Bank  2015b ). Consequently, entrepreneurs 
often have no choice but to rely on personal savings or informal lending 
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through their social networks in order to fund their ventures (Th ornton 
et al.  2011 ). 
 Second, emerging markets tend to exhibit relatively low levels of 
demand for new products and services. Orser et al. ( 2000 ) explained that 
because subsistence incomes prevail in emerging markets, potential cus-
tomers are less likely to risk spending the small amounts of available cash 
on new products and services whose functionality has not yet been con-
fi rmed by widespread adoption. In Kenya, although penetration rates for 
mobile phones are relatively high, consumers have been comparatively 
hesitant to buy technology innovations that were locally created. Instead, 
consumers prefer the products and services of global technology com-
panies such as IBM, Nokia, and Huawei, which dominate mobile and 
software markets in Kenya (Reuters  2014 ). 
 Th ird, legal and administrative systems are often marked by slow 
procedures, corruption, and a lack of property rights enforcement (Peci 
et  al.  2012 ), which make processes associated with the creation and 
operation of a new business time-consuming and unnecessarily costly 
(Aidis et al.  2012 ; Peng and Shekshnia  2001 ). Kenya ranks 136th (of 
189 economies) for ease of doing business, with administrative costs 
for setting up a business requiring over 40 percent of the average gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita (World Bank  2015a ). Often, there-
fore, in order to save costs and time, entrepreneurs hesitate to register 
their new businesses, which, in turn, excludes them from property rights 
protection and other legal safety nets, as fragmented as they may be 
(Khavul et al.  2009 ). 
 Finally, infrastructures are frequently inadequate for business cre-
ation in emerging markets, impeding access to suppliers, consumer 
markets, and market information (Coad and Tamvada  2012 ). Nairobi 
struggles particularly with the insuffi  cient capacity of its roads and 
its power grid (Blas  2013 ). Entrepreneurs in emerging markets may 
therefore incur additional costs in order to reach suppliers as well as 
customers. One frequently used strategy is to rely on personal net-
works to access market information and suppliers and to disseminate 
products or services through family and friends (Jack and Anderson 
 2002 ; Th ornton et al.  2011 ). 
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 New Forms of Entrepreneurial Activity 
 In a sense, any entrepreneurial activity is new, because it consists of the 
discovery and exploitation of previously unrecognized but potentially 
profi table business opportunities (Shane and Venkatamaran  2000 ). 
Researchers, however, have distinguished several forms of entrepreneur-
ial activity. Th ornton ( 1999 ), for example, distinguished demand- and 
supply-driven forms. Kunkel ( 2001 ) developed a typology that distin-
guished between need-driven, technology-driven, low-growth-potential, 
income-substituting, part-time, and lifestyle forms of entrepreneurship. 
 In addition to motivation-based approaches, entrepreneurial activity 
can also be classifi ed according to the types of new ventures that ensue 
(cf. Gartner et al.  1989 ). Social enterprises, for instance, are associated 
with distinctive forms of entrepreneurial activity. By combining social 
and market objectives, social enterprises’ business models, strategies, 
and funding streams diff er signifi cantly from those of more traditional 
businesses (Austin et al.  2006 ). Technology businesses, similarly, are also 
associated with distinct types of entrepreneurial activity. A key diff er-
entiator, as Beckman et  al. ( 2012 ) emphasized, is that innovations in 
science and engineering, rather than market demand, drive technology 
entrepreneurship. 
 When new forms of entrepreneurial activity fi rst emerge, they may 
face a variety of challenges. For example, structures that facilitate the 
new form may not yet be in place. Social entrepreneurs, for example, 
initially had diffi  culty in formally registering their businesses, because 
the organizational structure blending social and for-profi t values did not 
yet legally exist (Galera and Borzaga  2009 ). Similarly, reliable patent-
ing processes for the commercialization of technologies only developed 
over time, as technology entrepreneurship became established as a dis-
tinctive type of entrepreneurial activity (Datta et  al.  2015 ). Moreover, 
traditional stakeholders such as investors or universities may not initially 
understand and share the perspectives, values, or practices associated 
with the new forms of entrepreneurial activity. By taking stock of current 
developments, Cooper ( 1973 ), presented and described to the academic 
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 community the then-new phenomenon of technology entrepreneurship 
in North America. 
 In summary, entrepreneurial activity may be classifi ed according to 
the drivers or the types of ventures created. In either case, new forms of 
entrepreneurial activity are associated with additional challenges, such as 
limited acceptance from stakeholders or a lack of legal support. However, 
research so far has focused on industrialized economies, where new types 
of entrepreneurs do not also encounter the lack of fi nancial markets, 
low levels of demand, ineff ective policies, and weak infrastructure that 
entrepreneurs in emerging markets must cope with. As a result, little is 
understood about the challenges associated specifi cally with new forms of 
entrepreneurial activity in emerging markets. 
 A Case Study of Technology Entrepreneurship 
in Nairobi 
 To learn more, therefore, we drew on an in-depth qualitative case study 
highlighting the challenges associated with new forms of entrepreneur-
ial activity in Nairobi. Entrepreneurship itself is, of course, not new in 
the region. Informal entrepreneurs such as the  jua kali (Kiswahili for 
“hot sun”) as well as entrepreneurial activity related to agriculture and 
real estate have existed for decades (King  1996 ). However, technology 
entrepreneurship constitutes a new type of entrepreneurial activity. In 
comparison with existing types, technology entrepreneurship relies heav-
ily on science innovations and therefore a strong technology skill and 
knowledge base. Nairobi’s universities, however, only graduated their fi rst 
computer scientists in 1997 (20 students at the University of Nairobi), 
1998 (21 students at the Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and 
Technology), and 2003 (20 students at Kenyatta University). 1 In addi-
tion, unlike agriculture and real estate entrepreneurship, software and 
mobile technology entrepreneurship caters to consumers who already 
own the necessary technological hardware. A potential Kenyan consumer 
base for technology entrepreneurship only evolved in the mid-2000s, 
1  Th ese fi gures were provided by our informants. 
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 following signifi cant infrastructural improvements and the rapid dissem-
ination of mobile phones across the country. In 2007, only 30 percent 
of Kenyans owned a mobile phone; in 2014, the fi gure stood at roughly 
80 percent (Communications Authority of Kenya  2015 ). Finally, tech-
nology enterprises tend to compete globally, because technology inno-
vations—particularly software and mobile-technology innovations—can 
be relatively independent of context (Wickham and Vecchi  2008 ). Th is 
further distinguishes technology entrepreneurship from many other 
forms of entrepreneurial activity, which tend to be localized. 
 Since 2010, a variety of innovation hubs have taken up operations in 
Nairobi to promote and facilitate the creation of technology ventures. 
Manske ( 2014 ) remarked on the hubs’ centrality to technology entre-
preneurship in the city, writing that “until 2010, around the time when 
iHub (one of Nairobi’s fi rst innovation hubs) was becoming a reality 
there wasn’t much to say about the local tech ecosystem.” Currently, at 
least six innovation hubs operate out of Nairobi. 
 Our case study consists of more than 70 semi-structured qualitative 
interviews with technology entrepreneurs, investors, innovation hub 
staff , and technology professionals in Nairobi, and explores their views 
on technology entrepreneurship. Th e interviews ranged from 30 minutes 
to 2 hours, with an average of 65 minutes apiece. In addition, Angela 
Okune, the second author of this chapter, served as the research director 
at iHub, Nairobi’s largest innovation space for technology entrepreneur-
ship, giving her detailed insight into various social dynamics over time 
that might have remained implicit during the interviews with some of our 
informants. We captured these insights in the form of a written narrative. 
 Taking a grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss  1967 )—in 
which the theory emerges from the data rather than data confi rming exist-
ing hypotheses—we analyzed our rich data by fi rst broadly grouping pieces 
of information. From this, three groups of actors—technology entrepre-
neurs, investors, and innovation hub staff —emerged as being central 
to the processes and practices of technology entrepreneurship. Th rough 
iterative coding, we compared the three groups’ views 2 on  technology 
2  Although the individuals within each group naturally also expressed some degree of heterogeneity 
in their views, an analysis of their individual views is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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 entrepreneurship, which revealed three recurring themes: fi nancial capital, 
business skills, and market readiness. Finally, we discussed our analysis 
with key informants to ensure validity and reliability. 
 Perspectives on Technology Entrepreneurship: 
Contradiction, Divergence, and Misalignment 
 Our fi ndings are presented in three parts. First, we bring to the surface 
the contradictory perspectives among technology entrepreneurs, innova-
tion hub staff , and investors on the role of fi nancial capital. Second, we 
examine the divergent understandings that the three groups have of the 
business skills that are crucial to technology entrepreneurship. Finally, 
we analyze how understandings of what constitutes a viable technology 
consumer market are misaligned. 
 Too Much Seed Capital or Too Little? 
 We found, perhaps most saliently, that the entrepreneurs, innovation hub 
staff , and investors had contradictory views about the availability of fi nancial 
capital for technology start-ups. Whereas the entrepreneurs saw a disconnect 
between the investments they seek and the investments that are available, the 
innovation hub staff  problematized an overall lack of capital, and the inves-
tors complained that start-ups have too much funding available. 
 Entrepreneurs: Disconnect between Available Funding 
and Funding Sought 
 Th e technology entrepreneurs spoke of three types of disconnects 
between the funding available and the funding sought: the accessibility 
of  funding generally, the volume of capital needed, and the type of invest-
ment sought. 
 First, our data revealed that many entrepreneurs looking for invest-
ments struggled to approach investors. A survey showed that fully 75 
percent of start-ups in Kenya looking for external fi nancing did not 
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 contact investors (GSMA  2014 ). Often, this seems to have been caused 
by information gaps and subsequent ambiguities about where and how to 
approach suitable investors. As one informant explained, “Th e informa-
tion about available funding doesn’t get to the right people.” 
 Second, many technology entrepreneurs perceived a challenge in 
attracting the appropriate amounts of capital. One entrepreneur said:
 Th ere’s a gap for investments for start-ups who probably need something 
like USD100,000. Because the guys who want to invest are willing to put 
in at least USD500,000, you know? And there’s this other side of investors 
who want to put in USD25,000 [or] USD10,000. And so the gap for 
growth and really making it matter is….lacking. 
 Finally, the entrepreneurs perceived a disconnect between the types 
of funding sought and the types of funding off ered. Although capital 
from donations and impact investments might be available, many entre-
preneurs have become wary of the associated administrative processes, 
often in the form of regular reports and presentations. As one technology 
entrepreneur explained:
 I was just sent a 13-page document that asked me to compile a 100-page 
report to get money from a fund. I don’t have the time to manage those 
kinds of strings attached. 
 Innovation Hubs: Lack of Seed Capital 
 By contrast, many founders and managers of innovation hubs in Nairobi 
perceived that an overall lack of seed capital was hampering the survival 
and growth of promising technology start-ups. As one hub employee 
elaborated: “It’s capital. Even in Silicon Valley they probably say that they 
don’t have enough capital. But it really is lacking here.” Innovation hubs 
particularly cited the overwhelming number of start-ups—an estimated 
80 percent (GSMA  2014 )—that rely on personal savings or family net-
works for capital. Moreover, capital through bank loans is also often inac-
cessible, with interest rates for technology start-ups hovering at around 20 
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percent (Reuters  2014 ). Th e manager of one innovation hub spelled out 
the consequences:
 When they [entrepreneurs] run out of money, they panic and start apply-
ing for random grants and competitions. Some of them just do another 
[incubation or acceleration] program — totally unreasonable. Th ey should 
focus on reaching their customers and making money that way instead of 
going from program to program. 
 Investors: Too Much Seed Funding 
 Th e venture capital and angel investors perceived a diff erent reality: 
Instead of a lack of capital, they saw an oversupply. One informant com-
plained that “Africa is over-fl ooded with money,” and other investors said 
they have struggled with a scarcity of investment opportunities:
 We have a couple of start-ups that we’re interested [in] investing in and 
we’re doing due diligence. But I’m not overloaded with so many good start- 
ups that we feel like we do not have enough money. 
 Th e investors off ered two explanations for the lack of investment oppor-
tunities. First, they perceived the prominence of grants and social invest-
ments as crowding out other investments. Over the past years, the 
World Bank’s InfoDev has disbursed multi-million-dollar grants to nur-
ture information and communication technology (ICT) innovation in 
Nairobi, while impact and not-for-profi t investors such as the Acumen 
Fund and the Rockefeller Foundation have operated their (East) African 
headquarters from Nairobi (InfoDev  2014 ; Th e East African  2012 ). A 
seed capital investor added:
 If a start-up can get a grant from one of the development agencies, they get 
the money and nobody asks what they do with it. Th ey are spoilt with all 
the development money. But we can’t do that. We are not a charity. 
 Second, the investors perceived a shortage of start-ups that met their 
criteria. In particular, many prospective investees were missing  formal 
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records that conventionally form the basis of investment decisions. 
Many investors expressed surprise about the lack of accounting prac-
tices and business planning among start-ups and subsequently doubted 
entrepreneurs’ ambition and trustworthiness. In one case, a seed fund 
manager explained that after a start-up received the funds’ investment, 
“they stopped answering…emails; they stopped paying their staff  and 
apparently moved to the coast with the money.” Such examples, although 
extreme, further decrease investors’ confi dence in potential investment 
opportunities. 
 Divergent Notions of Business Skills 
 Although the entrepreneurs, innovation hub staff , and investors agreed 
on the importance of building technology–business skills, we found that 
their views of how business skills should be prioritized diverged. Whereas 
the entrepreneurs focused on planning and strategy, the hub staff  priori-
tized the importance of team building and leadership, and the investors 
emphasized administrative and structural skills. 
 Entrepreneurs: Strategy and Planning 
 Th e entrepreneurs explained that the ability to iterate on a business model 
and product as well as selling ideas to potential investors and customers 
were crucial. In other words, they felt that being passionate about an idea 
was one component while turning the idea into a business was another:
 It’s easy to have an idea and you’re very passionate but nobody cares. You 
talk to investors and angels and they’re not interested. I think once you 
make your idea one that people care about you’ve got a sustainable 
business. 
 In addition to understanding how to move from idea to business, 
the entrepreneurs saw the creation of business structures as another key 
skill they lacked. Many of the entrepreneurs used start-up terms, such 
as “minimum viable product,” “prototyping,” or “fail fast,” during our 
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interviews. Th eir familiarity with such terms alone, however, seems insuf-
fi cient for successfully implementing the associated business structures. 
One entrepreneur remarked:
 Talk to the start-ups that are sitting there [co-working at a hub] and I guar-
antee you that not a single one of them would know their numbers. Th ey 
wouldn’t have anything available that investors would want to see. 
 Innovation Hubs: Team Building and Leadership 
 Th e innovation hub staff  primarily perceived the importance of building 
a strong founding team. Th is stemmed from innovation hub staff  seeing 
technology entrepreneurs focus on the technology aspects of their idea 
and, as they progressed from idea to product, realize they lacked the 
business skills to build a company. A member of one innovation hub’s 
staff  noted:
 Th e most ‘successful’ start-ups all have at least one businessperson with a 
nontechnical background. If someone is working alone on their business, 
most likely this person won’t be successful in their entrepreneurial attempt. 
 Almost half of Kenyan start-up founders have a technical background 
(GSMA  2014 ), and without a strong business leader on their team, such 
start-ups can end up fi xating on technical details such as perfecting code. 
 Second—and closely linked to building a strong team—the hub staff  
perceived a lack of leadership skills among entrepreneurs. Leadership was 
understood to be crucial for communicating the vision of the business 
and attracting high-quality team members who shared a founder’s vision 
and values. Leadership of a multidisciplinary team, however, may require 
founders to communicate their technological innovations and ideas in 
simple, eff ective terms to those who may be unfamiliar with technology 
jargon. A hub staff  member explained:
 It’s diffi  cult for young entrepreneurs to articulate [their vision and values] 
and to play that leadership role. Controlling for the quality of the idea, the 
next important factor is leadership. Leadership and business skills are 
intertwined. 
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 Investors: Business Administration 
 Th e investors expressed surprise at the lack of fi nancial and administra-
tive structures they saw among technology start-ups. A venture capital 
investor said:
 We need to see that they keep budgets, that they keep track of their income 
and their expenditures, that they have a plan for income, that they have a 
long-term plan for returns — and they don’t do that. Most of the start-ups 
don’t track anything they do and then there is nothing you can do. Because 
even if I think they have potential, I can’t make a positive decision. I have 
to justify why we…should fi nance them…and I can’t do that if I have 
nothing written…if I have no accounts to show me what they are doing. 
 To investors, accounting and fi nancial skills were therefore key for dem-
onstrating a start-up’s business potential. Because investors primarily use 
fi nancial models to make investment decisions, the absence of fi nancial 
fi gures captured through regular, reliable bookkeeping makes it diffi  cult 
to assess the future profi tability of a start-up—suggesting that when tech-
nology start-ups learn the value of good accounting, they will be more 
likely to receive investments. 
 Misaligned Market Perspectives 
 A company that cannot fi nd customers to purchase its products or services 
will struggle to survive. Identifying the right market, however, sounds sim-
pler than it often is. A recent poll among the founders of failed start-ups 
revealed that 42 percent cited a lack of a market need for their product as 
the primary reason for the business’s failure (Fortune  2014 ). Despite Kenya’s 
high mobile phone penetration, an established customer base for emergent 
technology innovations is still lacking. Consequently, we found that entre-
preneurs, innovation hub staff , and investors have each developed their own 
interpretations of what constitutes a viable market for technology in Nairobi. 
 Entrepreneurs: Fuzzy Markets 
 Entrepreneurs encounter a high degree of skepticism among potential 
customers. Although mobile phones have penetrated daily life in Nairobi, 
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many potential customers seem to remain hesitant about mobile-related 
innovations and other technologies. Many entrepreneurs have reported 
diffi  culties when trying to sell their technology product or service. Th e 
founder of a small start-up summarized the situation as follows:
 A real challenge is market matureness. Everything else you can overcome 
and turn into an opportunity. Th is you can’t. Th ere is a widespread lack of 
trust in Kenyan society. Th at’s probably the result of many years of harden-
ing experiences. People here don’t trust that your product will deliver what 
it’s promising, and they don’t believe that you’ll stick around or can be 
taken seriously. 
 To overcome this barrier, a number of technology entrepreneurs have 
turned to what we term the nonprofi t market, composed of international 
development agencies and nongovernmental and nonprofi t organizations 
that have expressed interest in using technology to resolve challenges at 
the economic base of the pyramid. In contrast to for-profi t markets, 
where profi t is made through product sales, nonprofi t markets give grants 
to start-ups so that they target benefi ciaries, that is, those at the bottom 
of the pyramid who cannot otherwise aff ord to pay for the company’s 
product or service. As one technology entrepreneur explained:
 [For grants] you need to hit as many poor people in the slums as possible. 
Th at might be diff erent from what angel [investors] say. Th ey care more 
about whether you can actually make money out of the people in the slums 
whereas someone else [giving a grant] might say, “Do it all for free, just hit 
the numbers.” 
 Innovation Hubs: Designing for Markets 
 In contrast with the lack of market readiness that the entrepreneurs per-
ceived, the innovation hub employees found that the majority of tech-
nology entrepreneurs failed to develop adequate products for existing 
markets. As one hub manager said:
 Honestly, the customers are there. Th at’s not the main issue. You just have 
to design a product that fi ts what they want. 
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 Most hub employees explained that the majority of technology entrepre-
neurs failed to identify and address appropriate markets for their prod-
ucts and services. In particular, the innovation hub employees perceived 
that the majority of technology start-ups conducted insuffi  cient market 
research and did not pilot their product or iterate on customer feedback. 
Th e hubs therefore emphasized the importance of tailoring products and 
services to customer demand and have off ered a variety of mentoring 
opportunities to guide entrepreneurs. Innovation hub employees seemed 
to remain impartial about the type of markets that businesses could 
viably target. Whether start-ups fi nd customers that are willing to pay 
for a start-up’s products and services or whether they obtain grants from 
nonprofi ts to distribute their products, the hubs’ main concern was that 
entrepreneurs frame any kind of market in the fi rst place. 
 Investors: Identifying Market Boundaries 
 Th e investors tended to perceive consumer-driven markets—that is, markets 
composed of individuals and businesses that purchase a start- up’s products 
and services—to be the only viable target markets. Th is contrasted with the 
technology entrepreneurs and innovation hub staff , who also perceived the 
viability of designing for nonprofi t markets. One investor elaborated on 
start-ups that tailored their products and services to the nonprofi t market:
 Th e development money, it’s not helping them become sustainable. Th ey 
start designing their business plan to target development agencies and not 
the customer, and then once the grant runs out it’s a dead end. And then 
that makes it hard for us. Because all these companies might be run by 
promising entrepreneurs, but they have the wrong incentives. 
 Recognizing that the number of potential customers for technology 
goods and services may not yet be large enough to make start-ups sus-
tainable, many of the investors therefore emphasized the importance of 
instead developing technology products and services for the East African 
market at large. In contrast to the entrepreneurs and innovation hubs, 
the investors thus perceived the only viable markets to be customers that 
purchase technology start-ups’ goods and services. 
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 Discussion: Disconnected Perspectives 
as Challenges to Technology Entrepreneurship 
in Nairobi 
 In the previous section, we presented the perspectives of three key groups 
of actors—technology entrepreneurs, innovation hub staff , and inves-
tors—on the availability of capital, business skills, and the readiness of 
technology markets. To conclude, we refl ect on how these disconnected 
perspectives may constitute additional barriers to technology entrepre-
neurship in Nairobi (see Table  9.1 ).
 Table 9.1  Summary of actors’ disconnected perspectives on technology entrepre-
neurship in Nairobi 
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 Innovation hub 
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 Contradictory Perspectives: Financial Capital 
 First, we found that the entrepreneurs, innovation hub staff , and inves-
tors expressed contradictory views about the availability of capital for 
technology entrepreneurship. Technology entrepreneurs consequently 
encounter an additional barrier when attempting to secure funding, 
namely the need to bridge these contradictory views. 
 Many of the entrepreneurs remarked that, incentivizing North 
American or European entrepreneurs to join the start-up’s board or 
founding team meet investors’ expectations and helps attract fi nancial 
investments. Th e vast majority of angels and venture capital investors 
have been non-Kenyan, and merely 26 percent of investments have been 
made to start-ups founded by Kenyans thus far (GSMA  2014 ). One 
foreign entrepreneur explained that she built trust with another foreign 
investor based on their shared love of a soccer team, which ultimately 
secured an investment. A serial Kenyan entrepreneur summarized:
 You’d be surprised by how this ecosystem works. Me and four locals trying 
to nail a partnership would take years. But just bring in a non-local, we just 
need to have them in the meeting and then we look more serious. It’s a 
reality. 
 Because perspectives on the availability of capital for technology start- 
ups are contradictory, entrepreneurs incur additional (search) costs by, 
for instance, requiring co-founders to have certain geographical origins. 
 Simultaneously, innovation hub employees attempt to identify prom-
ising start-ups and connect them to capital. However, because interpre-
tations of what constituted a start-up suitable for investments diff ered 
between the hub staff  and the investors, the investors incurred additional 
costs by spending time and resources on start-ups that did not meet their 
criteria. An investor explained:
 Th e teams that were recommended by [an innovation hub], we look at 
their pitch deck and it’s so bad. And we’re like, “You’re coming from a good 
reference…but we can’t see it.” So I did three revisions on a pitch deck for 
a team because they were recommended to us. 
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 Divergent Perspectives: Business Skills 
 Although the entrepreneurs, innovation hub staff , and investors agreed 
that business skills are helpful in the creation of sustainable businesses, we 
found that they diverged in their interpretations of which business skills 
were most crucial at the onset of the entrepreneurial journey. Th e entre-
preneurs perceived the importance of strategic planning, the hub staff  
considered business leadership to be central, and the investors emphasized 
business administration. Th is has several consequences for the practices 
associated with technology entrepreneurship. Although all business skills 
are likely to be helpful at some point during a start-up’s  development, skill 
prioritization is critical, given most ventures’ limited time and resources. 
Th is prioritization, however, may be skewed toward the interests of inno-
vation hubs and investors rather than the start-up’s actual needs for skill 
development. One technology entrepreneur explained:
 Th ey [innovation hub] took us to a training for fundraising, but I didn’t 
fi nd it useful because my business wasn’t at the stage for fundraising. At 
that [idea stage] moment, it’s sort of a waste because when my start-up gets 
to that level, now I’ll need that training again. 
 As a result of divergent views on how to prioritize business skill develop-
ment, entrepreneurs may be induced to spend time and resources on, 
for example, attending training programs that do not immediately fi t 
their needs in order to fulfi ll the expectations of innovation hubs and 
investors. By doing so, they demonstrate to the hubs and investors their 
motivation to strengthen various leadership and business administration 
skills. But they also drain time and resources from the actual technol-
ogy start-up—meaning that divergent views on business skills become an 
additional barrier to technology entrepreneurship. 
 Misaligned Perspectives: Market Readiness 
 Finally, we found that views on the composition of viable technology con-
sumer markets were misaligned between the entrepreneurs,  innovation 
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hub staff , and investors. Th is can generate even more ambiguity about 
market readiness, and thus constitutes an additional barrier to technol-
ogy entrepreneurship. More specifi cally, some technology entrepreneurs 
tended to become trapped in a cycle where initial skepticism among con-
sumers made the nonprofi t sector appear to be the more viable market. 
After initial growth, the start-ups then struggled to switch from serving 
nonprofi ts and their benefi ciaries to targeting paying customers (in part 
because investors perceived the business to be “tainted” by its nonprofi t 
endeavors). As a result, start-ups that are designed for donors rather than 
for customers—that is, social enterprises and not-for-profi ts—to char-
acterize technology entrepreneurship in Nairobi. Th is, in turn, can frus-
trate investors, who have, in some cases, become uncertain about the 
for-profi t market potential in Kenya and have voiced doubts about the 
market focus of technology entrepreneurship. 
 Given the prevailing ambiguity of what constitutes a technology 
consumer market, many start-ups have attempted to address multiple 
markets simultaneously in order to generate revenue. One informant, 
for instance, said, “Th e core [technology] product is not paying enough 
money right now, so we have other projects — for example, a monitoring 
and evaluations tool for corporations to measure performance.” However, 
maintaining a sustained competitive advantage in multiple markets 
simultaneously requires signifi cant resource and capabilities, neither of 
which tend to be readily available to new ventures, thus making failure 
more likely. 
 Recommendations for Policy and Practice: 
Connecting Perspectives 
 In this section, we return to the initial question that motivated the chap-
ter: What are the challenges associated with new forms of entrepreneurial 
activity in emerging markets? We conducted a qualitative case study of 
technology entrepreneurship in Nairobi, which constitutes a relatively 
new form of entrepreneurial activity in the region. Our analysis revealed 
that key actors’ understandings of technology entrepreneurship do not 
yet align. Instead, entrepreneurs, innovation hub staff , and investors 
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expressed contradictory, divergent, and misaligned views about the avail-
ability of capital, the prioritization of business skills, and the readiness 
of local technology markets. Th is, in turn, promoted the persistence of 
additional barriers to technology entrepreneurship:
 1.  Contradictory views on the availability of capital mean that entrepre-
neurs need additional resources (fi nancial, temporal, and human) to 
bridge the contradictions and obtain funding. 
 2.  Divergent views on which business skills are crucial at the onset of the 
entrepreneurial journey distract entrepreneurs from developing their 
start-up. 
 3.  Misaligned views of what constitutes a viable market for technology 
innovations make technology markets ambiguous. 
 To be sure, key actors’ perspectives may align over time. However, we 
conclude that novel forms of entrepreneurial activity in emerging mar-
kets are especially hampered by a lack of shared perspectives among key 
actors. Specifi cally, our chapter has shown that building successful tech-
nology start- ups in Nairobi remains diffi  cult because of the contradictory, 
divergent, and misaligned perspectives on technology entrepreneurship. 
 Our analysis has concrete implications for those seeking to facilitate 
the creation of sustainable technology businesses in Kenya (and possibly 
those promoting new forms of entrepreneurial activity in other emerg-
ing markets), which we detail below. Specifi cally, our recommendations 
depart from the conventional approach of defi ning, measuring, and 
fi lling gaps associated with funding, skill training, and market readi-
ness—because our analysis has found that the defi nitions of these gaps 
diff ers substantially between key actors, and simply fi lling them is there-
fore unlikely to facilitate technology entrepreneurship in the long term. 
Instead, we argue that it is important to resolve the contradictory, diver-
gent, and misaligned perspectives among the key actors, and we off er 
three concrete recommendations on how to achieve this. 
 1. Encourage refl ection through discourse 
 Greater awareness of others’ backgrounds, interests and positions 
among the key actors, and refl ection on one’s own biases and expectations 
may help move the situation toward a middle ground where  disconnected 
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perspectives can in fact be connected. Initially, a handful of individuals 
championed the nascence of technology entrepreneurship in Nairobi, 
which sparked the fi rst crucial instances of social interaction around tech-
nology entrepreneurship. As our analysis has demonstrated, however, it 
may now be benefi cial to refl ect on how the current structures of social 
interaction seem to perpetuate disconnected perspectives. 
 Discourse, especially, can facilitate refl ection by enabling the various 
actors to voice their positions and understand those of others. Discourse 
can take various forms: blogging, engaging with media, events, and even 
simple person-to-person interactions. Although these types of interac-
tions already occur regularly, they have too often been limited to homo-
geneous groups that merely reaffi  rm their agendas instead of engaging 
with those whose perspectives may be disconnected from their own. 
Technology entrepreneurs and hub employees, for instance, attend 
events at innovation hubs—events that, as a hub employee noted, are also 
intended for investors (though they rarely choose to attend). Meaningful 
discourse occurs when all actors alike take the initiative to create avenues 
for frequent interactions that are respectful and can ideally be benefi cial 
to the interests of all involved. 
 2. Recognize Nairobi’s context-specifi city 
 Entrepreneurship tends to be circumstantial and highly context- 
specifi c. Specifi cally, One aspect specifi c to technology entrepreneurship 
in Nairobi is the salient mix of local and international actors that we have 
alluded to in this chapter. Although potentially potent, the heterogene-
ity of the technology entrepreneurship community in Nairobi has also 
created signifi cant information asymmetries. Local entrepreneurs, for 
instance, often complain that the computer science curricula of Nairobi’s 
universities are outdated. Simultaneously, although the international 
actors tend to be equipped with technology skills, they often lack the 
context-specifi c knowledge of how to do business in Nairobi, knowledge 
that is often second nature to the local actors. A convergence of knowl-
edge bases, by growing the local actors’ technology business skills and 
the international actors’ understanding of Nairobi, would reduce infor-
mation asymmetries and thereby facilitate the alignment of perspectives. 
A straightforward way of building local technology know-how could be 
through updating and improving classroom curricula. Increasing the 
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context-specifi c knowledge of international actors, however, may require 
a longer-term shift in mind-sets, as demonstrated by one respondent’s 
frustration that “many investors still think people in Africa live in huts.” 
 3. Articulate a shared objective 
 In addition, the articulation of a common objective—the creation of 
a sense of “we’re all in this together”—may also help connect the actors’ 
contradictory, divergent, and misaligned perspectives on technology 
entrepreneurship in Nairobi. Often, the actors’ diff ering backgrounds 
and interests overshadow their shared common interests. Most saliently, 
this manifests between local and foreign actors, where the locals’ mantra 
of “Th is is how we do things in Kenya” stands in opposition to foreign-
ers’ stance of adhering to their own ways of doing things. Emphasizing a 
larger overarching objective, such as the goal of building one of Africa’s 
fi rst sustainable technology entrepreneurship communities, could 
align the actors under a shared vision and help bridge their diff erences. 
Policymakers and technology thought leaders who refl ect on the role of 
technology entrepreneurship in Kenya’s economy at large may be espe-
cially well positioned to articulate such a shared vision. A more explicit 
articulation of the specifi cities and visions associated with technology 
entrepreneurship in particular might allow the nonlocal actors to root 
their expectations and perspectives in local realities rather than in unex-
amined hopes and expectations about what it might have meant to build 
technology businesses in Nairobi. 
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 Conversation #9 
 Toward a Systematic 
Approach to Building Ventures 
 Jessica Colaço and Ibanga Umanah 
of Brave Venture Labs 
 Jessica Colaço recently co-founded Brave Venture Labs, East Africa’s fi rst ven-
ture builder, based in Nairobi, with co-founder Ibanga Umanah. In 2010, she 
co-founded the iHub with Erik Hersman and served in various leadership posi-
tions there—as its Founding Manager between 2010 and 2011, as its Director 
of Partnerships and Community, and, at iHub Research, as its Research 
Director between 2011 and 2013. She is passionate about innovation, research, 
mobile and robotics technology, talent, and entrepreneurship in Kenya. She 
serves as an African start-up evangelist and advisor to various tech startups, 
using her position in Kenya to encourage local, regional, and international 
stakeholders to explore, understand, and adopt Kenyan-made and African-
made solutions. 
 Ibanga Umanah  partners with leaders to grow new businesses. He 
recently co-founded Brave Venture Labs to build new ventures from Africa. 
Earlier, he worked with Jump Associates (in California) to create growth 
strategies for Fortune 100 companies. He designed new health services for 
country ministries, launched technology products for logistics companies, 
and prototyped service innovations for retailers. In addition to Brave, 
Ibanga develops growth strategies for small businesses, lectures at design 
and leadership programs, and teaches skiing to anyone willing to fall in 
love with snow. 
 Jessica, why did you decide to start Brave Venture Labs after your six 
years at iHub? 
 J essica : It is diffi  cult to summarize six years of work at the iHub in a 
nutshell. But during this period, I came to understand the power of net-
works and the serendipity eff ect, meaning the eff ect of bringing people 
together and watching the unexpected happen—through collaboration 
and learning. Every single day, I would get an email with a question that 
usually went like this: “I have an idea! How can I fl esh it out and how can 
I turn this into a viable tech business?” 
 Two things to note. First, I am passionate about problem solving. So 
yes, I am the right person to address with those sorts of questions. And 
second, it is about talent, nurturing young talent, and unleashing their 
potential. Th e iHub provided me with a sandbox where I could experi-
ment with talent and problems in order to solve the problems and men-
tor young entrepreneurs. 
 But eventually, six years later, it was time to move on and become 
more risk-taking. Th e new challenge that I am tackling now with Ibanga 
at Brave Venture Labs is matching talent with opportunities to build 
truly scalable and successful businesses, not just in tech but across mul-
tiple sectors—wherever we identify opportunities that are ripe for a busi-
ness solution. 
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 During my time at the iHub, I came across a lot of talented entrepre-
neurs and developers as well as striking business opportunities. How do I 
connect the dots? Th is thought became the genesis of a longer discovery 
process, as I like to call it, in which I realized that I am a builder and con-
necter—someone who likes to start and create organizations and build 
teams in order to make it all grow and last. 
 A good colleague and friend of mine connected me to Ibanga. While I 
was in San Francisco, we actually met there and discovered that our inter-
ests and values aligned. We both have a deeper interest and motivation in 
creating scalable businesses and unleashing the potential of people to do 
the unimaginable! 
 Ibanga, what is the motivation behind Brave Venture Labs? How did 
the idea emerge? 
 I banga : In 1995, I lived with my father in Nigeria’s Delta. Fights over 
oil had reached the highest levels and former President Abacha’s cruel 
response left a sharp impression. As an American up until then, I saw 
money from my country of birth funding a government hell-bent on 
tearing down the lives of those close to me. I left Nigeria wanting to work 
on two problems in my life: How can we build organizations that are 
more benefi cial to, and less hurtful for, individuals and society? And how 
can we position intelligent, ambitious people to lead those organizations? 
 After experimenting with a few companies of my own, I decided to 
tackle the fi rst problem, initially with Ed Cohen, building a school for 
executives in India, and later with Dev Patnaik, creating new ventures for 
corporates at Jump Associates. Perhaps it is obvious to most folks, but 
I found corporations fi lled with people genuinely pursuing what they 
believe is right. Rare moments of corruption and breaks in ethics were 
often preceded by a slow erosion of purpose and empathy in leaders. So 
together with both Ed and Dev, we worked to instill purpose and empa-
thy into leadership decisions and solutions. We developed new methods 
for understanding and building unique customer insight, for collaborat-
ing with peers to make strategic choices, and for continuously generating, 
prototyping, and learning in the market. Along the way, we found that 
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continuously grounding ourselves in data all around us—from consum-
ers, teams, and stakeholders—we were able to increase not only impact, 
but the speed of work. You might call it human-centered problem solving. 
 Leaders who found a clear purpose, built empathy, and continuously 
learned, were able to organize their teams to solve what often seemed like 
impossible challenges. For instance, I recently left a meeting with Ratan 
Tata [former chairman of the Tata Group of Mumbai] awestruck by his 
masterful use of purpose, empathy, and learning to solve one challenge 
after another. Tata’s Nano project started as a sketch in his diary of a 
moped with a shield. Seeing families of four piled together, unprotected 
from wild traffi  c in the middle of often harsh Indian weather, was unac-
ceptable. He believed every family should have access to safe transit. Tata 
took the sketch to his colleagues to experiment on solutions for what 
would ultimately become the world’s most aff ordable car. His eff orts 
have shocked automotive manufacturing and, more important, improved 
transportation safety for thousands. Th e thing is, despite all his success, 
he spent most of the conversation inquiring about us. I have never met a 
more humble and curious person. I walked away realizing his practice of 
humility and curiosity was what actually allowed him to notice his sur-
roundings and continue to learn (at age 77!). Humility and curiosity were 
the foundation of Tata’s personal legacy of success. 
 Looking back, it seemed nearly all our successes, on seemingly impos-
sible challenges, involved leaders who valued humility and continuously 
learned. If we were able to apply our skills in problem solving to Africa, 
perhaps we could accelerate the development of more human-centered 
problem solvers like Tata—people who seem to do the impossible. 
 So we founded Brave! 
 Jessica, why is there such a strong focus on talent? And how do you 
ensure you match the right talent with the right opportunity? 
 J essica : Let me explain this using some of my own experiences. In my 
mind, I always thought I would be coding and heavily involved in com-
puter science—basically just writing code and building algorithms all my 
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life in a lab. It was the people around me who discovered my most innate 
qualities and abilities. For me, the power of networks and having people 
around me at the right time were critical. During my time at Strathmore 
University, there were people like Dr. Sevilla and Edwin Nyanducha who 
realized I was a really good problem solver and that, at the same time, 
I had this affi  nity to organize events and bring people together. At that 
time, I had no clue—because I was very shy! I also did not know that I 
had skills in business development until Edwin pointed it out to me and 
threw me into the deep end of the pool with an actual business client. 
 Similarly with TED. I applied in 2009, and became a TED global 
fellow. I could not believe it! I had to go on stage in front of hundreds 
of people and speak about my mobile project—Wireless Map Service. 
Th e event, however, pushed me to the next level of thinking more deeply 
and taking on bigger challenges. Because of that challenging but positive 
experience, I believe in the art of unleashing the best in people. Over 
time, I have been able to spot talent, and by now I know by observing 
and giving people a few tasks what they are good at and where they need 
a little push to realize their full potential. 
 At Brave we were doing two things. On the one hand, we were cre-
ating an entrepreneurs’ “forensic” map, another word for a systematic 
overview of their talents, individual qualities, and characteristics. By now, 
we have auditioned hundreds of entrepreneurs and developers and have 
built up a solid overview of what is out there. As a side note, we do 
not believe in job interviews, so we work on some challenges together 
with the entrepreneurs and, in that way, fi nd out where their capabilities 
are. On the other hand, we identify—through systematic and rigorous 
research—business opportunities and work with 20 potential candidates 
in our challenge days on a joint investment thesis. As we progress, people 
who are not suitable drop out and a core group emerges. 
 Ibanga, you want to create leaders with a particular mindset around 
problem solving. Why is a venture builder the right model for doing so? 
 I banga : We are committed to advancing leaders who take on and 
solve big problems. Refl ecting on our work investing in and supporting 
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entrepreneurs, we noticed two challenges getting in the way. One, many 
ideas are not scalable, usually because the original problem itself is too 
small. Two, teams rigidly focus on building their idea, as opposed to 
doing whatever it takes to solve their problem. 
 What do bigger problems look like? When Elon Musk was deciding 
what to work on after PayPal, he wrote down a list of fi ve issues that will 
most aff ect the future of humanity: the Internet, sustainable energy, space 
exploration (permanent extension of life beyond earth), artifi cial intelli-
gence, and reprogramming the human genetic code. Tesla and SolarCity 
were both founded to take on the signifi cant challenge of sustainable 
energy. And while he initially focused on better electric vehicles, better 
batteries and solar installation were clear additions. 
 One of our favorite Kenyan companies, Sendy, recognized the need 
for access to formal goods within an informal and continuously evolving 
infrastructure. Most folks do not receive goods at an address, making 
e-commerce mostly ineff ective. And between an inconsistently distrib-
uted retail sector and terrible traffi  c, it is costly to track down the goods 
you might want. Today, Sendy off ers real-time, point-to-point urban 
deliveries using smartphones and motorbikes. But it is not inconceivable 
for them to manage last-mile scheduling and logistics for any kind of 
inventory. Th e challenge is enormous. 
 We can refer back to Tata’s humility as an example of putting problems 
above ideas. I mentioned his original sketch was a shielded bike. It looked 
a bit like a fancy rickshaw. However, after two months of prototyping and 
testing, his team found that consumers were much more interested in an 
aff ordable car. So they shifted. As long as he was achieving aff ordable, safe 
transit, the specifi c idea was not important. 
 One might look at our challenge of creating a human-centered, learn-
ing mindset around problem solving and say, “Obviously you should 
pursue education for founders or young teams.” But what my time spent 
doing new business creation and transformation at Jump taught me is 
that people learn through the work. Th e evidence continues to grow in 
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this respect. Sugata Mitra showed that kids can teach themselves hard sci-
ences with a computer in a wall. Leading A.I. developers, neuroscientists, 
and learning theorists like Ray Kurzweil have argued that people’s natural 
sense of curiosity, creativity, and experimentation drive learning. 
 So rather than teach people to solve problems in a classroom, we will 
co-build companies with them. We will build to learn. 
 A venture builder is an ideal mechanism for learning. Generally 
speaking, a venture builder is a company that creates companies. In 
our approach, we continuously evaluate and share quantitative and 
qualitative market data to clarify problems entrepreneurs might tackle, 
then partner with a potential chief executive offi  cer (CEO) and co-
create an idea. Together, we study the market, prototype with custom-
ers, and refi ne our model until we fi nd a fi t and potential for scale. We 
do provide some starting capital, but our CEOs are expected to raise 
their own funds. Like most accelerators, we have distilled plenty of 
business-building methods and convened the best resources in the eco-
system. However, rather than run people through a linear, time-bound, 
task-oriented program where everyone launches a website at the same 
time, we create an environment where a team can quickly access a wide 
variety of resources to accelerate toward a broad objective. We create 
metrics for achieving product–market fi t or traction or positive cash 
fl ow and then convene the right mix of support for that company to 
achieve its goal. 
 In a way we are an institution of co-founders, multiplying our expe-
rience by convening the best of the ecosystem. If we are doing it right, 
we are increasing the level of start-up performance and generating more 
sustainable solutions for society. 
 Jessica, can you walk us through the ideation process and how this all 
leads up to actually starting a venture? 
 J essica : Brave is kind of like a start-up studio, meaning our 
 processes are aligned to fully fl esh out and start implementing an idea 
that addresses a problem. Right now, for example, we are looking at a 
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 specifi c problem between commercial education and young profession-
als who cannot aff ord the education they need. So we came up with a 
platform idea that matches students with corporates and organizations 
that will issue a loan and off er future employment once the graduate 
completes the degree. 
 Th e process for this solution looked like this. First, Ibanga and 
I identify sectors with ripe opportunities. We looked particularly at 
the middle to upper class in Nairobi. Th rough industry-sector reports 
from PricewaterhouseCoopers and Deloitte, we narrowed the focus 
to particular sectors. In fact, with Brave, we are looking at fi ve sectors 
at the moment—health, fi nance, agriculture, tourism, and education. 
Now we dig even deeper into each sector, conducting market and 
customer research to understand the dynamics. Th is process is com-
pletely self- funded. In health, for example, we want to focus on pre-
ventive health care, in fi nance on peer-to-peer lending, in agriculture 
on food trading and food wastage, in tourism on domestic tourism, 
and, as I mentioned, in education on the commercial side of higher 
education. 
 After that we conduct a challenge day with 20 individuals—entrepre-
neurs and developers—who understand the sector, and we note down all 
assumptions each business idea has. We formulated a research poster (6 
by 4 feet) with all this information and walked each individual through 
our process to get the thinking started. Picture it as a collective brain-
storming session in which we test business ideas in order to come up 
with a clear overview on the problem, the opportunity, and the “right” 
business idea. 
 Th e next step is a written opportunity abstract, forming an invest-
ment thesis that we use as a basis to sources the right talent—these are 
co-founders with whom we create the business to get the implementation 
started. Once all the founders are on board, Brave will co-build the busi-
ness with the co-founders and get to work. 
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 Ibanga, what are some of the tools you use to aff ect this mindset 
change and why, in your opinion, are those in particular of value? 
 I banga : We continuously pull principles and practices from as many 
disciplines as possible, as opposed to following one idea to the letter. 
And often, several disciplines form a unique approach to achieving the 
same end. 
 For example, think of all the diff erent ways we talk about “keeping an 
open mind” so we can learn:
•  Neuroplasticity 
•  Beginner’s mind 
•  Growth mindset 
•  Rapid prototyping 
•  Vertical learning 
•  Creative intuition 
•  Mindfulness 
•  Mental fl exibility 
 Neuroplasticity proposes that the human brain continues to change 
over the course of its life. As we age, experience new things, and chal-
lenge ourselves, we continue to learn. In other words, you are never done 
learning. 
 Beginner’s mind, a concept from Zen Buddhist philosophy, asks that 
we continue to see the world around us from the point of view of a child. 
If we look at people or experiences as if we were a beginner, we might 
notice new nuances and continue to learn. 
 Carol Dweck teaches folks to look at themselves and their teams as 
having the potential to learn with practice rather than seeing people as 
“born talented” or not. Folks with a growth mindset see failure as an 
opportunity to learn and get better. So we can continue to challenge 
ourselves and each other to learn something new from any experience. 
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 Rapid prototyping, as applied to solutions beyond 3D models, 
approaches product design like a science experiment. We make obser-
vations and generate predictions about what might work—otherwise 
known as having ideas! Th en we develop tests to see what works and 
what does not and improve our ideas. By quickly and cheaply gathering 
data to iterate, we increase our chance of market performance before run-
ning out of money. We learn from and improve with every attempt. Said 
another way, we actively learn from failure. 
 Information and techniques from every one of these areas will be use-
ful as we go about the work of developing new business ideas. We will use 
the same multidisciplinary mash-up for how to best research customers, 
work in teams, optimize systems, and so on. 
 Jessica and Ibanga, is the venture builder addressing a niche in Kenya 
in particular or do you see this approach as being useful globally? 
 I banga : Continuous learning and the hybridization of disciplines to 
solve problems are useful globally. My friends in San Francisco continue 
to combine the best of social science and data science to construct better 
ways of working, the best engineering and design to create better experi-
ences, and the latest business strategies and psychology to build businesses 
models around new behaviors. And although I practiced it there, it is 
almost certainly happening in every creative economy around the world. 
 For example, in 1978, Nicholas Negroponte and colleagues at MIT 
received government funding to create digital tools to familiarize soldiers 
with remote locations. Building off  of some work by early fi lmmakers, 
the Aspen Movie Map team built a camera array on a car, drove the 
streets of Boston, and using the then-new technology of laserdiscs (which 
could associate a location tag with a specifi c point on the disc), created 
a virtual, searchable map of the city. Building on the idea more than 25 
years, later Larry Page used the technology to create Google Street view. 
Basic legal practices and publishing had eff ectively allowed fi lmmakers, 
government, academics, and start-ups to collaborate on creating one of 
the most widely used products today. 
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 Th e opportunity for Kenya, and I imagine for most countries, is the 
ongoing practice of making it easier and culturally “okay” for this kind of 
collaboration to take place and be fruitful. 
 J essica : Our idea is not to stay in Nairobi. We see our longer-term 
task as connecting the dots on a pan-African scale. Once the fi rst two 
 companies are up and running, we will move to other cities across the 
continent, directed by market dynamics and our network’s strength. 
Right now, the destination for our next set of companies would be 
Ghana, Nigeria, or South Africa. 
 Ibanga, what are the crucial ingredients needed to build a venture 
that can advance society? 
 I banga : Th ere are two parts of a new venture to consider, broadly speak-
ing. First, solve a problem for people with an innovative model, experi-
ence, and/or technology. How innovative you need to be really depends 
on the problem. Second, organize people in an institution to execute. 
Every business is a structure for a group of people to work together. 
 You might think of our role in the second part as similar to how US 
insurance companies manage care networks. Using a combination of 
real-time data and frequent contact with members, they evaluate per-
formance and negotiate rates with the best mix of services required to 
quickly address a particular disease. When successful, in addition to 
reducing prices for patients, they can streamline a care pathway and boost 
the overall quality of treatment. 
 At Brave, we work to evaluate and convene new-business ecosystems, 
including lawyers, accountants, and subject-matter experts, to stand up, 
operate, and grow companies—faster, smarter, and at lower costs. 
 Creative problem solving is also systematic in a sense but should be 
seen more as a continuous-learning model than as a linear fl ow of activi-
ties. On some level, the analogy for us here is the scientifi c method. We 
attempt to understand the world, create hypotheses, conduct experiments, 
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allow our views to evolve based on new information, and  continuously 
update our solutions. 
 If we stop there, we just get the ventures. So, to the second part: if 
you want any human system, including entrepreneurship, to advance you 
need two more things. First, many people experimenting with their own 
approaches in a variety of settings. And two, previous discoveries docu-
mented and shared so the next generation can critique and advance that 
work. 
 Th e truth is, there is no shortage of intelligent, exploratory entrepre-
neurs in Kenya. Th e challenge is recording and exposing what they have 
learned so that how we work can be improved. Th e faster we can make 
the learning cycle, the better we can become. 
 As a normal practice of creating ventures, Brave is deeply involved in 
both listening to and learning from respected entrepreneurs as well as 
encouraging experimentation and improvement in every new generation 
of builders. 
 Th ank you, Jessica and Ibanga! 
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 “When you look at the infrastructure here, we should be miles ahead. 
But there’s so much fl uff  money, no hard talk, NGOs propping 
businesses up—it kills it.” 
 — Nikolai Barnwell, in a Wired article 
by Jessica Hatcher, June 10, 2014 
 “Yes, my good people, I said it. It was NGO ‘fl uff ’ money that 
funded what we do today.” 
 — Sam Gichuru in a blog post, June 10,  2014 
 Introduction 
 Back in 2014, a debate swept through the Kenyan tech sector about the 
value of grant funding for start-ups based on new technology. Swirling 
around the blogosphere, among Kenyans on Twitter, and entrepreneurs 
in the thick of it, the debate seemed to boil down to the question of 
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whether grants from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and donor 
 organizations interested in funding social enterprises in Kenya were a ben-
efi t or a hindrance. Put in less secular terms, many asked: Is grant funding 
a blessing or a curse? Key fi gures, like Nikolai Barnwell, at that time the 
manager of the technology business incubator 88mph, 1 and Sam Gichuru, 
the manager of Nailab (a competing tech incubator), landed on one side or 
the other of the debate. Even now, more than a year after the debate peaked 
in social media, its question still lingers over Kenyan entrepreneurs. 
 Seen through the lens of this debate, the presence of grant funding, or 
more generally the presence of nonprofi t organizations, seems black and 
white. It is either good for the growth of the sector or it is not; it either spurs 
innovation or it does not. In this chapter, my goal is to take this debate 
and reframe it in more constructive, less binary terms. I hope to do this by 
introducing a new lens through which to look at technology companies in 
Kenya, the lens of cultural theory. I will use this lens to make the case that 
the future of Kenyan technology innovation lies in the mixing of nonprofi t 
and for-profi t cultures in the sector and not in a battle between the two. 
 By culture, I refer not to national or ethnic cultures, but to cultures 
understood more broadly as a set of beliefs, practices, and assumptions 
of a particular group, whether that group is based around an organiza-
tion, a nation, or even around an idea. Looking just at the culture of 
organizations—for good or ill—the Kenyan tech sector is an exceedingly 
multicultural place. Th ere are large international for-profi t tech com-
panies like IBM and Google; international and domestic investors like 
Savannah Fund, Emerging Capital Partners, and Impact Amplifi er; aspir-
ing Kenyans and other East Africans entrepreneurs; donor organizations 
like the World Bank, Omidyar Foundation, and Hivos Foundation; social 
enterprises; public–private partnerships; and countless others. For most 
researchers who study culture (and this group is large and disparate), cul-
ture is understood to rarely be stagnant. It is prone to change, to evolve 
over time (Runciman  2005 ), and to undergo hybridization, 2 particularly 
in multicultural places (Kraidy  2005 ) like the Kenyan tech sector. 
1  In this chapter, I will refer to the organization as 88mph, even though it has been renamed 
Nairobi Garage, because the name change occurred after most of the research for this chapter had 
been conducted. 
2  When speaking about culture, the term hybridization is typically used by academics to refer to the 
mixing of two separate cultural groups. A good example of this is the case of second-generation 
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 In this chapter, I look at nonprofi t and for-profi t organizations and 
approaches to the work of technology development as forms of organiza-
tional culture. If we accept that cultures adapt and change in the presence 
of one another, it becomes easier, more intuitive, to see how changing 
forms of work and organizational structures are a natural result of the 
Kenyan tech sector’s multiculturalism. 
 In the remainder of this chapter, I will provide some background on 
the theories of organizational culture and cultural hybridity. I will lay out 
what, according to existing research, traditional nonprofi t and for-profi t 
organizational cultures look like, drawing in particular from Schein’s 
theory of the levels of organizational culture (Schein  1990 ). I will use 
this picture to construct a typology of the two diff erent types of organiza-
tional culture. I will then demonstrate how two individual organizations 
at the center of the Kenyan tech sector are cultural hybrids—whether 
that hybridity is intentional or not—that to varying extents adopt and 
adapt underlying cultural assumptions, espoused beliefs, and practices 
from both traditions. 
 Th e two organizations are the technology hub iHub and the technol-
ogy incubator 88mph. 3 As mentors to entrepreneurs, the incubators and 
tech hubs in Kenya act as role models for fl edgling start-ups. Whether 
these start-ups are successful or not, the example that the incubators and 
hubs set through the cultural models they themselves adopt could have 
an infl uence on how aspiring entrepreneurs approach their work in the 
future and what future organizations in the industry look like. Th is is 
primarily a comparative case-study analysis; the data used in the chap-
ter were drawn from ethnographic fi eldwork conducted by the author 
in Nairobi in the summers of 2013 and 2014, predominantly at iHub 
but with site visits to and interviews conducted at 88mph. Data are also 
members of a diaspora group (e.g., Nigerian-Americans or Somalis living in London) who retain 
some of their home culture but adopt much of the cultural practices and even beliefs of their new 
host country as well. 
3  Small-business incubators are understood by management scholars to be organizations designed 
to accelerate the growth of entrepreneurial businesses. Frequently, they off er a physical space and 
an intense training program, as well as access to capital to help businesses grow. Tech hubs, while 
less clearly defi ned, are, like incubators, typically designed to nurture entrepreneurial businesses but 
in less formal ways. Th ey typically provide communal space and focus on network building in order 
to foster the generation of new innovative ideas. Th ey do not provide direct funding. 
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drawn from an analysis of the discourse and rhetoric used by representa-
tives of both organizations publicly and in interviews with the author. 
 Th e two organizations chosen are often seen as representing opposite 
sides of the nonprofi t–for-profi t debate in Kenya, because iHub was built 
initially on grant funding from nonprofi t organizations, like the Omidyar 
Foundation, and 88mph was built initially by a pool of for-profi t inves-
tors. By using these contrasting examples, I hope to demonstrate the dif-
ferent ways that cultural hybridity are manifesting within organizations 
in the sector. By using the method of in-depth case studies, I will explore 
some of the internal dilemmas that this hybridity causes and how these 
two organizations have managed it in very diff erent ways. 
 Th e mixing of nonprofi t and for-profi t beliefs and practices gives the 
Kenyan tech sector access to more and diff erent resources, resources that 
must be managed carefully and conscientiously. By looking closely at 
how existing organizations are managing this hybridity, my hope is that 
we can develop strategies for taking advantage of the multiculturalism 
that clearly exists in the Kenyan tech sector rather than fi ghting about 
whether it is good or bad. 
 Theoretical Grounding 
 Organizational Culture 
 When we think about the culture of an organization, somewhat vague 
but emotive concepts like “the way we do things around here” or “the 
way people interact with and treat one another” might come to mind. 
Scholars studying culture at organizations, particularly in the manage-
ment fi eld, have identifi ed four diff erent types of culture in and around 
organizations: (1) the cultural context (as in the national, geographic, 
or industrial cultures surrounding it), (2) cross-cutting cultures (as in 
the diff erent occupational or ethnic cultures of its employees), (3) sub-
cultures specifi c to the organization (as in the particular cultures of 
departments within the organization), and, and most important, for this 
chapter, and (4) organizational culture (the culture of the organization 
itself ) (Gregory  1983 ). Th ese types of culture are all certainly worthy of 
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greater investigation in the context of a multicultural environment like 
the Kenyan tech sector, but it is organizational culture that we are pri-
marily concerned with here. 
 Andrew Pettigrew, widely considered to be the grandfather of the study 
of organizational culture, provided a defi nition that began to clarify what 
the culture of an organization was. He defi ned it as an amalgamation 
of beliefs, identity, ritual, and myths (Pettigrew  1979 ) of an organiza-
tion. Th is defi nition, and in particular, the inclusion of the themes of 
beliefs and rituals, has greatly infl uenced those studying organizations, 
including prominent scholars like Geert Hofstede and those studying 
technology organizations, like Kathleen Gregory. In the 1990s, Edgar 
Schein, a professor at MIT’s Sloan School of Management, built on 
Pettigrew’s defi nition and constructed a useful framework for analyzing 
and identifying organizational culture. Th is framework is known as the 
three levels of organizational culture and includes: (1) basic underlying 
unspoken assumptions, (2) espoused beliefs and values, and (3) visible 
artifacts and behaviors (Schein  1990 ). Within each of these levels, Schein 
found important evidence of an organization’s culture, though each level 
required a diff erent method of research (e.g., analysis, interviews, and 
observations). 
 At the fi rst level, the underlying assumptions often reside in large-scale 
ideological, philosophical, or theological commitments; they are basic 
assumptions about how the world is, or more often the case, how it ought 
to be. Such commitments could be to a particular religion, for example, 
or to democracy, neoliberalism, capitalism, and so on. Because assump-
tions are just that—things that are assumed or taken for granted—they 
can be the most diffi  cult for researchers to pin down and require deep 
analysis. Yet, according to Schein, they are fundamental to how much of 
the rest of an organization’s culture is determined. 
 At the second level, the espoused beliefs and values are the views, articu-
lated by members of an organization, that guide its purpose and its struc-
ture. Th is level has received the most attention from scholars, because it 
is typically relatively easy to identify through interviews or in an organi-
zation’s manifestos and policy statements. Yet the beliefs and values are 
often greatly shaped by the ideological commitments and assumptions of 
the fi rst, and more elusive, level of underlying assumptions. 
10 Organizational Cultural Hybrids 307
 And at the third level, the behaviors are the manners and customs of 
interaction between diff erent individuals and departments at an organi-
zation or how the organization behaves externally. And the artifacts are, 
according to Schein, “everything from the physical layout, the dress code, 
the manner in which people address each other, the smell and feel of the 
place, its emotional intensity, and other phenomena, to more permanent 
archival manifestations such as company records, products, statements of 
philosophy, and annual reports” (Schein  1990 ). In short, the artifacts are 
the material aspects of an organization’s culture and are typically under-
stood through direct observation. 
 Finally, an important part of Schein’s characterization of culture at 
organizations is that these three levels are not absolutely distinct; they 
feed into one another and comprise a more organic and ongoing process 
than the term “levels” can convey (Schein  2010 ). Underlying assump-
tions motivate, consciously or not, the central goals of an organization 
or the motivations of individuals for working there. And in turn, the 
organization’s core values and beliefs infl uence how they choose to struc-
ture themselves and how everyday operations take place (Greenwood 
and Hinings  1993 ). Google, for example, maintains an open-plan offi  ce 
and gives its employees time to work on their own projects (representing 
the artifacts of the third level) because of the espoused belief that such 
structural factors encourage more innovation and because of the under-
lying assumption that innovation is good for society. Th is interrelation-
ship between the various levels of culture is an important part of Schein’s 
framework and helps to visualize organizations as the organic fl uctuating 
entities that they are. 
 Organizational Hybrids 
 Th e conceptualization in Schein’s model of organizational culture as 
organic and fl uid is in keeping with a wider body of scholarship about 
culture and change. Scholars in cultural studies frequently describe cul-
ture as constantly evolving and being prone to hybridization, adaptation, 
and change in a myriad of ways (Gillespie  2010 ; Kraidy  2005 ). Th e evo-
lution of Sheng, the rich and unstructured linguistic hybrid of Kiswahili 
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and English used in Nairobi, is an example of a hybrid cultural artifact 
that emerged out of the close quarters in the city that brought many 
diff erent linguistic cultures into contact with one another. For scholars 
of organizations, hybrids are organizations that cross sectorial or institu-
tional boundaries or use core beliefs and practices from multiple organi-
zational types (Doherty et al.  2014 ; Mangen and Brivot  2014 ). A social 
enterprise is the quintessential example of a hybrid organization because 
it has both a social-impact purpose and a drive for fi nancial sustainability 
(Doherty et al.  2014 ), meaning that it is motivated by core beliefs from 
two diff erent sectors, the nonprofi t and the for-profi t sectors. 
 A prominent debate among researchers of organizations is whether 
hybrid organizations are stable and sustainable. For example, Greenwood 
and Hinings ( 1993 ) have argued that organizations tend to move toward 
a single set of core values and beliefs because of the internal confl ict 
caused by the presence of multiple potentially incompatible beliefs. 
Th is view of hybrid organizations as inherently unstable dominates the 
existing literature on organizations. However, more recent research car-
ried out in countries in the Global South has provided evidence that 
hybrid  organizations may actually be well suited to such environments. 
In Bolivia, Battilana and Dorado ( 2010 ) demonstrated that new organi-
zations that began as some kind of hybrid, like a social enterprise, had 
greater potential for sustainability than more established organizations 
seeking to change their organizational culture. For social enterprises 
in two diff erent African countries, Gupta et  al. ( 2015 ) made the case 
that hybrid organizations may actually be useful in resource-constrained 
environments. 
 By combining the theories of organizational culture and hybrids 
described above, I believe it is possible to attain a more holistic and 
nuanced sense of the construction of hybrid organizations that goes 
beyond the core beliefs typically examined. In the rest of this chapter, I 
use Schein’s framework of the levels of organizational culture: (1) to iden-
tify organizational culture at traditional nonprofi t and for-profi t organi-
zations and (2) to examine how iHub and 88mph, two organizations in 
the Kenyan technology sector, are to varying extents organizational cul-
tural hybrids that have adopted beliefs, practices, and even assumptions 
from both traditional nonprofi t and for-profi t organizational cultures. 
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 Nonprofi t and For-Profi t Organizational 
Cultures 
 At a basic level, the diff erence between nonprofi t and for-profi t organi-
zations may seem self-evident, even tautological—one has the goal of 
generating profi t, and one does not. Right? Going back to the original 
debate about what is good for the Kenyan technology sector, these two 
have certainly been painted as contrasting, even oppositional, types. A 
brief return to the literature here, using Schein’s levels of organizational 
culture, will help provide a more holistic and nuanced view. 
 Most of the research on organizational culture has been done by man-
agement scholars and has focused predominantly on culture at for- profi ts. 
Th e research was typically of the overarching variety, working to build 
generalized theories that might explain or predict organizational behavior 
as a whole across many varied organizations. Th e majority of these studies 
also focused exclusively on for-profi t companies and often on the role of 
leadership in encouraging the growth of a “strong” organizational cul-
ture (Bass and Avolio  1993 ; Clement  1994 ; Ogbonna and Harris  2000 ). 
However, there have also been a number of narrower studies looking at 
the particular iterations of organizational culture in unique types of orga-
nizations, like family-run manufacturing fi rms in the USA (Zahra  2003 ), 
Japanese fi rms (Deshpandé et al.  1993 ), multinational companies (Jaeger 
 1983 ), service sector companies (Chatman and Jehn  1994 ), and Silicon 
Valley companies (Gregory  1983 ), among many others. 
 Th ere have been fewer studies looking at the concept of organizational 
culture in the particular context of nonprofi t organizations. Tierney’s 
study ( 1988 ) of higher education institutions is one such example, as 
is Murta’s study ( 2011 ) of a nonprofi t organization in El Paso, Texas. 
Many of these studies were intended to advise nonprofi ts on how to build 
a more effi  cient and innovative organizational culture resembling those 
with the strength that many researchers see in the culture of for-profi t 
organizations (Dartington  1998 ; Lindenberg  2001 ). Similarly, although 
they do not refer specifi cally to organizational culture, recent studies by 
Hwang and Powell as well as Watkins and colleagues have addressed many 
of the cultural elements of nonprofi ts, including levels of professionalism 
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(Hwang and Powell  2009 ) in the nonprofi t sector in San Francisco and 
the organizational goals and material technology employed by interna-
tional development NGOs (Watkins et al.  2012 ). 
 A handful of studies have looked comparatively at aspects of culture 
of nonprofi t and for-profi t organizations. One such study was conducted 
by Hull and Lio ( 2006 ) of the Rochester Institute of Technology in 
New York. Th ey outlined the ways in which cultures diff ered between 
the two organizations. Th ey broke down these diff erences into three core 
components of the organization: vision, strategic constraints, and fi nan-
cial constraints. Other scholars, like Billis ( 2010 ), have contrasted for- 
profi t and nonprofi t organizations as follows: private-sector organizations 
are determined by their market orientation to maximize fi nancial return, 
with ownership by shareholders and a revenue model based on sales and 
fees, whereas nonprofi t-sector organizations are determined by their 
social and environmental goals, with ownership by members and the pri-
vate election of representatives, staffi  ng by a combination of employees 
and volunteers, and a revenue model based on membership fees, dona-
tions, and legacies (Billis  2010 ). 
 Table  10.1 uses the information acquired from the studies of culture 
at nonprofi t and for-profi t organizations described above and fi ts it into 
Schein’s levels of organizational culture framework, thus creating a typol-
ogy of the organizational culture of traditional nonprofi t and for-profi t 
organizations.
 Th e fi rst level, that of underlying assumptions, is rarely covered in the 
literature. As a result, the table draws from underlying assumptions embed-
ded in the literature itself and fi ndings from the author’s own ethnographic 
fi eldwork. Underlying assumptions includes an organization’s underlying 
priorities in society and ideological commitments. Th e second level, that of 
espoused beliefs and values, has received the most attention from research-
ers and thus is the most comprehensively represented of the three levels. It 
includes an organization’s goals, scope of impact on society, and ground-
ing in society. Finally, the third level, that observed artifacts and behaviors, 
includes an organization’s strategies for revenue generation, who an organi-
zation is responsible to, and an organization’s ownership structure. However, 
it excludes a number of more specifi c elements of artifacts, such as an orga-
nization’s layout or the habits of  interaction between various departments, 
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in order to focus on the most salient categories for understanding the diff er-
ences between nonprofi t and for- profi t organizational cultures. 
 Although this composite may seem a tad cumbersome, I believe it to 
be a worthwhile improvement over existing literature, which rarely looks 
at organizational culture holistically and instead focuses more narrowly 
on the level of beliefs and values or solely at an organization’s structures. 
 Th e core diff erences between nonprofi t and for-profi t organizational 
cultures as outlined here originate at the base level of underlying assump-
tions. Th e assumptions about what is good for society and what kind of 
socioeconomic system is best seem to stand in stark contrast with one 
another. For-profi ts typically rely on an ideological commitment to the 
 Table 10.1  Organizational culture at traditional nonprofi ts and for-profi ts 
 Levels of organizational 
culture 
 Categories of organizational culture 
 For-profi ts  Nonprofi ts 
 Underlying assumptions 
 Underlying societal 
level priorities 




 Free market economy  Philanthropic economy 
 Espoused beliefs and values 
 Goal/vision  Revolves around how to 
maximize profi ts while 
providing the services 
they are designed for 
 To maximize positive social 
change; vision forms core 
of organization’s work 
 Scope of societal 
impact 
 Societal impact considered 
to the extent that it 
affects profi t generation 
 Seeking to bring about 
social change in society 
 Geographical 
grounding 
 Flexible, able to relocate, 
or expand of necessary for 
profi t 
 Committed to the 
location(s) in which they 
operate 
 Observed artifacts and behaviors 
 Ownership structure  Shareholders  Donor support, members 
 Responsible to  Shareholders and, to a 
lesser extent, employees 
 Donors, employees, 
volunteers, intended 
benefi ciaries 
 Revenue generation  Seeks revenue 
maximization through 
sales and fees 
 Donor support, project 
revenue goes to improving 
service 
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free-market economy, where the logic of the market is the best way to 
build a better, more economically prosperous world. By contrast, non-
profi t companies are typically built on the assumption that the market is 
not enough—that there are important aspects of the social world that the 
fi nancial markets are not designed to improve or support, such as poverty 
eradication or social welfare. 
 Th ese contrasting underlying assumptions and ideological commit-
ments trickle down to infl uence the culture of an organization at the other 
two levels. At the level of espoused beliefs and values, for example, the 
goals of a typical for-profi t revolve around the maximization of profi ts, 
driven by the belief in the free-market system. Even when there is a strong 
commitment to the particular service being provided (for example, a great 
search engine or the best mobile taxi application), it is believed that the 
service cannot be provided sustainably without a profi t-driven revenue 
model. By contrast, the assumption that some social problems cannot be 
addressed within a free-market system drives nonprofi t organizations to 
put the goal of maximizing positive social change at the forefront. 
 In turn, both the underlying assumptions and the core beliefs infl u-
ence the behavior and artifacts of an organization. For the typical for- 
profi t, for example, their stakeholders are largely made up of shareholders 
(and to a lesser extent, other individuals such as clients), whereas for the 
typical nonprofi t, a large and diverse array of individuals must be kept in 
mind, ranging from the intended benefi ciaries of the nonprofi t’s social- 
impact work to the donors who support it and the individuals who give 
their time freely or for reduced pay. 
 Case Studies: iHUB and 88MPH 
 In this section, I use the two contrasting typologies of organizational cul-
ture outlined above to illustrate that two key organizations in the Kenyan 
technology sector, the incubator 88mph and the technology hub iHub, 
are hybrids of the two cultures and that the hybridity of organizational 
culture can take quite diff erent forms. 
 Th e incubator and hub were chosen for this study because, as nurturers 
of emerging companies, they are potentially serving as cultural models 
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for the organizations they are helping to build and for the individuals 
they are helping to train. I chose 88mph and iHub for the specifi c case 
studies to illustrate Kenya’s incubators and tech hubs. iHub has been 
described as the fi rst tech hub in Africa, and its role as a trendsetter makes 
it an important illustrative choice. 88mph (now called Nairobi Garage) 
is a start-up incubator that adopted a for-profi t model popular in Silicon 
Valley at the time it originally opened in Nairobi. Th ere are a fair number 
of other incubators and hubs in Kenya, but, as I will demonstrate, iHub 
and 88mph serve as useful points of comparison when the topic of inter-
est is the hybridity of nonprofi t and for-profi t organizational culture. 
 Artifacts and Behaviors 
 Beginning with the typologies associated with the third level of organi-
zational culture, artifacts and behaviors (Table  10.1 ), iHub largely aligns 
with the nonprofi ts and 88mph with the for-profi ts. In terms of owner-
ship structure, iHub was originally founded by Erik Hersman and Juliana 
Rotich, part of the team that made the software company Ushahidi 
famous. iHub received initial fi nancial support from donor organi-
zations, such as the Omidyar Network and Hivos Foundation, and is 
guided by a dedicated local advisory board that includes Bitange Ndemo, 
the former permanent secretary of Kenya’s Ministry of Information and 
Communication, and Becky Wanjiku, the Kenyan chief executive offi  cer 
(CEO) of Fireside Communications Limited. iHub’s business model at 
this point relies on partnerships with Internet providers (e.g., Zuku and 
Safaricom) that have supplied iHub with free Wi-Fi access to help nur-
ture the sector and on international tech companies, like IBM, Microsoft, 
and Google, that helped fi nance many of iHub’s popular events, includ-
ing networking events and trainings from experts. Its model of revenue 
generation has been based mostly on hosting these kinds of events in its 
large, open-plan space (akin to a Google-style space) on fi nancing from 
donors, membership dues collected from developers and techies who use 
the space, and conducting paid research. iHub has been able to keep 
some of its expenses down through many of its partnerships (e.g., the free 
Wi-Fi supplied by partners). 
314 E.R. Marchant
 As in the case of traditional nonprofi ts, to whom iHub is responsible is 
not straightforward, but it is clear from interviews and observations that 
the core of its commitment is to a community grounded in Nairobi. In an 
interview, Hersman illustrated the integral role he believes members of the 
community have played in the origins of iHub and in sustaining its contin-
ued success, saying, “Even before there was a space we had an advisory board 
of people from the community. So we actually knew people from that com-
munity. We’re part of that community, so it’s easier. ... Before we even had 
any paint on the wall, we had dozens of volunteers” (Duarte  2012 ). 
 Th e meaning of community espoused by Hersman and most prevalent 
among members of iHub has many layers. It seems fi rst and foremost 
to be a community of techies and developers who use the space to work 
on their businesses, but more broadly, it can be seen as the many varied 
individuals who have dedicated themselves to the idea of strengthening 
the iHub community and strengthening the ability of Kenya to become 
a hub for tech innovation in Africa. Th is community includes organiza-
tions and individuals from outside of Kenya who have a genuine interest 
in supporting the growth of the sector in one way or another, including 
its funders and its many numerous partners. In short, iHub’s commit-
ment seems to be to the success of the community. 
 Th e behavior and structure of 88mph is more in line with the for-profi t 
typology. Founded by a European serial entrepreneur, Kresten Buch, who 
came out of Stanford Business School in the USA, 88mph describes itself 
on its website as a seed fund that invests in, and connects investors to, 
particular start-ups nurtured during a three-month accelerator program. 
It resembles in many ways the incubator programs in Silicon Valley, like 
Y-Combinator, that provide intensive training and mentorship dur-
ing their accelerator programs and connect successful entrepreneurs to 
potential investors. Th e key employees at 88mph are also shareholders, 
encouraging a sense of personal stake in ensuring these start-ups grow 
and profi t. When it fi rst opened, Buch and many of 88mph’s initiating 
staff  were new to the Kenyan context and most of their investors were 
foreigners. Over the next few years, they worked to engage more with 
local actors, and by 2012, 11 of their 17 investors were from East Africa. 
 88mph has currently put its accelerator program on hold while it 
focuses on its existing start-ups rather than diversifying with new ones. 
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But they still maintain a group of “entrepreneurs in residence” from 
countries around the world who are intended to serve as mentors for 
the new entrepreneurs in Nairobi and at its other, newer offi  ces in Cape 
Town and Lagos. As a for-profi t company, 88mph’s model for revenue 
generation (see Table  10.1 ) is to invest in the very early-stage start-ups it 
mentors, including taking 7 percent equity in the fl edgling companies. 
As Buch said in 2012, “Th e only way we can make money is if the start-
 up does really well” (CNBC Africa  2012 ). Th e company conforms to the 
model of the majority of incubators in Silicon Valley, that is, for-profi t at 
its core and incorporating the potential for high risk in the short term in 
the hopes of a high return in the long term. 
 Again, in keeping with the traditional model of incubators and accel-
erator programs around the world and with the for-profi t typology 
shown in Table  10.1 , 88mph is primarily responsible to the investors 
who have supported it and who have invested in the start-ups. It also 
has a second responsibility to help the start-ups build fi nancially success-
ful companies, which feeds back into the goal of helping investors get 
a return on their investment. 88mph has made a point of bringing in 
Kenyan investors; the start-ups it nurtures in its Nairobi offi  ce are led by 
Kenyan or East African entrepreneurs, as well as a handful of foreign-led 
endeavors. Nonetheless, 88mph is not as embedded in the local Nairobi 
context as is iHub, which is particularly apparent through the multiple 
offi  ces it has in Africa and in the level of espoused belief in wanting 
to “invest in technologies that solve problems for emerging markets” 
(CNBC Africa  2012 ). 
 Espoused Beliefs and Underlying Assumptions 
 Th e two organizations begin to overlap in notable ways when we look 
at the organizational culture embedded in their espoused beliefs and 
underlying assumptions, the second level of Schein’s framework (see 
Table  10.1 ). As noted above, in the area of geographic grounding, they 
remain quite distinct. iHub has a clear commitment to growing the tech 
sector specifi cally in Nairobi and is highly integrated into that location, 
whereas 88mph is more fl exible and could shift its attention to another 
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offi  ce, like the one in Lagos, if the potential for a higher return on invest-
ment seemed more likely. Th at said, the involvement of local Kenyan 
and East African investors in 88mph projects means that many of the 
individuals in the organization now have a geographic commitment to 
Kenya. As Buch has said, “We need to understand the local market, so 
having local people come to advise and local investors is very important. 
We want to build those partnerships” (CNBC Africa  2012 ). Beyond the 
geographic relationship, it is in the other aspects of organizational culture 
at the level of beliefs and values as well as at the level of the core underly-
ing  assumptions that we see the original distinctions between nonprofi ts 
and for- profi ts begin to break down in iHub and 88mph and their orga-
nizational culture hybridize. 
 iHub still fi ts within the nonprofi t type to a large extent within the 
level of espoused beliefs. Its members frequently use the language of 
positive social change when talking about iHub’s goal of supporting the 
growth of the local technology community and locally designed technol-
ogy in Kenya. More specifi cally, a number of the projects it helps to nur-
ture and support also have clear social-impact objectives, like AkiraChix, 
which trains women to use technology and to program, or like the start-
 up M-Farm, which nurtures growth in the agricultural sector by bring-
ing market price information to farmers. Nonetheless, it is notable that 
while its own fi nancial model is nonprofi t, many of the organizations 
that have emerged from the iHub space are for-profi t companies, some of 
which have built products that target the business-to-business market—
in which nonprofi t organizations have rarely been involved. Moreover, 
on its website, iHub describes one of its goals as creating “the place where 
seeds are planted and are easily found by the people with the money to 
help them grow.” Th is mix of for-profi t and nonprofi t actors and funders 
is something that iHub has actively nurtured and that its leaders actively 
espouse. For example, in a 2014 post on his blog, WhiteAfrican, Hersman 
wrote clearly defending the role that nonprofi t grant funding has played 
in supporting early-stage development in the Kenyan technology sector 
(Hersman  2014 ). But he has also emphasized his belief that many pri-
vate companies see a “real viable opportunity” in the start-up ecosystem 
around the iHub space (Design Indaba  2014 ). Herman’s choice to high-
light the role of private companies as well as nonprofi t organizations in 
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his public interviews demonstrates the belief that iHub’s mission is not 
exclusively a nonprofi t one. 
 Th is goal of supporting the growth of a private sector, albeit a sec-
tor that the iHub team believes has the potential to aff ect social change, 
is atypical compared with traditional nonprofi t organizational culture. 
It speaks to the important ways in which iHub diverges from the non-
profi t type at the level of underlying assumptions (Table  10.1 ). iHub 
does resemble the nonprofi t type in assuming that the work it is doing 
will help to empower the disadvantaged and reduce inequality. Where 
it diff ers is in its ideological commitment to building a successful and 
sustainable market economy for technology in Kenya. Many of its indi-
vidual staff  members, including its founders, appear to believe that non-
profi t involvement has an important role to play in the early stages of 
the growth of the sector and of start-ups, but the belief that underlies 
this is that the growth of a for-profi t tech sector can aff ect positive social 
change. At this base level of organizational culture, iHub represents a real 
hybridization of the characteristically for-profi t commitment to the free 
market economy and the nonprofi t commitment to philanthropic inter-
vention where needed. 
 In the case of 88mph, the typology at the level of underlying assumptions 
(see Table  10.1 ) is less ambiguous than for iHub. Th ere is a clear underlying 
commitment to a free-market economy and profi t generation akin to the 
typical for-profi t. Th e way it measure its impact, for example, is a “pure, 
simple, bottom-line kind of investment” with “really no other impact met-
rics” (Barnwell  2014 ). At times, members of 88mph have been outspoken 
critics of the reliance on nonprofi t grant funding in the sector (Hatcher 
 2014 ). In a 2014 interview with Th e Ideal Space, Nikolai Barnwell, then 
the manager of the 88mph Nairobi offi  ce, described his vision of where he 
wanted to see 88mph in the future, summing up up how the organization’s 
commitments to profi t and to a free-market economy have translated to 
the goals that its employees espouse. “In a few years,” Barnwell said, “hope-
fully we will have invested in 100 start-ups across the continent, helped 
people make some cool start-ups, and our investors have made a lot of 
money” (Njiru  2014 ). Th ese goals of creating “cool” technology as well as 
creating wealth resemble those of many in the tech sector in Silicon Valley. 
Members of 88mph have also articulated a desire to stay away from purely 
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social enterprises because they perceive them as “easily dismissed as things 
around NGOs which are largely ineff ective” (Barnwell  2014 ), a perception 
that appears to be drawn from an underlying belief that social enterprises 
are unlikely to lead to any profi table return on investment, in keeping with 
the assumptions of the for-profi t typology. 
 Nonetheless, there are subtle ways in which social impact has crept into 
some of the language, or the espoused beliefs (see Table  10.1 ), used by 
individuals at 88mph. In describing his own motivation, Buch explained, 
“I would love to work with people who really want to change the world. 
Who want to leave the nice corporate job and go down in salary to try 
to solve a problem” (CNBC Africa  2012 ). Th is language of “changing 
the world” is typical of that employed by many for-profi t start-ups and 
incubators in Silicon Valley, where each is trying to prove that theirs is 
the next big idea that will change the world and therefore is deserving of 
support from investors. Nonetheless, 88mph’s decision to focus on the 
emerging economies of African countries seems to go beyond the work 
of “changing the world” that many in the American tech sector believe 
they are doing by creating the next dating app or smart watch. Although 
employees at 88mph still readily admit that profi t generation for their 
investors is their primary goal, local job creation and regional economic 
growth are side eff ects that they routinely acknowledge or even highlight. 
 For example, when speaking with me, Barnwell acknowledged that 
while their primary goal is supporting the growth of their start-ups, ide-
ally all of the people those start-ups hire “will be locally located so that 
it builds jobs” (Barnwell  2014 ). Local job creation was, in fact, the most 
frequently cited of the company’s impacts beyond profi t generation. Even 
if 88mph employees shy away from or even criticize the term “social 
impact” (Mulupi  2012 ), there is some acknowledgment of the potential 
for 88mph’s work to have a wider economic impact. And although many 
for-profi t companies are highlighting these kinds of positive externalities, 
particularly with the rise of the corporate social-responsibility movement, 
it shows how social-impact language has begun to infl uence the beliefs 
that for-profi t incubators in this sector, like 88mph, are articulating. 
 Th e following fi gures depict the diff erences between the two cul-
tural typologies as a continuum for assumptions, beliefs, and artifacts, 
 representing each level of organizational culture described in Table  10.1 . 
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Based on the above analysis, I have placed iHub and 88mph on these 
continuums. Th e fi gures certainly oversimplify the cultural complexities 
at both of these organizations, and the positions chosen for them are not 
hard and fast. Rather, the fi gures are simply intended to illustrate that 
although both of these organizations are hybrids, their hybridity takes 
very diff erent forms (Figs.  10.1 and  10.2 ).
 At the level of behaviors, iHub’s structure makes it responsible to a 
wide array of actors in the community to which it is committed, while 
88mph’s primary responsibility is to its investors. At the level of beliefs, 
they share the goal of supporting the growth of tech start-ups in Kenya, 
though iHub’s motivation for that seems to revolve more around the 
social impact of such growth while 88mph’s lies more in the generation 
of profi t and perhaps also regional economic growth and job creation. 
And at the level of assumptions, they seem to have more in common with 
a mutual, unspoken commitment to the growth of a free-market econ-
omy around the Kenyan tech sector, a notable area where iHub seems to 












 With such a diverse array of organizations present in the Kenyan tech 
sector, 88mph and iHub are exposed to many organizations that they 
might draw on for inspiration. In the globally connected ecosystem of the 
technology sector, they are also connected to organizational cultures from 
beyond Kenya, including the organizational culture of Silicon Valley to 
name but one. It may be that some hybrid composite of nonprofi t and 
for-profi t organizational culture, combined with some of these other 
organizational cultures (e.g., Silicon Valley tech culture or Kenyan busi-
ness culture) not explored in this chapter, may become the norm for 
the Kenyan tech sector. I believe it is still too early to say. What can be 
deduced at this stage, I suggest, is simply that these two organizations 
have decided that adopting cultural beliefs and practices from at least two 
diff erent organizational cultural types is the best way for them to operate 
in the current Kenyan tech sector. 
 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have made the case that in order for progress to take 
place in the Kenyan technology sector, we need to move beyond the stale 
debate about whether nonprofi t grant funding is good or bad and instead 
fi nd ways to take advantage of the multiculturalism that exists in the sec-
tor. In order to do this, I have drawn on existing theories about culture at 
organizations to demonstrate that even organizations like 88mph, often 
associated with the for-profi t model that dominates the discourse, are not 
purely for-profi t when they are examined more holistically using the lens 
of cultural theory. By using Schein’s theory of the three levels of organi-
zational culture—underlying assumptions, espoused beliefs and values, 
and observed artifacts and behaviors—I have demonstrated in a more 
nuanced way that cultural hybridity exists at key organizations in Kenya’s 
technology sector and that the practices and behaviors of these organiza-
tions are shaped by their fundamental underlying assumptions. 
 Th e cultural reality at iHub and 88mph is certainly even more com-
plex and more fl uid than was presented in this chapter. Organizations 
are essentially living ecosystems; they have many individuals within 
them who maintain various kinds of relationships across individuals, 
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 departments, job descriptions, and time. Th ey are also, like the hybrid 
language Sheng, continuously evolving and adopting to diff erent con-
texts, needs, and beliefs. Th e goal of this chapter was not to paint a com-
prehensive picture of all of the cultural infl uences at 88mph and iHub 
but to illustrate that these organizations are more complex than their 
revenue models might suggest. 
 Implications 
 For Kenya 
 Acceptance of this hybridization could have important implications 
for the future of technology companies in Kenya. A more hybridized 
organizational culture at the incubators and hubs—organizations that 
nurture the newly emerging technology start-ups of Kenya—could 
lead to more hybridity in the organizational culture at the start-ups 
themselves. In a sector that is riding on the potential of such start-ups 
to build the country’s future tech industry, the choices that entrepre-
neurs and start- up managers make about organizational culture early 
on could have the potential to infl uence the growth of this promising 
industry. Accepting that this hybridity already exists is a key step in 
fi ndings ways to take advantage of it and to work with it creatively and 
conscientiously. 
 Beyond Kenya 
 I would argue that the intermingling of nonprofi t and for-profi t culture 
observed at iHub and 88mph is refl ective of larger trends of overlap 
between these two sectors, not only in Kenya, but also in other parts 
of African and the Global South. Public–private partnerships, micro- 
fi nance for development, and social-impact investing have all been 
growing trends over the last 15 years in many countries in the Global 
South. In countries like Kenya, Nigeria, and Ghana, not only are non-
profi ts and international donors investing in start-ups,  something that 
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would have been hard to fi nd fi ve or ten years ago, but they are also 
adopting some of the language, and perhaps even the beliefs, of the for-
profi t sector. Th is may be seen in a focus on “sustainability,” “agribusi-
ness,” or testing new “business models,” like the World Bank’s infoDev 
project, or in committing to “sustainable economic development” as a 
core pillar of an organization’s work, as Hivos Foundation has done. 
Similarly, in ways akin to the experience of 88mph, many for-prof-
its operating in Kenya and other parts of Africa have begun adopt-
ing some of the more social-impact- focused goals and visions typically 
associated with nonprofi ts into the language they use to explain their 
work. Multinationals are particularly good examples of this, with some, 
including IBM, Google, and Microsoft, frequently articulating a desire 
to help “build local capacity” in Africa, as in IBM’s commitment to 
“encourage[ing] and strengthen[ing] an innovation culture” in its work 
in Kenya (citizen IBM  2012 ). 
 Furthermore, the review of the theories of organizational culture and 
hybridity provided in this chapter illustrated the existing literature’s 
weakness at explaining the behavior and structure of new organizations 
in emerging economies in the Global South and particularly the role 
of hybrid organizations in these spaces. Th e existing literature, largely 
built from studies in the USA and Europe, sees hybrid organizations as 
inherently unstable. Work from scholars like Battilana, Gupta, and their 
colleagues, as well as the case studies provided here, provides early indica-
tions that the opposite might in fact be true in countries in the Global 
South, or at the very least that such hybridity is a potentially more natural 
part of the development of economies in the Global South. 
 Recommendations for Practitioners 
 I want to off er a few recommendations for practitioners working in the 
Kenyan tech sector and in technology innovation in multicultural envi-
ronments in general that have come out of the research conducted for 
this chapter. Th ese recommendatons are: (1) to embrace hybridity, (2) 
to think holistically about culture at an organization, and (3) to consider 
hybrid individuals for employment. 
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 Embrace Hybridity 
 In multicultural environments, I would recommend embracing the 
hybridity that multiculturalism might lead to, but be well-informed 
about the diff erent kinds of culture that are infl uencing your work. Are 
you located in a cultural environment very diff erent from the ones in 
which you have worked before? Perhaps in such environments it makes 
sense to adopt some of the cultural practices of the new environment into 
your organizational culture even if such practices have not been a part of 
your operations in other environments. Th inking about these practices 
as an element of fl uid, evolving culture helps to embrace such hybridity 
and change over time as a natural part of organizations. Are there diff er-
ent cultural groups within your organizations that are creating divisions? 
One reason hybrid organizations are often believed to be unstable is that 
the hybridity is a result of the attempt to mix diff erent cultural groups in 
one organization, which often leads to confl ict between the groups. Such 
cultural mixing does not necessarily need to be avoided, but communica-
tion between such groups should be proactively managed. 
 Think Holistically 
 I would also recommend thinking holistically about the culture at an 
organization beyond just the choice of revenue model and to embrace the 
fl uidity that comes with looking at culture and not just at the structure 
of one’s organization. Although the debate about whether to accept grant 
funding or venture capital funding is very much alive among entrepre-
neurs in Kenya, it focuses on a small piece of the puzzle. Entrepreneurs 
should consider very carefully the choices they make about not just their 
revenue model, but also the myriad other aspects of organizational culture 
that they adopt. When designing the structure of a new company, what 
templates are being used to infl uence it? Incubators? Peer competitors? 
Successful foreign companies? If the latter, how diff erent is the market 
those companies succeeded in from the one you are in? Purposeful, con-
scientious attention to understanding why particular elements of culture 
are being adopted could go a long way to helping fl edgling  organizations 
324 E.R. Marchant
stay committed to their goals and retain a sense of organizational coher-
ence even when adopting cultural practices from multiple diff erent orga-
nizational cultures. 
 Consider Hybrid Individuals 
 Once the cultural hybridity in a multicultural sector is embraced, it 
becomes easier to develop tangible strategies for managing an organiza-
tion’s cultural hybridity, such as hiring hybrid individuals. Th ere is some 
evidence from the literature that hybrid individuals—individuals who 
have experience working in more than one kind of organizational cul-
ture—are particularly adept at switching between the two cultures or 
combining them. Th ink, for example, of individuals with dual national-
ity and experience living in two or more countries. Th ey are typically 
able to adapt and blend into each country far more easily than a for-
eigner who might have to learn a new language or who might falter on 
even such basic things as the appropriate way to greet an elder. In their 
work in Bolivia, Battilana and Dorado ( 2010 ) demonstrated that new 
hybrid organizations benefi tted from hiring employees with experience 
in the various cultures that the new organizations represented. Much 
more research needs to be carried out in order to better understand the 
roles these individuals might play, but the potential for hybrid individu-
als within hybrid organizations is one way in which embracing hybridity 
can have practical consequences. 
 Recommendations for Researchers 
 Finally, one of the goals of this chapter was to lay the groundwork for 
research on culture and organizations in technology sectors in African 
economies. Recommendations for avenues of research in this area 
include: (1) examining the stability or sustainability of organizations with 
hybrid cultures in the sector, (2) studying the ways in which the culture 
of organizations in the sector are changing over time, (3) problematizing 
the infl uence of other forms of culture at organizations (e.g., the cultural 
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context, cross-cutting culture, and sub-culture), (4) deconstructing the 
meaning of the culture for an organization’s employees, and (5) testing 
the applicability of theories of intercultural communication to hybrid 
forms of work. 
 Such research could help build a more holistic picture by looking, for 
example, at the change in organizational culture at incubators and hubs 
over time or at how individuals inside and outside of them construct or 
perceive their cultural infl uences. Watkins et al. ( 2012 ) have argued that 
“NGOs are shaped as much by how they are imagined as by what they 
actually do.” How do start-up managers perceive the incubators and tech 
hubs? How would members of an organization’s advisory board charac-
terize it? How might this characterization change depending on whom 
they are talking to? 
 Closer examination of the relationship between these organizations 
and the industrial and cultural context in which they exist could also 
prove very fruitful. Do the incubators and tech hubs in Kenya, as I 
speculate in this chapter, really have any power to shape the organi-
zational cultures of the start-ups they work with or the institutional 
norms being adopted by the country’s tech industry as a whole? Is there 
something theoretically useful to be learned from studying organiza-
tions forming in new industries like the Kenyan tech industry that 
might be applicable more broadly? 
 Finally, I believe that the study of intercultural communication could pro-
vide a particularly fruitful avenue for research on these kinds of hybrid orga-
nizational cultures in multicultural environments. Researchers specializing in 
intercultural communication have typically focused on environments with 
a mix of national cultures, like foreign language classrooms or among stu-
dents who study abroad. By taking some of the theories that were developed 
in these contexts—like cross-cultural competence, cultural intelligence, or 
code-switching—and applying them to the study of culture at organizations, 
researchers could help in a number of ways. Th ey could build theory about 
how hybrid organizations interact with one another or with nonhybrid orga-
nizations or test the value of hiring hybrid employees with experience work-
ing in various diff erent organizational cultural environments. 
 Nonprofi t, for-profi t, and hybrid organizations are likely to be part of 
Kenya’s tech sector for a while. And as in any environment where cultural 
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groups are forced to live together, there is the potential for confl ict. It is 
my hope that highlighting the areas in which these organizational groups 
overlap culturally and drawing attention to the fl uidity of culture, as this 
chapter has done, will help individuals in the sector acknowledge the 
areas of common ground between them and to use them to facilitate 
easier communication during the many intercultural interactions that 
take place on a daily basis in this diverse sector. 
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 Conversation #10 
 Refl ections on the Hiring Process: What 
Happened to Curiosity and Passion? 
 Conrad Akunga of Innova Limited 
 Conrad Akunga  is an enthusiastic, optimistic cynic, thinker, developer, son of 
Kenya, and all-round good guy with a keen interest in governance, economics, 
technology, and human nature. He has worked with technology for more than 
15 years and does not see that changing in the immediate future. He is a co-
founder of several initiatives, the main ones being Innova Limited, a pan-Afri-
can software company that develops analytics and tools for the investment and 
capital markets, and  www.mzalendo.com , a digital governance platform that 
provides nonpartisan insights into Kenya’s government and administration. 
 Why did you start Innova, and what is the story behind it? 
 Before I started Innova, I worked for a software company that developed 
supply chain software solutions for almost ten years. We developed client–
server applications running on mobile devices before there was Android. 
Before there was iOS. Before there was even 3G. Or Edge. It got to the point 
where I felt I knew the space and the issues like the back of my hand. In that 
capacity, I led a team that won the 2011 Growth Economy Venture Challenge, 
a million-dollar award from Nokia. But over time, I grew bored working 
in a space I knew so well and wanted a new challenge. So I partnered with 
my longtime friend Vincent Ntalami and went into a space I knew nothing 
about—fi nance and capital  markets. We started offi  cially in 2011, developing 
a range of fi nancial software and tools for the capital markets. Today, we have 
20 full-time staff , and we develop solutions for custodians, fund managers, 
private equity fi rms, and insurance and pension managers. We have clients in 
fi ve countries—Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Malawi. 
 Entrepreneurship in Africa is quite hyped at the moment. How do 
you see this development? 
 I feel it is unfortunate. Entrepreneurship is considerably romanticized 
and glorifi ed. Nothing is hotter and sexier than entrepreneurship. Th e 
current ethos is that entrepreneurship is the solution to all our problems. 
I could not disagree more. I agree that entrepreneurship is important, but 
entrepreneurship is not the Holy Grail or the solution to all our problems. 
We cannot all be employers. We also need employees. As a matter of fact, 
employers and employees exist for the exact same reasons. Take the parallel 
of the armed forces. You cannot have an army of all generals. You also can-
not have an army of all noncommissioned offi  cers. Each element brings 
something to the table, and the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. 
 Perhaps this new narrative is a knee-jerk response to the atmosphere 
we have been brought up in. For generations, kids have been told the 
following: go to primary school, work hard so you can go to a good 
secondary school, work hard so you can go to a good university, and 
fi nally work hard so you can get a good job. Generations and generations 
conditioned in this fashion have led to an education system optimized 
around producing employees, which, in turn, produces graduates who 
seek jobs. Th at is the demand side—employment. However, not much 
used to happen on the supply side—entrepreneurship. Perhaps that is 
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why the entrepreneurship narrative is getting such a reaction. It is the 
complete antithesis of the status quo. 
 Th e other issue I feel we have with the education system is its outright 
bias toward science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). 
Do not get me wrong—I think STEM is very important. But I also feel that 
the humanities, arts, and physical education are just as important. Again our 
kids have been conditioned to grow up to become doctors and engineers. 
In Kenya, the exit point from primary school is a nationwide examination 
called the Kenya Certifi cate of Primary Education. Millions of students 
appear for this exam around November, and by January, the results are out. 
Th ere is generally much fanfare, and the highest-scoring students are identi-
fi ed, celebrated, and interviewed. And every year,  without fail, these kids 
are asked what they want to be when they are done with education. Th ey 
invariably respond with some variation on doctor, surgeon, engineer. I can-
not recall ever hearing any of these kids say they want to be poets or dancers 
or artists. In our schools, a smart kid is one who is good at math or science; 
a kid who is good at drawing, curiously, is referred to as “talented.” But not 
smart. For society as a whole to fl ourish, each of these disciplines brings 
something to the table. We need STEM. But we also need arts. And physical 
sciences. And humanities. A holistic approach to our development capacity. 
 How will more “curious” students graduate from the education system? 
 I have always felt that the really good teachers can only be truly recog-
nized after they have left their students to themselves. Allow me to explain 
what I mean by that. Given that our education system is optimized around 
passing exams, anyone with a good memory can cram facts and dates and 
regurgitate them at exam time. But knowing facts and understanding and 
internalizing them is a diff erent kettle of fi sh. Good teachers plant a seed in 
your head, and usually you are blissfully unaware of it. Th ey instil curios-
ity. Curiosity is what will make you go to the library and look for books on 
how electricity works. Not because there is an exam or because you have 
been asked to. You have gone on your own because you simply want to 
know. Th ings you learn out of curiosity, or genuine passion, stick in your 
head a lot longer than those bullet points you crammed to pass an exam 
and almost immediately forgot. Th is model of a teacher standing in front, 
rapping out notes, and then students regurgitating the same notes back 
at them during exams needs to be reviewed. I have interviewed  software 
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developers and architects for almost 15 years now, and I am simultane-
ously saddened and amused by the number of graduates, masters, and 
even postgraduate prospects who have no clue about even the most basic 
fundamentals of computer science. What then does your degree prove 
other than that you know how to pass exams? What is it worth if you 
cannot access what you claim you know? It is a tragedy on so many levels. 
 How do you fi lter out job candidates that can apply and not only 
repeat what they have learned? 
 For starters, I no longer care whether anyone has a degree. As a matter 
of fact, for some positions, a degree paradoxically seems to get in the way. 
A degree seems to install some kind of thoughts barriers (justifi ed or not), 
and I want a mindset that either does not realize there are any barriers or 
ignores them completely. Th ere is a lot to be said for dreamers and the 
doggedly determined who are not held back by reality. 
 Just like our education system, the interview process is also broken. 
Take the usual hiring situation… 
 I nterviewer : Tell us about yourself. 
 I nterviewee : My name is Mary. I am a hard-working, God-fearing 
citizen. 
 I nterviewer : Tell us about your past jobs. 
 I nterviewee : Currently I work at…. 
 I nterviewer : What are your strengths? 
 I nterviewee : I am a team player. I work well under pressure. I require 
minimal supervision. 
 I nterviewer : What are your weaknesses? 
 I nterviewee : I am a perfectionist. 
 It is as if there were a universal template—literally dozens of interviews 
where I have heard the same things. At Innova, we used this model for many 
years until we had some particularly disastrous hires who interviewed well 
but not only performed poorly, they but actually retrogressed us. We real-
ized that it is impossible to know if someone will be good at their job during 
the interview. Some people interview well and fl ounder. What if there were 
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people who interviewed poorly but would have turned out to be excep-
tional? So we changed it. We use the interview to get to know you, and vice 
versa. We sell you our vision and expectations. You do the same. Meet our 
team and your potential colleagues. What are your interests? What are you 
passionate about? Convince us to give you a chance, not a job. After this, 
you work for three months. How good are you at the job? Are you a team 
player? Are you pleasant to work with? Do you enjoy the work? Can you 
manage yourself and your time? Are you willing to pull together and pitch 
in during emergencies? We do not enforce offi  cial working hours, so these 
things matter. After these three months, your colleagues and your head of 
department vote whether to keep you or not. Any negative votes—no hire. 
After all, if your colleagues do not want to work with you, how useful can 
you be in a collective eff ort? It has worked extremely well for us. 
 How many people do you fi nd that fi t the profi le of a creative  problem 
solver? 
 It is very diffi  cult to fi nd those, because almost all software developers 
come with the mindset that their primary work is to write code. Th is is not 
true. Th eir primary work is to understand and solve problems. Writing code 
just happens to be one of the tools at their disposal. Th e other problem is 
that they come in as Java guys. Or C++ guys. Or C# guys. Th ey do not come 
in as programmers. Th e programming language is neither here nor there. 
What is important is the knowledge and understanding of algorithms and 
data structures. Syntax and organization of source code is a book or a google 
away. Mindset and attitude are the most important things. Are you curious? 
Determined? Passionate? Driven? If so, most of the war is won. Th e techni-
cal stuff  we can teach you. However, we cannot teach you the former. My 
old boss Francis Kioko once told me that the fi rst thing you should do when 
you take on a new job or opportunity is to train your replacement. At the 
time, that made no sense to me, because it sounded like career suicide. But 
with age came wisdom, and I understood that much as I could try to impart 
all of my technical knowledge, what I could not impart, even if I wanted to, 
was my experience—how to apply said knowledge: Th at is your edge! You 
cannot study this by cramming and repeating what you have read. You need 
to start trying and learning by applying knowledge. We are looking for those 
who know how to put their knowledge to work. 
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 Hustling is very prominent in Kenya. What is your opinion on the 
“hustling” entrepreneur? 
 It depends. If hustling is a temporary and reactionary move, in excep-
tional circumstances, then it makes sense. If it is the end of the month 
and you do not have the cash fl ow for payroll, how can you temporarily 
address that situation? Aggressive negotiation? Overdraft? Short-term con-
sultancy? If, however, hustling is your standard mode of operation, then 
you have a big problem. It is not sustainable or scalable. You will be spread 
too thin. You will not be focused. And that is bad for you, your employees, 
and your company. Here, hustling is a bad thing. Structure, planning, and 
process are essential for scaling and growth. Th e dubious badge of honour 
carried by those who are permanent hustlers needs to be retired. If you are 
constantly hustling, you have fundamental problems. Fix them. 
 Let us imagine you could start Innova all over again. What would you 
change? 
 I have been asked this several times, and I used to answer, “I should 
have started sooner.” But again, with age comes wisdom. If I had started 
sooner, would I have had the experiences and lessons that shaped my 
thinking and attitude today? Because learning includes both the things 
you should do and the things you should not. All of these played a part 
to make me who I am today. And so I can answer confi dently that, with 
hindsight, I would not change a thing! 
 Th ank you, Conrad! 
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 In 2005, the fi rst day of my new job as permanent secretary (equiva-
lent to a company chief executive offi  cer [CEO]) of Kenya’s Ministry of 
Information and Communications was dramatic. In response to a jour-
nalist’s question about what I would do about the corruption in the ICT 
sector, I said, I needed time to study the situation and would do my best 
to tackle it. 
 It was the fi rst media interview in my life. I was still trying to under-
stand my new assignment and what it meant to the people of Kenya. Th e 
previous night, President Mwai Kibaki had appointed me to work with 
the Hon. Mutahi Kagwe, who was appointed as minister (equivalent to 
a nonexecutive chairman of the board). Th e minister is the political head 
of the ministry. 
 Inside a Policymaker’s Mind: 
An Entrepreneurial Approach to Policy 
Development and Implementation 
 Bitange   Ndemo 
 B.  Ndemo ( ) 
 University of Nairobi ,  Nairobi ,  Kenya 
 As the top civil servant in the ministry, I was responsible for policy-
making and implementation. Everything in the ICT and media sectors 
ended up on my desk. Corruption issues topped the agenda fi nancially at 
the ministry. Th e incumbent telecom, Telkom Kenya, was bleeding fi nan-
cially and losing revenues. Powerful cartels from the private sector in col-
lusion with staff  were stealing the company’s assets through phony court 
cases while employees were colluding with international cartels to use the 
local network without paying (a practice known as the grey market in 
telecommunications). Publicly owned shares of the new mobile company, 
Safaricom, had disappeared to a secretive company registered in Guernsey 
under nominee accounts. Radio frequencies, a public resource, had largely 
been inappropriately allocated to well-connected individuals and compa-
nies, meaning that new entrants could not enter the broadcasting market. 
 At every function, I faced a barrage of questions from media, donor 
agencies, and civil society 1  as well as the public about corruption in the 
sector. I had no answer to any of these questions, but I kept promising 
that we would soon deal with all the issues. At that time, the Ministry of 
Information as well as my post in it had a fairly low profi le. I quickly real-
ized that the industry had no policy in place. Previous attempts to have a 
policy in place were always frustrated by strong vested interests. 
 Th e elephant in the room was what we would do to open up the indus-
try by subverting corrupt networks. Before I joined the sector in 2005, 
privatization was a pressing matter. Th e new minister and I consulted 
with the industry and concluded that the answers lay in policy changes. 
We revised a draft policy document (Government of Kenya  2006 ) that 
had been developed earlier and formally adopted it through publica-
tion in the  Kenya Gazette , the government legal publication. Th ereafter, 
implementation—though characterized by risk—started in earnest. 
 On paper, Kenya’s ICT sector was liberalized. However, the reality 
was that the incumbent telecom, a creation from the colonial days, con-
trolled key resources such as the international gateway. Th is monopoly 
status made calling costs very expensive, sometimes 70 % more than in 
countries like India. New fi rms had no option but to endure exorbitant 
1  In this case, civil society refers to many diff erent nongovernment organizations and public institu-
tions that represent the interests of Kenya’s citizen. 
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prices, which they passed on to the consumer. Th e incumbent as the gate-
keeper for all international connections controlled the emerging Internet 
resources. Th e cartels benefi tting in this grey market jealously protected 
the incumbent’s monopoly status and obstructed all eff orts at liberalizing 
the sector. Th is eff ectively stifl ed entrepreneurship and innovation. 
 Quick Wins from the New Sector Policy: 
Market Liberalization 
 We leveraged the policy document to build suffi  cient support from the 
industry in order to open up the sector. We selected fi ve priority areas 
from the document, including development of and access to aff ordable 
infrastructure, content and innovation, capacity building, public–private 
partnership, and the creation of employment opportunities. In spite of 
this open approach to policymaking, we faced challenges. Th e grey mar-
ket cartels waged war against our initiatives. We received death threats 
over the opening up of the international telecommunications gateway 
(ITG) gateways used to link telecommunications operators to the outside 
world. However, we were determined, and we went ahead and opened 
up the industry, enabling competitive environment. Because of the death 
threats, we had to deploy heavy security as we issued new IG licenses. 
Some members of the media who had been manipulated into accusing 
us of destroying the national strategic resource, the incumbent Telkom 
Kenya, eventually began to realize that our actions would be benefi cial 
to all citizens. Th is was the beginning of the transformation of the sector. 
However, because of the technological and other changes, we needed a 
dynamic public policymaking process to accelerate the sector’s entrepre-
neurial reforms. 
 Th is chapter is devoted to an examination of the complex policymak-
ing process and entrepreneurial mindset that led to Kenya’s breakthrough 
in ICTs innovation during President Mwai Kibaki’s administration. It is 
mostly narrative in nature, based on recollections of my participation and 
observations, but it also attempts to use Dror’s general systems theory 
framework ( 1969 ) and Edelenbos and Klijn’s interactive decision-making 
theory ( 2005 ) to help explain the process. 
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 It also provides a detailed account of policy development and the 
institutions that supported Kenya’s ICT innovation dynamics, in the 
process identifying some of the pressing policymaking problems that 
had to be overcome to facilitate innovative thinking on Kenya’s position 
in the so- called information age. Th e rest of the chapter is a narration of 
how innovation policies were made on an ad hoc basis to facilitate devel-
opment. Th ree case studies are analyzed using these theories, revealing 
the two major policy decisions that enabled projects that sparked ICT 
innovation in Kenya. 
 The Public Policymaking Process 
 Policymaking is a dynamic and complex process and one that is nec-
essary in creating a level playing fi eld in any sector. To refl ect chang-
ing circumstances—and because they rarely address all pertinent issues 
exhaustively—policies need regular iterations. 
 Th e process of public policymaking is a decision-centric and a goal- 
driven process (Geurts  2014 ). Decision-centric processes are those that 
require decisions to be made. Goal-driven processes are those that require 
a desired outcome. Goal-driven processes are not static, and iterations are 
performed until the outcome has been produced. Th e fi nal outcome is 
thus often a compromise between the targeted result and the constraints 
encountered. Th e framework suggested in this chapter is largely decision- 
centric and perhaps explains why Dror ( 1969 ) found systems theory 
to be a more eff ective tool to explain the continuous and often ad doc 
nature of policymaking. According to Dror’s approach, for policy to be 
sustained, it requires a continuous input of resources and motivation. It 
is a dynamic process that changes with time and whose subprocesses and 
phases vary internally and with respect to each other. 
 In any country, the policymaking process faces several challenges. In 
developing countries, discourse on policymaking processes is rare and 
almost nonexistent, a situation that creates room to manipulate decisions 
in favour of powerful individuals and engenders corruption. 
 Dror ( 1969 ,  1983 ) recognized that the principal problem with con-
temporary public policymaking is the constantly widening gap between 
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what is known about policymaking and how policy is actually made. 
Despite ever-complex and evolving challenges, contemporary society 
relies on static policymaking machinery. At the same time, corporations, 
private institutions, and government organizations need adaptable guide-
lines to help them make urgent decisions. For Dror, general system the-
ory referred to the relations between public policymaking and behavioral 
science and is used to facilitate eff ective policymaking. 
 In interactive decision-making theory, according to Edelenbos and 
Klijn ( 2005 ), the public actors, faced with the challenge of translating 
political objective into policy, attempt alternative ways of creating pol-
icy. Perceived problems in policy practices are responsible for protracted 
decision-making process and the resistance of various actors. Proposed 
solutions are often not inventive enough for policymakers to make real 
change. Often, there is a large gap between the objectives of politicians 
and those of civil servants and the citizens that the policy is supposed to 
serve. Th is is the case in a country like Kenya, where politicians have no 
ideological leaning but change policy positions not on account of ideol-
ogy but out of political expediency. 
 Nurturing Emerging Tech Entrepreneurs 
 In their book  Start-up Nation , Senor and Singer ( 2009 ) demonstrated 
the power of innovation and entrepreneurship to propel an economy to 
unimaginable growth levels. Th ey detailed how Israel nurtured technology 
start-ups by investing in research and development to become one of the 
major global players in technology, even rivaling Silicon Valley. In 2008, 
Israel, a country of 7.1 million people with no natural resources, attracted 
“close to $2 billion in venture capital, as much as fl owed to the U.K.’s 61 
million citizens or the 145 million people living in Germany and France 
combined” (Senor and Singer  2009 ). Th e success was largely due to the 
“government’s macroeconomic policies that played an important role in 
speeding up the country’s growth, reversing it, and then unleashing it in 
ways that even the government never expected” (Senor and Singer  2009 ). 
 However, start-ups do not just grow; they are nurtured. Technology 
entrepreneurs get advice from a variety of sources, including directors, 
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advisory board members, friends, and informal advisors (Choi and 
Stark  2005 ). Th ese advice networks serve as important sources of infor-
mation about business, technical, and social issues for the entrepre-
neurial community. 
 Applied to policymaking in the Kenyan context, this means that a 
combination of an enabling policy environment, investments in research 
and development, and good advisory networks are necessary for nurtur-
ing a successful technology entrepreneurship start-up program. And in 
fact, sustained government interventions contributed to the success of 
several start-up support systems in Kenya, such as iHub, iLab, M-Lab, 
and 88mph. 
 Two of the policy interventions discussed below were instrumental in 
putting Kenya on the global ICT map. 
 Policymaking in the Kenyan Context 
 Public policymaking in Kenya in the decade under review was made 
more complex by the fact that it was happening in an environment of 
emergent technologies—and of policymakers with limited experience in 
the subject matter and even less of the skills necessary to build bold, 
innovative policies. 
 As in other countries, most public policies are the result of a change 
in political leadership. In Kenya, the ministries or departments develop 
a policy statement in line with the vision and political agenda of the 
incoming administration and pass it on to the cabinet—composed of 
the president and the cabinet secretaries. Once the cabinet has approved 
the policy statement, it is then shared with stakeholders for comments to 
refl ect the demands of the Kenya Constitution (Government of Kenya 
 2010 ), which demands that policymaking be consultative, participatory, 
collaborative, and transparent. 
 This constitutional requirement notwithstanding, achieving 
meaningful consultation is a core challenge of policymaking in 
Kenya. This is because leaders often assume that the public partici-
pates meaningfully and agrees with the proposed agenda when, in 
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reality, the opposite is true. In many cases, there is lack of incentive 
for the public to meaningfully contribute to the policies that affect 
them. Additionally, in most public consultation hearings, Kenyan 
civil society actors highjack hearings and turn them into avenues for 
political debate on other issues. 
 Once the consultative period has ended, public views are incorporated 
into the policy document, which is then sent back to the cabinet for the 
fi nal approval. If no existing legislation exists on which the policy can be 
underpinned, the policy is accompanied by a new draft bill. 
 If a policy goes through these stages successfully, it is then forwarded 
to the Attorney General’s offi  ce to ensure it does not confl ict with 
other policies or laws. If it requires legislation, it is then forwarded to 
Parliament for deliberations as a bill before it become an Act (law) after 
receiving presidential assent. Policies that do not require any legislation 
(i.e., where a legal framework exists but there are no regulations) are 
published in the  Kenya Gazette . After publication, implementation of 
the policy starts. 
 Th e time it takes for any policy document to go through all these 
stages can range anywhere from six months to ten years, mostly depend-
ing on the commitment and infl uence of the sponsoring ministry and 
of the cabinet. When a policy contains contentious issues that politi-
cians do not want to deal with, it might even take longer. For example, 
an attempt to develop a Freedom of Information Law, which seeks to 
ensure that every citizen has a right to information, encountered resis-
tance. Th is bill has taken more than ten years and has yet to be passed by 
Parliament simply because politicians think that citizens will gain access 
to their sensitive data. With this kind of highly politicized policymaking 
process, it is no wonder that development in most developing countries 
becomes paralyzed. 
 Fortunately for us, before the the promulgation of the 2010 con-
stitution, the president had powers to bypass the cabinet and have 
a policy in place within a week. Th e minister and I, working closely 
with the president, exploited this opportunity in executing our 
ICT projects  in record time. However, presidential discretion was a 
 double-edged sword. 
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 Using the presidential powers, we were able to push through other 
policies that, although lying outside our purview, were necessary to the 
success of our sector. Th e fi ve policy objectives we identifi ed—develop-
ment of and access to aff ordable infrastructure, content and innova-
tion, capacity building, public–private partnership, and the creation of 
employment opportunities—each required its own several sub-policies or 
its own policy statement. Public–private partnership, for example, was a 
broader policy that fell within the purview of the Ministry of Finance but 
was an important policy for my department’s goals in ICT development. 
 Problem Statement 
 Innovation precedes policy in emerging areas such as ICTs. Th is, however, 
should not happen if signifi cant resources are committed to research and 
development. Until 2007, Kenya was among 22 Eastern Africa countries 
grappling with the challenge of linking the region to the rest of the world 
through undersea fi ber optic cables. Th e challenge centered on whether 
it was commercially viable to lay such cables and if the governments 
required development assistance to build the infrastructure. At the time, 
no relevant policy existed, and so, naturally, focus turned to the legal 
guidelines that were required to see the project through to completion. 
 A steering committee comprising mostly nontechnical government 
teams from each participating country wanted a policy framework spell-
ing out operations of the proposed project before infrastructure develop-
ment began. Embedded in some of the engagements were government 
interests, all of which had engaged experts to help them in the policy 
negotiations. Th is was in contrast with the team I led, which took the 
view that, because we had the political will, all was needed was the cre-
ation of a general policy statement that could be modifi ed and updated 
as construction went on. In my view, it was premature to formulate a 
comprehensive policy statement in a technical area in which many of the 
participants had limited subject matter expertise. It would be more eff ec-
tive to develop a general policy to help guide those involved gain more 
experience and exposure to the technologies being proposed. 
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 Was Existing Knowledge Suffi cient to Address 
Future Demands for Policy Guidelines? 
 Th e policymaking process under review was happening in the context of 
rapid dynamic technological advances. Th e Kibaki administration aimed 
at minimizing the risk of investing in an area whose contribution to eco-
nomic development was unknown. 
 Th ree subquestions therefore guided our research on the topic: (1) 
How could new ideas be accepted in the absence of a comprehensive 
policy? (2) Could an alternative and more dynamic policy environment 
give us the desired results? (3) Without a comprehensive policy docu-
ment, how could investors be convinced that the management of the 
infrastructure would be fair? 
 What follows is a policymaker’s refl ection on the policy process that 
changed Kenya’s ICT landscape. 
 Th ree cases (projects) that required constant policy revision will be 
discussed using Dror’s general systems theory framework ( 1969 ) and 
Edelenbos and Klijn’s ( 2005 ) interactive decision-making theory to help 
explain the rationale of the policy interventions. 
 Th e cases illustrate the diffi  culty of creating a dynamic policy environ-
ment owing to personal vested interests as well as scant technological 
knowledge by some government offi  cials. 
 General Systems Theory: A Recapitulation 
 Dror is an acknowledged contributor to policy literature. In  Th e Capacity 
to Govern (2001), one of his more remarkable works, he argued that a 
distrust of government has caused a brain drain from elected political 
 positions. Other stakeholders in the political process—industry,  civil 
society , and nongovernmental organizations—however important, he 
argued, cannot compensate for government’s role in defi ning policy, 
which it is democratically empowered to do. Dror argued that radical 
improvements in governance were urgently needed but noted the scarcity 
of salient  policy proposals to achieve this. 
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 Th e Capacity to Govern diagnosed contemporary governments as obso-
lete and proposed changes in values, structures, staffi  ng, public under-
standing, and political culture to equip governance for the radically novel 
challenges of the twenty-fi rst century—and, as such, provided an appropri-
ate lens through which to understand ICT policy development in Kenya. 
Th e framework of Dror’s systems analysis involved three main elements:
 1.  Looking broadly at problems and alternatives, taking into account 
many of the relevant variables and of the probable results—in other 
words, taking a “systems” view; 
 2.  Searching for an optimal, or at least clearly preferable, solution among 
the available alternatives, without being limited to incremental 
changes; and 
 3.  Rationally identifying the preferable alternative (or alternatives) 
through comparison of expected results. 
 However, in my experience, policy rarely followed such a linear path. 
Th e political agenda of leaders is obfuscated by vague and confl icting 
statements and undefi ned national goals, and the policymaker has to 
abstract the real political intentions from such statements, translate them 
into detailed and actionable targets, and attach appropriate policy inter-
ventions to them. 
 Policymakers frequently delegate policymaking to technical staff , a fact 
that can widen the gap between intent and actual policy. Standing alone, 
the general systems approach does not always yield the desired results. 
Th ere is a need to supplement systems theory with one that describes 
the consultative nature of policymaking—that is, interactive decision- 
making theory. 
 Interactive Decision-Making Theory 
 Edelenbos and Klijn ( 2005 ) argued that proposed solutions are often 
not inventive enough for policymakers to create eff ective and actionable 
policy and that there is a large gap between the objectives of politicians 
and those of civil servants and the citizens they were elected to serve. 
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 According to Pröpper and Steenbeek ( 1998 ), it is imperative to close 
the gap between government and its citizens, increase commitment to 
handling challenges, and create support for an interactive and consul-
tative decision-making process. Th is involves understanding that the 
basis of the state–society relationship is that citizens and their leaders 
have the responsibility and commitment to realize goals are in the pub-
lic’s best interest. Klijn and Koppenjan ( 2000 ) suggested that the clo-
sure of the gap between the government and its citizens typically has a 
positive impact on the legitimacy (in terms of support and acceptance) 
of the government. 
 Research camed out by Van der Veen ( 1999 ) in the Netherlands on 
local governments that have experimented with interactive and consul-
tative decision-making found that the infl uence of citizens and interest 
groups on public policymaking was enhanced. Th e main motivations for 
involving stakeholders in interactive decision-making are to diminish the 
veto power of various societal actors by involving them from the start, 
thereby improving the quality of decision-making by using the informa-
tion and solutions of the various actors as well as to bridge the perceived 
growing cleavage between citizens and elected politicians. 
 Th ese two theories are useful in looking at, and explaining, the level of 
feedback loops and interactivity that enabled a dynamic policy develop-
ment process in Kenya, without which much of the success we have seen 
in the ICT sector would never have happened. To illustrate the policymak-
ing dynamism already alluded to in the foregoing discussion, three cases 
are discussed below. Two were successfully implemented, and one failed. 
 The East Africa Marine Systems (Teams) 
 When I joined the Ministry of Information and Communications, there 
was an initiative to provide high-speed connectivity and lower the cost 
of accessing the Internet by linking East Africa to the rest of the world 
through a fi ber optic cable. More signifi cantly, the cable was expected to 
bring closer the dream of having universal broadband connectivity. 
 For six years, the 22-country project had remained at the planning 
stage. Th e amount of money countries had spent in meetings almost 
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 surpassed the actual cost of building the infrastructure. Clearly, some of 
the countries were resistant to the project. 
 Ultimately, after numerous discussions, it became clear that forg-
ing ahead with the project successfully was going to require a unilateral 
approach. Our Ministry decided to abandon the regional initiative in 
favour of a Kenyan-led project—a diffi  cult decision to make in light of 
the politics (local and regional) as well as the vested interests. 
 Th e long process from multilateralism to unilateralism started with 
convincing of our minister, Mutahi Kagwe, of the need to abandon 
the common initiative, which was characterized by political machina-
tions. Next, the minister convinced the then-Minister for Finance, Amos 
Kimunya. Th ree of us met with the president and convinced him that 
the decision we had taken was good for the country. Within three days, 
we developed a temporary policy document and a cabinet memorandum 
(the fi rst step in any policymaking in Kenya). 
 We then sought the direct intervention of President Kibaki, who, hav-
ing concurred with our assessment, agreed to search quickly for a partner-
ship to develop an alternative to the regional initiative. 
 We faced a policy challenge. In 2008, Kenya did not have a policy to 
govern public–private partnerships. Yet, such a policy was necessary to 
convince stakeholders that Kenya would lead the project. To save time, 
we proceeded to get Etisalat Telecommunications Corporation in the 
United Arab Emirates as a junior partner (15 %). Once we had secured 
this initial deal, we came back and mobilized local operators to invest 
in the remaining 85 % of the project. I was sure to modify the original 
cabinet memo to refl ect the partnerships. 
 Once more we approached the president, and his intervention enabled 
us to obtain fi nancial allocation from the government for the initial 
investments in the TEAMS project. To fast-track the project through the 
rigid procurement procedures, I had incorporated a provision in the cabi-
net memo allowing for the creation of a steering committee. 
 Th is committee included Esther Koimett, the investment secretary 
who in Kenya is responsible for overseeing government investments 
and public enterprise, John Waweru (representing the Communication 
Commission of Kenya [CCK], the telecommunications regulator), and 
Robert Hunja (director-general of the Public Procurement Oversight 
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Authority, the entity that oversees public procurement in Kenya). Th e 
committee also included Samuel Kirui (the then-CEO of Telkom Kenya). 
 With this team mobilized, we quickly developed a memorandum of 
understanding with Etisalat of United Arab Emirates and sought price 
quotations to survey the cable route from the two principal global opera-
tors, Tyco and Alcatel. Tyco won the USD3 million and immediately 
started work. Tyco’s timely implementation of the project won the confi -
dence of the local operators that we wanted to partner with. 
 Ordinarily, tenders of such magnitude are published internationally 
for a period of 28 days, and the whole procurement process can take 
up to six months. It took us one month. Director General Hunja, sec-
onded by the World Bank to the Kenya government, quickly understood 
the project’s benefi ts and appreciated our high level of commitment. A 
forward-looking Hunja guided the committee in navigating through the 
2005 Procurement Act, Kenya’s newly launched procurement law. 
 Th ere were still policy challenges around this public–private partner-
ship project. To calm investors, I created a board consisting of all of those 
who had expressed interest in being part of the process—largely local 
telecommunication companies. And with that TEAMS was born. Th e 
TEAMS board created an escrow account to use as a vehicle to mobilize 
the resources required to build the cable. Th is enabled us to proceed with 
the tender to construct the cable. Technically, TEAMS was a government 
outfi t that was subject to procurement rules, but the project was new, 
and some of the procurement processes of building undersea cables had 
not been anticipated in our laws. Th is forced us to rely on the United 
Arab Emirates’ procurement processes as per agreement with Etisalat and 
eventually with Alcatel, which became the contractor. 
 Headwinds 
 Th e process moved at a remarkable speed, but not without challenges. By 
the time the local media were beginning to question the logic of abandon-
ing a regional initiative, we were close to starting the actual construction. 
We encountered hostile media. Around that time, the government had 
introduced a Media Bill requiring self-regulation of the media  industry. 
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Because the media perceived it as an attempt by the state to control 
media, we  concluded that this was main reason for the media hostility. 
 In addition, the Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System, the regional 
cable we had abandoned, and another private initiative put pressure on 
us to abandon the initiative. Th e media accused us of fl outing procure-
ment rules. Th is prompted the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, 
the African Center for Open Governance (Africog), the Effi  ciency 
Monitoring Unit, the auditor general’s offi  ce, and a host of other  civil 
society investigative agencies to start probing the project. 
 Adding to the challenges was the post-election violence in Kenya after 
the disputed presidential elections of 2007. From my 11th-fl oor offi  ce at 
Teleposta Towers, I watched anti-riot police patrol Nairobi’s streets. Th e 
project contractor, Alcatel, wanted legal and fi nancial guarantees in order 
to start the work. And Parliament, which approves such guarantees, was 
not in session. 
 I consulted Joseph Kinyua, my counterpart at the Treasury Department 
and an optimist like me who shared the dream of bringing ICT to Kenya. 
He suggested that I approach the CCK, the then industry regulator, or 
Kenya’s biggest telcom, Safaricom. Both these entities had the fi nancial 
capability to provide a guarantee. 
 Michael Joseph, Safaricom’s CEO at the time, was sympathetic to my 
request but said it would require Safaricom board approval. I concluded 
that selling the idea to the Safaricom board would be a tall order and 
decided to pursue other means. I approached John Waweru, the director- 
general of CCK.  Here too we needed board approval. I pushed the 
agenda through, because I was a board member at CCK. Th at evening, I 
lobbied the board members one by one, and by the time the board met, I 
had suffi  cient support, and they approved the provision of the guarantee. 
Th is did not go down well with Patrick Musimba (now the member of 
Parliament for Kibwezi) who, shortly thereafter, resigned from his board 
position. Permanent Secretary Kinyua then gave confi rmation to CCK’s 
bankers about the deal, Citibank, which needed confi rmation from the 
Treasury before it could give the guarantee. 
 We secured the guarantee a few days before the March 2008 signing of 
the National Peace Accord, which brought peace to Kenya, and within days 
Alcatel moved ships to the United Arab Emirates to begin laying cable. 
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 At the time, many political changes were occurring. My very  supportive 
minister, Mutahi Kagwe, had lost the local election. Unlike today, under 
Kenya’s old constitution this meant that he could not be appointed as a 
cabinet minister. President Kibaki appointed Samuel Poghisio as the new 
minister and retained me in the same position as permanent secretary. 
Th e new minister, Samuel Poghisio, was a former university teacher like 
me, and we developed a good working relationship. 
 Probes 
 Criticism against the project was unrelenting. More than seven diff er-
ent investigative agencies demanded information. Th e majority of the 
investigators had little knowledge of the undersea fi ber optic cable. One 
investigator demanded, “Do you really think the entire country is fool-
ish enough to believe that a 5000 kilometer wire can be laid under the 
sea?” Africog had hired expert investigators whose sound and objective 
analysis was invaluable in helping us explain the project. I convened a 
press conference and stated that I would take full responsibility for any 
impropriety in the project. Th is reassured the public, but it is noteworthy 
that we spent close to USD1 million dollars making copies of everything, 
including thousands of A2-size marine survey documents for transmis-
sion to the phalanx of investigators. 
 Just as we were beginning to see progress, the Privatization Commission 
was created to provide a legal framework for public–private partnerships 
and other privatization projects. TEAMS had been a shell company reg-
istered as a government entity, which came with a number of repercus-
sions. In order to meet the tight deadlines of the commission, we had to 
allocate shares to investors. Th is meant hiring an accounting fi rm to value 
the “assets,” a highly bureaucratic task. Th e investors grew agitated as I 
argued that the law could not be applied retrospectively while maintain-
ing that it was useless to bring in an accounting fi rm when we had been 
making payments through a jointly owned escrow account, of which all 
members of the consortia were signatories. Fortunately, some commis-
sioners began to understand my case. Th e chairman of the Commission 
was a professor of economics and a colleague from the university who 
11 Inside a Policymaker’s Mind 353
explained the intricacies of the matter to his commissioners, and they 
eventually approved the partnership. 
 Th e benefi ts of the cable were felt from the start in 2009. Eric Hersman, 
for example, an American-Kenyan tech enthusiast, asked me to provide 
at least 40 megabits for an open space he was developing to enable young 
people to access broadband for free. I embarked on establishing subsi-
dized connectivity to the space, which was later known as the iHub. I 
gave directives that Telkom Kenya, one of the operators that had been 
acquired by Orange, a French conglomerate, was to provide the needed 
broadband. As I waited to hear the good news that iHub had been con-
nected, Telkom sent me an invoice for USD200,000—money my min-
istry did not have. Clearly, few people had understood the concept of 
subsidized broadband to stimulate innovation. 
 Hersman later secured development assistance and raised capital to 
deliver broadband to iHub, which later became a hotbed of innovation. 
Kenya’s journey as a center for tech start-ups had begun. 
 Th e experience of developing TEAMS was a turning point in the devel-
opment of the current public–private partnership policies and legal frame-
works that are now used in implementing ICT policies in Kenya. Its dynamic 
policy development process enabled the project to be realized in a timely 
manner. Other aspects that led to the success of the project were having the 
courage to take entrepreneurial risks and, even more important, collaborat-
ing with industry through an online policy dialogue platform known as the 
Kenya ICT Action Network KICTANet, which has a global membership 
that shares best practices and seeks to have them implemented locally. 
 M- PESA : A First-of-Its-Kind Money Transfer Tool 
 As we pursued our infrastructure development goals, another innova-
tion with profound implications for monetary transactions emerged: 
M-PESA. Like TEAMS, it called for policy that did not exist and that 
needed to be created. In 2006, Michael Joseph, the CEO of Safaricom, 
a leading telecommunications provider in Kenya (partly government-
owned) sought my ministry’s approval for this new application, to be 
used to transfer money via mobile phone. 
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 Th e application required approval from the Central Bank of Kenya, 
which Joseph found diffi  cult to obtain without my ministry’s support. 
After seeing a demonstration, I concluded that M-PESA was easier to 
use than Posta Pay, a government-owned money transfer app used by the 
Postal Corporation of Kenya and so I promised to support the project. 
 I contacted the Central Bank in order to get support, allowing 
Safaricom to test mobile money transfer in Kenya. Th e then acting gov-
ernor of the Central Bank, Jacinta Mwatela, was extremely cautious and 
understandably so. In the 1990s, Kenya had lost about USD600 million 
through false claims to the government’s export-compensation scheme. 
Th e Central Bank had paid out these monies to a company called 
Goldenberg International Limited, ostensibly as an incentive to boost 
exports of gold. Investigators later found that no gold was exported or 
that it was gold smuggled in from Congo. 
 Because of her negative experience with Goldenberg, Mwatela declined 
to support M-PESA and advised me to do the same. She doubted the 
novel project and eventually asked me to put my request in writing. In 
response to my letter, Mwatela sent four members of her staff  to meet 
with Safaricom executives and me. Th ey were clearly impressed by the 
presentation, although they made no promises. Th e bank directed that 
our ministry, which was responsible for both Posta Pay and Safaricom, 
take the responsibility for the oversight role. I accepted. 
 At the same time, I decided to seek the bank’s formal approval through 
the Treasury. I wrote a letter that I hand-delivered to Permanent Secretary 
Kinyua, who by virtue of his position also sat on the bank board. At the 
time, there existed neither a policy nor a legal framework for the M-PESA 
kind of technology, which informed my decision to hand-deliver the let-
ter. Had I simply mailed the letter, he would have marked it for a senior 
offi  cial to look into existing policy—and naturally, because the policy was 
nonexistent, my request would have been rejected. 
 I explained to the permanent secretary that Kenyans needed a quick 
and effi  cient way of sending money and that the existing Posta Pay trans-
fer could not possibly deliver the effi  ciencies implicit in the M-PESA 
model. As an economist, the permanent secretary wondered whether 
M-PESA could aff ect the money supply and cause disruptions. However, 
the plan was that Safaricom would work with the banks to execute the 
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project so it would not aff ect the money supply. Th e permanent secretary 
agreed to help. 
 In the meantime, I asked my policy team, led by Dr. James Kulubi, to 
draft an electronic transactions bill and a policy document. In addition, I 
briefed Ambassador Francis Muthaura, Secretary to the Cabinet and the 
Head of Public Service, about the new concept and its enormous positive 
implications for the economy. 
 Ambassador Muthaura encouraged us senior servants to take measured 
risk and inject new ideas into the public service. M-PESA was a gamble, 
and if it failed my career was on the line. I lobbied parliamentarians, 
especially the ICT–energy subcommittee that oversaw the operations of 
our ministry. Much of my lobbying consisted of “market education” to 
try to help ensure that the members understood the new product and its 
potential to revolutionize the money transfer industry in Kenya. 
 At the Central Bank, a new governor, Prof. Ndung’u Njuguna, was 
appointed. He was an open-minded academic who soon after his appoint-
ment declared that the M-PESA concept would not pose any danger to 
the Kenyan economy. 
 With that, Safaricom’s Michael Joseph proceeded to implement 
M-PESA in 2007, establishing Kenya as a world leader in mobile money 
transfer technology. 
 Clearly, M-PESA is a classic case in which innovation preceded policy. 
In such cases, policymakers take the risk and, through systemwide con-
sultations, push for supportive policies. 
 Posta Land Development: A Failed Policy 
for the Public Good 
 In 2009, after paying a courtesy call to Kenya’s President Mwai Kibaki, 
the presidents of two giant global corporations said they wanted to invest 
in a social enterprise in Nairobi that would create 10,000 business-
process- outsourcing jobs. In return, Kenya was to provide at least fi ve 
acres of land where the two communications giants would build their 
enterprise. President Kibaki requested that I fi nd the land and report 
back to him. 
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 Although our policy to develop a technology city at Konza was on 
track, this was an urgent opportunity. After a futile search through the 
Ministry of Lands, we identifi ed land owned by the Postal Corporation of 
Kenya at an upmarket area near the well-known Yaya Shopping Center, 
15 minutes from Nairobi City Center. Th e government assessor valued 
the land at Ksh 460 million (USD4.6 million). 
 I directed our legal teams to fi nd out how we could legally transfer it to 
our new investors. Th ey quickly came back with the laws on public land 
disposal, which had very detailed procedures, including approval by the 
board, the minister in charge, and fi nally the fi nance minister, who is the 
custodian of all government property. Th e legal team went through these 
steps very carefully. 
 Despite following the law to the letter, we encountered resistance. Th e 
Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission suspected that the land was 
being acquired unlawfully by a large multinational corporation. Th is trig-
gered a letter from the Commission warning that if I proceeded with the 
process, I would be charged in court. I called the Commission’s Executive 
Director Prof. P.L.O. Lumumba and carefully explained the matter. 
 A few days later, however, Prof. Lumumba gave a public lecture in 
which he censured permanent secretaries for being complicit in cor-
ruption. Specifi cally, he insisted that the procurement of land must be 
consistent with the procurement law. In this case, the eloquent Prof. 
Lumumba was wrong, because the procurement law had no provision 
for land disposal. 
 Prof. Lumumba and the Commission as well as the Postal Corporation 
offi  cials failed to appreciate that, given the rapid decline of postal services, 
we needed innovative technologies such as the business process outsourc-
ing for job creation. 
 Th e challenge was that the public procurement and disposal law did 
not adequately address the sale of land for such developments. Th e dis-
posal that was allowed by law was for minor equipment. Th e law did not 
bar disposal of land but required a much more elaborate process to be 
executed for the sale of public land. 
 Land values in Kenya have greatly appreciated, and land cannot be 
disposed of without valuation. I sent the details of the process we had 
followed to the Commission. Once again, it insisted that we follow the 
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procurement law. By this time, one of the giant corporations had gotten 
wind of the fact that we were subjecting the matter to the procurement 
law and off ered to pay the valuation price. Posta immediately tried to 
scuttle this new development by failing to eff ect board decisions. Th e 
Commission wrote again, insisting that the land should be sold to the 
highest bidder. Th e risk from our perspective was that the highest bidder 
might turn out not to be the companies that caused us to embark on the 
project in the fi rst place. 
 I briefed Ambassador Muthaura, who issued a directive that the land 
be sold at the valuation price. Th e Commission ignored the directive and 
wrote to me saying it would hold me personally responsible. To compli-
cate matters, the management of Posta refused to sign off  on the land. 
We contemplated a disciplinary action against management. However, if 
such a recourse got into the media, it would be costly to the corporate 
image of the two global giants that just wanted to create job opportuni-
ties through ICT development. 
 Later, I discovered that some employees in Posta were enjoying a 
monthly income from leasing the land in question to informal motor 
vehicle dealers. Out of self-interest, they may had looped in some junior 
Commission offi  cials in destroying a deal with a huge potential to  create 
much-needed jobs in Kenya and thwarted an important step toward 
advancing ICT innovation. 
 Th e Posta case is signifi cant in policymaking, because it illustrates 
how policy of any kind cannot work where personal interests obscure 
decision-making. It also shows that, although the upper echelons of gov-
ernment might formulate a policy, middle-level managers can ultimately 
sabotage the policy out of personal interest. Both the general systems and 
interactive decision-making theories work on the assumption that there 
is transparency among all players. Th e reality is that often there is none. 
 Implications for Policy 
 Th e TEAMS and M-PESA cases related here are two projects that sparked 
ICT innovation in Kenya. In hindsight, the risks were worth taking. 
Th ey illustrate how dynamism in policy development can lead to greater 
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development by creating an environment where entrepreneurship and 
innovation can fl ourish. 
 Th e success of the TEAMS project was largely due to the fact that deci-
sions were made interactively and transparently, with the involvement of 
many stakeholders. We facilitated the timely completion of the project by 
giving information when it was needed, and the investors deliberated on 
issues internally before making decisions openly. 
 Th rough the 4000-member-strong industry portal KICTAnet, I 
responded directly to the public’s questions, enabling us to enrich the 
content and advance it toward the usage policy we aimed to create. Th is 
process of interactive and consultative decision-making, as described by 
Edelenbos and Klijn ( 2005 ), lent the much-needed support to the proj-
ect, enabling its completion in record time. 
 M-PESA became the enabler of e-commerce in Kenya, which had 
hitherto stagnated because of low credit-card penetration. Virtually 
every month following the introduction of M-PESA, I taught online 
start-ups about M-PESA’s application program interface, which speci-
fi es how software components should interact to create smooth pay-
ments between two diff erent fi rms. Many more developers in Kenya 
were inspired by what M-PESA could achieve and tried to emulate it. A 
few have succeeded. Nevertheless, the motivation had been established, 
leading application developers to bring their expertise to other sectors, 
mainly agriculture, health, and education, where they have helped cre-
ate massive effi  ciency improvements. 
 For this project, the theoretical approach that fi t its execution was 
Dror’s general systems theory, because those involved in pushing the pol-
icy through attempted a structured, rational way of enabling a new inno-
vation to go to market. Th ere was a degree of interactivity, too, especially 
when convincing certain players of the merits of a particular approach or 
perspective. My intentions were to get both the Treasury and the Central 
Bank to look at the problem in a broader sense. Although there were not 
many options, they could at least agree to a pilot program. My desire was 
to get to rational identifi cation of the preferable alternative—in order to 
allow Safaricom to proceed. And in the end, this is what actually occurred. 
 Th e failed land acquisition was a major setback. Business process out-
sourcing was the main reason we sought to build ICT infrastructure in 
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the fi rst place. Th e project would have sparked off  a new service industry. 
However, it was derailed by the self-interests of a handful of public ser-
vants. Th ey were veterans of the system and were able to ignite squabbles 
between the two public service departments and continue with their 
“business as usual.” 
 However, all of this off ers a great lesson, in that when there is resistance 
to change and innovation, one must be fl exible and react accordingly. 
One mistake we made in executing a presidential policy was the fact that 
we dealt with those at the strategic level, ignoring and hurting the feel-
ings of the mid-level managers who usually execute policy. 
 Self-interest and other ulterior motives are often responsible for cre-
ating paralysis in policy formulation and implementation. In retrospect, 
there are many things that we ignored and that led, as a result, to our 
policy failure. We should never have assumed there would be no resis-
tance from Postal Corporation. Had we applied interactive decision-
making theory to the Postal case as in the other cases, we might have 
succeeded. Without making any assumptions, we should have involved 
many more stakeholders, who would have prevailed on the offi  cers to 
let go of their personal motives. And we should at least have involved 
not just people at the strategy levels but the senior offi  cers and other 
fi eld staff . 
 Conclusion 
 Th is chapter has revealed that there is benefi t in a continuous review of 
policy to facilitate the emergence, commercialization, and monetization 
of new technologies. Th e chapter focused on three case studies in Kenya: 
the TEAMs project, the development of M-PESA, and the Posta land 
development project. 
 From the case studies, it is clear that in any policy implementation, 
a mechanism for involving as many stakeholders as possible is critical. 
Such mechanisms might include leveraging known theoretical founda-
tions, such as interactive decision-making, which seeks to create a col-
laborative setting where stakeholders deliberate on a policy to reduce the 
gap between political proposals and what the citizens expect. 
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 Other mechanisms involve general systems theory in order to arrive 
at a rational decision after taking all of the issues into consideration. 
Our two successful projects were successful because they applied strate-
gies based on these theoretical foundations. Our failure in the third case 
study was caused largely by the wrong assumption that a direct policy 
pronouncement from the head of state would result in automatic imple-
mentation. Th e opposite was true—a lesson that any policy needs some 
process to succeed. 
 If we fuse the analytical frameworks of general systems theory and 
interactive decision-making theory, we can use them to understand ICT- 
related policymaking in the Kenyan context. Using this approach, it 
becomes evident that a combination of the right policy environment, 
strong political will, smart investments in research and development, and 
good advisory networks led to eff ective policymaking and laid the foun-
dation for Kenya’s ICT boom. 
 For all its worth as an examination of case studies in policymaking, 
this chapter is still a personal narrative whose aim was provide the per-
spectives of three distinct cases of policy development in the context of 
emergent technologies in a developmental and democratizing setting. It 
is therefore not a generalizable view of policymaking. Th e insights from 
the chapter, grounded in theoretical analysis, however, might serve as a 
starting point for other policy practitioners seeking to understand the 
birth of ICT in Kenya. 
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 Conversation #11 
 Why Policy Matters for Entrepreneurs 
 Ory Okolloh of Omidyar Network Africa 
 Ory Okolloh  is a well-known commentator on technology trends and gover-
nance in Africa. She has worked with organizations like Omidyar Network , 
 Google Africa and the World Bank. She is also a co-founder of Ushahidi and 
Mzalendo. In 2014 ,  she was recognized as one of Time Magazine ’ s 100 most 
infl uential people in the world. 
 Ory, you have been involved in Mzalendo and Ushahidi, you have 
worked for Google, and you are now in the investment space with 
Omidyar. You are also an active blogger and trained lawyer. How do 
all these diff erent roles fi t together? 
 I consider myself an active citizen of the world, and if something both-
ers me enough, then I will do something about it. I got into technology 
because it allows me to reach out to a number of people at once. Primarily, 
my eff orts are directed less at solving issues but rather aimed at creating a 
platform that can enable citizens to solve the problems they deem relevant. 
Mzalendo, for example, was created to give citizens access to vital informa-
tion on relevant government issues. Th e basic idea behind Mzalendo was 
to create awareness about the role and work of Members of Parliament in 
Kenya and increase the accessibility of such information. For Ushahidi we 
developed a similar idea, with a diff erent spin to it. At Ushahidi we built a 
platform that allowed people to crowd-source information directly with-
out intermediaries. My work at Google continued in a similar vein. Few 
things scale better than Google initiatives and at Omidyar, I am concerned 
with identifying the tools that entrepreneurs and innovators in our region 
require to succeed and scale beyond national borders. In sum, I am moti-
vated by how I can put my skills to use most eff ectively—that is, providing 
a platform so that problems become visible and get solved. 
 How would you describe your work at Omidyar? 
 My task is to bring an African perspective into the investment 
 opportunities. We need more investments into ventures that make sense 
for the region and its entrepreneurs. Th is simply requires a thorough under-
standing of both the region and the investment opportunities. For example, 
on the entrepreneur side, we need to demystify the art of pitching and mar-
keting. By the same token, we need to make sure as investors that we are 
staying close to the trends and to how African economies are evolving. All 
in all, I believe that by being more connected to the region and its entrepre-
neurs you will identify the hidden jewels that can have an immense impact. 
 Why are many entrepreneurs likely to disengage with the govern-
ment, or “fl y under the radar,” as it is often called? 
 Not just in Kenya but in the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa you fi nd 
very young democracies that suff er from high unemployment rates 
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and incapable governments that are failing to provide basic services. 
As a consequence, the perception that you should not rely on public 
goods has become the status quo—up to a point where the rule of 
thumb has become that the less you deal with government the better. 
We have become very creative and innovative in developing entrepre-
neurial solutions that work around public goods failures. However, 
at some point, you will notice that you are stuck, and you will have 
to engage with public policy. I believe that this idea—not expecting 
anything from your government—is harmful. Entrepreneurship and 
government are not two separate issues. Th ey are interdependent right 
from the start. 
 Th ere is a reason why industry lobbies in Europe and America are so 
powerful. Yes, they are entrepreneurs but they also leverage public policy 
to raise issues that are of concern to them. Th ere is a reason why Obama 
and any presidential candidate in the general elections in the USA has 
to engage with the Silicon Valley lobby. All the government chief tech-
nology offi  cers at the current White House, for example, have been for-
mer employees of big technology companies like Google or Facebook. 
Engagement with the government, as entrepreneurs, is absolutely com-
mon and needed. If this is the norm in the West, then why are we being 
asked to ignore the government? 
 Let’s take procurement, for example. Why are African governments 
not procuring more from local technology entrepreneurs if they have 
the capability? How do we expect the local tech sector to grow if there 
are no policies in place to support it? Issues like this need to be put 
on the table and require a solution for the benefi t of the region’s ICT 
sector. 
 Who are the kinds of entrepreneurs that tend to get more involved in 
channeling information to policymakers? 
 We are starting to see more senior entrepreneurs become involved. 
Engaging the government is hard work and requires persistence. You can-
not expect to knock on their door and see the change immediately com-
ing through. Long meetings with policymakers where you move one step 
backward to go one forward are exhausting, especially when you know 
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that you could be using this time for your business and get way more 
done. However, when the new solution that you crafted with policy-
makers becomes national and permanent, meaning a law, then you have 
achieved something for everyone else as well. Entrepreneurs should see 
this as a diff erent kind of hack. 
 Let us say entrepreneurship also has a fl avor of being an activist for 
society. Th en what should the role of the government be? 
 Th e role of the government should be to create an opportunity for 
entrepreneurs to thrive. Th at is it! I am not pushing toward the other 
extreme, in which government will have to do everything. I am advocat-
ing for an enabling environment. 
 If we step back, refl ect, and realize that the Kenyan population is 
in general quite entrepreneurial then we can start shifting some of the 
responsibility to them rather than shifting it even further away from 
them. Governments and policymakers do not need to do everything by 
themselves. What if we created an environment where we can act out 
our entrepreneurial nature for society as a whole? If you ask someone 
now for a short list of items that need to change, they will tell you that 
they do not want to deal with the Nairobi City Council every two days 
as they pass by the shop or that they need a streamlined business regis-
tration process—one unifi ed license—or that access to fi nancing needs 
to be addressed. An interest rate of 25 % is not really very conducive to 
doing business. 
 However, when we disengage completely, then there is no pressure for 
people on the other side to do their jobs. 
 What are some solutions you have observed to get the government 
involved? 
 I am interested in the recent revival of residence associations, which 
was mostly driven by security concerns that are by now evolving into 
other issues. I am fascinated by the Kilimani Project Foundation, as an 
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 example. 2 It was formed by businesses and residents in the Kilimani area 
and provided a forum of vital exchange in the community. Th e idea 
goes back to a famous book,  Bowling Alone :  Th e Collapse and Revival 
of American Community , which analyzed the decline of in-person social 
interactions and how this basically undermines democracy. So you have 
to understand your neighborhood as a community where you have clear 
responsibilities as residents or business people and, on the other side, fi g-
ure out who is responsible for doing what in government. For example, 
if there is a blocked drain on your street, it is more eff ective for you to 
complain collectively to the right local government entity than to solo on 
social media. 
 All in all, we need to think about ways to keep the government 
involved, rather than thinking of ways to stay under the radar. If we do 
not bring forth the issues that matter to those that can change them, then 
we will end up, if we are unlucky, with solutions that are only a tempo-
rary fi x—or with no solutions at all. 
 Th anks you, Ory! 
2  See  http://kilimani.co.ke / 
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 We have all seen them, widely shared inspirational quotations that come 
in tweet length and deliver general wisdom to our glimmering screens 
about what it takes to be a successful technology entrepreneur. In fact, 
these tweets are everywhere, and for one reason or another, their messages 
are extremely powerful. Th ink of a tweet-sized quote from Jeff  Bezos 
(founder of Amazon and Blue Origin and owner of  Th e Washington Post ): 
“I knew that if I failed I wouldn’t regret that, but I knew the one thing I 
might regret is not trying.” 
 Th e core element of his message is the deeply held belief that failure 
is an inevitable part of a technology entrepreneur’s journey—and indeed 
that the entrepreneur should embrace rather than avoid the power of 
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failure. Th is positive attitude and the inherent glorifi cation of failure has 
become a mantra that surfaces again and again in many similar quotes. 
While in theory, we might all agree with Bezos, the question is whether 
the mantra holds true in the everyday life of a technology entrepreneur 
in, say, Kenya? Put more bluntly, are you really willing to fail? Usually, the 
answer is a little more complex than a simple yes or no. 
 To judge from the opinions and convictions that linger in such tweets 
and similar statements you hear at conferences and on pitch nights, it 
seems as if there is a rule book, a recipe, that if followed will lead to suc-
cess. If there were only a single recipe, success as an entrepreneur would 
indeed be easy. Reality is, however, a little messier. In Kenya’s diverse and 
multicultural technology entrepreneurship sector, everyone is exposed to 
a multitude of these recipes for success. Here, domestic advice mingles 
with international mantras about what successful technology entrepre-
neurs ought to do. Th e problem arises once you try to put the recipes 
into action. When you add them all up, you discover that some recipes 
are contradictory, others are not easily applicable, and some just do not 
make sense. 
 Th ink about it: Are you really a true technology entrepreneur only if 
you want your digital solution to change the world? Or is it okay to make 
incremental improvements? Can you call yourself a serious technology 
entrepreneur only if you focus on a single venture? Or what about your 
next employee? Are you making the right decision if you hire a referral 
from a good friend—Or is it a grave mistake? Implied in these and many 
more unanswered questions is a quest for a formula that works—a holy 
grail for becoming a successful technology entrepreneur in Kenya. 
 We wanted to fi nd out what this holy grail looks like, if it exists. We 
sifted through many diff erent opinions, perspectives, and convictions 
in Kenya’s international technology sector 1 in order to do two things. 
First, zoom out and from a bird’s-eye perspective, organize the diverse 
statements into understandable big-picture themes 2 —best described as 
1  Th is chapter is based on an academic article. For more detailed information about our methodol-
ogy, the underlying theory, and a closer look at our fi ndings, see Weiss and Weber  2016 . 
2  Th ere are diff erent ways to investigate how participants in Kenya experience technology entrepre-
neurship. De la Chaux and Okune, for example, in Chap.  9 of this book, take a participant-centric 
approach and sort entrepreneurs, innovation hub staff , and investors into groups in order to expose 
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worldviews. Worldviews are deeper holistic systems of beliefs, norms, and 
values that motivate the variety of opinions, perspectives, and convictions 
that we see in Kenya’s international technology sector. 
 We found a Kenyan worldview and an international worldview that 
each prescribed unique characteristics an entrepreneur ideally ought 
to have and the strategies he or she ideally ought to follow to become 
successful. 3 Consider, for example, the question of whether technology 
entrepreneurs should or should not pursue side hustles. Th e Kenyan 
worldview favors multiple ventures under management at the same time 
as the right approach, best embodied in the idiom “A true hustler chases 
the buzz!” In contrast, the international worldview takes a fundamentally 
diff erent position and favors one venture under management at a time as 
the ideal route to entrepreneurial success, meaning that business oppor-
tunities should be pursued serially. Such confl icting worldviews in a com-
munity pose problems for the entrepreneur in managing expectations, 
aligning aspirations, and taking into account the demands and require-
ments of those who subscribe to the opposite worldview. Just like the two 
poles of a magnet, opposing and confl icting worldviews can cause confu-
sion about what is right or wrong, and hence create tensions, as seen, for 
example, when an entrepreneur negotiates with an investor. 
 Given the diversity of the sector, what is the “right way to do it in 
Kenya” today? Th e question motivated us to zoom back in and try to 
understand those involved in Kenya’s Silicon Savannah in order to fi nd 
out how they deal with diff ering worldviews in their everyday work life. 4 
divergent views about the groups’ prescriptions for overcoming barriers to fl ourishing technology 
entrepreneurship. In Chap.  10 , similarly, Marchant proposes that nonprofi t and for-profi t values 
infl uence participants’ actions in Kenya even though they are commonly perceived as incompati-
ble, arguing that drawing on both logics can in fact be a great resource for technology enterprises. 
In the current chapter, we follow a similar line of thought, though with a diff erent analytical 
approach. 
3  Note that the beliefs, norms, and values of each worldviews are idealized features of becoming a 
technology entrepreneur. 
4  Our argument is based on two insights. First, seeing worldviews as a cultural toolkit moves us 
away from seeing culture as a constraining force heading in one direction and allows us to see it as 
a resource and toolkit from which community member can select various elements to act (Swidler 
 1986 ). Second, cognitive psychology has developed the concept of mindsets, which brings to the 
fore the various ways that individuals collect and processes information and develop knowledge 
structures that are essential for navigating through reality (Walsh  1995 ; DiMaggio  1997 ; Eggers 
and Kaplan  2013 ). Taken together, these insights allow us now to explore how individuals deal with 
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Imagine a conversation between an entrepreneur who adheres to the 
Kenyan worldview and a venture capital fund manager who adheres to 
the international worldview. Th ey will enter the conversation with partic-
ular mindsets—guides to using information and action (Walsh  1995 )—
about how to deal with the worldview of their counterpart. 
 Does the venture capital fund manager know that the entrepreneur 
runs a car wash and a consultancy on the side? Is the entrepreneur 
prepared to tell the fund manager about  all of his or her side hustles? 
If the fund manager and entrepreneur both adhere to their worldviews 
(the “Defender” mindset [see below]), we can imagine a scenario full 
of misunderstandings and frustration. However, with another mind-
set at work, the fund manager and entrepreneur can use the world-
views openly to come up with a solution that works for both sides 
(the “Blender” mindset [see below]). During our work, we found six 
mindsets that off er diff erent approaches for navigating such tricky situ-
ations. In the following pages, we will sketch out, fi rst, the fi ve layers of 
each worldviews and then describe the six mindsets in detail. Th e art of 
managing worldviews leads to new, at-fi rst-sight counterintuitive solu-
tions that can help in fi nding a unique and collective Kenyan recipe for 
successful technology entrepreneurship. 
 Zooming Out: Two Confl icting Worldviews 
in Kenya’s Tech Community 
 We conducted 156 interviews 5 in Kenya’s international technology 
sector, all with the aim of holistically understanding the Kenyan and 
international worldviews. 6 Worldviews are deep cultural structures that 
and make use of culture, manifested here in worldviews. Diff erent mindsets emerge with which 
community members manage the confl icting worldviews. 
5  Th e interviews were done in 2013 and 2014 with technology entrepreneurs (49 Kenyan, 10 
Kenyan repatriates, and 22 expatriates), investors (2 Kenyan, 1 Kenyan repatriate, and 23 repatri-
ates) and industry representatives (17 Kenyan, 4 Kenyan repatriates, and 28 expatriates). 
6  Our research used a grounded theory approach (Charmaz  2011 ; Suddaby  2006 ; Glaser and 
Strauss  2012 ), understood Kenya’s international technology sector as a case study, and applied 
techniques of inductive theorizing and semiotics (Chandler  2007 ; Barley  1983 ). We used 
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undergird, in this case, business activity with systems of beliefs, norms, 
and values related to the shoulds, should nots, rights, and wrongs of 
becoming and being a successful technology entrepreneur. 7 Th ey provide 
an in-itself coherent and encompassing view of the world that lays out 
which behavior is ideal, desirable, or undesirable (Koltko-Rivera  2004 ). 
A worldview matters! Th at is why, like a compass, a worldview holds 
out an often unreachable reference point—an  ideal —against which to 
benchmark and align one’s entrepreneurial mentality, strategy, relation-
ship management, fi rm evaluation practices, and image of the self. 8 In 
our study, all of these fi ve layers of technology entrepreneurship were 
signifi cantly aff ected by worldviews. 
 Th e presence of two diff erent worldviews is comparable to using two 
diff erent navigation instruments at the same time—say, a compass and 
a map. If you can read only one of the two but need to use both, then 
your entrepreneurial journey has just become seriously more compli-
cated. Confusion can be immense, and the likelihood of getting lost is 
real. However, if both instruments are properly understood, they can, 
together, lend real clarity and direction. Similarly, a profound compre-
hension of the worldviews held by other people in Kenya’s international 
technology sector has the potential to serve as part of a powerful personal 
formula for entrepreneurs navigating the domestic and global tech scene. 
 Entrepreneurial Mentality: Hustling versus 
Single-mindedness 
 In general, two distinct entrepreneurial mentalities are at play. In the Kenyan 
worldview, the distinct hustling mentality is a ubiquitous  behavioral pattern 
MAXQDA software (VERBI Software, Berlin, Germany) to code the fi nal dataset of 77 interviews. 
Th e set was selected based on the richness, quality, and clarity of the interview materials. 
7  Note that the beliefs, norms, and values in both worldviews presented here are not prescriptions 
about what those involved in Kenya’s international technology sector should believe but rather a 
representation of what they believe to be an ideal state. 
8  Th is is not an exhaustive or fi xed list but rather a refl ection of the dominant components that 
interviewees were talking about—meaning there might be components that could be added. We 
encourage our readers to engage in a debate with us in an eff ort to further revise and refi ne the 
worldviews. 
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that cuts across income levels, religions, ethnic lines, and industry sectors. 9 
In its ideal form, it is best described as a proactive and outcome-focused 
mentality that seeks to generate income through fi nding fi xes for many dif-
ferent problems or business opportunities. Th ink of an  askari (Swahili for 
“guard”) who is involved in far more than guarding a building. Picture an 
offi  ce employee who also has a chicken farm and, as a side hustle, runs a car 
wash and a consultancy. Or think of an entrepreneur who grows more than 
three businesses simultaneously. In the Kenyan worldview, this mentality 
is the norm rather than an exception. In the international worldview, by 
contrast, a diff erent dynamic is at play. Th e technology entrepreneur, also 
known as techpreneur, has established a unique approach toward doing 
business. Th ink of Bill Gates, Mark Zuckerberg, or Jack Ma—working in 
a professional community of co-entrepreneurs. Th eir actions and successes 
are compared against each other’s rather than those of real estate moguls, 
for example, or tycoons in the construction business. Indeed, professional 
techpreneurs champion a particular mentality. Th ey make single-minded-
ness a discipline and are known for having a focused and experience-ori-
ented mentality moving along a path toward self-fulfi llment that seeks to 
develop a business solution for a single, fundamental problem. 
 Th e confl ict between an outcome-focused mentality that seeks to gener-
ate income versus an experience-oriented mentality on a path toward self-
fulfi llment stands out. Th e hustling mentality in the Kenyan  worldview is 
deeply rooted in Kenya’s history and an art brought to perfection in deal-
ing with market and government ineffi  ciencies. Arguably, without the 
hustling mindset, many day-to-day problems in Kenya would not fi nd a 
fi x, and many business opportunities would remain without that special 
someone who makes use of it. Although grounded in an entrepreneurial 
nature, hustling is in essence a means to pay the bills that are waiting at 
home. Put diff erently, in the mind of the hustler, entrepreneurship is a 
job more than anything else. Th e focus is on getting the job done. In the 
international worldview, a diff erent belief reigns. Ideally, techpreneurs are 
not only involved in growing a business, they are also thought to be on a 
9  For more details, see Chap.  13 Eskor John and conversation #13 with Mikul Shah and Ritesh 
Doshi, in this book. 
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personal mission. Th ey are expected to be enmeshed in a profound per-
sonal process toward self-fulfi llment and realization. Entrepreneurship is 
meant to be far more than just making ends meet, it is a deeply personal 
journey to fi nd one’s true calling and what one was meant to do in life. 
Embarking on this journey is therefore not supposed to be solely driven 
by a need for money but rather by a passion for creating value for cus-
tomers and society. 
 Taken together, these worldviews reveal fundamental diff erences 
in the purposes of entrepreneurship. In one view, entrepreneurship is 
mostly a pragmatic approach to make ends meet, and in the other view, 
entrepreneurship is supposed to be part of a broader, personal explora-
tion. Th is can cause misunderstandings and tensions. Th rough the lens 
of the hustling mentality, it seems irrational and foolish to focus on 
only a single problem. What if the problem becomes irrelevant? How do 
you generate income and create wealth? Th rough the lens of the single-
mindedness mentality, it seems untrustworthy to be always ready for 
the next job. Are you serious in anything you do? And will you ever be 
successful? 
 Entrepreneurial Strategies: “Hedge Your Bets” versus 
“Exploit One Niche” 
 Th e entrepreneurial mentality is inextricably linked to the entrepreneur’s 
interaction with the market and larger environment. Th e  hedge-your- bets 
strategy seeks to exploit multiple business opportunities in unrelated 
industry sectors at the same time. Th is diversifi cation strategy makes 
business creation in multiple industry sectors a well-respected and rec-
ognized business norm in Kenya. To an outsider, the accumulation of 
businesses may follow no particular rationale. In the Kenyan worldview, 
however, the strategy is a logical next step in, for example, seizing the 
abundant opportunities Kenya has to off er and it is one of the necessary 
evils hidden in starting businesses in general. For entrepreneurs who 
adhere to this worldview, a look abroad is a welcome and comfortable 
source of inspiration and usually helps to identify business  opportunities 
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and  solutions that do not seem apparent at fi rst glance in Kenya. Th is 
leads to the importation of foreign business solutions to tackle mar-
ket ineffi  ciencies (see Chap.  4 by Marissa Drouillard). However, each 
imported solution also comes with a perception fallacy. Although a busi-
ness may thrive and fl ourish in another market, it can easily suff er from 
signifi cant downsides once put to work in Kenya. Th e reason for this 
is that the fundamental assumptions built into the business model can 
turn into fl aws 10 if not addressed. A business clone must be carefully 
examined and assumptions need to be questioned to develop adequate 
adaptations for those that prove fl awed in Kenya. A prominent topic, for 
example, is functional integration. Often times, the creation of a new 
business is accompanied by the need to establish peripheral businesses 
in order to successfully realize the primary business’ aim. Here is why: 
Th ink of an e-booking site that fi rst has to push hotels into the digital 
age (i.e., leading to the creation of a peripheral business such as a con-
sultancy or a separate business entity for hotel software development and 
marketing) before turning to the primary business endeavor that sought 
to aggregate and off er hotel bookings on the World Wide Web. If there 
is no one who does it for you, then an additional business is needed to 
solve these peripheral problems, pushing entrepreneurs into seizing mul-
tiple business opportunities in parallel. 
 Quite the opposite holds true in the exploit-one-niche strategy, 
which seeks to seize a single business opportunity in a market niche, 
one opportunity at a time. Ideally, the techpreneur meets multiple 
 opportunities sequentially, addressing a new business opportunity 
only after an earlier opportunity has been fully exploited. To an out-
sider, this international worldview may seem odd. But it is based on 
the strongly held conviction that in order to be successful an entrepre-
neur should identify and pursue only one market niche and contract 
out peripheral business problems to third parties. Th e rationale for this 
is that a focus on one particular market niche allows the techpreneur 
to holistically comprehend the market, develop specialized expertise 
and experience, craft an adequate solution to the underlying problem, 
10  See  www.livemint.com/Companies/9MS2eZjmYwcC040ktsu5JP/Th e-fault-in-our-startups.
html for an extensive discussion of clone fl aws in India’s start-up scene. 
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and develop strategic capabilities so that a copycat can’t drive the tech-
preneur’s venture out of business. Th e fundamentals of the exploit-
one-niche strategy are clear: Th e techpreneur is supposed to create 
a specialized enterprise, and peripheral problems are supposed to be 
contracted out to other businesses, allowing strategic partnerships to 
rise. Th is functional integration creates the notion of a well-connected 
business landscape whose elements rise and fall together. 
 In sum, the Kenyan worldview promotes the simultaneous creation of 
multiple enterprises in order to generate substantial income and build up 
wealth in a complex environment. Expectations built on this worldview 
regard people who do not seize the many opportunities as careless and 
suggest to those who propose the contracting out of peripheral problems 
as a little far removed from reality. In contrast, the international world-
view off ers a blueprint for a highly specialized enterprise that focuses on 
developing core competencies in order to realize a comparative advan-
tage and pave the way for an exponential growth trajectory in a highly 
competitive environment. Viewing the world through this lens causes 
community members to wonder how a competitive edge or market 
dominance can ever be realized by spreading yourself thin, because doing 
everything yourself seems like you are not doing it right! 
 Relationship Management: Relations versus Contracts 
 How do you hire employees you trust? How do you select partners you 
want to team up with? And how do you ensure they deliver? Th e Kenyan 
worldview has a clear answer, in which trust in one’s contacts and loyalty 
stand on an informal network-driven approach to business. Business col-
laborations that matter are therefore not merely a function of aligned 
business interests for mutual gain; in their ideal form, they rather refl ect 
an outcome of longstanding and deeply trusted relationships with family, 
friends, and colleagues that reach back to joint secondary school or uni-
versity attendance. Social is fi rst, business comes second! Business rela-
tionships are embedded in a social network and need to be cultivated and 
protected. Not only “who you know” matters (i.e., status and reputation) 
but also “how well you know someone” (i.e., quality). An entrepreneur 
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who, for example, hires a referral from a trusted network contact over 
someone who is more adequately trained for the job is following the pre-
ferred reliance on social safeguards—favors and obligations ensure that 
the referral delivers on the agreed goals. Th is may mean that the start- 
up’s performance is overall lower than if a fully qualifi ed person were 
on the job. But the referrals and recommendations from trusted sources 
ensure the start-up’s functionality and protect the employer from adverse 
employee behavior. 
 In the international worldview, incentive schemes and contracts stand 
on trust in formal business relationships. Ideally, a business relation-
ship becomes trusted and sealed with a formalized contract. Contract 
violations are seen as a breach of trust. As a consequence, the hiring of 
employees circles around aligning interests between the start-up’s goals 
and the employees’ capabilities. Here, the start-up’s goals and objec-
tives are of primary importance. Th ey come fi rst and are, in general, the 
main driver behind forming business relationships. Detailed incentive 
plans, performance-based salaries, or equity-based compensation plans 
are seen as well-suited instruments to ensure alignment and performance 
of employees. If needed, judicial measures protect the company from 
adverse employee behavior. 
 Both worldviews rely on diff erent arrangements. In the Kenyan world-
view, the entrepreneur is part of a social network who—depending on 
the quantity, quality, and status of her or his contacts—may be able to 
unlock important resources and thereby help ensure the continuing per-
formance and success of the start-up. Proponents of this view perceive the 
excessive use of formal contracts as a killer of the dynamic nature of busi-
ness, primarily because it is not practical to try to pack all  eventualities 
into a contract. In the international worldview, the primacy of company 
objectives coupled with the reliance on contracts creates a dynamic in 
which compliance with detailed contracts and individualized incentive 
schemes matter for start-up performance and success. Th is perspective 
sees informal business arrangements as highly suspicious, opaque, and 
secretive, suggesting involvement in nepotistic business activities. A 
cooperative or investment deal with community members who bank on 
informal relationships is highly unlikely for someone who believes in the 
primacy and power of contracts. 
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 Firm Evaluation: “Bricks and Mortar” versus 
“Strategic Value” 
 A company’s evaluation is probably one of the most contested issues dur-
ing an entrepreneurial journey. It not only determines the cost of capital 
and informs contractual negotiations, it also sets the stage for the future 
relationship between the entrepreneur and fi nanciers. In short, there is a 
lot that can go wrong. 
 In the Kenyan worldview, company evaluations are based on assets and 
revenue, and investors use brick-and-mortar businesses as a reference to 
assess the potential of new investment options. Imagine a technology ven-
ture that developed a digital solution and a committed investor off ered a 
take-it-or-leave-it deal for a huge slice of equity—say, USD100,000 for 
85  % of equity. Th is seems like a high equity price, yet it is indeed a 
realistic valuation. Why? Th e Kenyan worldview provides an answer—
namely, that real estate, land, and property development represent a 
secure, desired, and representative investment destination, with more or 
less guaranteed returns. Th ese investments are low-risk and off er moder-
ate returns, pushing investors to focus exclusively on tangible brick-and-
mortar businesses. Th ey form the dominant reference category against 
which any other investment is judged, compared, and evaluated. Put dif-
ferently, technology businesses are in competition with brick-and- mortar 
deals, where evaluations are based on business fundamentals such as mar-
ket share, assets, profi t margin, existing revenue, and projected revenue. In 
addition, the absence of realistic exit routes 11 underlines the belief that a 
conservative investment and entrepreneurial philosophy, in which a busi-
ness should grow based on generated revenue, paves the way to success. 
 In stark contrast lies the international worldview, in which evaluations 
are based on growth potential, strategic value, and investors assess and 
compare the value of new investments in technology enterprises with those 
of ventures that have the same or similar characteristics. Ideally, high-risk 
technology enterprises should mingle in a dedicated investment category. 
Th is allows investors and entrepreneurs to use industry-specifi c measures 
11  See Chap.  14 : Venture Capital in East Africa: Is Th ere a Right Model? by Stephen Gugu and 
Wilfred Mworia.
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to evaluate and compare high-risk companies with each other. Traction, 
unique user visits, and the conversion rate are just a few among the many 
metrics that are specifi cally designed to grasp the business realities and 
future potential of technology ventures. In an environment where early-
stage ventures off er little information, highly specialized investors pick up 
the latest industry trends, and their investments serve as proxies for per-
ceived entrepreneurial success and future performance. Th ese investments 
are normally publicly reported and believed to be an essential stepping-
stone to building a recognized and successful company. A vibrant exit mar-
ket where buyouts and initial public off erings represent viable avenues for 
liquidating investments enables creative pricing strategies that determine 
potential market or strategic value. Th is aff ects business strategy in turn 
and allows a start-up to rely on investors’ fuel to keep the engine running. 
In an equity-fi nanced growth trajectory, revenue generation is secondary. 
 Taken together, the Kenyan worldview on fi rm evaluations is deeply 
anchored in brick-and-mortar businesses and favors a conservative invest-
ment philosophy. Th rough this lens, an investment deal of USD100,000 
for 85 % of equity in a technology venture that owns a few laptops and 
generates almost no revenue is a reasonable and good off er. Anything else 
would be irrational, if not lunatic, and completely out of context. In the 
international worldview, high-risk technology ventures are a legitimate 
asset class and represent the norm rather than an exception. Th rough this 
lens, an early-stage investment deal of USD100,000 for 85 % of equity 
is irresponsible and toxic and can only be met with sarcasm in order to 
retain what little sanity is left! Technology entrepreneurs who hold the 
international worldview are therefore unlikely to fi nd an investor among 
those who hold the Kenyan worldview. 
 Self-Image: “Catching up” versus “Leading the Way” 
 Self-image answers the question of how we view ourselves, our sector, and 
our country in relation to other countries on the globe. For example, in 
times of uncertainty and of many unknowns, where do you turn for advice 
and solutions? Do you seek outside help or rely on your own capabilities? 
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 Th e self-image inherent in the Kenyan worldview is a mark of a 
complex and deeper-lying historical cause. 12 In its contemporary 
nature in Kenya’s technology sector, it is best captured by an out-
ward looking logic in which advice and solutions from abroad are 
largely seen in a positive light. Th ese are believed to be the adequate 
source of inspiration and learning. In particular, foreign business 
ideas and management philosophies are introduced and adopted with 
high authority. Caused by a constant comparison and benchmarking 
with nations that are regarded as “advanced,” a sense of “catching up 
with the rest of the world” lingers in this worldview and provides a 
source of inspiration, motivation, and at the same time, frustration. 13 
Th e  role of foreign aid, for example, attracts continuing attention 
because grant capital and donor-driven projects are a ubiquitous rem-
edy used to try to address economic, social, political, and cultural 
problems. Not only  is foreign aid prevalent in the nongovernment- 
organization landscape and political sector, but it also mingles in the 
private sector, creating multiple approaches to doing business (see 
Marchant, Chap.  10 ). Despite all this, foreign commitment to Kenya 
is eyed critically 14 and characterized as hesitant, ambiguous, and 
largely provisional. 
 Th e international worldview off ers a strong contrast, in which the 
belief dominates that advice and solutions from within are superior and 
that internal capabilities produce state-of- the-art solutions. “Th e solu-
tion lies within you!” Solutions developed within a start-up, community, 
or nation are inherently superior and cutting-edge. Th ey will set new 
standards and lead the way toward progress, change, and development. 
Th is inward perspective creates a view of the world that others will inevi-
tably start making reference and comparison to in order to learn from 
12  For a thorough understanding of the historical causes, the current global economic order that 
reproduces them, and the dynamics of colonialism and post-colonialism, turn to the many famous 
philosophers who have analyzed the African condition in rich detail. To name just a few: Asante 
 2015 ; Fanon  2005 ; Mazrui and Wondji  1993 ; Mazrui  1974 ; Mbembe  2003 ; Mudimbe  1988 ; 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni  2010 ; Th iong’o  2009 . 
13  See in this book, conversation #1 with Jimmy Gitonga. 
14  See in this book, conversation #3 with Anne Shongwe. 
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and  imitate. It is entrepreneurship and business activity that take a key 
role in addressing today’s problems, be they societal ills, environmental 
hazards, or market ineffi  ciencies. 
 In a nutshell, because of profound historical developments, those that 
adhere to the Kenyan worldview in technology entrepreneurship favor 
foreign solutions. In fact, foreign solutions are largely perceived as supe-
rior. From this angle, local solutions are disregarded from the start as 
inferior, considered to have a high likelihood of failure, or seen as being 
merely a recombination of already existing solutions—refl ected in a 
“We’ve been here before” attitude. 15 Th e international worldview takes 
an opposite stance with a strong inward perspective in which solutions 
from within are superior. Th rough this lens, adapting foreign ideas and 
copying business models puts into question the true innovation potential 
of the Kenyan technology sector and its seriousness about disruption, 
change, and exponential growth. 
 Zooming In: Mindsets Getting to Work 
 Th ese two worldviews have provided a bird’s-eye perspective on the 
beliefs, norms, and values in their ideal form that mingle in Kenya’s 
international technology sector. Arguably, the reality is not as stylized 
and nicely separated. Rather, the two confl icting worldviews blend in a 
diverse and international community. Th is leads to substantial problems 
in expectation management if members base their expectations, visions, 
understandings, and aspirations on opposite worldviews. Th e dynamic 
will lead to profound misunderstandings and frustration. However, there 
is a way out! Once the worldviews are fully understood, they provide 
rich information—a resource—that members of Kenya’s tech commu-
nity can use to build their start-ups (Swidler  1986 ; DiMaggio  1997 ). Th e 
15  See also prominent Kenyans critiques that go against this grain and are in favor of local solutions. 
Among them are Th iong’o  2009 , Mwalimu Ali Mazrui’s BBC radio Reith Lectures at www.bbc.
co.uk/programmes/p00gq1wn for a phenomenal start into his way of thinking about the African 
condition and James Shikwati’s critical refl ections on “donor economics” at  http://tinyurl.com/
Stop-aid-it-is-killing-Africa and  http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/18/us/politics/18thinktank.
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
382 T. Weiss and K. Weber
 challenge is to adequately put this knowledge to work. We zoom into 
the minds of Kenya’s tech community members to showcase how to deal 
with and make use of the two diff erent worldviews. 
 A mindset is an individually held point of view that lays out how 
the world works and helps in dealing with the complexity reality has to 
off er. It drives how we collect, analyze, and interpret information from 
the environment and is a product of past experience (Walsh  1995 ). 
Th ink of a fi lter. In principle, our mindset fi lters information and puts 
it in a particular frame so it can be interpreted. In day-to-day situations, 
our mindset comes in handy and guides us in understanding a situation 
and responding to it (see Eggers and Kaplan  2013 for a comprehen-
sive overview). However, a narrow mindset can also limit us to familiar 
ways of thinking and acting (Dhanaraj and Khanna  2011 ; Hill and 
Levenhagen  1995 ). Ambiguous, uncertain, or entirely new situations 
challenge our mindset and require a shift or change to achieve a desired 
outcome. Th e more subconscious, hidden, and taken for granted a fi l-
ter, the more diffi  cult it is to create awareness and create change and 
versatility. In other words, if we cannot change our mindset, we will 
remain stuck in old behavioral patterns, repeat mistakes, and continue 
on the already beaten path without making use of the full potential 
a diff erent perspective can off er. Ignoring the diverse resources that 
Kenya’s international technology sector has to off er may well turn out 
to be a costly mistake. 
 Each dimension of the worldviews showed us the tensions and prob-
lems that those involved in Kenya’s international technology sector face. 
Now we can move on to see which mindset is best equipped to deal 
with and make use of the worldviews. While reading through the follow-
ing pages, it is best to ask yourself when you apply which mindset and 
whether it gives you the desired result. If not, you might want to consider 
developing another one. 
 Mindset #1: The Defender 
 “I do it my way or no way!” describes a community member who 
adheres to one worldview only and insists on its principles with 
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astonishing  persistence. You will realize that you are logged into a 
Defender mindset if you face diffi  culties in understanding the ratio-
nale of your counterpart and keep insisting that your way is the only 
way. You will consider behaviors that bank on the other worldview as 
inferior. 
 Th ink of an entrepreneur in Kenya who criticizes and labels any 
advice from someone whose self-image is best characterized by “lead-
ing the way” as cocky accompanied by the expression “they don’t 
understand the fundamentals of our market.” Or think of an investor 
who is confronted with a hustling entrepreneur. By adhering to the 
single-minded techpreneur ideal, the investor will attribute a lack of 
seriousness and focus to the hustler, coming to the conclusion that, if 
the hustler does not quit his or her side hustles, an investment will be 
impossible. What the Defender does not see is that this mindset misses 
out on opportunities to learn profoundly from the market and work 
with rather than against the diversity of Kenya’s international technol-
ogy sector. Th e mindset may work in the short run, but in long run, 
the Defender will run into problems because new partners to work with 
will be hard to come by. 
 Mindset #2: The Pretender 
 A champion in signaling, the Pretender has a vague, superfi cial under-
standing of the opposite worldview. All in all, the Pretender follows the 
worldview that is closest to the heart, paying only lip service to the oppo-
site view. For example, a deep understanding of the meaning behind 
labels and metrics matters. Using CEO, UX, KPI, disruptive growth, and 
market trends too loosely or starting a clone with tags like “Th is is the 
Ebay of Kenya” would not help an entrepreneur in building credibility 
or unlocking new resources if the underlying meaning of these labels is 
only vaguely known or if the metrics cannot survive a thorough check. 16 
Instead, it creates false expectations, and the Pretender will run into the 
16  See Mbwana Alliy’s post at  http://savannah.vc/2012/12/19/10-deadly-mistakes-and-pitfalls-afri-
can-startups -should-avoid-in-2013 
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perception trap—signaling profi ciency and commitment when a closer 
look reveals ignorance. 
 Similarly, it is by now evident that networks drive business in Kenya. 
Relationships are “social fi rst and business second.” Paying lip service 
to the social-fi rst component would not create trust. A blog post best 
illustrates this mindset. Malaika Judd ( 2013 ), a former investment 
manager at Savannah Fund, outlined prominent expatriate failures in 
East Africa. Among them, having no long- term plan for East Africa, 
having no Kenyan co-founders, staying inside the expat bubble, and 
not learning Kiswahili are behaviors that raise questions about the 
intentions of a Pretender. An investor should double check before seal-
ing a deal. 
 Th e Pretender fails to understand the underlying meaning of the 
opposite worldview and thus lacks the authenticity and deep knowl-
edge needed to build important connections that can facilitate access to 
fi nance, high-quality employees, and other business contacts necessary to 
run a successful business sustainably. 
 Mindset #3: The Pleaser 
 Th e Pleaser integrates both worldviews at the same time—but at a cost. In 
attempting to harmonize both of them in one start-up, she or he can then 
become occupied with pleasing multiple audiences. Th e Pleaser’s focal task 
becomes managing stakeholder expectations in order to draw on a larger 
resource pool. Th is runs the risk of unraveling into a schizophrenic identity 
with two entrepreneurial mentalities. 
 An example of a pleaser can be a founder who draws on both grant and 
equity capital. Nested in the self-image, the Kenyan worldview under-
stands foreign aid as a source to tackle grand challenges and fi nance 
market activities, and the international worldview regards business 
approaches as the superior solution to societal ills. Now, a Pleaser will 
combine both and simultaneously write grant proposals and compile 
pitch decks—selling the same idea with two diff erent stories to two dif-
ferent audiences. Th e tension between both worldviews is thus imported 
into the start-up, most likely leading to a for-profi t and non-for-profi t 
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entity, also known as a hybrid social business. 17 Although it creates access 
to both worldviews, it also engenders a double management burden on 
individuals—multiple board meetings a year, numerous update reports, 
reapplication for funds, and harmonizing grant-capital-provider inter-
ests with those of equity fi nanciers. Th is can be a viable strategy, but it 
is best reserved for those with high cultural competence, an extensive 
management skill set, and a gift for speaking with multiple audiences. 
 The Art of Managing Worldviews 
 Understanding worldviews alone is not enough. A personal openness is 
also needed to challenge the status quo, look for viable alternatives, and 
get community members enmeshed in a dialogue in order to replace old 
thinking patterns with new ones (Dhanaraj and Khanna  2011 ). Pushing 
beyond the status quo requires a deeper understanding of the rationales 
baked into each worldview—a form of cultural competence that reads 
the similarities, diff erences, and compatibilities in order to craft some-
thing “new” that will both be of collective value to Kenya’s international 
technology sector and benefi t the venture. 
 We have found three mindsets that do exactly that. Th ey incubate nov-
elties that have the potential, if widely adopted, to push Kenya’s tech space 
to the next level—a unique Kenyan form of technology entrepreneurship 
that works and leads to high-level exits that benefi t all. Admittedly, these 
mindsets do not come without downsides. Hence, they are not for every-
one. But they are of central importance in attempting to develop Kenya’s 
tech scene further. 
 Mindset #4: The Blender 
 Combining the best of both worldviews into something new is the analyti-
cal focus of the Blender. Arguably, novelty emerges amidst experimentation 
and exploration. Let us look back at grant and equity fi nancing. Although 
17  See also fascinating research on this topic by Battilana et al.  2012 , Battilana and Lee  2014 , and 
Battilana and Dorado  2010 . 
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the integration of both instruments at the same time causes coordination 
challenges, a sequenced approach may well be the way ahead—that is, start 
with grant funding where it makes sense and then test and mature your 
prototype, well knowing that grant capital would not last. Th e goal is not 
to become the “donors’ darling,” it is rather to create a product within the 
confi nes of the foreign aid logic with the ultimate goal of acquiring inten-
sive market knowledge, increasing the company’s valuation and, once the 
pilot has been tested, approaching debt or equity investors to get to market. 
Th e entrepreneurial strategy would be to fi rst test and experiment using 
grants and then to embark on a growth trajectory using equity  capital. 
 Another example is skillful translation, also known as “Africanizing it.” 
Th is expression gets at the combination of the foreign and local. Rather 
than attributing absolute superiority to either foreign concepts or the 
local context, it makes sense to see truth in both of them and acquire 
competence in skillful translation. Th is holds true for any community 
member. Question the consequences of your behavior, such as, What are 
the implications if I strictly do not invest in a hustler? Yes, you remain 
true to your principles; however “Africanize your principles!” would mean 
to step out of your current mindset and think of a middle ground where 
an investor or mentor helps entrepreneurs fi nd their way while growing 
a company. Investors and mentors should get obsessed about fi nding out 
new ways how that can be done rather than drawing up contracts to best 
ensure that the hustler does not launch into something new on the way. 
 Similarly, rather than idealizing and glorifying what the technology 
gurus from abroad have to say, it makes sense to put on a lens that afri-
canizes their advice. Why does failure matter so much to Jeff  Bezos? What 
does failure mean for an entrepreneur in Kenya? Obviously, for many in 
Kenya, putting all their eggs in one basket comes close to suicide, but 
opening up to the possibility of failure detaches you from your busi-
ness idea, frees you from overly conservative business approaches, and 
allows you to accept defeat if something does not work out. “Failcons” or 
“Fuck-up Nights,” 18 emanating from Mexico, are innovations that came 
from such a mindset. 
18  Th is movement is about sharing business failures publicly, serving to demystify failure, and 
enhancing its general acceptance. For more information, see  http://fuckupnights.com/ 
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 As familiar practices are left behind, new patterns emerge. Th ey are 
inherently unstable and may lead to a new practice that actually works—
or to one that fails. Th e mindset comes with a caveat. Potential downsides 
are nested in the absence of the familiar, the instability of the new, and an 
overly strong focus on the novel that can divert your attention away from 
the operational business. 
 Mindset #5: The Educator 
 Th e Educator, also known as the friendly guru, possesses the gift of 
deeply comprehending both worldviews, intuitively reading individuals, 
and seeing the worldview others adhere to. He or she is in a unique posi-
tion to create awareness for both sides, lifting those stuck in their narrow 
mindset out of their own boundaries. Without the Educator, there would 
be no refl ection on what is happening or, more importantly why it is hap-
pening. Th e Educator introduces reason and structure into what is hap-
pening and connects history with the present in order to show options 
for the future. 
 During our research, we were fortunate enough to meet a handful of 
these community members who have become role models in Kenya’s 
international technology sector. It is impossible to draw up a conclu-
sive list that does justice to all of them, but this short list combines tre-
mendous wisdom with a strong sense of community that Ken Njoroge, 
Mike Macharia, Joseph Mucheru, Isis Nyong’o, Carey Eaton, 19 Jimmy 
Gitonga, Ory Okolloh, Erik Hersman, Juliana Rotich, and Bitange 
Ndemo all share in common. 
 Pitfalls of this mindset are that you become a highly visible go-to 
person, meaning you will get enmeshed in highly political and con-
tested issues, will have to play multiple roles, and may easily get side-
tracked into a political agenda that would not allow you to fully focus 
on business. 
19  Carey Eaton was cherished as a genius with his heart at the right place. He died recently in a 
tragic incident. See  www.whiteafrican.com/2014/06/06/remembering-the-genius-and-grace-of-
carey-eaton/ for more information. 
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 Mindset # 6: The Innovator 
 Taking unresolvable diff erences and creating innovative solutions charac-
terizes the Innovator mindset. Th e Innovator looks for the counterintui-
tive. Rigid boundaries and huge areas of tension and contestation in the 
community become particularly good grounds for novel solution devel-
opment. We will outline three such solution strategies that deal with con-
tested issues in Kenya’s tech community—hustling, adequate  fi nancing, 
and cultural diff erences. Some have already been launched and put into 
action; others are mere inspirations. 
 Financing the Hustler 
 Hustling versus single-minded entrepreneurship has received mostly 
informal attention. Lingering underneath the surface of discussions and 
reports, it seems as if the front lines are clearly demarcated without much 
movement. An ideal ground for a new solution! While one side believes 
that side hustles are a necessity to grow a tech enterprise in Kenya, the 
other side strongly advocates for a focus on only one venture. It seems as 
if an “either–or” approach is the only solution. Yet there is another way. 
A possible solution for incubators, accelerators, and investors can be to 
deliberately select parallel entrepreneurs, as they are known, that have the 
 most businesses in their portfolio. After all, championing the “hedge your 
bets” strategy suggests a well-connected, seasoned, and diversifi ed entre-
preneur with at least three diff erent businesses along with a deep knowl-
edge of Kenyan business trends and dynamics. Th e task of the incubator, 
accelerator, and investor is then to assess, analyze, and work through all 
the side businesses with the entrepreneur in an eff ort to create synergies, 
introduce new strategy concepts, and work on a venture together. 
 Th is solution focuses on two aspects—on the one hand, respecting 
the entrepreneurial reality and accommodating the entrepreneur in an 
open collaboration in which disclosing all the side-business activity is 
positively valued. On the other hand, the solution seeks to grow both 
the entrepreneur and a focal business. Taking parallel entrepreneurship 
as a given rather than an abnormality demands entirely new strategies for 
working with the entrepreneur that are aimed at streamlining business 
activities. As one of our interviewees said, “Th ere is a time and place for 
hustling. You got to know when you have to let go.” 
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 Combining the Chama and the Venture Capitalist 
 Th e chama and the venture capitalist are well-established and highly 
sophisticated institutions. Both were created to deal with fi nancial assets, 
though in diametrically opposite ways. Th e chama is primarily a local, 
bottom-up social vehicle and selects its members based on social  networks. 
In a chama, collective saving or investing in personal or low-risk assets 
among family, friends, or colleagues is in the foreground. Venture capital 
funds are primarily a nonlocal, top-down economic vehicle—a fi nan-
cial intermediary—that channels capital from diverse and geographically 
dispersed investors into high-risk businesses. Infusing the lean, volun-
tary, and trusted management structure of a chama with the spirit of a 
venture-capitalist-style economic vehicle would direct the chama’s invest-
ment targets toward high-risk businesses. 
 Th is solution does two things. On the one hand, it draws on the 
social network function that business relationships are built on and 
gathers medium- and high-net worth individuals into an investment 
group geared toward investing in Kenyan businesses outside of the 
regular investment targets. It leverages the networks, experience, and 
capital of the chama members in order to help verify and grow new 
businesses. On the other hand, it shifts the focus of the chama to an 
economic function, using the joint capital pool to invest in high-poten-
tial and high- risk investments rather than making the safe bet. Th is 
solution provides a Kenyan alternative to the high cost structures cur-
rent private equity and venture capital funds face in the East African 
market (see Chap. 14). 
 On-Arrival Training for Newbies 
 Imagine you are new to a country; you will most likely dive into the Net 
or buy a  Lonely Planet in order gather some information about the new 
place you in—and you will be able to gather quite a lot of information. 
But you will miss some of the unwritten rules—the cultural nuances. 
Th is holds true for foreign techies coming to Kenya and for Kenyans ven-
turing into the world of technology entrepreneurship. In each case, the 
language, norms, and the way you interact are new. For a foreigner, being 
fl uent in Kiswahili, knowing how to eat  ugali skillfully, or knowing why 
East African Breweries dubbed a beer “Senator” matters. Th e same holds 
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true for Kenyans. Not only is the language of techpreneurs with all its 
buzzwords completely diff erent from that of other sectors, but also what 
is considered to be “hip” and “cool” diff ers. Th e devil is in the details!—
and admittedly, learning the details is diffi  cult and time-consuming. 
 A training program for both Kenyans and foreigners, however, could 
facilitate a controlled exposure to the culture of one’s counterpart—a 
unique opportunity to learn how the game is played. Not everyone picks 
up these peculiarities right from the start. Rather than going through a 
painstaking six-month period in which everyone only scratches the sur-
face, this solution can be a unique opportunity to learn the meaning of 
and reasoning behind each others’ behaviors and terms. 
 As always, there are also downsides to this mindset. Th e Innovator is 
met with opposition, resistance, and a small peer group to work with. 
Counterintuitive and inherently new solutions face an uphill battle until 
they become recognized and fully accepted. Th e bearers of this mindset 
will therefore fi nd only few supporters who fully understand and support 
the solution. So being able to take a long breath when working through 
potential failures and to bear with comments such as “I told you it ain’t 
worth it!” are assets. 
 Concluding Remarks 
 How do we move forward from here? In our opinion, the co-existence 
of two diff erent worldviews in Kenya’s international technology sector—
the Kenyan worldview and the international worldview—is a blessing. 
It opens up novel ways to practice technology entrepreneurship, ways 
that take domestic conditions seriously and see the future in a skillful 
blending of domestic and international wisdom—because narrowing the 
scope to only one worldview dramatically reduces access to the fi nancial, 
human, and organizational resources locked behind the other worldview. 
 We do not subscribe to the idea that one worldview is superior to the 
other. Rather, we believe that the two worldviews together can be a great 
resource to help create a Kenyan understanding and defi nition of tech-
nology entrepreneurship that creates truly innovative products. All this 
comes with an important caveat. We are not pushing diversity at all cost; 
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we are aware that it creates a new set of problems that require both com-
munity members who are willing to explore the art of managing world-
views and an audience that is ready to listen and try new approaches. 
Given the historical trajectory of Kenya’s tech scene, we believe that this 
is the “hotbed of innovation” that will not only bring forth remarkable 
product innovations but can also infuse technology entrepreneurship 
with its unique Kenyanness. 
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 Conversation #12 
 How to Be a Rebel and Build 
a Business at the Same Time 
 Ken Njoroge of Cellulant Corporation 
 Ken Njoroge  is the co-founder and group chief executive offi  cer (CEO) of 
Cellulant ,  one of Africa ’ s leading mobile commerce companies. He has led 
Cellulant from being a dream he and his co-founder Bolaji Akinboro sketched 
on a napkin in 2003 to an organization with a staff  of more than 240 spread 
across 10 countries. Unwavering in his pursuit of excellence ,  Ken is dedicated 
to seeing Cellulant achieve its goal of connecting more than 100 million con-
sumers with digital payment services that are relevant to their daily lives. 
 What is the story behind Cellulant? 
 Cellulant is a payments business serving the mobile commerce market 
segment. Mobile commerce is a familiar segment to people who have 
heard about M-PESA, for example, and about mobile banking in Africa. 
However, we did not start out, 14 years ago, in mobile commerce. We 
started as a mobile content provider, selling music downloads over mobile 
phones. At the time, we knew there were going to be a big opportunities 
in mobile, but we did not know what shape or size they would come in. 
 After about three or four years of selling digital content, we noticed 
a couple of things. First, notably, that our early adopters were rural or 
near-urban and slightly older, in their early 30s and mid-30s. Th is was 
interesting—and very diff erent from what we had expected. We had 
gone into the business thinking our customers would be urban, slightly 
younger, more tech savvy, and richer. Second, we noticed that when we 
off ered music and ringtones on credit, so that customers could pay the 
one-dollar cost in three or four chunks, then our sales generally qua-
drupled. Th e basic thinking began to form around the fact that a lot 
of the services on mobile were really mass market, meaning that if you 
could build useful services they could reach large numbers of consumers 
and that if you could fi nd a way to innovate on the payments model then 
you could actually charge fair value for services—a dollar for a ringtone, 
for example, even though the average top-up value at that time was just 
slightly over half a dollar. 
 Th is triggered a new thought process on the mission of the busi-
ness. Th e goal was very clear since our founding: We wanted to build a 
billion- dollar enterprise. We set out on a plan that suggested we could 
get there if Cellulant had 100 million customers using our services 
and made USD1 per customer per month. By 2008, it had become 
clear that mobile payments and mobile money were going to be a big 
space, and we began to look actively at these as a potential future for 
us, thinking we could basically leverage the payment innovation we 
had developed for music and ringtones on credit into a mainstream 
payment system. 
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 In 2009, we became a business that was building a future on the back 
of mobile commerce. We ended up developing a couple of products for 
payments and banking and sold these to quite a large number of banks 
over time. Th is marked the second phase of our growth, in which went 
from being a music and ringtone business in Kenya to being a mobile 
commerce company in Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Malawi, Uganda, 
Zambia, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Mozambique. 
 Today, we are a business that is running a shared payment ecosys-
tem, powering services for about 71 banks, including some of the large 
multinationals across the region. We also serve other nonbank cus-
tomers, including major utility companies and governments that are 
looking to provide services and get paid digitally over mobile phones 
or the Internet. 
 You initially started out to study pharmacy at a university but discov-
ered your passion for computers and the Internet along the way. Do 
you think it was the right decision to switch to computers? 
 Yes, it is one of the best decisions I have made in my life—although I 
have to admit I got into computers almost purely by accident. Immediately 
after high school, I was admitted to a pharmacy school. I think it was 
quite an elite school in those days, admitting only about 25 students at 
a time. But there was going to be a two-year lag between high school 
and actually entering the university—and my mom, a single parent, just 
did not like the idea of me hanging around and doing nothing for two 
years! She came across a newspaper advertisement saying that one of the 
other universities, Strathmore (traditionally an accounting and business 
school), had started a computer program and was calling for students to 
apply for scholarships. So I applied, luckily got a scholarship, and went 
off  to Strathmore for the time being. 
 I, of course, fell in love with computers extremely fast. But also I 
fell in love with the schooling and the teaching culture of the univer-
sity, because we had lecturers who were practitioners in the industry. 
One in particular, who is today the CEO of Uchumi (one of Kenya’s 
Conversation #12: Ken Njoroge of Cellulant Corporation 397
largest supermarket chains), would bring the Times and Newsweek 
magazine articles about Bill Gates and Steve Jobs and all the cool 
things they did in the early days of Silicon Valley. 
 As a result, I got socialized, not just on computers but also on entrepre-
neurs who were doing interesting things. Th e cutting-edge technology of 
the time and the entrepreneurs globally who were not much older than 
I was made a powerful impression on my mind. So when I went to the 
pharmacy school after the two years were up, I saw that my mind had 
started to develop in a completely diff erent direction from that of the 
medical school culture. Th is was a very signifi cant culture clash for me. I 
only lasted about a year and a half and came to the conclusion that this 
was not going to work. So I and went back to Strathmore for another year! 
 You started working for several Internet service providers (ISP s), and 
in 1998, decided to make the transition and start 3Mice. Why was it 
the right time? 
 By the time I left Strathmore, the desire to become an entrepreneur—
like Steve Jobs, Bill Gates, and the Netscape founders—had already set-
tled in my mind to a point of no return. Th e basic direction, the highest 
level where one could go in terms of ambition as a technology person, 
had settled. 
 What does it mean for you to be an entrepreneur? 
 I think I am a rebel—self-directed maybe, but a personality who likes 
to have his own mind about things. For me, it was never about the money, 
but rather about the fact that you could, almost from a blank sheet, cre-
ate and build something, out of your own thoughts, and shape it into 
whatever it could become. Th at was a very powerful idea for me. It still 
 continues to drive me today. It is just an innate personality trait. Th en 
seeing other entrepreneurs and what their companies were doing gave this 
trait a shape and a form of expression. It is like an artist—except that an 
artist expresses himself or herself in, say, a painting. I fi gured that you 
could express rebellion, sort of your view of the world, in the ability to cre-
ate something new and great—and that you can do that with a business as 
well. Th is desire was deeply ingrained in me by the time I left Strathmore. 
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 When you say rebel, what do you mean? Rebelling against what? 
 In our society, we were socialized to go to high school, get extremely 
good grades, go to university (and, in my case, go to the top course), 
excel in the university, and then be successful. Breaking away from that 
mold—coming to terms with the realization that “Hang on, this particu-
lar path that has been prescribed doesn’t actually make sense for me and 
doesn’t fi t with my interests and passions”—was quite a clear departure 
from the norms of our society at the time. 
 Of course, my dropping out of the university was diffi  cult for my 
mom, because it is not what people do. Saying, “Well, this doesn’t make 
sense for me; I’m going to do something diff erent” is a form of rebellion. 
And the way you then express it—and it was not rebellion for rebellion’s 
sake—is a very specifi c refl ection of why this was not going to work for 
me and why there ought to have been a much better, much more exciting 
path to pursue for my career. 
 What were some of the main learnings you took with you from 3Mice? 
 3Mice (a Web hosting and design company in Nairobi) was a fan-
tastic learning opportunity because it was the fi rst business I set up. 
Th e most important thing I took out of 3Mice is that one can actually 
do these things and do them well. I think the fact that, from nothing, 
we set up a business that became reasonably well known in the coun-
try was a very powerful lesson. Th e other lesson unfolded when we 
became an Africa online company, witnessing a Pan-African business 
in the making very early on in my career and to see, again, that it can 
actually be done. 
 Th e other more practical lessons were on the “how-to” side, like how 
to get products to market and how to build teams. What really matters 
are people. 3Mice was a partnership of three people, and what got us all 
excited was creating a company very early on. However, it was a common 
motivation, a common vision, and a common purpose that kept the part-
nership alive as the business model changed and evolved. What innately 
drives entrepreneurs is essentially their purpose and vision—“How big 
do you want this to go?”—and they are important in keeping things 
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together. I learned the value of having them aligned very early on and 
applied it to my future partnerships. So when I moved on to Cellulant, 
my co-founder Bolaji and I spent a lot of time making sure we were 
aligned on those things. To a large extent, our extremely successful part-
nership at Cellulant is a result of those early learnings. 
 What was the eff ect of 3Mice on Kenya’s tech-ecosystem? 
 Th e 3Mice journey was a very short one when you look at how long 
it typically takes to have large impact. I certainly can say that a lot of 
today’s big, more experienced industry people came from within or 
around 3Mice. Paul Kukubo, for example, who became CEO of the 
Kenya ICT Board, was one of the co-founders of 3Mice. We certainly 
created a strong foundation for the belief in technology and in start-ups. 
Th e spirit still lives on. And of course, I too have been a signifi cant ben-
efi ciary of coming from 3Mice. It built a lot of my credibility. When I say 
that I was involved in 3Mice, everybody always lights up and says, “Oh, 
3Mice!” Th ey can see that, “Okay, this guy is a serial entrepreneur — and 
not a shabby one!” 
 Would you consider yourself more of an “ideational” entrepreneur, 
the kind who launches an idea and, once it matures into a business, 
moves on to the next idea? 
 I would say that to some extent this is true. I think I am an ideas 
guy. But then, I am a bit of a boring guy too. For instance, for 13 
years, I have now been with Cellulant, and I have this relentless focus 
to achieve a mission. What is common to both my journey at 3Mice 
and at Cellulant was a relentless mission to build a business on the scale 
of the ventures in the early days of the Internet: the Netscapes, the 
Microsofts, the Apples. 
 So what I have done is change my role as the business grew. I am 
still with Cellulant. I am not going to leave Cellulant anytime soon, 
because I have an almost dogged commitment to building a busi-
ness of scale and achieving the mission of making Cellulant a billion- 
dollar enterprise. 
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 I enjoy building ideas. What happened was that instead of leaving 
Cellulant to go and start another company, I just changed my job within 
Cellulant. Recently, we got a new COO who takes away a lot of the day-
to- day operational activities and makes sure that projects are delivered on 
time and that sort of thing. Th is gives me a lot of time with the product 
guys to create the new ideas of tomorrow, within Cellulant—a very inter-
esting confi guration for me. I do not see myself starting another business 
after Cellulant, but I do see a lot of job changes coming my way so that I 
continue to be an ideas man within Cellulant. 
 In a nutshell, what would you say are some of the key fundamentals 
that make an entrepreneur successful? 
 Th ere are at least two ways to look at it. 
 Th ere is what I call an innate, almost intangible driver that gives one 
the motivation to succeed. It has to be very deeply rooted in a person, 
because it basically serves as the fuel to pursue an original path and gives 
you the strength to push for success. In my case, it gave me an extraordi-
nary drive to succeed. I come from a single-parent family, as you know, 
and we are always driven and drilled to succeed despite the odds. I also 
come from a continent that I believe requires this kind of mindset to 
lift itself and reach its potential. Another fundamental trait found in 
entrepreneurs is ambition and motivation. Th is has to come naturally for 
entrepreneurs to succeed. I consider myself generally ambitious and moti-
vated. Otherwise, why aim for a USD1 billion Pan-African company? 
 You will also hear entrepreneurs described as focused, resilient, and 
committed to a mission. Th ese qualities translate into the business in 
various ways. So looking at focus, I once asked myself, “What do I 
know about real estate? And what do I know about all this other stuff ?” 
Nothing, really! But in technology, because I have been at it for such a 
long time, I can develop very specifi c, deep insights that are scarce. And 
as a result of that, I can spend time creating opportunities and ideas 
because deep knowledge puts me in a reasonable position to succeed. 
Th at is why I have been in technology and a technology entrepreneur 
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since September of 1998, when I co-founded 3Mice. I have followed the 
same path of building a technology business at scale ever since. I have 
been on that journey, I have not wavered, I have not given up. And even 
today, I do not allow myself to get into distractions that seek to take me 
away from the journey. So to me, that is focus! I am also resilient. It does 
not really matter how diffi  cult a situation is—I wear it down! I always say 
I feel sorry for problems that come my way, because there is only one way 
it is going to end. I am going to wear the problem down! (L aughs .) Th e 
problem has no chance. I will look at it, I will turn it around, I will go 
home, I will sleep. Tomorrow, I will wake up and think about it and push 
it, and push it, and push it, until it breaks. (L aughs .) 
 What was your biggest “Aha!” moment during your entrepreneurial 
journey? 
 It must have been sometime in 2001 or so when I saw the pace at 
which mobile phones were growing. Before then, I used to look at the 
Internet in a PC mindset. I used to work in the ISP world, and we saw 
the Internet in sort of computer, PC, server ways. But when I saw the 
growth of mobile phones—I think, there were projections for Kenya for 
two million mobile phones by the year 2004, and Nigeria would have 
eight million—now that was a big “Aha!” moment. It struck me like a 
thunderbolt, “Wow, this thing we call the Internet might actually make 
its way to the African mass market over the mobile phone.” It was a real 
epiphany—an epiphany that started my journey with Cellulant. 
 Th ank you, Ken! 
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 Entrepreneurship is an omnipresent phenomenon in Africa. Everyone 
wants to use his or her zeal and creativity to develop monetized strategies 
for engaging with the continent’s opportunities and challenges. Th e suc-
cess of entrepreneurs such as Kenya’s Chris Kirubi (Nkem-Eneanya  2015 ) 
in harnessing economic potential on the continent have been celebrated 
both domestically and internationally. Less is written about, however, is 
the entrepreneurial culture from which these successes have sprung. One 
hears anecdotally instead of the teacher who, outside of the classroom, 
runs a tourism business, electronics distribution center, and hair salon 
or of the musician who sets up a language center, art studio, and bakery. 
What may seem like the sporadic pursuit of a random assortment of busi-
ness ventures to many in the West is, in fact, evidence of the fruitful and 
distinctively African business phenomenon of parallel entrepreneurship. 
 Developing Strategies to Harness 
the Power of Parallel Entrepreneurship 
in Africa 
 Eskor   John 
 E.  John ( ) 
 Marigold Asset Management ,  London ,  United Kingdom 
 Early entrepreneurship studies often regarded entrepreneurs as a 
homogeneous group. More recently, scholars have recognized that entre-
preneurs have diff erent ownership propensities. Parallel entrepreneur-
ship, a sub-type of the habitual entrepreneurship, is entrepreneurship in 
which the actors are involved in a number of businesses simultaneously 
(Fierro and Noble  2013 ). Known also as concurrent entrepreneurship, it 
is found around the world and is particularly evident at the international 
level, in the form of conglomerates. Parallel entrepreneurship in Africa 
is unusual in the way it permeates the business culture of the continent. 
Th e propensity to own and operate a number of businesses simultane-
ously does not appear to be infl uenced by gender, age, or wealth. 
 Th e motivation behind this chapter is to identify some of the most 
salient factors related to parallel entrepreneurship—factors that, if bet-
ter understood and supported, have the potential to make a signifi cant 
contribution to the economic transformation of the region. By their 
very nature, entrepreneurs owning multiple ventures are more experi-
enced than their peers operating single businesses, and studying them 
can enhance understanding of entrepreneurship more generally. Th is 
chapter explores the contextual factors contributing to the growth of 
entrepreneurship in Africa and the prevalence and implications of paral-
lel entrepreneurship in particular. Th e chapter also recommends ways of 
supporting and developing parallel entrepreneurship in the future. 
 Parallel Entrepreneurship in Africa 
 Africa’s contemporary culture of entrepreneurship has fl ourished as a 
consequence of two broad factors—the improvement of economic con-
ditions and the change in social attitudes. 
 Th anks to improved political stability and economic reform in many 
countries, Africa’s growth rate in the twenty-fi rst century so far has been 
unprecedented. Average annual growth on the continent increased from 
1.81 % in 1980–1989 to 5.28 % in 2000–2010 and has remained 2 % 
above that of the world economy in the 2008–2012 postfi nancial crisis 
period. Many African countries have posted strong average growth rates 
of around 6 %; some have even reached double digits (UNCTAD  2014 ). 
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Among the benefi ciaries of Africa’s economic renaissance are entrepre-
neurs who have been presented with a plethora of revenue-generating 
opportunities. Whether it is tapping into the buoyant weddings mar-
ket, setting up aff ordable boutique hotels, or providing micro-credit 
programs, countless business activities are being explored. Such an abun-
dance of opportunities has led to a burst of new entrepreneurial activity 
on the continent. A recent Global Enterprise Monitoring (GEM) report 
evaluating the health of entrepreneurship globally found that the Sub- 
Saharan Africa region has the highest number of people involved in early- 
stage entrepreneurial activity in the world. In particular, Nigeria and 
Zambia had the highest representation of entrepreneurs, with approxi-
mately 40 % of those between the ages of 18 and 64 owning a company 
less than 3.5 years old (GEM  2015 ). 
 As to the change in social attitudes, throughout the twentieth and early 
twenty-fi rst century, formal employment was the overwhelming prefer-
ence for African citizens. In recent times, however, entrepreneurship and, 
in particular, opportunity-driven entrepreneurship (versus necessity-
driven entrepreneurship) have become increasingly popular career 
choices. According to a report on entrepreneurship in Africa by Omidyar 
Network and Monitor Group (ONMG), 49 % of Nigerians, 76 % of 
Kenyans, and 78  % of Ethiopians believe becoming an opportunity- 
driven entrepreneur is a desirable choice (ONMG  2013 ). Th is fi nding 
highlights the fact that, because of the level of economic potential in 
Africa, people are increasingly seeing entrepreneurship as a way to capi-
talize on opportunities, and their eff orts are being positively received by 
their communities. 
 As entrepreneurship has fl ourished, so has parallel entrepreneurship. 
A number of entrepreneurs are taking advantage of improved economic 
conditions by exploiting diff erent opportunities simultaneously, leading 
to the emergence of parallel entrepreneurship in new areas. A 2012 study 
by the IMANI Center for Policy and Education focusing on Ghanaian, 
Nigerian, and Kenyan entrepreneurs found that the surveyed entrepre-
neurs owned an average of six businesses each (Th e Economist  2012 ). 
Th is fi nding requires one to look beyond the factors that have contributed 
to the rise in entrepreneurship in general in the region—the improved 
economic conditions and shifting social attitudes—to identify the more 
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specifi c factors and challenges that are infl uencing African entrepreneurs’ 
decisions to operate a number of businesses simultaneously. 
 Unpredictable Business Environment 
 Th e African business environment is vulnerable to a number of desta-
bilizing factors that can interfere with strategic plans and operations. 
In particular, political violence is once again a pressing matter in the 
region, with the number of deaths from political violence rising sharply 
since 2010 to approximately 40,000 over the period (Bugnacki  2015 ). 
Th e recent phase of violence is highly concentrated in a small number of 
high-profi le confl icts—the Boko Haram insurgency in Central and West 
Africa, the Second Libyan Civil War in the northern Sahara, and the al 
Shabaab insurgency in the Horn of Africa, to the east. Th ese confl icts 
serve to increase the perception of risk in the region among entrepre-
neurs, and as a result, parallel entrepreneurship serves as a way to diversify 
from a single company’s revenue. 
 Furthermore, whereas the stop–go policies that typifi ed Africa’s post-
colonial period have abated, corruption is still a pressing issue that 
scars Africa’s entrepreneurial landscape. According to Transparency 
International, fi ve of the top 10 and nine of the top 20 most corrupt 
nations in the world are in Africa (Transparency International  2014 ). 
Because an entrepreneur has no way of predicting when or how a cor-
rupt practice or action will undermine his or her business, it is unsur-
prising entrepreneurs seek to diversify their income away from a single 
revenue source. 
 Lack of Quality Middle Managers 
 Africa’s meteoric growth in the last decade has not generated the number 
of large businesses that might have been expected. One of the biggest 
challenges to building scalable businesses is the absence of skilled middle-
level managers. Adcorp, a South African labor market specialist, reported 
in 2013 that the middle-management issues in South Africa, which are 
also relevant across Africa as a whole (Rigoglioso  2011 ), can be attributed 
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to three causes—the emigration of high-skilled workers, the immigration 
restrictions placed on high-skilled foreigners, and a dysfunctional educa-
tion system. Adcorp also reported that, at the time its study was conducted, 
244,400 management positions were unfi lled in the South African private 
sector (Adcorp  2014 ). One impact this skills shortage has on entrepre-
neurs is potentially to limit their ability to truly scale a business. In order 
to adapt to this factor, many entrepreneurs may instead choose to grow 
and maintain their businesses at medium-size  levels (Bindra  2012 ). 
 Unemployment 
 A lack of jobs and poor job security are two of the biggest contradic-
tions in Africa’s growth story (Mead  2012 ). Th e continent is known for 
being home to more than half of the world’s 20 fastest-growing econo-
mies in the last 5 years (Hauge  2014 ). However, a number of these coun-
tries have relied on capital-intensive and mineral-extractive initiatives to 
turbo-charge their growth, and job creation has not grown at a similar 
rate (Taylor  2015 ). In addition, the scarcity of jobs is most pronounced in 
the youth population (ages 15–25 years). Th e young represent more than 
60 % of the continent’s total population and account for 45 % of the total 
labor force (African Economic Outlook  2008 ). However, Africa has been 
unable to realize the benefi ts of having such a sizeable working popula-
tion, because of the gulf between the skills this population possesses and 
the skills employers require. As a result, the World Bank estimated, youth 
account for some 60 % of all unemployed Africans (Filmer and Fox  2014 ). 
 Th e interconnections between unemployment and parallel entrepre-
neurship are represented by the concept of necessity entrepreneurship—
which refers to entering into entrepreneurship primarily as a means of 
survival versus exploiting a business opportunity. In particular, when 
full-time employment is not a viable option, identifying and pursuing a 
business opportunity become the best alternative. Survival instincts and 
entrepreneurial zeal have resulted in Africans using entrepreneurship as a 
partial remedy to youth unemployment. Th ese entrepreneurs are working 
aggressively to generate lifesaving income versus exploring a profi table 
market opportunity. 
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 Implications for Entrepreneurial Action 
 Th e prevalence of parallel entrepreneurship in Africa has signifi cant 
implications for the shape and behavior of businesses on the continent. 
Successful parallel entrepreneurs are inarguably experienced business 
founders. As such, they are expected to have acquired the knowledge and 
skills necessary to develop strategies to overcome common problems in 
new venture and thereby be more successful business starters. Below are 
some of the issues of particular concern to parallel entrepreneurs that 
require more attention in policy, research, and practice. 
 Legal Structures 
 Entrepreneurs need to have a good understanding of the legal structure 
available to them when establishing a business portfolio. In general, 
entrepreneurs can opt for one of two choices—they can create a cor-
poration or limited liability company (LLC) for each venture, or they 
can form a holding company that owns the individual corporations and 
LLCs constituting the entrepreneur’s multiple ventures. Evaluating the 
pros and cons of both options is beyond the scope of this chapter. But it 
should be noted that African entrepreneurs need to be aware of the way 
these structures can aff ect the operation of their portfolios, especially with 
regard to their implications for taxes and profi t distribution. Given the 
fact some foreign investors see the complex ownership structures of some 
African businesses to be a deterrent to investment (Th e Economist  2013 ), 
it would appear that selecting the appropriate legal structure might not 
only facilitate the operating of a portfolio of businesses but also entice 
investors looking to provide growth capital. 
 Hedging 
 Th e issue of hedging is of particular relevance to a parallel entrepreneur. 
Instead of owning a collection of related businesses, parallel entrepre-
neurs looking to circumvent company-specifi c risks in Africa’s business 
environment often choose to own a portfolio of unrelated businesses—a 
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strategy related to the old adage “Don’t put all your eggs in one basket.” 
Th is notion resonates strongly with African entrepreneurs, who know 
they must always have an alternative, or a plan B. Regulatory uncertainty 
and other forms of instability mean that one’s revenue forecasts can be 
exposed to signifi cant variability. Consequently, owning an additional 
one, two, or three businesses becomes particularly appealing, because 
these other businesses may be able to help balance out the health of 
one’s overall portfolio. Th is strategy is most eff ective when the businesses 
in question are in unrelated fi elds, as is the case with, for example, the 
Muguku family in Kenya (with businesses in real estate, education, and 
poultry farming), where a decline in a particular industry’s profi tability 
probably will not aff ect the other businesses in one’s portfolio. 
 Synergies 
 Managers of parallel businesses need to seriously think about how 
resources across their businesses are shared. Whether operating a large- or 
small-scale collection of companies, a parallel entrepreneur can transfer 
resources directly between operations in order to insulate a business from 
a sudden shock. Th is is particularly useful in the African business envi-
ronment, where unforeseen catastrophes are common, and bank lending 
rates tend to be punitively high. 
 At the same time, however, cross-subsidization can result in an ineffi  -
cient allocation of resources across a business portfolio when, for example, 
failing businesses continue to receive support from stronger-performing 
entities in the portfolio. Th is phenomenon has been well covered in the 
Western context through research on the behavior of conglomerates 
(Almeida and Wolfenzon  2006 ) and has been cited as one of the major 
drawbacks of these types of business endeavors. And although its inten-
tions as a business strategy are understandable, the eff ect of suboptimal 
cross-subsidization can be to prolong the life of a subpar entity—as scarce 
resources are repeatedly diverted from a promising entity to a laggard, 
thereby ensuring that the promising entity is unable to use the resources 
to strengthen its own position. Furthermore, the prolonging of a fail-
ing business also has the potential to be a counter-productive measure if 
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management is disincentivized from making meaningful changes thanks 
to the guarantee of funds irrespective of performance. 
 Recommendations 
 Parallel entrepreneurship is an omnipresent aspect of Africa’s business 
landscape that has been shown to be a key driver of wealth creation 
(Rosa  1998 ; Westhead and Wright  1998 ). It has also been shown to be 
an important component of Africa’s economic development (Balunywa 
 2009 ). Given the importance, then, of parallel entrepreneurship in the 
African economic landscape, following set of recommendations aim to 
provide suggestions to key stakeholders in the community for making 
parallel entrepreneurship more eff ective. 
 Entrepreneurs 
 Entrepreneurs must consider what kind of organizational structure is 
most appropriate for their portfolio. Th e traditional hierarchical model 
of organization is derived from European military practice (Short 
 2008 ), in which a clear chain of command and authority travels verti-
cally downward from a chief executive offi  cer (CEO) to department 
managers and thence to individual workers. In this model, all employ-
ees have a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities, and 
the organization is able to operate in a predictable and unifi ed way. 
Th is kind of structure is useful for some of the strategic considerations 
a parallel entrepreneur must face. 
 However, when dealing with a collection of diverse operations, as is 
the case in parallel entrepreneurship, fl exibility is required because of the 
complexity of running the multiple ventures and the need for a wider 
range of expertise. In such a situation, an individual is unlikely to have 
suffi  cient knowledge to make key decisions about all ventures in his or 
her portfolio or to be aware of all the consequences a decision about one 
venture might have for the other ventures. Consequently, a hierarchi-
cal structure may be unsuitable for the kind of mixed decisionmaking 
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required by the portfolio in various situations. A parallel entrepreneur 
may therefore want to develop a “fl at” structure for his or her organiza-
tion—a structure that to some extent shares decisionmaking power and 
infl uence across the workforce. Th e structure is intended to remove lay-
ers of bureaucracy in a business, allowing individuals to come together 
in informal and autonomous clusters and allowing key decisions to be 
made at local levels in faster and better-informed ways—and it may be 
appropriate for the kinds of strategic decisions that require creativity and 
innovation, such as those pertaining to incubation and recognizing syn-
ergies as well as those that require rapid responses to local market signals, 
such as hedging and sharing resources across a portfolio. 
 In addition to determining the appropriate organizational hierarchy 
for one’s business, the parallel entrepreneur also needs to identify optimal 
ways of managing a number of businesses simultaneously. One model 
that is growing in prominence in the tech world—because of the success 
of companies like Idealab and Betaworks, in America—and that is worth 
consideration in the current context is the start-up studio model, which 
involves setting up a company that builds several companies in parallel 
via reusable infrastructure and resources. 
 Proponents of the model have cited focus and collaboration as key 
benefi ts (Nesta  2014 ), with entrepreneurs bringing together a team that 
focuses intensely in the product development stage while collaborating 
and using existing knowledge obtained from developing other products. 
In the African context, the studio model could be used as a way to hone 
in on pressing problems faced by the community. Th is approach has 
been adopted by Foresight Ventures, a Kenyan-based start-up studio 
aiming to create and commercialize products that solve pressing prob-
lems in the region. 
 Although the start-up studio model is an exciting prospect, there are 
certain challenges that an aspiring parallel entrepreneur should con-
sider before going down this path. First, the approach is capital inten-
sive, because funding is required to build the necessary infrastructure 
and recruit a talented cross-functional team. Second, if the entrepre-
neur is unable to use internal resources to meet the required capital 
target, then pitching the business to an investor might be a challenge, 
because the entrepreneur would need to convince the investor not only 
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of the viability of the product(s) in question, but also of the merits of 
funding a special team in a co-working space. (Th e latter requirement is 
a particular challenge, because very little data exist on the track record 
of the studio model.) 
 Investors 
 A consideration that investors should give to parallel entrepreneurship 
in Africa is how the prevalence of simultaneously owning a number of 
businesses aff ects the traditional concept of holding an equity ownership 
stake in a company. Given the myriad of interconnected entities owned 
by entrepreneurs on the continent today, investors should consider more 
unorthodox approaches to investing. For example, rather than take an 
equity stake in a company per se, investors may wish to identify a con-
tinuously successful parallel entrepreneur and take an equity stake in his 
or her future earnings. Th is model, known as a human capital contract, 
has long been advocated by a number of leading economists, including 
Milton Friedman (Friedman and Kuznets  1945 ) and has the potential to 
provide much-needed capital to capable parallel entrepreneurs. 
 However, until now, past attempts to explore human capital contracts 
in the West have proven unsuccessful. In the 1970s, Yale University 
attempted to replace traditional student loans with human capital 
 contracts under its Tuition Postponement Option but ended up cancel-
ling the program. Other attempts to use human capital contracts in the 
education sector have also proven to be a failure, primarily because of the 
issue of adverse selection (NYT  1999 ), meaning that students who opt 
into human capital programs can tend to be the students who expect to 
pursue low-income careers and consequently are less likely to repay their 
full share of the loans. Another issue that has aff ected the performance of 
human capital contracts is moral hazard, meaning that the borrowers can 
tend to be discouraged from maximizing their income and are instead 
encouraged to focus on non-wage-based forms of compensation, such as 
better benefi ts (Simkovic  2011 ). 
 Although the issues of adverse selection and moral hazard could still 
arise if the human capital contract approach were applied to  parallel 
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 entrepreneurs, a key diff erence between the students and the parallel 
entrepreneurs is that it would be the entrepreneurs with a proven record 
of successfully running businesses who were the ones selected for fund-
ing. Th ese entrepreneurs, who have demonstrated a willingness and 
ability to succeed, would be unlikely to deliberately underperform after 
receiving funding. However, a challenge investors would face would be to 
enforce the contract, because of the underdeveloped nature of the regula-
tory framework around human capital contracts. 
 Government 
 Government policy needs to tackle some of the obstacles that cur-
rently restrict the potential of parallel entrepreneurships, including lack 
of access to fi nancial capital and human capital (in the form of quality 
management). 
 A large number of Africa’s parallel entrepreneurs are micro- or small- 
scale operators at the early stages of business development who struggle 
to obtain capital in the form of aff ordable loans. Currently, in several 
African nations, including South Africa, Nigeria, and Tanzania, govern-
ments have tried to increase the volume of credit channeled to small- 
and medium-size enterprises via credit lines and partial credit guarantees 
(PCGs) (Berg and Fuchs  2013 ). However, the success of these schemes 
has been limited because of the terms and conditions applied as part 
of PCGs. Issues including coverage ratios, fees, payment rules, and col-
lateral requirements have limited the potential of government eff orts. In 
Tanzania, for example, a PCG that began in 2005 was disbanded in 2008 
because of excessive bureaucracy. Financial institutions felt that the PCG 
duplicated other loan assessment processes and was slow to pay out. 
 One country that appears to have increased lending to small- and 
medium-size enterprises via PCGs is Rwanda (Berg and Fuchs  2013 ), 
where take-up by banks to lend was positive. One of the key reasons 
for this success was the fact the scheme was developed in close coopera-
tion with the private sector, which suggests that other nations in the 
region would do well to adopt a similar approach when developing 
their schemes. 
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 In addition to providing fi nancial capital to parallel entrepreneurs, 
government policy should also focus on addressing the lack of quality 
management expertise through the development of context-specifi c train-
ing. Currently, the small number of organizations focusing on develop-
ing management capacity—such as the African Management Initiative (a 
joint venture of the Association of African Business Schools, the Global 
Business School Network, Canada’s Lundin Foundation, and the Lagos- 
based Tony Elumelu Foundation) (Furlonger  2012 ) are non-profi ts. 
Another problem is that management training in Africa continues to be 
Western-oriented, with students encouraged to develop business plans for 
single businesses in a way that refl ects teaching styles of US and European 
business schools and the profi les of most US and European entrepre-
neurs. However, as this chapter has tried to make clear, the profi le of an 
African entrepreneur is often very diff erent. African entrepreneurs would 
therefore benefi t immensely from being exposed to culturally relevant 
and customized training programs that advise them on how to manage 
multiple businesses, often at the level of micro- and small-size opera-
tions, and how to function in the unique and often unpredictable African 
business environment. Developing these kinds of courses is a complex 
and location-specifi c task, and as a result, governments should strongly 
consider partnering with consulting fi rms, academia, and relevant fi rms 
in the private sector. 
 Research 
 Th e quality of management training in Africa would benefi t from tar-
geted research. In recent years, there has been a gradual increase in aca-
demic interest in parallel entrepreneurship (Sieger et al.  2011 ). Research 
has concentrated on highlighting the reasons entrepreneurs have 
adopted a portfolio approach to capitalize on business opportunities. At 
this stage, the general consensus from the likes of Alsos and Ljunggren 
( 2006 ), for example, is that there are three types of parallel entrepre-
neurs—opportunity- motivated, income-motivated, and employment-
motivated. Th e next step, driven by the likes of Antonio Fierro, has 
been to explore the fi eld of parallel entrepreneurship outside of the 
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Western context (Fierro and Cornelius  2013 ) and in the context of the 
developing world. Fierro, in particular, discovered through research that 
selecting a parallel entrepreneurship approach can result in the ability to 
take advantage of opportunities that otherwise have limited potential in 
terms of scale and scope. 
 However, despite these eff orts, there is still much more work to be 
done. To begin with, the research done in the fi eld (e.g., exploring the 
motivations behind choosing the path of simultaneous ownership) 
needs to collect more data from Africa, beginning perhaps in countries 
that have a strong entrepreneurship culture, such as Nigeria and Kenya. 
Th is step will allow key stakeholders to gain a customized understanding 
of what drives African entrepreneurs to stretch themselves to their limits 
while providing greater insights for governments and education institu-
tions keen to support parallel entrepreneurship. Th is research should be 
directed toward answering the question “Who are the leading parallel 
entrepreneurs in Africa, and what policies can support them in ways that 
further their growth and lead to the elevation of smaller fi rms along the 
supply chain?” 
 Research also needs to be conducted on the prevalence of parallel entre-
preneurship in other regions of the world. Surely the conditions that exist 
in Africa that promote a culture of owning numerous businesses simulta-
neously must exist in other parts of the world. Parallel entrepreneurship is 
widespread in India, for example, and as in Africa, many entrepreneurs in 
India are trying to capitalize on the multiple moneymaking opportunities 
in their country. Researchers and practitioners need to better understand 
the reasons parallel entrepreneurship is so common. How do these entre-
preneurs perform compared with their more focused peers? And what are 
the ways that knowledge transfer could be initiated among like-minded 
entrepreneurs in the region and perhaps farther afi eld? 
 Finally, further research needs to be conducted on the interconnectiv-
ity between parallel entrepreneurship and the continent’s informal sec-
tor. Extensive research on Africa’s informal sector has yet to be done. 
However, the African Development Bank recently released a report say-
ing that 55 % of Sub-Saharan Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP) and 
80 % of its labor force can be attributed to the informal sector (African 
Development Bank Group AFDB  2013 ). Th ese numbers cannot be 
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ignored. Th e suggestion that individuals operating numerous businesses 
are unregistered has wide-ranging implications across the economy, from 
lost tax revenue to the promotion of corruption. Th e report also cites 
three core issues as the underlying causes for the proliferation of the 
informal sector—infl ated taxation, a sub-optimal regulatory environ-
ment, and a lack of property rights. Interestingly, these same conditions 
also contribute to entrepreneurs taking the parallel entrepreneurship 
route. It seems apparent, therefore, that before one can look to optimize 
the performance of the continent’s parallel entrepreneurs, more needs to 
be done to ensure that they feel comfortable enough to step out, moving 
from the shadow economy into the formal economy. 
 Conclusion 
 Parallel entrepreneurship is one of the most defi ning aspects of Africa’s 
entrepreneurship landscape. In today’s world, where entrepreneurship is 
the “in thing” and entrepreneurs are seen as quasi-revolutionaries, paral-
lel entrepreneurship acts as a striking diff erentiator between Africa and 
much of the rest of the world. 
 A combination of push (unpredictable business environment, unem-
ployment, and lack of quality middle managers) and pull (positive societal 
attitudes and increased economic opportunities) factors have contributed 
to the prevalence of parallel entrepreneurship on the continent. However, 
after spending time on the ground in Africa, whether it be in Nigeria, 
South Africa, or Kenya, for example, one cannot help but feel that even 
in the absence of these push and pull factors, parallel entrepreneurship 
would still thrive—because it is highly apparent that parallel entrepre-
neurship is embedded in the minds of Africans. Improve management 
standards and curb corruption, and parallel entrepreneurship would still 
thrive. It is simply the way business is done, and this fact needs to be 
appreciated by all observers. 
 Th is chapter has explored the key implications of parallel entrepre-
neurship for how business is conducted in the region. From identify-
ing unique challenges, such as moral hazard, that arise when looking 
to share resources across business holdings in a portfolio to selecting an 
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optimal legal structure that will be tax and investment effi  cient, the paral-
lel entrepreneur has quite a lot of unique challenges to think about. And 
this entrepreneur would be in a stronger position to circumvent these 
challenges if he or she were better supported by two key stakeholders—
government and researchers. Government support is needed to help alle-
viate fi nancial and managerial constraints (through grants and sponsored 
management training programs), and research is needed to help deepen 
our understanding of parallel entrepreneurship in Africa. Th e topic mat-
ters—yet little is presently known about this social and business phenom-
enon that characterizes virtually the entire continent of Africa. When one 
considers the fact that this innovative approach to entrepreneurship has, 
if properly managed, the potential to materially advance the living stan-
dards of millions of the continent’s citizens, then it becomes even more 
apparent that much more needs to be done to realize its potential. 
 In summary, parallel entrepreneurs are an undeniable force in Africa’s 
entrepreneurial landscape. Th ese multitasking workhorses are driving 
economic activity across the continent and are one of the most distinctive 
indicators of Africa’s increasing prosperity. However, for these individuals 
to elevate their performance and take the continent even further, much 
more needs to be done to increase all stakeholders’ understanding of this 
exciting phenomenon. It is through collective understanding and action 
that positive steps can be transformed into giant steps toward economic 
prosperity. 
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 Conversation #13 
 The Hustling Entrepreneur on Trial 
 Mikul Shah of EatOut and 
Ritesh Doshi of Naked Pizza 
 Mikul Shah  is the founder of Africa ’ s online restaurant guide EatOut and a self-
proclaimed foodie and travel buff . Born and raised in Mombasa ,  he spent over a 
decade in the UK before returning to Nairobi to join his family business. In 
2010 ,  over a dinner conversation with friends ,  he realized there was a gap in the 
market for a comprehensive online restaurant guide for the city. What started out 
as a hobby fi nanced by a US $ 1000  investment is now an award-winning portal , 
 seating thousands of diners at hundreds of restaurants a month. Over the years , 
 EatOut has added several innovative brands to its portfolio ,  including a monthly 
free-distribution print publication called Yummy Magazine ,  the annual Nairobi 
Restaurant Week event ,  and the Taste Bar & Restaurant Awards. In 2013 , 
 EatOut raised capital from the Netherlands ’  Africa Media Venture Fund to 
expand into the East African region. Beyond EatOut ,  Mikul plays an active role 
as a mentor ,  advisor ,  and investor for several businesses. He co-founded SleepOut.
com ,  which was named as one of CNN ’ s top African start-ups in 2014 ,  and has 
invested in brands such as Ghafl a ,  Nairobi Garage ,  OkHi ,  and Naked Pizza. He 
also serves as an advisor to Safaricom ’ s Spark innovation fund . 
 On a visit home to Nairobi in 2011 ,  Ritesh Doshi ,  a Kenyan fi nancier 
living in Jordan ,  was frustrated that he could not get a pizza delivered in under 
an hour. So unlike most fi nanciers ,  he quit his day job and decided to do some-
thing about it. Ritesh ,  a self-proclaimed “ serial entrepreneur stuck in a fi nan-
cier ’ s body ,”  studied at the London School of Economics and launched his career 
working for fi nancial institutions such as Credit Suisse ,  HSBC ,  and Probitas 
Partners ,  a private equity fi rm. In 2012 ,  Ritesh founded Naked Pizza , 
 Nairobi ’ s premier fast-delivery all-natural pizza restaurant. He is also an 
active angel investor in the Kenyan start-up scene ,  having made investments in 
OkHi ,  BookNow ,  and EcoPallets. In addition ,  he is an independent director of 
Tropical Heat, a popular brand of snacks and spices, and is the President of the 
Kenya chapter of the Entrepreneurs’ Organization.  In May 2016, Ritesh suc-
cessfully sold Naked Pizza to Pizza Hut. 
 How would you describe the Kenyan “hustling” culture and its link 
to entrepreneurship? 
 R itesh : Th e Kenyan culture of hustling is rooted in doing anything 
and everything to make the extra buck or, in extreme cases, to make ends 
meet. Many professionals, from bankers and lawyers to entrepreneurs 
and doctors, have a side hustle, with the aim of generating additional 
income, ideally passively. Sometimes, these hustles turn out to be much 
larger opportunities than an individual’s main business or career and 
become his or her primary business. 
 M ikul :  Biashara , as it is termed in Kiswahili, has a deep root in our 
culture, and many Kenyans have an almost built-in spirit of entrepre-
neurship. Most Kenyans have a side hustle mainly to help them aff ord 
an aspirational lifestyle, whether it is to purchase a car or a mobile phone 
or to provide access to better education and health care for their families. 
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 What is your opinion of hustling? Is it a useful strategy for doing 
business in Kenya? What are the pros and cons from the entrepre-
neurial, employee, and investor perspectives? 
 M ikul : Having a side hustle is great in some aspects because it allows 
you to generate a substantial additional income. However, building a sig-
nifi cant brand presence and a scalable business models takes dedication 
and tenacity. As an investor, I would not be willing to fi nance an entrepre-
neur who is not willing to dedicate all of his or her time and eff orts to their 
main business. From an employer’s point of view, this entrepreneurial spirit 
can be very detrimental to the success of a business. No employer would 
be willing to waste company resources and paid time on an employee’s 
hustle unless they had something to gain, too.  Yummy has several team 
members who earn extra income through their own food blogs—and we 
have managed to set out a symbiotic relationship that benefi ts both par-
ties.  Yummy gains additional traffi  c through back links, and the bloggers 
build their knowledge and experience in the hospitality industry. But it is 
important to be candid and lay the ground rules from the outset. 
 R itesh : I actually think hustling is a distraction. It usually ends up 
meaning that you try a whole bunch of things until something works—
often without focus on anything except the short-term income gener-
ated. By nature, entrepreneurs have a lot going on in their heads with all 
they are doing. A side hustle, or business, if it can even be called that, 
is a distraction. For an employee, I think there are actual ethical issues 
with it, unless you are doing it 100 % in your free time—but in reality, 
we all know that never happens. If I am paying someone to be at work, 
I want their mind, body, and heart 100 % committed when they are at 
work. From an investor’s perspective, I would actually not invest with 
someone who had a side hustle, because to me, it means they are only 
thinking short-term. 
 Would you also describe yourself as a hustling entrepreneur? 
 R itesh : If it is the Kenyan defi nition, then no. But if by hustling you 
mean doing whatever it takes to get something done—which is what is 
required of an entrepreneur focused on his or her business—then yes. 
Start-ups require focus and 150 % of an entrepreneur’s time. Trying to 
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do a few things half-heartedly would mean that I would not be able to 
get anything done well. Having said that, I have been involved in a num-
ber of start-ups but have limited my involvement to the initial idea and 
ongoing advice, and have let the other co-founders run with it. 
 M ikul : I would say yes. But it has always been important to me to ensure 
that a competent team and strategy are in place before moving on to a new 
opportunity. Fairly early on, we realized that EatOut needed to achieve 
two main goals. Th e fi rst was to ensure that we were seen as the market 
leaders and were able to sustain our position. Th is meant diversifying our 
product portfolio to include offl  ine activities such as Nairobi Restaurant 
Week, the Taste Awards, and  Yummy . All these activities helped cement our 
position as an authority within the industry while increasing our revenues 
and profi ts. Th e company’s general manager oversees these projects, with 
little or no input from me—which has allowed me to concentrate on our 
second goal, introducing a more scalable transactional revenue model and 
expanding to new countries, starting with Rwanda and Uganda. We have 
recently launched a gift-voucher solution in Kenya and are actively work-
ing on pilots with several banks for mobile payments at restaurants. 
 How did you get into starting and investing in new (side) businesses? 
Would you consider those side hustles? 
 M ikul : One of the key challenges that many start-ups face in Kenya 
is developing trust. EatOut’s early success and its reputation as a mar-
ket leader and innovator allowed me to build a considerable network 
in the hospitality and technology sectors over the years. I therefore saw 
an opportunity to be able to “open doors” for other start-ups, giving 
them access to investors, partners, and collaborators. However, I am not 
actively involved in these businesses on a day-to-day level, so I do not 
consider them to be side hustles. 
 R itesh : Once an entrepreneur develops credibility, opportunities fl ow 
toward you—though this can also be the beginning of the end if your 
focus is diverted too much. In my case, building a successful business in a 
short timeframe meant lots of opportunities coming my way. But I have 
been judicious and have only ever invested in businesses to which there 
was some connection to my core business and where I could really add 
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value with my knowledge and network. I will never take an operating 
role, and I always wear the hat of the shareholder—so they are defi nitely 
not side hustles. 
 What is your main recommendation for the hustling entrepreneurs 
out there? 
 R itesh : Stop being involved in too many things. Seriously. Pick a 
business you are passionate about, can and want to do all day long, every 
day, and focus on it. Lack of focus limits your ability to develop knowl-
edge, deep relationships, and experience to ultimately become successful 
in your chosen area—and potentially limits your growth, success, and 
ability to achieve your full potential in life. 
 M ikul : I think the advice remains the same for all businesses. First, 
there should be a strong and diverse team who are all vested in the busi-
ness. In terms of skill sets, it is an advantage to have people who have 
good experience with legal, marketing, sales, and technology. In most 
cases, spending time in the corporate world helps to build experience 
and networks that can in turn help you determine whether an idea is 
worth pursuing. Second, start-ups should focus on execution. Our brain-
storming whiteboard sessions at EatOut are arguably the most fun part of 
what we do, and we come up with hundreds of new ideas every day. But 
the truth is that we have very limited time and resources, which is why 
it is important to focus and prioritize. Settling on a clear focus—your 
 product, your audience, your strategy—is critical from day one. Finally, 
there is no substitute for hard work. We try to have a lot of fun at the 
same time. Work hard and play hard, and the rewards will come. But it 
is also always important to remember that there is nothing wrong with 
trying and failing. If you are going to fail, make sure it happens quickly, 
pick yourselves up, and start again. 
 What was your biggest “Aha!” moment when it comes to doing 
 business in Africa? 
 M ikul : Th e biggest diff erence from developed markets (e.g., Silicon 
Valley) is that start-ups in our region have to focus on revenues at a fairly 
early stage. Kenyan investors look at profi tability above almost everything 
else. In other markets, growth potential based on users and traffi  c is much 
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more important, and it is common to see large investments in start-ups 
that have no revenue model in place. Second, the Kenyan market is rela-
tively small, and technology businesses that can expand regionally are 
more attractive for investors. 
 R itesh : Business is hard everywhere; it is even harder in Africa. 
Everything takes longer, costs more, and there is more bureaucracy than 
you can imagine. My “aha” is having enough cash to see through the 
increased costs and time taken, and developing a lot of patience when 
things happen  pole ,  pole [“slowly, slowly”]. 
 You have tested quite a few diff erent market opportunities. Can you 
give some examples? Why did some work out? And why did you 
decide not to pursue others? 
 M ikul : Our main goal with EatOut at the moment is to ensure that 
we have Number-One market share within the industry, and we have 
therefore explored many diff erent opportunities. Our magazine  Yummy 
and activities such as Nairobi Restaurant Week have done well to generate 
revenue and increase our presence as an industry authority. We recently 
decided to explore the e-gift voucher market, allowing consumers to pur-
chase and redeem digital gift vouchers securely online, tapping into a 
multi-billion-shilling industry (the shilling is the Kenyan currency) and 
providing easy gift solutions for the diaspora. In 2016, our aim is to have 
pop-up stores in high-traffi  c locations such as supermarkets and malls. 
On the other hand, we decided not to continue with an online restaurant 
delivery pilot due to the fact that there were already a number of start-ups 
concentrating on the same thing. We also felt that the market was simply 
not large enough to justify a heavy investment in building the logistics 
infrastructure and customer service team required to service it. 
 R itesh : We have tested a number of opportunities, from alcohol deliv-
ery and a mobile juice bar concept to providing third-party logistics to 
other consumer brands. Th e reasons why most of those concepts were not 
feasible as standalone businesses were mainly centered around two themes. 
 Number one was the size of market. As interesting as some of these busi-
nesses may have seemed on the surface, some of them just did not have 
a large enough customer base for the business to be sustainable. Let me 
426 M. Shah and R. Doshi
give you an example: We tried alcohol delivery to customers at home. It 
was a logical extension from the delivery of beer and wine at Naked Pizza 
that customers usually purchase alongside their food order. We saw a natu-
ral path to move into home delivery of alcohol, given that the customers 
trusted us, we had the infrastructure with bikes and storage facilities in 
place, and we had suffi  cient supplier relationships. In reality, we found that 
most middle-class consumers would prefer to “be seen” drinking their pre-
mium alcohol of choice in a public venue rather than enjoying it at home. 
Th e more affl  uent customers who were willing to consume premium alco-
hol in the comfort of their own homes either had the means to make own 
arrangements by sending their driver or simply had it in stock. Th e space 
that was left for us with customers who wanted premium alcohol delivery 
on demand was not large enough to justify a stand-alone business. 
 Number two was the willingness to pay. We piloted third-party last- 
mile logistics for a number of B2B players. Th ey all expected a premium 
service, which meant a rider who was well spoken, well versed in terms 
of maps, driving a reliable bike with a clean uniform and possessed a box 
that safeguarded the items from rain. Th at is all good. However, sadly 
they were not willing to pay the costs associate with that kind of qual-
ity service. We usually heard things like “But my  boda boda [motorcycle 
taxi] guy only charges me half the amount.” After fi ve months, with that 
mindset in place, we just had to pull the pilot. 
 Th ank you, Mikul and Ritesh! 
Th is chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ), which permits use, dupli-
cation, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit 
to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes 
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 In its brief history so far, the venture capital (VC) and private equity 
(PE) industry in East Africa has attracted a sizeable number of active 
participants, and investment activity is on the rise (EAVCA and KPMG 
 2015 ). Th is has been driven partly by the overall trend toward posi-
tive sentiments about the viability of Africa as a whole as an investment 
destination (Roxburgh et  al.  2010 ). Th e sustained positive economic 
growth of the continent over the past decade has generated some new-
found interest in the continent other than as a recipient for aid. Indeed, 
by some estimates, the total dollar value of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) (UNCTAD  2013 ; UNESCO  2013 ; Lautier and Moreaub  2012 ; 
M’Amanja and Morrissey  2006 ), infl ows to Africa now exceeds that of 
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offi  cial development assistance (ODA). Sy and Rakotondrazaka ( 2015 ) 
observed that there were only two countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in 
1990 that received greater FDI infl ows than ODA—Liberia and Nigeria. 
In 2012, 22 years later, 17 countries were receiving more FDI than ODA. 
 Early-stage venture funding through VC and PE fi nancing have been 
coming up as viable funding options for businesses alongside the traditional 
fi nancing avenues through commercial lenders (Deloitte  2015 ). According 
to an East Africa Venture Capital Association (EAVCA)–KPMG survey 
( 2015 ), 79 investment deals of this nature worth approximately USD800 
million were reported between 2007 and 2014 across East Africa (EAVCA 
 2014 ). An Intellicap ( 2015 ) report noted that VC funds have committed 
USD93 million since 2012 and that since 2010 PE investors have USD862 
million under management in Kenya alone (EAVCA and KMPG  2015 ). 
 What these statistics do not show is the fact that most general partners 
are in their fi rst-round funds and are not sure if they will be able to raise 
second-round funds. Th at said, we naturally expect that some learning will 
have taken place among the general partners in the course of investing in the 
region over the time period they have been operating. We set out to interview 
a number of VC and PE players in the industry with the objective of getting 
a sense of the current state of the industry and how its future might evolve. 
Right from the beginning, we found our respondents constantly alluding 
to the idea that in their experience some of the key attributes of the venture 
funding model commonly used—that of structuring a fund based on a part-
nership model between the general partners (GPs) who run the fund and the 
limited partners (LPs) who provide the investment capital (Tawiri  2010 ; Zider 
 1998 )—are not entirely suited to the East Africa context. Fund managers, 
for instance, thought the 7-to-12-year time span for a closed fund was not 
adequate and that the 2–3 % management fee was too low. 
 Th ese realizations led us to formulate our research question: Is there 
a right model for VC funding in East Africa? Further, it emerged in the 
course of our investigation that this question cannot be considered in 
isolation. Th e right model has to be considered in light of two key reali-
ties for VC investors in the region: constrained deal fl ow, which is a func-
tion of the nature of entrepreneurship in the region (e.g., the tendency 
for entrepreneurship in the region to be driven by necessity rather than 
opportunity), and a challenging exit environment. 
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 Literature Review 
 A 2010 report by McKinsey (Roxburgh et  al.  2010 ) showed Africa’s 
economy growing at an average pace of 4.9 % between 2000 and 2008. 
Th e East African Community (EAC) in particular—which comprises 
Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda—grew at an aver-
age pace of 6.2 % between 2004 and 2014 (Gigineishvili et al.  2014 ). 
Projections indicate that this growth is likely to be sustained in the short 
to medium term, because key economic indicators for the region, and 
the broader continent, are quite robust: a growing middle class and cor-
responding consumption patterns, rapid urbanization, stable (or stabiliz-
ing) governments, a large and growing proportion of youth who would 
provide labor, and so on. Eff orts to integrate the EAC countries economi-
cally under a common market while doing away with inhibitive trade and 
investment barriers could create a unifi ed market of more than 160 mil-
lion potential consumers (World Bank  2012 ). Perceptions about doing 
business in Africa have also changed considerably over time, becoming 
much more positive (EY  2015a ; Roxburgh et al.  2010 ). 
 It is in this general economic environment that PE and VC funding 
in East Africa have been developing. Buoyed by consistent growth and 
a favorable outlook, PE and VC in the region and the wider continent 
have developed progressively. Fundraising to invest specifi cally in Africa 
grew 24 % in 2014 over the previous year to USD4.1 billion (EY  2015b ). 
About USD1.6 billion was raised by the PE sector for the East Africa 
region between 2007 and 2014—7.3 % of a total USD22 billion targeted 
at Africa. Most funds were sized in the USD10 to USD50 million or 
USD100 to USD500 million range. Of the 79 deals worth approximately 
USD822 million reported within that time, 63  % were in Kenya and 
15 % were in Tanzania, including 27 % in agriculture, 14 % in fi nancial 
services, 11 % in fast-moving consumer goods, 10 % in information and 
communications technology (ICT), and 9 % in healthcare. Seventy of 
the 79 were below USD10 million in size. Th ere were 21 exits worth 
a combined value of USD260 million in the period, 43 % of them in 
fi nancial services. As in other frontier markets, the majority of funds were 
sourced from development fi nance institutions and high-net- worth indi-
viduals. Th e investors were mostly foreign, those from Europe accounting 
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for about 50 % of the total. Local investors from the East Africa region 
were only represented as a minority (EAVCA and KPMG  2015 ). 
 VC funding specifi cally in the technology sector in East Africa is an even 
more recent development and has to a large extent been focused on Kenya, 
which has gained prominence over the past seven years as a rising technology 
hub known as the Silicon Savannah. Total invested capital in tech start-ups 
across Africa more than doubled in 2015 to USD26.9 million from USD12 
million in 2014. Th e average capital secured per venture increased from 
USD129,348 to USD205,374 over the same period (VC4Africa  2015 ). 
 Earlier research (SAVCA-Monitor Group, SAVCA  2011 ) has shown that 
the cost of running a fund in Africa is generally quite high compared with 
that of other markets, a fact that has not been refl ected in compensation 
structures, which have more or less been borrowed “as is” from other experi-
ences of investing in developed markets. Th ere is a shortage of skilled talent 
for funds. Th e operating environment is also characterized by high competi-
tion for viable investments and a shortage of deal fl ow. GPs mostly have to 
deal with founder-led fi rms that need signifi cant business support from the 
investor to help them develop their governance, management, and opera-
tional capabilities to a level comparable to those that an investment-ready 
fi rm in the West would be adding to its cost base for funds and eating into 
its investment window. Furthermore, the deal intermediary and service pro-
vider ecosystem are relatively underdeveloped, meaning that GPs have had 
to do almost all the work, from sourcing deals to preparing them for exit. 
 Methods 
 In addition to secondary sources (i.e., industry reports and news articles) 
and the experiences of both authors in East Africa’s investment landscape, 
primary data were collected from interviews with representatives of six 
investment funds (see Table  14.1 below). Th e six were selected for the fact 
that they were involved in investments across the region and in invest-
ment prematurity stage ventures. It should be noted that the six were 
selected purely for these reasons and for their availability to participate. 
We cannot claim that they constituted a scientifi c sample of the popula-
tion of VC investors in the region. Data were collected by means of ques-
tionnaires administered through face-to-face interviews.
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 We investigated the following aspects: fund structure and remunera-
tion, team and roles, fundraising, deal sourcing and due diligence, invest-
ing, post-investment, and exit. Some of the investors invested as little 
as less than a hundred thousand dollars to start-up ventures, and others 
invested in the millions. In terms of their portfolios, several had invest-
ments across early-stage ventures through mature fi rms, where others 
were specialized. Moreover, our respondents invested in multiple coun-
tries and various sectors, including technology, healthcare, manufactur-
ing, and fi nancial services. Th e majority of the fi rms we spoke with are in 
the investment and early holding period of their funds. 
 Results 
 Four out of our six respondents stated that their funds were organized in 
the classic partnership structure. Two were organized as companies; one, 
a limited liability; and the other, limited by guarantee. Th e two limited 
companies were more focused on early-stage investing at the seed–start-
 up stages. All of the investment funds were incorporated outside East 
Africa, mostly in European countries. One of the companies was reg-
istered as a holding company in Europe with two separate entities in 
Kenya—a company limited by guarantee and a limited company. Th is 
was because the fi rm carried out both for-profi t and not-for-profi t activi-
ties. Th e other company was based in the Seychelles, “where it is easy to 
operate due to very low capital gains taxes and relative ease of set up,” as 
one our respondents noted. Most of the respondents cited tax benefi ts 
as the main consideration in deciding where to incorporate. One fund 
incorporated in the Netherlands noted that the country has favorable 
legislation for funds; it is tax-transparent, meaning that individual inves-
tors are taxed instead of the fund. 
 Cost repeatedly came up as a major concern for industry players. Th is 
led to our asking about the remuneration of GPs. We found that the 
partnership-based funds, as expected, took the more or less standard 
2–3 % management fee. However, all our respondents noted that operat-
ing expenses in East Africa have tended to be higher than average. One 
respondent went as far as suggesting that management fees should be in 
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the 5–6 % range. In addition, the partnership-based funds followed the 
standard ten-year (maximum) lifecycle from starting the fund to winding 
it down. Our respondents felt that fi nding suitable investments in this 
region took much more time and eff ort than average, calling the standard 
ten-year life of a fund into question. One of our respondents noted, for 
instance, that on average, it takes a year from identifying an opportunity 
to invest in and closing the deal. Another noted that the longest it had 
taken them from initiation to close was three years for one of their deals, 
explaining that “in the best case scenario, it takes us three to four months 
from identifying the opportunity to concluding an investment. In the 
worst case scenario it can be up to three years.” 
 Th e respondents noted that, when it came to fundraising, the vast 
majority of investment funds in the industry were foreign—typically devel-
opment fi nance institutions, as is the case in most frontier markets. Th e 
dearth of local capital, even from local pension funds, was a major concern. 
Koome and Kipanga ( 2013 ) note that at the time of their research, no local 
pension had invested in PE. However, more recently the PE fi rm Ascent 
Capital of Bangalore, India, managed to draw Kenya Power Pension Fund 
and Nation Media Group Pension Fund into their Sh8 billion fundrais-
ing (Gachiri  2015 ). It was noted that high-net-worth individuals in the 
region were mostly unfamiliar with the asset class and were more comfort-
able with traditional investments—real estate, shares, and bonds—that 
are perceived as being less risky. New legislation in Kenya (specifi cally 
the Retirement Benefi ts Authority [RBA] Act and the Insurance Act that 
govern the pension-fund and insurance industries), for instance, allows 
pension funds to allocate funds to alternative assets, although there is still 
low uptake among pension funds (FSD Kenya  2008 ). 
 Generally speaking, our respondents felt that the standard partnership- 
based fund structure was not well adapted to the regional context and 
boxed them in. However, we also noted that LPs are accustomed to this 
structure and that GPs have little chance of altering it. One respondent 
proposed that his fi rm would consider using an investment vehicle, such 
as a holding company, in the future instead of using the partnership fund 
structure. Th is would solve the problem of investment horizons and partly 
solve the exit issues, because the funds would exit only when good avenues 
arose instead of exiting in accordance with preset time limits. Additionally, 
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it would remove the need for explicitly set management fees based on the 
amount of funds raised, thereby also addressing the cost issue. 
 All our respondents reported that they maintained the smallest teams 
they could manage with (usually fewer than 10 members) in order to 
minimize operating costs. Th ey tended to hire skilled individuals who 
had extensive work experience that could encompass multiple role expec-
tations. One respondent said, “We have two people who are dedicated 
to sourcing deals. Th e same two need to be technical enough to sell the 
proposition,” referring to the fact that even the staff ers doing work that 
ordinarily did not need technical skills still needed these skills in order to 
take on the additional tasks. As another noted, “Everyone on our team is 
involved in sourcing deals.” In addition to the typical functions covered in 
a fund (sourcing, selection, due diligence, valuation, and negotiation), we 
found two peculiar characteristics among our respondents: First, because 
of cost constraints, the funds (instead of the portfolio companies) had to 
do a large part of the work themselves to get a deal to its fi nancial close 
internally. For instance, one of our respondents indicated that his fi rm 
handled all aspects of due diligence internally. Second, the funds tended 
to be highly involved in the operations of their portfolio companies. Th e 
reason given for this was that the GPs typically had to deal with founder- 
led fi rms that needed signifi cant business support from the investor to 
help them develop their governance, reporting, management, and opera-
tional capabilities. Funds used a mix of in-house resources and exter-
nal consultants to support their portfolio companies. One respondent 
said, “We sent experienced consultants to the diff erent companies to help 
operationally. We also did a lot on the board.” In addition, to minimize 
costs, the funds preferred to have regional offi  ces in one location rather 
than multiple offi  ces. “Having satellite offi  ces is hard. Teams tend to be 
small,” said one respondent. Another said, “You operate where you know 
best.” Th is ends up aff ect deal sourcing, as we shall see. 
 When it came to deal sourcing, the underlying theme across the spec-
trum was the highly relationship-based nature of the industry. As one 
fund manager said, “Right from deal sourcing, it’s a very network- sourced 
industry.” Th e funds relied heavily on social networks to source their deals 
and tended not to turn to intermediaries, such as investment advisory 
fi rms. “We don’t use intermediaries to source our deals. Most of them place 
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their own interests above those of the fund. Th ey rarely give us what we are 
looking for,” one respondent remarked. Another respondent noted that 
the quality of intermediaries was not as high as in more mature markets. 
In addition, the respondent felt that many times, deals that came through 
intermediaries had been “shopped around,” that is, had already been pre-
sented to multiple investors in the same form. Th e clear preference among 
our respondents was to build strong personal networks by building trust 
(e.g., through information exchange, pro-bono work, membership in key 
associations, personal attendance of domestic conferences, and recipro-
cal action) and a good reputation (depending on multiple factors, such 
as the performance of investees, condition of investor–investee relation-
ships, degree of embeddedness in the business community, and long-term 
interest in the region) such that deals could confi dently be referred to the 
respondent. Th is kind of “social capital,” however, takes signifi cant time 
and patience to develop and can make things harder for new funds mak-
ing their initial foray into a region. Some funds used the media to attract 
deals. One noted that one of their best marketing tools was contributing 
articles to newspapers or publicizing their investments, which would lead 
to potential investees contacting them. 
 On average, the funds ended up investing in only about one out of every 
hundred deal opportunities. Th e issue of time in getting deals to fi nancial 
close was often raised. One respondent noted, “It takes long to build the 
fi rst deal. You need time to network so that you can move; the fi rst deal is a 
big thing in this case. People need to know if you are serious.” Th e respon-
dent proceeded to explain that although it is in the investor’s interest to put 
in the work in order to help increase the value of the company ahead of 
the exit, entrepreneurs looked at this diff erently. Th e majority knew they 
needed help to build up their businesses and took this positively, but others 
perceived it as the investors meddling. As such, the respondent noted that 
the buy-in of the entrepreneur is critical from the start. 
 As for investment instruments, we found that investors used instru-
ments similar to those used in developed markets—with several altera-
tions. One of the accelerators we spoke with, for instance, off ered 
training, coaching, business development, and support services to a 
cohort of ventures but did not take a stake upfront. Instead, at the end of 
the accelerator period, the investors selected the most promising ventures 
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and converted the value of their support to a predetermined shareholding 
if the investee company was able to raise funds in a specifi ed amount of 
time. Another interesting model we found was revenue-based fi nancing, 
in which the investor took a royalty on sales as part of the return toward 
debt repayment until the debt and interest were paid off . Structures such 
as these ensure that in case the investment does not perform as expected, 
the funds can protect their downside risk to some extent. 
 As for deal fl ow, our respondents cited the exit as the most challenging 
aspect of investing in East Africa. Although trade sales and sales to strategic 
buyers were the most promising exit avenues in the market, it was pointed 
out that there were not many big fi rms locally that were in the market for 
acquisitions. Illiquid public markets have further added to the exit chal-
lenge, in the sense that without a fi nal exit through public markets, the 
chain has no termination point for larger investors to harvest value—which 
creates a scarcity of buyers for VC projects (see Fig.  14.1 below).
 Discussion 
 Venture funding in developed markets, particularly in the West, has sev-
eral decades of history behind it (Gordon  2012 ; Hsu and Kenney  2004 ). 
VC and PE activity in East Africa, by contrast, is a very recent import 
and is still in its formative stages. Th e Western model has been refi ned, 
as it were, over the years and decades through the experiences of practi-
tioners and other stakeholders, such as policy makers, to suit the context 
and characteristics of venturing in that context (Ferrary and Granovetter 
 2009 ). Further, the model has seen widespread uptake and been exported 











 Fig. 14.1  Challenges in the current exit environment in East Africa 
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is not guaranteed to succeed, given the new contexts’ potentially unique 
dynamics, especially in terms of the nature of local entrepreneurship, 1 as 
we shall see shortly in the case of East Africa. Indeed as our respondents 
noted, there are substantial diffi  culties with the application of the Western 
partnership-based fund model in its strict form in the East African con-
text. Compensation structure (Gompers and Lerner  1999 ; Litvak  2009 ) 
and fund life were particularly called into question. 
 We found that a lack of signifi cant amounts of local participation in 
venture funding has been a major constraint for the industry. Probable 
local investors tend to prioritize for security and to be averse to risk and the 
unknown. Yet they have a much better grasp of local dynamics and could 
be of great value both on the investor side and the entrepreneur side. On 
the investor side, local investors can bring local know-how and understand-
ing of the local norms and nuances of doing business as well as the long-
term view needed for VC and private capital. Furthermore, they can add to 
the perception of the fund’s local credibility, enhancing trust among local 
entrepreneurs. On the entrepreneur side, local investors, particularly those 
who have been successful in business in the past, can bring local market 
knowledge, contacts, and business linkages (Mäkelä and Maula  2008 ). Th is 
kind of support is especially critical for inexperienced early-stage founders 
and would be hard for a purely foreign player to match. 
 In contrast to US pension funds, East Africa’s pension funds scarcely 
invest in VC.  But it appears that commercial banks may be starting 
to dabble in it (Black and Gilson  1999 ). In the recent past, we have 
seen some commercial banks in Kenya getting involved in the tech 
start-up arena through partnerships (e.g., Chase Bank with the Nairobi 
Innovation Hub [iHub] [Jackson  2015a ; Chase Bank  2015 ] and Barclays 
Bank, which has run an accelerator for fi nancial technology start-ups 
in collaboration with a VC investor [Jackson  2015b ]). We see this as 
potentially pointing to possible involvement in VC at some point, and 
we foresee that pensions will remain skeptical about VC in the short to 
medium term. Positive returns from the earlier-mentioned investment 
by two pension funds in Ascent Capital could, however, stimulate more 
interest by pension funds. 
1  See Bruton et al. ( 2004 ) for a similar study in East Asia. 
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 Cost and ease of doing business in East Africa have clearly been impedi-
ments to VC funding. Th ese factors vary quite signifi cantly across the indi-
vidual countries in the region. According to the 2015 World Bank Doing 
Business Ranking (World Bank  2015 ), Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, and 
Tanzania ranked 62nd, 108th, 122nd, and 139th globally, respectively, in 
cost and ease of doing business. In terms of enforcing contracts, Tanzania 
ranked 64th, Uganda ranked 78th, Kenya ranked 102nd, and Rwanda 
ranked 127th. For investors hungry for deal fl ow and scouring the region 
to fi nd deals, this situation can be daunting. Corruption presents itself as 
another major stumbling block, adding to the cost and complexity of doing 
business (Smarzynska and Wei  2000 ). Moreover, the East African bloc 
is a combination of fi ve countries with diff erent norms, legislation, and 
entrepreneurial cultures (Autio et al.  2013 ). Th is means that VC and PE 
focusing on fi rms in the region need to open local satellite offi  ces or incur 
signifi cant travel costs that further increase the costs of doing business. 
 Th e region’s rather lengthy lag times between identifying and making 
an investment can be partly explained by a lack of trust and understand-
ing of VC and PE on the part of entrepreneurs. In a market where inves-
tors—mostly foreign capital—are seeking local entrepreneurs, investors 
need to take time to “court” entrepreneurs and convince them to accept 
capital, not least because business owners in the region are more familiar 
with and accustomed to fi nancing their work through commercial loans 
instead of VC.  In addition, we have seen that a number of businesses 
that investors get involved in tend to need a lot of work to bring them 
up to standard in terms of eff ective operations and governance. Th e need 
for business support is a crosscutting feature of businesses in East Africa 
(Omidyar  2013 ), not just those that receive VC. However, with a lack of 
alternatives to provide such support, investors are placed in a situation 
where they have to take over this role in order to help develop the venture 
for future exit. Th is creates additional demands on the fund manager’s 
time that could otherwise have been spent on other aspects of running 
the fund. It also requires a more active engagement by the fund manager 
in potential investees and a broader knowledge base to go beyond purely 
administering an investment fund. When the fund manager opts to bring 
in professional consultants, even more additional costs are incurred, fur-
ther straining management fees. 
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 Th e need for heavy post-investment involvement means fund manag-
ers getting in the market have to be prepared to play roles that go well 
above and beyond the call of duty for their typical role. Th ey have to 
take on tasks related to coaching, mentoring, and training—becoming, 
in other words, enmeshed in the operational activities of their portfo-
lio companies and signifi cantly blurring the lines between investor and 
investee. Th is has an impact in turn on the composition of the fund’s 
team. Compared with typical fund teams in mature markets, funds oper-
ating locally require people with operational business skills and immense 
contextual market knowledge; the alternative is to hire consultants. 
However, involvement in investee operations can create the potential for 
confl icts with entrepreneurs who are only interested in the fund’s money, 
wishing to run their businesses as they see fi t and to avoid the percep-
tion, especially among start-ups, that equity investors will take away their 
control in the fi rm—with the result that they become skeptical of VC. 2 
 In our opinion, the lack of an exit avenue to public markets will 
remain the case in the short to medium term. According to data com-
piled by PricewaterhouseCoopers ( 2014 ), Kenya’s stock market, the 
largest by market capitalization in the East Africa region, had only fi ve 
initial public off erings from 2010 to 2014, raising a total of USD157 
million; Tanzania had four, raising USD16 million; and Rwanda and 
Uganda each had only two raising, USD91 million and USD69 million, 
 respectively. Some exchanges, such as the Nairobi Securities Exchange, 
have introduced market segments targeted at small and medium enter-
prises with lower and less stringent listing thresholds, but these have yet 
to really kick off  and become vibrant enough as exit avenues. Liquid 
stock markets will draw in larger investors that will create demand from 
earlier VC (Black and Gilson  1999 ). As more multinationals seek entry 
into markets across Africa, investors that position themselves strategically 
through their holdings could fi nd potential buyers (see Fig.  14.2 below).
 On the other hand, VC is driven by the supply of high-quality entre-
preneurship, creating a steady pipeline of deals for venture funders. Th e 
2  See De Clercq et al.  2006 for a fascinating overview of the VC’s world through the lens of the 
entrepreneur, and Collewaert and Fassin  2013 on the possible confl icts in investor–investee 
relations. 
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region is not lacking or behind the curve in entrepreneurial dynamism, 
as evidenced by Kenya’s noted “hustling” culture, in which one can often 
have a full-time job and one or more other income-generating activities 
(usually not formally organized businesses) that are pursued on a deal-
by- deal basis (Simons  2012 ). Much of the entrepreneurship that exists in 
the region (as in much of the rest of Africa) for those in “full-time” entre-
preneurship, is characterized as necessity entrepreneurship (Giacomin et 
al.  2011 ), that is, as a means of survival and a way of earning an income, 
having failed to secure other means of making a living or supplementing 
one’s income—as distinct from conventional entrepreneurship driven by 
the identifi cation of an opportunity (Omidyar  2013 ). Muller and Amit 
( 1995 ) referred to “push” versus “pull” entrepreneurship: Push entrepre-
neurs start ventures out of some kind of dissatisfaction with their current 
state, not as a result of their entrepreneurial spirit. Pull entrepreneurs are 
motivated by the attractiveness of the new venture in and of itself. Muller 
and Amit concluded that pull entrepreneurs are more successful than push 
entrepreneurs. Th e latter, thus, do not create opportunities as valuable for 
VC as intentional, opportunity-driven pull entrepreneurship does. 
 Th e problem of entrepreneurship supply is really about developing a 
culture of entrepreneurship, specifi cally the propensity for risk taking 
and a tolerance for failure. Nothing short of more and better-quality 
entrepreneurship will provide a lasting solution to the challenge of 
deal fl ow. Th is new kind of culture cannot emerge instantaneously. 
Cultures develop over time, and once entrenched are diffi  cult to alter. 
Th e fact that entrepreneurship as a career seems to have gained general 
acceptance (Omidyar  2013 ) is encouraging. However, the hallmarks of 
entrepreneurship culture—again, the propensity for risk taking and a 
tolerance for failure—have yet to emerge suffi  ciently across the board. 
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investors as they have to expend less time and money to fi nd suitable 
investees. Better entrepreneurship will also mean that investors will 
not need to be so highly involved in their investees’ businesses, cutting 
costs further. 
 In a bid to bridge access to fi nance, governments in the region have taken 
initiative to create funds—usually subsidized loan funds such as Rwanda’s 
Hanga Umurimo (meaning “create your own job”) Fund, the Uwezo 
(meaning “enable”) Fund in Kenya, and the National Entrepreneurship 
Development Fund in Tanzania—to support entrepreneurs. However, we 
feel that their eff orts would better be directed at initiatives that provide 
entrepreneurs business support, emphasizing practical entrepreneurship 
skills in curricula and adapting education systems to develop entrepre-
neurialism in students from an early age. In fact, some have already ques-
tioned the possible role of such subsidy programs in eroding—rather than 
promoting—the entrepreneurial edge of benefi ciaries. 3 
 Th us, we fi nd VC in East Africa in a dilemma: on the one hand, a lim-
ited supply of high-value deals and, on the other hand, a challenging exit 
environment. Compounding this dilemma are the issues of time, cost, 
and lack of local capital providers for VC investing. Figure  14.3 summa-
rizes these challenges for VC in East Africa.
 Recommendations 
 While the general idea of a partnership-based fund may still hold in 
East Africa, the specifi c characteristics of the partnership—the man-
agement fee percentage, carried interest, fund life, team composition, 
investment instruments, and so on—do not necessarily apply in the 
same way across diff erent contexts. Nevertheless, this is the fund struc-
ture that foreign LPs, which constitute the main source of investment 
funds in the region, are familiar and comfortable with. Altering the 
modalities of the structure signifi cantly might be desirable but is not 
feasible in the immediate term. 
3  See  http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2014-09-18/181038/ for an intriguing recent 
article on whether government gives too much to start-ups. 
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 As such, we recommend that fund managers  adopt a lean ,  start-up – like 
mentality of frugality and maximize resources as best as they can to oper-
ate eff ectively in the region. Joint ventures between funds investing in the 
same sectors can increase their geographic coverage, split the burden in 
terms of cost and eff ort to fi nd and make investments, and potentially 
help them get into bigger deals. Th is can be a good strategy for investors 
coming into the market for the fi rst time, because it can help reduce the 
time it takes to close their fi rst deal. 
 Fund managers should also  consider alternative structures : evergreen 
funds where the fund has an indefi nite fund life and a periodic inbuilt 
liquidity event to cater to LPs who would like to exit and to management, 
to calculate carried interest. Evergreen funds also have the advantage of 
keeping the gems in the portfolio within the fund while doing away with 
layered management fees that can be quite costly for the LP.  Another 
structure that could be pursued to address the time issue is the setting 
up of investment holding companies in which capital providers can buy 
shares. As indicated earlier, there would be no management fees or exit 
stipulations. Fund managers would be remunerated as the company’s 
agents, and the holding company would hold investments as long as it 
deems necessary and exit at the opportune time. 
Challenges of Venture Capital in East Africa
Cost & time constraints limiting
returns
Lack of local capital providers
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 In terms of encouraging local capital, we see great potential in  bring-
ing corporations into VC either as suppliers of capital to funds or through 
in-house managed funds. As it stands, established fi rms in East Africa are 
not known to be very active in corporate venturing. Safaricom Limited in 
Kenya has been a pioneer in this direction, having set up its Safaricom Spark 
Fund that focuses on investments in tech start-ups. 4 We envision that estab-
lished corporations investing in and working with young enterprises could 
bring in the rigor of administering an established enterprise. Furthermore, 
the enterprises could gain competitive advantage from being exposed to 
the corporation’s internal resources and market. For the corporation itself, 
the innovation associated with start-ups could result in new product lines. 
Second, local savings and investment groups, known as chamas, could be 
another source of capital. 5 Some chamas command sizeable funds that could 
be directed to VC activity. Th e challenge with the majority of chamas is 
their lack of investment sophistication; most stick to the well-understood 
areas of real estate and stocks, security being more attractive to them than 
high returns. Th e long-term horizon of VC investments does not sit well 
with chamas either. Th at said,  structuring funds as investment holding com-
panies, as suggested earlier, could be attractive to chamas, because the idea 
of buying shares in a holding company is familiar, and in fact some larger 
chamas attract members by issuing shares in the group. 
 We see also two additional interesting avenues that could be explored 
to improve the entrepreneurship supply:  introduce venture builders and 
search funds . Venture builders are outfi ts that create start-ups internally 
using shared resources, develop them, and then spin them off  (as distinct 
from accelerators, which solicit external entrepreneurs and ventures). We 
are familiar with at least one venture builder—Brave Ventures—that is 
in its formative stages in Kenya. 6 Search funds, by contrast, have inves-
tors in the fund fi nancially supporting an entrepreneur’s eff orts to locate, 
acquire, manage, and grow an existing privately held company. To our 
knowledge, there is only one active search fund in the region (Kolarova 
et al.  2014 ). However, these two avenues cannot really create new entre-
4  See  http://www.safaricom.co.ke/spark/ and  http://disrupt-africa.com/2015/11/sendy-named-1st-
safaricom-spark-venture-fund-investee/ 
5  For a comprehensive review, see KAIG ( 2014 ). 
6  See  https://braveventurelabs.com/ for more details. 
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preneurs at scale. Only a thriving opportunity-driven entrepreneurship 
culture will produce the kind of deal fl ow investors are looking for. 
 On the matter of exits: Funds could explore  weaving in self-liquidating 
securities . A fund could, for instance, invest in a mix of high-interest- 
yielding loans and equity. Th is would ensure that the equity portion 
does not need to exit at signifi cant levels for the target returns to be met 
(hence increasing the likelihood of exit) while at the same time, return-
ing some cash to the investors before the fi nal exit event. Gilson and 
Black (1999) suggested that a solution for the lack of active local stock 
markets for VC to exit to, while avoiding the time and eff ort needed to 
develop local markets, would be to turn to external markets in the way 
Israeli ventures have found an avenue through US capital markets. In 
the same manner, creating avenues for East Africa’s ventures to  list on 
more mature stock markets on the continent —such as the Johannesburg 
AltX—could be worth exploring. 
 In terms of future research, we feel that the cultural eff ects of invest-
ing in East Africa need further investigation. In particular, the Kenyan 
hustling culture described earlier has been a stumbling block to foreign 
investors, who feel that entrepreneurs should be ready and willing to drop 
everything else in order to focus 100 % on their venture—an obstacle 
that has also turned many entrepreneurs away from seeking investment, 
knowing that this would be required of them. (See Eskor John’s chapter 
in this book on portfolio entrepreneurship.) Th e issue is further com-
pounded by the fact that foreigners are quite active and getting more 
so over time in Kenya’s start-up scene. Th is is inevitable in a globalized 
world. Foreigners come with a knack born out of experience for iden-
tifying and seizing opportunities and, through established networks, 
 gathering the resources to launch and grow ventures—easily bypassing 
locals. If some of the stumbling blocks to the development of a vibrant 
start-up ecosystem are cultural in nature and changing culture takes time, 
how will local founders stack up against their counterparts who are com-
ing in with the skills and experience? 
 Another area that could be investigated further is the intermediaries’ 
space—that is, which aspects of VC are most in need of intermediation 
and how can this be developed? A strong intermediary network would, 
for instance, shorten the amount of time, eff ort, and associated cost 
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required by investors to source for deals. Yet another aspect that could 
be interesting to research further would be to benchmark the risk profi le 
for investing in East Africa against that of other markets and those of the 
individual countries. Is it generally more risky to invest in Tanzania or 
in Uganda, for instance? And if so, why? And how can the risk be mini-
mized? Th is can help investors better focus their eff orts and help govern-
ments make better interventions to promote entrepreneurship and VC. 
 Conclusion 
 To summarize: We found that the high cost of operating a fund in the 
region and the length of time it takes to make an investment are the top-
most concerns among fund managers. Further, fund managers are called 
upon to take on roles, such as acting as a mentor and business coach to 
investees, that are not typical of fund management. Fund managers have to 
expend their own time or that of their staff  to support investees or spend 
money to hire consultants to do so. Th e dearth of local investors in VC 
stood out, and we noted that the industry would be better off  with more of 
this. In addition, the surrounding issues of deal fl ow and exit were identi-
fi ed as being pertinent. Th ese may not be exactly in the realm of the “right 
model” in terms of fund structures, but they inevitably have an impact on 
what structure works best. We also found that the industry is heavily depen-
dent on social networks rather than intermediaries to source investments. 
 We conclude that the key aspects needed to increase the chances of 
success for existing funds and new classical partnership-styled funds 
making their initial foray into the region are the following:  Fund 
managers need to adopt a lean, start-up—like approach to fund 
management and investing, gain a keen understanding of and take 
into consideration the nature of entrepreneurship in the region, and 
be ready to take on a far more active role in the business than fund 
manager typically do—while maintaining amicable relations with the 
founders and owners. Further, we recommend that fund managers 
explore new structures to circumvent cost and time constraints, such 
as investment holding companies and evergreen funds. To tackle the 
issues of deal fl ow, we propose that governments in the region should 
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focus on entrepreneurship education and business, instead of on pro-
viding subsidized loans. We drew attention to venture builders and 
search funds as having potential to create investment-worthy ventures. 
As to successful exits, we proposed opening up avenues to more liq-
uid markets by way of external markets, much as Israeli ventures have 
found an avenue through US capital markets, as a way of circumvent-
ing illiquid regional markets. 
 In the end, then,  is there a right model for venture funding in East Africa ? 
Not yet. But we believe that it will emerge in the years ahead—as VCs 
continue to learn to adapt to the context and take into account the unique 
characteristics of venturing in the region. 
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 Conversation #14 
 Creating the PayPal Mafi a 
of East Africa 
 Ben Lyon of Kopo Kopo 
 Ben Lyon  co-founded Kopo Kopo in 2010 and sits currently on the Board of 
Directors. Earlier, he studied economics and international studies at Rhodes 
College in Memphis, Tennessee, where he specialized in informal economics 
and microfi nance. Ben has served in various roles while at Kopo Kopo, from 
Head of Product to VP of Marketing and CEO. He has operational experience 
in multiple markets throughout Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Find Ben on 
Twitter @bmlyon, and check out his company at www.kopokopo.com. 
 What is the story behind Kopo Kopo? And why did you decide to 
start in Kenya? 
 We—Dylan, Tom, and I—co-founded Kopo Kopo fi ve years ago in 
Seattle, Washington, as a Delaware C corporation. Dylan and I moved to 
Nairobi in late 2010 and lived here for four years. 
 Th e reason we came here was because of the ubiquity of mobile money. 
Our background was all in microfi nance, and we had a hunch there was 
a business angle and a microfi nance angle in mobile money that hadn’t 
been fully exploited. Today that’s diff erent, because almost all microfi -
nance institutions (MFIs) in Kenya use mobile money for disbursement 
and collection to some degree. 
 In our early days, we wanted to help MFIs integrate mobile money 
with their core banking systems. We quickly found that this wasn’t the 
best idea—the reason being that microfi nance systems and processes aren’t 
standardized. MFIs can take ages to make a business decision, and they 
are highly bureaucratic and risk-averse, so they don’t change. Change is a 
frightening thing, so they are using lots of disparate legacy technologies, 
and there isn’t a real understanding or desire to fundamentally change 
that technology to catch up with the times. 
 Would you say that’s only typical for the MFI sector or for most SMEs 
in Kenya? 
 It’d be most SMEs. Fiber cables just came a few years ago, and so the 
Internet hasn’t fully reached all businesses yet, but you do see this massive 
growth in Android devices and 3G connections. MFIs are not at the front 
of the adoption curve. Th ey are not your early adopter. We found this 
quickly and pivoted to focus on retailers. By retailers, we mean a barber 
shop, a salon, a general trader, somewhere where you’re paying for goods 
and services to the person in front of you. 
 In early 2012, we launched as the world’s fi rst merchant aggregator of 
mobile money services. In essence, we were to Safaricom’s M-PESA what 
Square was to Chase Paymentech in the U.S. 
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 Safaricom is the issuer of M-PESA (Kiswahili for “mobile money”), 
the largest mobile money service in the world. When we entered the 
market, the majority of Kenyan adults had M-PESA on their phones, 
but less than one percent of businesses formally accepted it. So imagine 
if you were walking around with a payment card in your wallet but you 
couldn’t fi nd anywhere to pay with it. Th e utility of that card would 
be diminished signifi cantly. So we said to Safaricom, “Let us help you 
acquire merchants so people can pay for everyday goods and services with 
M-PESA.” We were the fi rst to do that in the mobile money industry, and 
we are currently the largest third party doing it. 
 Why did you decide to incorporate in the U.S. ? 
 We incorporated in the U.S. because we are Americans and planned 
to raise money from U.S. investors. For tech startups in the U.S., you 
either incorporate in your home state, in the state of your investor(s), or 
in Delaware as a C corporation. For a U.S. technology investor, that’s kind 
of the gold standard. So all lawyers in the U.S. are educated or taught on 
Delaware Case Law. C corporations can raise money from local and inter-
national investors. Th ey have good board protections etc. So because we 
were raising money in the U.S., we incorporated in Delaware and have a 
branch in Kenya rather than a subsidiary. All of our shares are domiciled in 
Delaware, and that’s again for investors. If we had a subsidiary, then we’d 
have shares sitting in Kenya, and that can complicate things in an exit. 
 Th e company was designed to be enticing and relatable to the investor 
and also kind of designed from the beginning as a technology company to 
be prepared in the event of an exit. So if someone wanted to acquire us, if we 
wanted to list on a stock exchange, that’s how investors get their money back. 
If you want to get investment, you have to be prepared. It’s not just what’s the 
product, what’s the opportunity, what’s the problem you solve, or how big is 
it? It’s also, how will I get my money back, and how long will it take, because 
they are not charitable organizations. So if they invest in you, on year three 
of their funds, they have seven years to get their money back. And so they are 
thinking in terms of an exit timeline from the very moment you shake hands. 
So you need to have a structure that accommodates that. 
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 How about your employees? How do you engage them? 
 Building Kopo Kopo is a mission, not a job. And by mission, I mean 
a higher calling—something both important and meaningful that is 
greater than our individual selves. We wanted a compensation package 
that refl ects that, and we wanted everyone to be aligned toward the same 
outcome. Every employee has a stake in the company’s future— engineers, 
sales personnel, drivers, janitors,  everyone . 
 Th e way it works is that every new employee signs an Employee Stock 
Option Agreement that entitles them to purchase shares at a strike price 
in the event of an acquisition or IPO. We also pay competitive salaries, so 
there aren’t any real trade-off s. It’s the best of both worlds. 
 Some time back I heard you talk about the “PayPal Mafi a of East 
Africa.” What makes it so valuable? 
 Silicon Valley is both ecosystem and mindset. Th e ecosystem is a func-
tion of mature capital markets, supportive institutions, and experienced 
entrepreneurs. It’s common to see successful entrepreneurs in Silicon 
Valley become investors, and for good reason: Th ey off er capital and, 
more importantly, empathy and expertise. Look for example at all of the 
consumer Internet companies you know today, the big ones, Facebook, 
Twitter, Foursquare, etc. Most of them have PayPal employees invested 
in them. So when PayPal IPOed, it made a huge number of millionaires, 
and now those employees are seeding entire generations of investment 
and starting new companies. You see it in 500 Startups, too. I mean, it’s 
all over the place—Peter Th iel with Palantir, Elon Musk with SpaceX and 
Tesla. Th ese are all PayPal people. We want to see that same ecosystem 
develop in East Africa. 
 Specifi cally, we talk about building the “PayPal Mafi a of East Africa” 
because we want our team to become the fi rst batch of entrepreneur- 
investors in the region. Th eir experience building a company and with-
standing the ebbs and fl ows of entrepreneurship are a real and lasting asset. 
 What’s happened here so far is that diff erent parts of the ecosystem are 
developing parallel to one another. You have the incubators like iHub, 
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Nailab, iLab Africa, m:lab East Africa, and all the accelerators. You have 
angel investors starting to come from other markets. And this is all 
 happening at the same time. What hasn’t happened yet is there haven’t 
been many successful exits from the technology community because it’s 
so young. And because of that, you don’t have many fi rst-generation 
tech entrepreneurs that are wealthy enough to invest in the next genera-
tion. So we need a big exit, and then we need the members of that com-
munity to become the PayPal Mafi a. Th at’s the missing element. 
 Five years from now, I’d love to see our earliest employees behind the 
biggest startups on the continent. Th at’s my personal vision of success. 
 How essential are investors from Africa to realize that vision? 
 I don’t think it’s about creating African investors or Silicon Valley 
investors or European investors. I think it’s about learning a skill and 
paying that skill forward irrespective of region or nationality. We built a 
company from the ground up in Nairobi. Th at’s what we know. As we’ve 
grown, we’ve seeded partnerships and cut our teeth throughout the con-
tinent. So I’m not on a mission to create “African investors”—I’m on a 
mission to create entrepreneur-investors that know their markets better 
than anyone else. 
 Should ICT ventures aim at becoming strategically valuable for a for-
eign buyout, reach for an international IPO, or simply not worry 
about it because other things matter? What is your strategy? 
 Th ere’s a saying that “companies are bought, not sold.” I think that’s 
true. Our main priority has been to build a big, defensible company. 
With defensible I mean that we’re in the business of digging moats to 
protect our castle from attack. A company that is not defensible cannot 
withstand attack, or direct competition. In other words, to be defensible 
means that you have to capture a market segment quickly, patent some 
kind of unique IP, or jump over a material barrier to entry. Defensible 
companies are hard to replicate or attack. 
 We’ve made mistakes along the way in terms of prioritizing incorrectly. 
For example, we scaled prematurely. Specifi cally, we hired for the business 
Conversation #14: Ben Lyon of Kopo Kopo 457
that our projections said we would have, not the business that our cash 
position dictated we actually had. We spent too much too quickly, and 
then we missed our targets. Another example is that we should have hired 
a chief fi nancial offi  cer or head of fi nance as early as 2013 or 2014 but 
only fi lled this role in late 2015. 
 In retrospect, I think we would have been more successful in 
the capital markets, if we had someone strong in the finance role. 
Despite these setbacks, our strategic goal has always been to build a 
big, defensible company. If you do that correctly, then there’s a ready 
exit path. 
 How have you managed the tension between openness versus 
closed-ness when it comes to broadcasting information about your 
company? 
 We’ve probably been  too open, insofar as we’ve always broadcasted our 
work. We’ve blogged about our work on the Kopo Kopo blog. We’ve also 
shared insights through industry blogs (e.g. CGAP, GSMA, and FSD 
Kenya). We’ve also talked about many of our insights and fi ndings at 
industry conferences around the world. On the one hand, we’ve had a 
number of competitors try to replicate our ideas. On the other, the global 
industry knows and looks to our work. So it’s hard to tell if our openness 
has been an asset or a liability. In general, though, it’s who we are—it’s in 
the DNA of our company. 
 What are some of the not-so-obvious risks you can get into when run-
ning a business in Kenya? 
 Risk is a relative term. It’s important to understand the day-to-day 
context of your customers, employees, and partners. Growing up in 
the U.S., my idea of risk was relatively limited, and I mean this in 
the literal sense. We lost a friend in the 2013 Westgate Mall attack, 
and one of our board members was murdered in Nairobi in 2014. My 
wife and I also repelled or escaped repeated home-invasion attempts 
and a carjacking in 2014. As a result, I now think about security every 
single day. Growing up in the U.S., I never had to be so conscious of 
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 physical security. We often talk about the relationship between risks 
and rewards. To be clear, there are real and signifi cant risks to operat-
ing a business in an emerging market. Th ings don’t often go south, but 
when they do, they go south quickly! Th at’s a realization that inspires 
humility and patience. 
 Th ank you, Ben! 
Th is chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ), which permits use, dupli-
cation, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit 
to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes 
were made.
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 Concluding Thoughts 
 Digital Kenya is a modest representation of the powerful space and time 
in which an inspiring generation of entrepreneurs fi nds itself at the pres-
ent moment—a generation that is working actively to bring the benefi ts 
of the digital age to every citizen and organization of Africa, unleashing 
the power of modern-day technology for the benefi t of society. Above all, 
it is a generation that seeks to help create a brighter future full of oppor-
tunities and possibilities for the many generations to come. Th e book 
has sought to capture this intriguing moment and—like the snap of a 
camera’s shutter—permanently conserve and document its uniqueness. 
 In this volume, we have not focused on the so-called hard facts that 
fi nd truth in numbers, models, and calculated projections that explain 
how entrepreneurship contributes to creating new organizations, 
technology developments, employment, and economic growth (for a 
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 Zeppelin University ,  Friedrichshafen ,  Germany 
review, consult Aldrich  2005 ). Instead, we have focused on the underly-
ing fabric—the vivid stories, ideas, beliefs, and opinions—of economic 
exchange that brings a society and its economy to life. Besides the 
uncontested drive for wealth creation in entrepreneurship, the chap-
ters and conversations have also revealed a strong and visionary “itch” 
to overcome and remove prevailing constraints so as to allow change, 
progress, and development to occur—not just for the benefi t of the 
individual entrepreneur but also to unleash a transformation for the 
benefi t of all. With this in mind, the book off ers illustrative examples 
of entrepreneurship as a societal project in which the creation of wealth 
and change happen for society, a process that Rindova et  al. ( 2009 ) 
called entrepreneuring. Hence, the quest of bringing about something 
 new dominates—“a new idea, a new thing, a new institution, a new 
market, a new set of possibilities for the entrepreneuring individual 
or group and/or for other actors in the environment” (Rindova et al. 
 2009 ). In other words, entrepreneuring is about breaking out of the 
old mold of dusty constraints that restricted and held back in order to 
imagine and practice a new tomorrow. 
 David Audretsch ( 2007 ) said that earlier economies built on the man-
ufacturing paradigm—in which the organization man sought perfection 
in standardized production units and economies of scale—which have 
been replaced by the entrepreneuring (wo)man, who reigns through cre-
ativity, outside-the-box thinking, nonconformity, independence, and the 
pursuit of a greater mission that fuels the “itch” for something new. Th e 
reason behind this shift is simple but powerful. Although the production 
of physical goods has increasingly been outsourced to off shore locations—
think of Nike’s original equipment manufacturing model, the so-called 
Nikefi cation—the production of knowledge has had to remain in place. 
In fact, the “right” location mattered and is today of pivotal importance 
in turning investments in knowledge into social returns that fuel eco-
nomic growth and job creation (Audretsch  2009 ). Now if knowledge 
production through creative ideas and world-class innovations provides 
the competitive edge over manufacturing in today’s global economy, then 
Kenya has the opportunity at this point in time to take on an all-new role 
in the digital economy—from off shore location to knowledge creator, 
a vision embodied in the slogan “Also designed in Kenya and made in 
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the USA,” 1 crafted by the Kenyan start-up BRCK to highlight both the 
importance of creation over manufacturing and the similar development 
trajectories of its product and US President Barack H. Obama. 
 In fact, as change creation and wealth creation continue to fuse in the 
remarkable narratives of a new generation of entrepreneurs in Kenya, it 
has become evident that the entrepreneurs’ motivation is grounded in a 
complex nexus of goals and values, in which fi nancial goals are just one 
among many others and are quite often not the primary ones (Rindova 
et al.  2009 ; Baker and Pollock  2007 ; Ruef  2010 ). Put diff erently, “stud-
ies across a number of nations have consistently shown that values such 
as desires for autonomy, to express creativity for its own sake, to pursue 
innovation, and to be one’s own boss typically dominate fi nancial goals 
in motivating entrepreneurship” (cited in Rindova et al.  2009 , originally 
from Baker and Pollock  2007 ). As a result, entrepreneurship is not a 
schizophrenic endeavor divided between societal and fi nancial goals. It 
is much rather in its essence both, about social change and about wealth 
creation. Note that the label social entrepreneurship, despite its norma-
tive push toward recognizing and making the social aspect of entrepre-
neurship even more prominent, is, given this understanding, “not only 
unnecessary but potentially not valid, since many entrepreneurs seek to 
improve their economic positions through the impact of broader social 
change” (Rindova et al.  2009 ). As Eleanor Marchant showed in her chap-
ter, key actors in Kenya’s technology sector creatively combine a social- 
change agenda with wealth creation to remove constraints for themselves 
and the wider ecosystem. It makes them pivotal actors in the scene. 
 Against this background, I will undertake a brief synthesis of the 
book—a few key takeaways—through a closer look at four overarching 
themes that are grounded in (though they also have relevance beyond) 
Kenyan entrepreneuring—namely, mindset change, creation of newness, 
critical refl ection, and location as a comparative advantage. Th ese are of 
central importance, because none of the chapters or conversations could 
have done without at least one of them. In a fi nal step, I will take a leap 
into the future—the road ahead—and briefl y outline four additional 
1  A marketing slogan developed by BRCK ( http://whiteafrican.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/
Obama_MadeInKenya_BRCK.jpg ) for use during President Obama’s visit to Kenya in 2015. 
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themes that have yet to receive attention as the entrepreneurial revolu-
tion in Kenya’s knowledge economy unfolds—namely the dark sides of 
entrepreneurship, of the future’s in the past, of Pan-Africanism in busi-
ness, and of Africa’s response to grand global challenges. 
 An Attempt at a Synthesis 
 Among African economies, Kenya stands out as a stellar example of a 
thriving and growing technology sector. It is thus a good time to draw 
some conclusions that might also be of value beyond Kenya, in particular 
for other African economies that decide to explore a similar path. In the 
four overarching themes explored below, I will dive into a brief assess-
ment of the book’s corollaries by interweaving its chapters and conversa-
tions into a single narrative and laying out a number of agenda items that 
call for further mindful scrutiny. 
 Mindset Change 
 In our conversation with Anne Shongwe, she expressed that “I have 
dreamed of a future season when youth of my village will not run in 
hope at the sight of a Land Cruiser with a foreign agency logo on the car 
door—only door to turn away dejected by yet another broken promise of 
their fi nally being saved by the Land Cruiser guy. Instead, I have dreamed 
that the youth of my village will be so invested in ensuring that they not 
only defi ne and shape their own destiny but that they also will build their 
own Land Cruisers.” Shongwe opened up a crucial debate with a striking 
image that embodies both the harsh reality of many Africans and a rich 
imaginary future of positive change and progress. She pushed us to think 
more deeply about the lens through which Africans view, experience, and 
act in the world (Asante  2015 ) and consequently advocated for instill-
ing a mindset in young Africans that is grounded in self-awareness and 
autonomy where nurturing aspirations become key pillars for change. 
 While governmental and foreign aid eff orts have focused strongly on 
infrastructural measures and governance projects as a basis for change, 
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using the individual and collective mindset as a starting point turns the 
debate about progress and development in a new direction—toward the 
self-image of Africans. Here, the formulation of new visions, ideals, and 
role models is a necessary precondition for citizens to align their internal 
image of the world with a new imagined future. With his introductory 
chapter, Bitange Ndemo describes a steady, albeit subtle, transformation 
toward embracing new and empowering values that center on the capa-
bilities and agency of the individual. Disruption, creativity, and innova-
tion become the central tenets of a new era. Hence, the personal quest 
circles around  What can I do within and for society ? Instead of surren-
der, paralysis, and frustration, Ndemo went on and brought forth, in 
his chapter on Kenya’s policy arena, an example of how entrepreneur-
ing—seeking out ways to actively overcome and remove perceived con-
straints—could set free new possibilities and opportunities. In fact, his 
entrepreneurial approach during his time as permanent secretary for 
Kenya’s Ministry of Information and Communication proved to be piv-
otal in connecting Kenya to the global optical-fi ber grid. In a similar 
vein, Weiss and Weber’s chapter demonstrated that, in order to see the 
abundant resources in an environment, an open and mindful mindset 
is needed that gauges tension and contestation as spaces of opportunity. 
In particular, in today’s globalized economy, a global mindset is a key 
asset for working through challenges and realizing new, global opportu-
nities (Gupta and Govindarajan  2002 ). Th e logical consequence is clear, 
namely that initiatives are needed that take as their starting point the 
unique societal, communal, and individual conditions of African citizens 
in order to bring forth projects that can unleash a profound mindset 
shift. Whether these are from the private sector, government, or civil soci-
ety, existing initiatives need to be strengthened further, and new initia-
tives should be developed. In particular, initiatives that extend their work 
to rural citizens and the poor can help ensure that their pivotal work will 
be of benefi t to the many rather than just the few. 
 Our conversation with Ory Okolloh reemphasized the signifi cance 
of the links between government, the private sector, and civil society. 
While common wisdom favors a culture to operate outside the pur-
view of  government—staying under the radar—Okolloh pushed back 
and brought the government back in. Hence, entrepreneuring does not 
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mean creating a parallel system wherever service delivery, for example, is 
malfunctioning; it means getting organized, communicating with a joint 
voice, and both feeding government offi  cials with vital information and 
holding them accountable. A bypass may help solve a problem in the 
short run, but a permanent fi x that includes crafting good policy will 
help society evolve better in the long run. 
 In our conversation with Judith Owigar, she took the power of organiz-
ing a step further and showed how getting organized around a common 
cause helps not only to bring new themes into the purview of society but 
also aff ects mindsets. Her organization, AkiraChix, has sensitized Kenya’s 
tech scene early on to gender issues and women’s rights in order to make 
the involvement of women in the fi eld of technology an indisputable 
norm rather than an exception. Th ese kinds of initiatives can iron out 
many of the pitfalls mature industry sectors in Western economies are 
suff ering from and confi gure emerging industries in Africa with a dif-
ferent set of value and norms (Marquis  2013 ; Amaeshi and Idemudia 
 2015 ). Likewise, de la Chaux and Okune’s chapter advocated for discur-
sive spaces where heterogeneous groups tackle common challenges in new 
ways rather than forming homogenous groups that tend to reaffi  rm and 
solidify already-existing knowledge structures. Th e takeaway? Getting 
stuck in old behavioral patterns will not help with future challenges. 
 All this comes with an important caveat. In the entrepreneurial soci-
ety, the individual advances to becoming the central actor, who—now 
equipped with agency—will make real changes. Here, the individual is 
seen as the source of and solution to society’s problems (Frank et al.  1995 ; 
Brandl and Bullinger  2009 ). Hence, the value system shifts toward seeing 
individuals as being accountable and responsible for their own destiny. 
While this can be a desired outcome, the degree to which such a societal 
transformation is realized matters. Th ink of the perception of unemploy-
ment, for example. Is unemployment a result of personal failure? Or is it 
a result of a collective failure, in which extended family and society have 
not prepared the unemployed adequately for the job market. Depending 
on which side you choose, you will either leave the unemployed to them-
selves to make do in their situation or invest in them as an extended 
family or society to equip them with an adequate skill set. Our views of 
individualism not only play a role in these grand social questions, but can 
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also aff ect the development of new technologies, the conceptualization 
of products, the cultivation of relationships, and even the preservation 
of traditional values. Individualism cuts across all levels. Hence, resis-
tance to it is preprogrammed in societies where increased focus on the 
individual also means the erosion of deeply held beliefs and rituals about 
interpersonal and intra-communal relationships. 
 A normative question about tradeoff s, pitfalls, and balances lingers 
underneath this value system shift: What is the right balance, if any, for 
societies in Africa between individualism and collectivism? Put diff er-
ently, which traditional norms and values should remain and which new 
ones should be incorporated and adopted to foster rather than impede 
societal development? A living system such as a society needs a dynamic 
answer with constant revisions and refi nements. After all, individual-
ism in conjunction with prevalent economic concepts and approaches 
(i.e., neoliberalism) necessitates a holistic consciousness that can gauge 
and prevent profound negative societal implications—of which social 
isolation, extreme economic inequality, and environmental exploitation 
are just a few symptoms on a long list of global negative externalities. 
However, there is light at the end of the tunnel! A recent push toward a 
normative theory of business that sees the purpose of business in collec-
tive value optimization may well provide a common ground for society, 
in which the values of society and business are not seen as two forces that 
work in opposition but rather in conjunction and harmony (Donaldson 
and Walsh  2015 ). Again, it depends on your mindset whether you see 
tension and friction or opportunity and possibilities in something truly 
innovative and new. 
 Critical Refl ection 
 Marissa Drouillard’s chapter intriguingly demonstrated that a critical 
assessment and analysis of the environment can bring new opportuni-
ties to the surface. In fact, market ineffi  ciencies—so-called institutional 
voids—can become a fertile ground for new digital platforms that “help 
to develop the overall market ecosystem so that other products and ser-
vices can also fl ourish,” as she put it. 
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 In the same spirit, our conversations with Munyutu Waigi and Su 
Kahumbu Stephanou each identifi ed two societal nuisances that the digi-
tal age can help solve. 
 First, endemic corruption impedes government functionality with 
severe repercussions on society. Here, the digitization of services would 
not only bring Kenya’s government into the twenty-fi rst century, but 
would also limit or at least complicate adversarial behaviors that come 
at a high social cost. Consequently, the digital age can, so the hopeful 
thought goes, be a key pillar in reinstituting trust in government. Second, 
agriculture has experienced a substantial loss of prestige in Kenya. Even 
though fertile land exists to feed not only Kenya, but also to supply the 
East African community, urban migration has been leaving the elderly 
and the poor behind to farm ancestral land. Sounding a call against 
industrial farming, Stephanou advocated for the power of digital solu-
tions to make small-scale farming effi  cient and sexy again, with the aim 
of feeding and employing Africa’s population through sustainable farm-
ing practices that also have the potential to feed populations beyond the 
continent’s borders. 
 In a similar spirit, Wamkoya and Ng’weno’s chapter laid out an 
award- winning social business model that honed in on the high levels of 
youth unemployment in Kenya. Here, the social impact agenda domi-
nated, making business process outsourcing more than just an employ-
ment- and wealth-creation opportunity, but also a means to transfer 
crucial knowledge to the nation’s youth. Th e key takeaway was that the 
knowledge economy provides a new context and new resources to entre-
preneurs seeking tailor-made solutions to societal problems (Weiss and 
Weber  2016 ). 
 Taking a slightly diff erent angle, our conversation with Conrad 
Akunge dove into the education sector and questioned the dominant 
cramming culture, in which the hiring process, morphs into role-play-
ing between employers and potential employees about “who is fooling 
whom?” Instead of developing refl ective, critical, and creative thinkers, 
the current education system rewards people who perfect the art of repro-
ducing, not applying, knowledge. Arguably the repercussions of turning 
Kenya’s  technology sector into a global hotbed of innovation are substan-
tial and will require a reform of the educational system to meet today’s 
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new workforce demands. Larson and Munger’s chapter proposed a radi-
cal approach. As an alternative to emulating other education solutions 
from abroad, as if a global one-size-fi ts-all approach would work, they 
called for a reimagination of education delivery. Th is can be done by bas-
ing the new, digital solutions on a comprehensive analysis of the educa-
tion sector and drawing on the latest advances in technology to help craft 
a workable, digital solution tailored to the realities of the context. Th is 
approach bears the potential to imagine entirely new forms of education 
delivery that break with existing models and may prove more suitable for 
Africa and the Global South in general. 
 New developments and trends, however, also require critical analysis in 
order to fully understand the eff ects of change. In particular, the mythi-
cal character inherent in information and communications technologies 
(ICTs) as remedies for social and economic problems demands critical 
inquiry. A seemingly sacred charter fueled by seductive tales of heroes 
(Patai  1972 )—in this case, the highly successful entrepreneurs, investors, 
and inventors equipped with their digital theory of change—instills the 
belief that, together, entrepreneurship and ICTs can solve the world’s 
many challenges (Miscione  2015 ). Harvard’s Vincent Mosco vividly 
illustrated how, for example, the reigning wish for an abundant and equal 
distribution of information is believed to democratize power and encour-
ages a sense of freedom. Yet, much like the promise of other, earlier tech-
nologies (e.g., electricity or steam engines), the myth conceals the fact 
that technology’s control continues to remain in the hands of a few global 
businesses (Mosco  2005 ). As Mosco put it, “Th e magic wand of com-
puter communication is undeniably seductive. It is also undeniable that 
much of the allure is manufactured by the very companies that stand to 
benefi t from the sale of computer technology software, and access to the 
Information Highway. Indeed, we are in the midst of a worldwide eff ort, 
organized by many diff erent companies and governments in many diff er-
ent ways, to make computer communication a transcendent spectacle” 
(Mosco  1998 ). Instead of leveling the playing fi eld, old power structures 
reproduce themselves after all. Cheerfully unaware, we build start-ups, 
design innovations and take for granted that our fi rst hits on Google 
tend to come from abroad. Digital solutions can be eff ective tools, yet 
the creators and users need to be mindful of the terms that structure their 
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use, because those who set the rules control the information fl ow. In such 
an environment, it is highly negligent not to investigate the structures in 
which Kenya as a society and its entrepreneurs operate. We should ask 
ourselves, What are the intended and unintended consequences of put-
ting new technology to work for society? And who are the ultimate ben-
efi ciaries of, for example, big data initiatives, the development of artifi cial 
intelligence, Bitcoin, or free Facebook usage? More work is needed that 
can provide answers to these diffi  cult questions. 
 Creation of Newness 
 Arguably, the most diffi  cult passage in entrepreneuring is the creation 
of something new and bringing about change. In our conversation with 
Jimmy Gitonga, he made a consequential move by reaching the conclu-
sion that “Silicon Savannah” is an inadequate and misleading term to 
describe the character of Kenya’s technology sector. He proposed instead 
an original term grounded in the language and memories of Kenyans—
Digital Nyika. Although the term may seem a marginal novelty at fi rst, it 
in fact it has profound implications if taken seriously and carried forward. 
As Th iong’o ( 2009 ) said, “Language is a communication system and car-
rier of culture by virtue of being simultaneously the means and carrier 
of memory”—and hence the term Digital Nyika activates the memo-
ries of Kenyans and connects it to their future. New meanings can arise, 
meanings that can be further developed by Kenyans and have the chance 
to break free from predefi ned structures. Mark Kaigwa’s chapter intelli-
gently continued this line of thought and demonstrated how social media 
gave rise to a new class, the “connected Kenyans.” Th ey have become the 
narrators of their own destiny, locally and globally, with a great likelihood 
of precipitating a cultural shift in the contemporary interpretation and 
perception of Africa in the world (Mudimbe  1994 ) that is driven by the 
heart of the society (Kaigwa and Wu  2015 ). 
 Disruption has become a synonym for newness in the tech scene. 
Disruptive digital solutions are sought to fundamentally change 
 established ways of doing things by breaking with convention, changing 
perceptions, or solving a previously unsolvable problem. Timbo Drayson’s 
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start-up OkHi has set out to do exactly that. In our conversation, he 
asserted that the secret of building a start-up lies in an obsession with 
solving a big, fundamental problem in society. Th e start-up’s resources 
are then concentrated on fi nding the best solution to the given problem, 
and through constant iteration cycles something new arises—in the case 
of OkHi, a digital solution that will provide a virtual addressing system 
for the four billion people in the world without a conventional physical 
address. Although at fi rst sight, this simply makes the job of logistics 
experts easier, the change is more profound than that. Here is why: OkHi 
created an empowering digital identity for those excluded from the sys-
tem by unlocking the emotional, social, and economic value that stands 
behind physical addresses. Th ink of the consequences if an ambulance 
driver missed the correct turn on his or her way to you. Or think of 
the feeling that comes with fi nally existing on a map and receiving the 
services that the rest of the world already enjoys. Likewise, wealth and 
change creation became one in Elizabeth Rossiello’s BitPesa. During our 
conversation with her, she showed how her start-up translates the mani-
fold opportunities of Bitcoin into a new way of transferring cash within 
Africa and beyond. In essence, the digital solution broke free of the old 
mold of expensive, bank-dominated cash transfers by using a decentral-
ized ledger technology to bring cross-border cash transfers into the digital 
age. Th ese ambitious examples demonstrated how entrepreneuring new 
solutions can overcome and remove longstanding constraints in order to 
eff ect positive change for individuals and for society. 
 Entrepreneuring, however, does not stop with government. Quite 
the opposite. As Bitange Ndemo’s chapter showed, an entrepreneurial 
approach to policy-making helps to ensure that something actually gets 
done. Th e risk-taking usually associated with the private sector is equally 
part of the strategic decision-making process in the policy arena. In a 
recent paper, Waswa and Juma (2012) pushed Kenya’s Vision 2030 a 
notch further. Th ey laid out a policy plan to develop an outer space sec-
tor in Kenya, saying, “A domestic space sector generates a multiplicative 
development eff ect and enables making Kenya ‘customise’ space appli-
cations for its own consumption. Such a position is preferable to the 
current one where Kenya is a mere ad hoc user of space technology prod-
ucts and services conceived elsewhere without any signifi cant capacity to 
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infl uence the source.” Again, entrepreneuring also means imagining and 
pursuing new futures for the benefi t of society. 
 A focus on the creation of newness is a daunting challenge that demands 
conducive working environments, specifi c competencies, and carefully 
placed fi nancial investments (Shane 2009). First, we need to ask, What 
are the principal challenges in dire need of new solutions in African soci-
eties? Th is question calls for a holistic comprehension of the causes rather 
than a surface treatment of symptoms. Second, if at all possible, How can 
the creation of newness be strategically incentivized? While research on 
innovation processes and the like have developed profound models, their 
eff ective application in the African context still requires much attention. 
Our conversation with Jessica Colaço and Ibanga Umanah showed that 
the two of them set up shop with a venture builder to do exactly that—
blend local and global knowledge to seize new opportunities that lie in 
deep fi xes for society’s problems. 
 Inherent in the pursuit and appreciation of newness is the denial of 
the mundane. Th is can have severe consequences, because the inclusion, 
maintenance, and alteration of the new in society is equally important. 
In that light, an entrepreneur’s or start-up’s success becomes a function of 
the wider ecosystem and its condition. In other words, while disruptive 
innovations catch the observer’s eye, the proliferation, subsequent use of, 
and alteration of the innovation is crucial, as evidenced by the diverse set 
of developments that the original M-PESA technology has set in motion 
(Omwansa and Sullivan 2012). Without the daily work of countless 
shop owners and intermediaries in Safaricom’s agent network and new 
solutions by entrepreneurs to further extend and alter its application, 
the impact of mobile money transfer on Kenya’s society would only be 
a fraction as profound as it is today. Hence, the absorptive capacity of 
the ecosystem and market environment plays a signifi cant role. What are 
successful strategies to test, anchor, and scale innovations within a given 
African economy and beyond national borders? In particular, applied 
research by private sector consultancies can shed light on the strategies 
and underlying mechanisms that infl uence the adoption, proliferation, 
and appropriation of African innovations in Africa. 
 Beyond that, while a shift from Afro-pessimism to Afro-euphoria 
has spurred a wave of global excitement for the Afro-moment (Onuoha 
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 2015 ), the mobilization of cultural and economic resources needs 
to translate into tangible economic gains so that a gradual shift away 
from reliance on natural resource exploitation by foreign multinationals 
remains within reach (Taylor  2015 ). While busy nourishing the hype, the 
economic fundamentals should not be left out of the societal equation. 
On the contrary, they require careful attention from policymakers so that 
it all adds up to enhanced socio-economic development. 
 Location as Comparative Advantage 
 Despite the increased proliferation and benefi ts of communications 
technologies in a globalized and thus more connected world, physical 
location remains important. Th is holds especially true if the intention of 
seizing the opportunities of the knowledge economy is to be taken seri-
ously. Th e nature and resource confi guration of their location not only 
nourishes and raised companies but also—as this book shows—serves as 
their unique space for inspiration. Ushahidi and the iHub, for example, 
are two successful examples that can bear witness. A unique human capi-
tal pool in conjunction with careful investments in research and devel-
opment hold the potential to set in motion a domino eff ect, in which 
increased global awareness of location can trigger the infl ow of additional 
resources. 
 Muriuki Mureithi and Johannes Bramann outlined in their respec-
tive chapter the unique ecosystem eff ects that governed the emergence 
of Kenya’s technology sector. Interestingly, an entrepreneurial revolution 
started in Kenya from the bottom up with minimal infrastructure in place. 
Perhaps best understood as grassroots movements (as evidenced, e.g., by 
the fact that there are now more than 90 technology hubs in Africa2), this 
dynamic parts ways with the top-down, policy-driven approach previ-
ously believed to instigate innovation on such a scale. Epitomized by the 
romantic slogan “Innovation follows regulation,” this all-too-attractive 
approach requires academic scrutiny, especially for economies trying to 
enter the knowledge economy as knowledge creators. Inherent in the label 
2  For updates on the latest count, see  http://blogs.worldbank.org/ic4d/tech-hubs-across-africa-
which-will-be-legacy-makers . 
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is the risk of justifying a laissez-faire approach to policymaking instead of 
taking more adequate action—that is, a structural change in government 
that rewards and fosters innovation for society instead of trying to kill it 
because of institutionalized neophobia. Or, to put it more bluntly and 
use the words of our conversation with Erik Hersman: “So the role of the 
government is very simple: To reduce friction in the system for the tech-
nology industry to grow.” Policymakers must ask, What are the distinct 
features and mechanisms that drive social movements in African societ-
ies? How can they be further nourished with the goal of fostering innova-
tion output for society? And what are the successful policy approaches 
from the viewpoint of the society that can make government an enabler 
of, rather than an obstacle to, grassroots movement and innovation? 
 Although physical location can be an inspiration, it can also be a source 
of frustration. During my own research in Kenya’s technology sector, I 
came across an entrepreneur who said with great disillusionment in his 
voice, “We are supposed to compete globally, yet we have to deal with 
the constraints we face here in Kenya!” Indeed, in a global knowledge 
economy, entrepreneurs are asked ideally to perfect their skills in both the 
local and the global game. Th is book is, in fact, dedicated to the dire need 
for rich context-specifi c knowledge that makes sense of and helps guide 
the entrepreneurial journey onto the global stage. Investors are pivotal 
companions. Stephen Gugu and Wilfred Mworia’s chapter, in particular, 
fi lled an important gap. Although well-placed investments are crucial in 
helping strengthen and grow businesses, little is known—beyond indus-
try reports driven by quantitative data—about the management struc-
tures prevalent in venture capital and private equity investment funds. 
Gugu and Mworia’s insights revealed that, indeed, adaptations to the 
unique East African context have been a key challenge to making equity 
investment a standard fi nancing vehicle. Th is opens up opportunities for 
new research to identify and test the many creative equity model changes 
currently at play in the investment space and to further develop new ones 
with the aim of fi nding the best-fi tting models. 
 Investment models that work are of great importance in triggering a 
stronger buy-in by domestic investors into domestic businesses. Leaving 
the opportunity to development fi nance institutions and funds from 
abroad again runs the risk of reproducing and solidifying existing power 
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structures in the global economy. In our conversation with Ben Lyon, for 
example, he proposed a model similar to that of the US “PayPal Mafi a,” 
in which many of the founders and employees of PayPal sold their equity 
stakes after an acquisition by eBay in order to help invest in and found 
new companies. Th is model not only creates fi nancial wealth among the 
employees, but also creates substantial entrepreneurial expertise that can 
be put to work in triggering a wave of new ventures. 
 Th e cry for location-specifi c research could not be louder. (To mention 
just a few, see Johns  2006 ; Marquis and Battilana  2009 ; Welter  2011 ; 
Bamberger and Pratt  2010 ; Rousseau and Fried  2001 ; Weick  1996 ; and 
Weber and Glynn  2006 ). Not only does context-specifi c research pro-
vide the immediate opportunity to translate novel fi ndings back to the 
subjects studied, it is also a productive ground for new theory develop-
ment (Zoogah et al.  2015 ). An award-winning research piece by Chris 
Yenkey ( 2015 ), for example, mapped out the proliferation of stock mar-
ket practices across Kenya. Using data from the Nairobi Stock Exchange, 
Yenkey discovered that investments in the stock market were not just 
geographically clustered in Nairobi but were spread across the country 
as a whole and across ethnic lines. His research uncovered the prevailing 
social mechanisms, showing that Kenyan investors identify themselves 
with a common market rather than as agents of competing social groups. 
In particular, for societies that are highly fragmented along ethnic lines, 
these fi ndings are an eye-opener. Without his research, this novel fi nd-
ing would have remained hidden in Kenya’s social fabric. I concur with 
Lewin ( 1945 ) that “nothing is so practical as a good theory.” 
 Richer descriptions, analyses of contextual events, and comparative 
studies are needed (Rousseau and Fried  2001 ). Th e call for more context- 
specifi c research is anything but a no-brainer. In seeking out a publisher 
for this book, Ndemo and I were asked repeatedly by prominent publish-
ing houses to write a book instead about technology entrepreneurship 
“in Africa.” In fact, most research in the fi eld of management and orga-
nizations (though less so in the fi eld of entrepreneurship) are somehow 
trying to conduct research “on Africa” as a whole without accounting 
for its enormous location-specifi c diff erences. We therefore opted for an 
apparently counterintuitive approach, seeking out rich descriptions of 
context and encouraging the many authors in this volume to focus on 
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the hidden but important details. We believe that, in a subsequent stage, 
comparative studies across Africa as a whole will be useful and needed 
to make sense of the regional diff erences and compatibilities among the 
continent’s economies. 
 What is more, the local reliance on foreign educational materials and 
prescriptions emanating from foreign research conducted in foreign con-
texts can be fatal. Instead, research needs to be based on Afro-centric 
inquiries that takes the values and ideals of Africans as their starting point 
(Asante  2015 ). Th is would aff ect not only the questions we as researchers 
ask but also the educational materials we deem ideal for local classrooms. 
In essence, new Afro-centric research on business and educational materi-
als that build on an Afro-centric epistemology are desperately needed. Th e 
wheel does not have to be invented anew. What is called for is stronger 
research collaborations across such disciplines as, for example, Africology, 
anthropology, African philosophy, entrepreneurship, and organization 
and management research. 
 The Road Ahead 
 An agenda for future entrepreneuring for society and its corresponding 
academic research could easily fi ll a chapter on its own, if not an entire 
new book. In the meanwhile, the purpose of the fi nal section of this 
chapter is to highlight four agenda points that have received little or no 
attention in public discourse and research. However, as the entrepreneur-
ial revolution unfolds in Kenya, spills over, and joins into that of other 
African economies, the four themes explored below will force themselves 
onto the agenda. 
 The Dark Sides of Entrepreneurship 
 Entrepreneurship and entrepreneurs are widely celebrated as heroes of 
modernity (Brandl and Bullinger 2009), yet entrepreneurship can also 
come with a destructive and exploitative force that aff ects individuals, soci-
ety, and the environment (Rindova et al. 2009). Behind the glamor lingers 
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an often-ignored side of entrepreneurship. Excessive risk-taking and work 
pressure come at a personal cost and have societal implications. Th e high 
mortality rate of start-ups, for example, triggers excessive stress, burnout, 
and peer pressure that are “on mute” in most conversations among entre-
preneurs. Th e ubiquitous image of a strong and invulnerable male entre-
preneur dominates local and global folklore (Ogbor and Avenue 2000; 
Cardon et  al. 2009), drawing a veil over the actual social and physical 
tolls that entrepreneuring takes on the individual, such as social isolation, 
drug abuse, alcoholism, and deteriorating physical and mental condition. 
Th e pendulum, however, can also swing in other directions, including 
harmful behaviors, such as overconfi dence, greed, unwillingness to share 
control, and power abuse as outer manifestations of worrisome personal 
conditions that aff ect start-ups’ functionality. For entrepreneurs, “there is 
a fi ne line between being highly confi dent in their abilities to be success-
ful in an entrepreneurial endeavor and exhibiting hubris” (Haynes et al. 
2015). What this reveals is a need for a look behind the scenes of entre-
preneuring. We need to ask, What are the social dynamics among entre-
preneurs in Africa? What happens to entrepreneurs in Africa who fail? 
Special attention needs to be placed on young entrepreneurs that enter 
the digital economy between the age of 20 and 30. How does failure aff ect 
their life trajectory? Eskor John’s chapter and our conversation with Mikul 
Shah and Ritesh Doshi provided an interesting hint. Th ey stressed that 
the parallel entrepreneur, or hustler, is involved in multiple undertakings, 
which have signifi cant eff ects on company growth. But what are the eff ects 
on personal wellbeing? One may hypothesize that entertaining multiple 
engagements at the same time may actually buff er the entrepreneur in 
African societies from the psychological costs inherent in entrepreneur-
ship. If one venture fails, the entrepreneur can still rely on other income 
generating activities. More research is needed. 
 On a societal or environmental level, the negative externalities can be 
grounded in criminal entrepreneurship or in various unexpected outcomes 
of entrepreneuring. Drug and human traffi  cking run by mafi as, for exam-
ple, has garnered attention as the drug route from Afghanistan to Europe 
through East Africa has gained in importance (Th e Economist  2015 ). 
Similarly, illicit trade in ivory, timber, gold, diamonds, arms, or antiqui-
ties is a lucrative global market, creating societal, cultural, economic, and 
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 environmental damage (World Customs Organization  2015 ). Another 
notion are the unexpected outcomes or unintended consequences of entre-
preneurial action. Although change creation may aim at altering conditions, 
adverse outcomes can also become a reality. Because there have been so few 
long-term studies, few results are available, though an intriguing study of 
Pakistan’s soccer ball manufacturing industry revealed how a global out-
cry about the prevalence of child labor led to a change in regulations and 
the abolishment of child labor in the industry—the change creation—yet 
the benefi ts for children were questionable, driving the aff ected children 
and women deeper into poverty, with far-reaching consequences (Khan 
et al.  2007 ). Without examining the aftermath of change, its intended and 
unintended consequences, it is almost impossible to gauge whether soci-
etal change for the better is actually happening—highlighting the need 
for more long-term studies of the unexpected outcomes and unintended 
consequences of entrepreneurship. 
 The Future Is in the Past 
 Although my position as a European, more precisely a German, researcher 
who conducts academic work in Kenya comes with myriad diffi  culties 
and a constant feeling of uneasiness about the role of my country’s and 
continent’s past in Africa—as well as a nagging feeling of uncertainty 
about the authority with which I can enter the terrain of knowledge pro-
duction—I do want to follow the lead, in this section, of many critical 
African thinkers in order to strengthen the strand of inquiry that lies at 
the intersection of African history, entrepreneurship, and organization 
and management research. 
 For the Kenyan philosophers Mwalimu Ali Mazrui and Ngũgĩ wa 
Th iong’o, the Congolesian Valentin-Yves Mudimbe, and the African- 
American scholar Molefi  Asante (to name just a few), the past is an 
important way to connect with the present and a basis for imagin-
ing the future. As Mudimbe ( 1988 ) said, “What I mean is this: the 
Western tradition of science, as well as the trauma of slave trade and 
 colonialization, are part of Africa’s present-day heritage.” Not only is 
Africa an invention of the West (Mudimbe  1994 ; Mudimbe  1988 ), but 
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also “racial stereotypes that bred contempt and lack of understanding 
and became so deep rooted that they distorted even the basic concepts 
of historiography” (M’bow  1993 ) have severely complicated a clear 
view of African history, with profound repercussions for all spheres of 
societal life. Th at is why, as M’bow ( 1993 ) wrote, “Africans themselves 
have felt a deep- seated need to re-establish the historical authenticity 
of their societies on solid foundations,” of which the  General History 
of Africa , counting by now nine volumes, is one outcome full of wis-
dom about the African condition. After all, “re-membering Africa is the 
only way of ensuring Africa’s own full rebirth from the dark ages into 
which it was plunged by the European Renaissance, Enlightenment and 
modernity. Th e success of Africa’s renaissance depends on its commit-
ment and ability to remember itself, guided by the great re-membering 
vision of Pan-Africanism” (Th iong’o  2009 ). 
 Diving into one’s own personal, national, and continental history is a 
deeply personal journey, with recondite implications for present-day iden-
tity construction and the mindsets that govern how one’s world is viewed 
and acted on. For obvious reasons, discourse about the intersection of 
African history and modern-day entrepreneurship and organization and 
management studies has so far largely been absent. Yet, as entrepreneurs 
increasingly shape Africa’s present—and future—a connection with the 
collective memory of the past seems desirable if not indispensable, even 
in today’s global economy, in order to act with an informed consciousness 
in ways that accord with one’s own and society’s values and ideals. 
 Eff orts that nourish a critical discourse—be they formal, informal, 
local, transnational, or global—need to be extended into the heart of soci-
ety in order to avoid limiting the discourse to a handful of intellectu-
als in the academic realm. A thorough understanding of the historical 
dimension, so the belief goes, will ground and substantially enhance peo-
ple’s unique entrepreneuring capabilities for the benefi t of their societies. 
Research endeavors could start at the continental, national, or ethnic level, 
for example, by asking, What are the historical roots of entrepreneurial 
behavior in Kenya and other African economies?  How have organizing 
concepts evolved over time within and across ethnic lines in a particu-
lar  geographical cluster in Africa ?  What were the mechanisms behind the 
development ,  proliferation ,  and translation of inventions and innovations 
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within and across ethnic lines ? Behind these and many other questions lies 
a wealth of wisdom—a  treasure that needs to be lifted for the benefi t of all. 
 Pan-Africanism in Business 
 In our conversation with Ken Njoroge, he expanded on his entrepre-
neurial journey and said, “I consider myself generally ambitious and 
motivated. Otherwise, why aim for a USD1 billion Pan-African com-
pany?” It seems self-evident today that Kenyan enterprises venture fi rst 
into regional and Pan-African markets before even considering leaving 
the continent’s boundaries. Th e development and respective benefi ts of 
new technologies from Africa are thus deployed fi rst in, and for the ben-
efi t of, other African economies—demonstrating that entrepreneuring 
does not stop within national borders but only within the “borders” of 
the technology (Beckman et al.  2012 ), continuing onward to scale and 
to outgrow its own market. A step toward increased Pan-African trade, 
collaboration and knowledge exchange driven by the private sector 3 is 
becoming a vibrant reality, a development that was not obvious two 
decades ago when Mazrui ( 1993 ) wrote that “uniting against the foreign 
oppressor was one thing; uniting for internal development was another. 
Th e earlier part of this period of history [the twentieth century] has dem-
onstrated that Africans are eff ective when they unite for liberation. Th e 
later part of this era demonstrated that Africans are fi nding it hard to 
unite for political and economic development.” Achielle Mbembe ( 2002 ) 
continued this line of thought, arguing that eff orts to “re-invent a being- 
together” were largely relegated to peripheral importance, muting action 
that would focus on a renegotiation of the social bond among Africans 
who had been “corrupted by commercial relationships (the sale of human 
beings) and the violence of endless wars.” 
 It is against this background that Pan-African initiatives require par-
ticular attention. Osiakwan raised, in his chapter, awareness of devel-
opments at the Pan-African level by outlining similar trends that are 
aff ecting Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Ghana, and South Africa—and 
3  Th e trend in intra-African economic exchange is not confi ned to technology enterprises but also 
applies to banking, fast-moving consuming goods, and the hospitality industry, among others. 
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thus the evolution of a Pan-African knowledge economy. With his des-
ignation of the “KINGS” economies, Osiakwan introduced a sense of 
connectivity and a shared future at a Pan-African level that is likely to 
intensify as time passes. In particular, Pan-African conferences, work-
shops, Internet platforms, and organizations create a new dimension of 
entrepreneuring, one that works to overcome and remove constraints at 
the transnational level. Tony Elumelu, a Nigerian philanthropist, struck 
a similar chord with his eff orts to foster entrepreneurial excellence at a 
Pan-African scale and by crafting the neologism Africapitalism, a man-
agement concept that seeks to remoralize capitalism in Africa by put-
ting it to work for society and by thrusting African economies onto an 
equal footing with those of the rest of the world (Amaeshi and Idemudia 
 2015 ; Elumelu  2011 ). 
 Th ese remarkable economic, social, and cultural developments require 
further academic inquiry to understand their full magnitude and poten-
tial. Raising awareness of these trends may also spill over into the policy 
arena and accelerate and strengthen a Pan-African agenda that reaps 
benefi ts for all African citizens and creates substantial economic power. 
Regional and Pan-African integration will provide further fuel to the 
already ongoing transnational entrepreneurial actions. 
 Africa’s Response to Grand Global Challenges 
 Catching up, reaching an equal level of socio-economic development, or 
leapfrogging technologies are some of the buzzwords that mingle in the 
current discourses on societal evolution strategies in Africa. Yet increased 
global migration, rising global economic inequality, a crippled world 
economy, global hunger and severe malnutrition, the eff ects of a deterio-
rating climate, and the crumbling façade of capitalism are just a few of 
the daunting global challenges that will require a new frame of reference 
for the current—and the next—generation of entrepreneurs in Africa. 
Th e task, therefore, becomes not only to develop African societies and to 
“catch up with the rest,” but rather to place grand global challenges at the 
center of entrepreneurial inquiry in innovation processes, asking, What 
are the responses from Africa to these grand global challenges? 
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 Th e current innovation scenery among multinational companies, 
for example, is best encapsulated by the term “reverse innovation” 
(Govindarajan and Trimble  2012 )—“developing ideas in an emerg-
ing market and coaxing them to fl ow uphill to Western markets” 
(Govindarajan  2012 )—attesting a deep-seated mindset stuck in an old 
paradigm that sees innovation creation as a one way pipe leading “down-
hill” from the Global North to the Global South. Going against the 
fl ow then requires special engineering capabilities. However, innovation 
development on the globe today is much rather circular and dynamic in 
nature which makes countries of the Global South just as much a part of 
the global quest for innovations and inventions then the Global North. 
Indeed, we are all in it together. 
 Take Google X, for example, a research and development initiative by 
the company Alphabet (formerly known as Google), that seeks to grow 
a global community of radical innovators and inventors to tackle the 
world’s biggest challenges. 4 In this worldview, the correct problem defi ni-
tion and solution can come from anywhere in the world, still, be mindful 
as to who is setting the terms for innovation and invention. Initiatives 
like this one, though still scarce, help create a global mindset among 
their members in which entrepreneuring means to overcome and remove 
constraints at a global rather than a local or transnational level. Arguably, 
truly path breaking inventions and innovations will come from a mindset 
in which solutions to grand global problems are just as important as local 
ones. And in fact, both approaches can be synergistic. Th ere is a demand 
for similar initiatives from Africa. 
 Entrepreneuring around grand global challenges helps realize the 
potential to defi ne a global agenda from an African perspective, with 
far-reaching implications for prevailing global power structures and the 
potential to propel global society forward in the quest for path breaking 
solutions. Indeed, the current—and the coming—generations of entre-
preneurs are part of an exciting time, a time that in the years ahead will 
no doubt continue to unveil ever more of Africa’s unique entrepreneurial 
revolution. 
 To be continued…. 
4  See  https://www.solveforx.com 
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